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
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OF THE
PROFICIENCY AND ADVANCEMENT
OF
LEARNING.

THE TWO BOOKS
OF
FRANCIS BACON
OF THE
PROFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT
OF LEARNING,
DIVINE AND HUMAN.

REVISED FROM THE EARLY COPIES, WITH THE REFERENCES
SUPPLIED, A FEW NOTES, AND AN INDEX,

BY THOMAS MARKBY, M.A.



THE SECOND EDITION.

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PREFACE.

THIS little book is sent forth in pursuance of a plan (begun about a twelvemonth since by the reprint of the first book of Hooker) of issuing at intervals in a cheap form some of the chief works of our great English writers. That something of the kind is needed, will be allowed by every one who is acquainted with the general neglect of our own tongue which still prevails in our schools. It may be safely affirmed, that there are few which a boy may not pass almost entirely through without ever reading a line of the works of any English writer of eminence. In those professedly devoted to the study of the classics this is a matter of less consequence, since men who have read Sophocles and Plato to any good purpose will not neglect Shakspeare and Bacon. But in English schools (so called) this disregard of the best models of writing in our own mother tongue is a very serious evil, for it practically amounts to omitting to direct the attention of the learner to the study of any good authors at all, except perhaps a few scraps in books of miscellaneous extracts, as great a curse to literature as epitomes.

It seems to be taken for granted in many schools that none but inferior books are fit for the capacity of boys; or if a good author is chosen for their perusal, that his works must be defaced by expurgations, commentaries, and various kinds of assistance, intended, as

it would seem, more to meet ignorance on the part of the master than the scholar, before being put into their hands. Hence the market is full of crude compilations all professing to be for the special use of schools. One of the most popular forms just now for schoolbooks is the catechetical. We have catechisms of geography, history, natural philosophy, &c. &c., in endless variety. It is probable that the excellence of the Church Catechism and its wonderful success in fulfilling the intentions of its framers has led to the general adoption of the catechetical form. But the compilers of these manuals have not brought to their task the learning and judgment which distinguished the divines who drew up the Church Catechism. Nor have they at all understood the object those wise fathers had in view. Its very shortness might have taught them that it was by no means intended to supersede all further oral teaching, but to serve only as a guide, to indicate to the teacher an outline which his own industry was to fill up; to be a corrective to errors into which he might fall; to be deeply implanted in the minds of his scholars, as a standard by which they might assay the doctrines they heard in the schoolroom or the church. Whereas the books of which I speak are adapted to no such purposes. Not only do they presume the most absolute ignorance on the part of the teacher, and with tedious prolixity enter into every little detail; but their authors have fallen into the common error of taking *elements* and *minor details* to be synonymous, and have in general carefully avoided entering upon the principles on which the science of which they are treating is founded. Nor are many other of the books commonly used free from similar objections. School histories, for example, are generally dry recapitulations of facts and dates, unre-

lieved by a single reflection springing from the compiler's own mind, and therefore sure to be forgotten as soon as read. It is the custom, moreover, now-a-days to add a farrago of questions, to be answered from the text. These, as might be expected, the schoolboy contents himself with looking through and making out the answers just well enough to escape punishment; so that, in fact, they prevent rather than encourage a regular perusal—the only method by which he could reap any lasting benefit.

The root of the evil lies in the presumption that the teacher can call forth the mental energies of his scholars while his own mind lies idle. There cannot be a greater error. If he is converted into an engine for putting stereotyped questions as he wearily plods along the oft-repeated track of a fixed routine, he will find that nine-tenths of his pupils will do nothing at all, or at best, become mere machines. Few boys' minds out-strip their master's. The clumsy compilations I have spoken of may gratify sloth, but can only cramp an active teacher. Question and answer, perhaps the most lively and attractive method that can be used, when it is *extempore* and illustrated by a quick fancy and a good text book, becomes hard and dry when put into a permanent form, and will only cramp the thoughts and weary the spirits of both master and scholar.

The best thing a master can do for his boys is to choose some book really worth their reading, make himself master of it beforehand, and while he goes through it in his class-room, explain and illustrate it from all available sources; taking care not to omit to lecture upon such questions of history and general literature as fairly come within the compass of the task before him. By so doing, he will teach his boys how

to instruct themselves,—and that, after all, is the great end of all school work.

The *Advancement of Learning* was published in the year 1605. It was reprinted in the year 1629, and again (at Oxford) in 1633. I have been surprised to find how materially the common editions differ from the original text. Words and expressions are changed, terminations altered, and in fact, the whole text to a great extent modernized—a sure method of destroying all traces of the earlier stages of a language. Except as regards the spelling, I have held myself bound to reproduce the work as nearly as possible as it came from the author's pen. Where the text, therefore, is found to differ from that commonly received, it may be taken for granted that the change is on the authority of the editions of 1605 or 1633. The latter of these appears to have been corrected with considerable care; accordingly, where they agree, I have held myself bound to make no change; where they differ, I have used my own judgment, guided where it was possible by the Latin edition. To that of 1629 I had not access until some sheets were printed off; but it is very inferior to either of the others, and nothing would have been gained by consulting it. The Latin edition, to which I have from time to time referred the reader, came from the press in 1623. A very fine copy exists in the British Museum, and an equally good one in the Public Library at Cambridge. Whether the Latin is Bacon's own, or a translation from an English copy prepared by him, it is not a fit time to discuss; but there is internal evidence to show that it preceded the *Nouum Organum* in composition, though not in publication.

The limits prescribed to me forbade adding much in the shape of comment. I have, however, here and

there given a hint or a reference to other authors which may furnish the thoughtful student with sources of further reflection.

In tracing the references, I have received no assistance whatever from previous editions, except the translation of the *De Augmentis*, by G. Wats (Oxford, 1640), in which the name of the author supposed to be cited is generally added in the margin, and sometimes the title of the work. Bacon appears mostly to have quoted from memory, or perhaps from a common-place book, in which he might have jotted down the pith of such passages as he met with while collecting materials and thought likely to be useful. Hence it is often difficult to recognise with certainty the passage he had in view. But although he often does not give the exact words of an author, I have been strongly impressed with his conscientiousness in interpretation, and have found no instance in which he distorts the meaning of a passage to suit his purpose. I can scarcely hope to have always hit on the right passage, but when the difficulty of the task is remembered I shall doubtless receive indulgence.

For the headings, the divisions into chapters and paragraphs, marginal notes, and glossary, I am entirely responsible.

T. M.

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON

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THE
FIRST BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON.

OF THE PROFICIENCE AND
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,
DIVINE AND HUMAN.

To the King.

THERE were under the law, excellent King, both daily sacrifices and freewill offerings;¹ the one proceeding upon ordinary observance, the other upon a devout cheerfulness: in like manner there belongeth to kings from their servants both tribute of duty and presents of affection. In the former of these I hope I shall not live to be wanting, according to my most humble duty, and the good pleasure of your Majesty's employments: for the latter, I thought it more respective to make choice of some oblation, which might rather refer to the propriety and excellency of your individual person, than to the business of your crown and state.

Wherefore, representing your Majesty many times unto my mind, and beholding you not with the inquisitive eye of presumption, to discover that which the Scripture telleth me is inscrutable,² but with the observant eye of duty and admiration; leaving aside the other parts of your virtue and fortune, I have been touched, yea, and possessed with an extreme wonder at those your virtues and faculties, which the Philosophers call intellectual; the largeness of your capacity, the faithfulness of your memory, the swiftness of your apprehension, the penetration of your judgment, and the facility and order of your elocution: and I have often thought, that of all the persons living that I have

¹ See Numb. xxviii. 23. Levit. xxii. 18.

² Prov. xxv. 3.

known, your Majesty were the best instance to make a man of Plato's opinion,³ that all knowledge is but remembrance, and that the mind of man by nature knoweth all things, and hath but her own native and original motions (which by the strangeness and darkness of this tabernacle of the body are sequestered) again revived and restored: such a light of nature I have observed in your Majesty, and such a readiness to take flame and blaze from the least occasion presented, or the least spark of another's knowledge delivered. And as the Scripture saith of the wisest king, *That his heart was as the sands of the sea*;⁴ which though it be one of the largest bodies, yet it consisteth of the smallest and finest portions; so hath God given your Majesty a composition of understanding admirable, being able to compass and comprehend the greatest matters, and nevertheless to touch and apprehend the least; whereas it should seem an impossibility in nature, for the same instrument to make itself fit for great and small works. And for your gift of speech, I call to mind what Cornelius Tacitus saith of Augustus Caesar: *Augusto profluens, et quæ principem deberet, eloquentia fuit*.⁵ For, if we note it well, speech that is uttered with labour and difficulty, or speech that savoureth of the affectation of art and precepts, or speech that is framed after the imitation of some pattern of eloquence, though never so excellent; all this hath somewhat servile, and holding of the subject. But your Majesty's manner of speech is indeed prince-like, flowing as from a fountain, and yet streaming and branching itself into nature's order, full of facility and felicity, imitating none, and inimitable by any. And as in your civil estate there appeareth to be an emulation and contention of your Majesty's virtue with your fortune; a virtuous disposition with a fortunate regiment; a virtuous expectation (when time was) of your greater fortune, with a prosperous possession thereof in the due time; a virtuous observation of the laws of marriage, with most blessed and happy fruit of marriage; a virtuous and most Christian desire of peace, with a fortunate inclination in your neighbour princes thereunto: so likewise,

³ Phædo, i. 72, *seq.* (Steph.) Menon, ii. 81, and cf. Theæt. i. 166 and 191, and Aristot. *de Memor.* 2.

⁴ 1 Kings iv. 29.

⁵ Tac. *Annal.* xiii. 3.

in these intellectual matters, there seemeth to be no less contention between the excellency of your Majesty's gifts of nature, and the universality and perfection of your learning. For I am well assured that this which I shall say is no amplification at all, but a positive and measured truth; which is, that there hath not been since Christ's time any king or temporal monarch, which has been so learned in all literature and erudition, divine and human. For let a man seriously and diligently revolve and peruse the succession of the emperors of Rome; of which Cæsar the Dictator, who lived some years before Christ, and Marcus Antoninus, were the best learned; and so descend to the emperors of Græcia, or of the West; and then to the lines of France, Spain, England, Scotland, and the rest, and he shall find this judgment is truly made. For it seemeth much in a king, if, by the compendious extractions of other men's wits and labours, he can take hold of any superficial ornaments and shows of learning; or if he countenance and prefer learning and learned men: but to drink indeed of the true fountains of learning, nay, to have such a fountain of learning in himself, in a king, and in a king born, is almost a miracle. And the more, because there is met in your Majesty a rare conjunction, as well of divine and sacred literature, as of profane and human; so as your Majesty standeth invested of that triplicity, which in great veneration was ascribed to the ancient Hermes; the power and fortune of a king, the knowledge and illumination of a priest, and the learning and universality of a philosopher.⁶ This propriety inherent and individual attribute in your Majesty deserveth to be expressed not only in the fame and admiration of the present time, nor in the history or tradition of the ages succeeding, but also in some solid work, fixed memorial and immortal monument, bearing a character or signature both of the power of a king, and the difference and perfection of such a king.

Therefore I did conclude with myself, that I could not make unto your Majesty a better oblation than of some Treatise tending to that end, whereof the sum will consist of these two parts: the former, concerning the

⁶ See the argument of Marsilius Ficinus, prefixed to the *Poemander* of Hermes Trismegistus.

excellency of Learning and Knowledge, and the excellency of the merit and true glory in the augmentation and propagation thereof: the latter, what the particular acts and works are, which have been embraced and undertaken for the Advancement of Learning; and again, what defects and undervalues I find in such particular acts: to the end, that though I cannot positively or affirmatively advise your Majesty, or propound unto you framed particulars; yet I may excite your princely cogitations to visit the excellent treasure of your own mind, and thence to extract particulars for this purpose, agreeable to your magnanimity and wisdom.

*Of Cavils
against
Learning.*

I. 1. **I**N the entrance to the former of these, to clear the way, and as it were to make silence, to have the true testimonies concerning the dignity of Learning to be better heard, without the interruption of tacit objections; I think good to deliver it from the discredits and disgraces which it hath received, all from ignorance; but ignorance severally disguised; appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of Divines; sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of Politiques; and sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned men themselves.

2. I hear the former sort say, that Knowledge is of those things which are to be accepted of with great limitation and caution; that the aspiring to overmuch knowledge was the original temptation and sin whereupon ensued the fall of man; that Knowledge hath in it somewhat of the serpent, and therefore where it entereth into a man it makes him swell; *Scientia inflat*?⁷ that Solomon gives a censure, *That there is no end of making books, and that much reading is weariness of the flesh*?⁸ and again in another place, *That in spacious knowledge there is much contristation, and that he that increaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety*?⁹ that St. Paul gives a caveat, *That we be not spoiled through vain philosophy*?¹ that experience demonstrates how learned men have been arch-heretics, how learned times have been inclined to atheism, and how the contemplation of second causes

⁷ 1 Cor. viii. 1.

⁸ Eccl. i. 18.

⁸ Eccl. xii. 12.

¹ Col. ii. 8.

doth derogate from our dependence upon God, who is the first cause.

3. To discover then the ignorance and error of this opinion, and the misunderstanding in the grounds thereof, it may well appear these men do not observe or consider that it was not the pure knowledge of nature and universality, a knowledge by the light whereof man did give names unto other creatures in Paradise,² as they were brought before him, according unto their proprieties, which gave the occasion to the fall: but it was the proud knowledge of good and evil, with an intent in man to give law unto himself, and to depend no more upon God's commandments, which was the form of the temptation. Neither is it any quantity of knowledge, how great soever, that can make the mind of man to swell; for nothing can fill, much less extend the soul of man, but God and the contemplation of God; and therefore Solomon, speaking of the two principal senses of inquisition, the eye and the ear, affirmeth that the eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing;³ and if there be no fulness, then is the continent greater than the content: so of knowledge itself, and the mind of man, whereto the senses are but reporters, he defineth likewise in these words, placed after that Kalendar or Ephemerides, which he maketh of the diversities of times and seasons for all actions and purposes; and concludeth thus: *God hath made all things beautiful, or decent, in the true return of their seasons: Also he hath placed the world in man's heart, yet cannot man find out the work which God worketh from the beginning to the end:*⁴ declaring not obscurely, that God hath framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass, capable of the image of the universal world, and joyful to receive the impression thereof, as the eye joyeth to receive light; and not only delighted in beholding the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but raised also to find out and discern the ordinances and decrees, which throughout all those changes are infallibly observed. And although he doth insinuate that the supreme or summary law of nature, which he calleth, *The work which God worketh from the beginning to the end, is not*

² See Gen. ii. and iii.

³ Eccl. i. 8.

⁴ Eccl. iii. 11.

possible to be found out by man; yet that doth not derogate from the capacity of the mind, but may be referred to the impediments, as of shortness of life, ill conjunction of labours, ill tradition of knowledge over from hand to hand, and many other inconveniences, whereunto the condition of man is subject. For that nothing parcel of the world is denied to man's inquiry and invention, he doth in another place rule over, when he saith, *The spirit of man is as the lamp of God, wherewith he searcheth the inwardness of all secrets.*⁵ If then such be the capacity and receipt of the mind of man, it is manifest that there is no danger at all in the proportion or quantity of knowledge, how large soever, lest it should make it swell or out-compass itself; no, but it is merely the quality of knowledge, which, be it in quantity more or less, if it be taken without the true corrective thereof, hath in it some nature of venom or malignity, and some effects of that venom, which is ventosity or swelling. This corrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh Knowledge so sovereign, is Charity, which the Apostle immediately addeth to the former clause: for so he saith, *Knowledge bloweth up, but Charity buildeth up*; not unlike unto that which he delivereth in another place: *If I spake, saith he, with the tongues of men and angels, and had not charity, it were but as a tinkling cymbal;*⁶ not but that it is an excellent thing to speak with the tongues of men and angels, but because, if it be severed from charity, and not referred to the good of men and mankind, it hath rather a sounding and unworthy glory, than a meriting and substantial virtue. And as for that censure of Solomon, concerning the excess of writing and reading books, and the anxiety of spirit which redoundeth from knowledge; and that admonition of St. Paul, *That we be not seduced by vain philosophy*; let those places be rightly understood, and they do indeed excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations, whereby human knowledge is confined and circumscribed; and yet without any such contracting or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the universal nature of things; for these limitations are three: the first, *That we do not so place our felicity in knowledge, as we forget our mortality*; the second, *That we make application of our knowledge,*

⁵ Prov. xx. 27.⁶ 1 Cor. xiii. 1.

to give ourselves repose and contentment, and not distaste or repining: the third, *That we do not presume by the contemplation of nature to attain to the mysteries of God.* For as touching the first of these, Solomon doth excellently expound himself in another place of the same book, where he saith:⁷ *I saw well that knowledge recedeth as far from ignorance as light doth from darkness; and that the wise man's eyes keep watch in his head, whereas the fool roundeth about in darkness: but withal I learned, that the same mortality involveth them both.* And for the second, certain it is, there is no vexation or anxiety of mind which resulteth from knowledge otherwise than merely by accident; for all knowledge and wonder (which is the seed of knowledge) is an impression of pleasure in itself: but when men fall to framing conclusions out of their knowledge, applying it to their particular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or vast desires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble of mind which is spoken of: for then knowledge is no more *Lumen siccum*, whereof Heraclitus the profound⁸ said, *Lumen siccum optima anima*; but it becometh *Lumen madidum*, or *maceratum*, being steeped and infused in the humours of the affections.⁹ And as for the third point, it deserveth to be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly passed over: for if any man shall think by view and inquiry into these sensible and material things to attain that light, whereby he may reveal unto himself the Nature or Will of God, then indeed is he spoiled by vain philosophy: for the contemplation of God's creatures and works produceth (having regard to the works and creatures themselves), knowledge, but having regard to God, no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken knowledge. And therefore it was most aptly said by one of Plato's school,¹ *That the sense of man carrieth a resemblance with the sun, which, as we see, openeth and revealeth all the terrestrial globe; but then again it obscureth and concealeth the stars and celestial globe: so doth the sense discover natural things, but it*

⁷ Eccl. ii. 18.

⁸ Or obscure—ὁ σκοτεινός.

⁹ Ap. Stob. *Serm.* v. 120. (quoted by Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.*, § 47.) See Coleridge, *Aids to Refl. Comment on Aph.* viii.

¹ Vide Philo Jud. *de Somn.*, p. 41, (edit. A. F. Pfeiffer.)

darkeneth and shutteth up divine. And hence it is true that it hath proceeded, that divers great learned men have been heretical, whilst they have sought to fly up to the secrets of the Deity by the waxen wings of the senses. And as for the conceit that too much knowledge should incline a man to atheism, and that the ignorance of second causes should make a more devout dependence upon God, which is the first cause; first, it is good to ask the question which Job asked of his friends: *Will you lie for God, as one man will do for another, to gratify him?*² For certain it is that God worketh nothing in nature but by second causes:³ and if they would have it otherwise believed, it is mere imposture, as it were in favour towards God; and nothing else but to offer to the Author of Truth the unclean sacrifice of a lie. But farther, it is an assured truth, and a conclusion of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of philosophy may incline the mind of man to atheism, but a farther proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to religion: for in the entrance of philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on farther, and seeth the dependence of causes, and the works of Providence; then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of nature's chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair.⁴ To conclude therefore, let no man upon a weak conceit of sobriety or an ill-applied moderation think or maintain, that a man can search too far, or be too well studied in the book of God's word, or in the book of God's works; divinity or philosophy; but rather let men endeavour an endless progress or proficiencie in both; only let men beware that they apply both to charity, and not to swelling; to use, and not to ostentation; and again, that they do not unwisely mingle or confound these learnings together.

² Job xiii. 7.

³ Compare Hooker *Eccl. Pol.*, i. 2. See also Butler, *Anal.*, part i. c. 2.

⁴ Hom. *Il.* viii. 19; and conf. Plato, *Theæt.* i. 153.

Objections
of Politi-
cians.

II. 1. And as for the disgraces which Learning receiveth from Politiques, they be of this nature; that Learning doth soften men's minds, and makes them more unapt for the honour and exercise of arms; that it doth mar and pervert men's dispositions for matter of government and policy, in making them too curious and irresolute by variety of reading, or too peremptory or positive by strictness of rules and axioms, or too immoderate and overweening by reason of the greatness of examples, or too incompatible and differing from the times by reason of the dissimilitude of examples; or at least, that it doth divert men's travails from action and business, and bringeth them to a love of leisure and privateness; and that it doth bring into states a relaxation of discipline, whilst every man is more ready to argue than to obey and execute. Out of this conceit, Cato, surnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men indeed that ever lived, when Carneades the philosopher came in embassage to Rome, and that the young men of Rome began to flock about him, being allured with the sweetness and majesty of his eloquence and learning, gave counsel in open senate that they should give him his dispatch with all speed, lest he should infect and enchant the minds and affections of the youth, and at unawares bring in an alteration of the manners and customs of the state.⁵ Out of the same conceit or humour did Virgil, turning his pen to the advantage of his country, and the disadvantage of his own profession, make a kind of separation between policy and government, and between arts and sciences, in the verses so much renowned, attributing and challenging the one to the Romans, and leaving and yielding the other to the Grecians: *Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento, Hæ tibi erunt artes, &c.*⁶ So likewise we see that Anytus, the accuser of Socrates, laid it as an article of charge and accusation against him, that he did, with the variety and power of his discourses and disputations, withdraw young men from due reverence to the laws and customs of their country, and that he did profess a dangerous and pernicious science, which was, to make the worse matter seem the better, and to suppress truth by force of eloquence and speech.⁷

⁵ Plut. *vit. Cat.*

⁶ Virg. *Æn.* vi. 851.

⁷ Plato, *Apol. Soc.*, i. 19, 24, *et al.*

2. But these, and the like imputations, have rather a countenance of gravity than any ground of justice: for experience doth warrant, that both in persons and in times, there hath been a meeting and concurrence in Learning and Arms, flourishing and excelling in the same men and the same ages. For, as for men, there cannot be a better nor the like instance, as of that pair, Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar the Dictator; whereof the one was Aristotle's scholar in philosophy, and the other was Cicero's rival in eloquence: or if any man had rather call for scholars that were great generals, than generals that were great scholars, let him take Epaminondas the Theban, or Xenophon the Athenian; whereof the one was the first that abated the power of Sparta, and the other was the first that made way to the overthrow of the monarchy of Persia. And this concurrence is yet more visible in times than in persons, by how much an age is a greater object than a man. For both in Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Græcia, and Rome, the same times that are most renowned for arms, are likewise most admired for learning, so that the greatest authors and philosophers, and the greatest captains and governors have lived in the same ages. Neither can it otherwise be: for as in man the ripeness of strength of the body and mind cometh much about an age, save that the strength of the body cometh somewhat the more early, so in states, arms and learning, whereof the one correspondeth to the body, the other to the soul of man, have a concurrence or near sequence in times.

3. And for matter of Policy and Government, that learning should rather hurt, than enable thereunto, is a thing very improbable: we see it is accounted an error to commit a natural body to empiric physicians, which commonly have a few pleasing receipts whereupon they are confident and adventurous, but know neither the causes of diseases, nor the complexions of patients, nor peril of accidents, nor the true method of cures: we see it is a like error to rely upon advocates or lawyers, which are only men of practice and not grounded in their books, who are many times easily surprised when matter falleth out besides their experience, to the prejudice of the causes they handle: so by like reason it cannot be but a matter of doubtful consequence if states be managed by empiric statesmen,

not well mingled with men grounded in learning. But contrariwise, it is almost without instance contradictory that ever any government was disastrous that was in the hands of learned governors. For howsoever it hath been ordinary with politic men to extenuate and disable learned men by the names of pedants; yet in the records of time it appeareth, in many particulars, that the governments of princes in minority (notwithstanding the infinite disadvantage of that kind of state) have nevertheless excelled the government of princes of mature age, even for that reason which they seek to traduce, which is, that by that occasion the state hath been in the hands of pedants: for so was the state of Rome for the first five years, which are so much magnified, during the minority of Nero, in the hands of Seneca, a pedant: so it was again, for ten years' space or more, during the minority of Gordianus the younger, with great applause and contentation in the hands of Mithreus, a pedant: so was it before that, in the minority of Alexander Severus, in like happiness, in hands not much unlike, by reason of the rule of the women, who were aided by the teachers and preceptors. Nay, let a man look into the government of the bishops of Rome, as by name, into the government of Pius Quintus, and Sextus Quintus, in our times, who were both at their entrance esteemed but as pedantical^s friars, and he shall find that such popes do greater things, and proceed upon truer principles of estate, than those which have ascended to the papacy from an education and breeding in affairs of estate and courts of princes; for although men bred in learning are perhaps to seek in points of convenience and accommodating for the present, which the Italians call *Ragioni di stato*, whereof the same Pius Quintus could not hear spoken with patience, terming them inventions against religion and the moral virtues; yet on the other side, to recompense that, they are perfect in those same plain grounds of religion, justice, honour, and moral virtue, which if they be well and watchfully pursued, there will be seldom use of those other, no more than of physic in a sound or well-dieted body. Neither can the experience of one man's life furnish examples and precedents for

^s Edit. 1605, *prejudicial*. The Latin edition has "*fraterculis rerum imperitis*."

the events of one man's life: for, as it happeneth sometimes that the grandchild, or other descendants, resembleth the ancestor more than the son; so many times occurrences of present times may sort better with ancient examples than with those of the latter or immediate times: and lastly, the wit of one man can no more countervail learning than one man's means can hold way with a common purse.

4. And as for those particular seducements, or indispositions of the mind for policy and government, which Learning is pretended to insinuate; if it be granted that any such thing be, it must be remembered withal, that learning ministereth in every of them greater strength of medicine or remedy than it offereth cause of indisposition or infirmity. For if by a secret operation it make men perplexed and irresolute, on the other side by plain precept it teacheth them when and upon what ground to resolve; yea, and how to carry things in suspense without prejudice, till they resolve; if it make men positive and regular, it teacheth them what things are in their nature demonstrative, and what are conjectural, and as well the use of distinctions and exceptions; as the latitude of principles and rules. If it mislead by disproportion or dissimilitude of examples, it teacheth men the force of circumstances, the errors of comparisons, and all the cautions of application; so that in all these it doth rectify more effectually than it can pervert. And these medicines it conveyeth into men's minds much more forcibly by the quickness and penetration of examples. For let a man look into the errors of Clement the seventh, so lively described by Guicciardine, who served under him, or into the errors of Cicero, painted out by his own pencil in his Epistles to Atticus, and he will fly apace from being irresolute. Let him look into the errors of Phocion, and he will beware how he be obstinate or inflexible. Let him but read the fable of Ixion,² and it will hold him from being vaporous or imaginative. Let him look into the errors of Cato the second, and he will never be one of the Antipodes, to tread opposite to the present world.¹

5. And for the conceit that Learning should dis-

¹ *Pind. Pyth.* ii. 21, *seq.*

² *Vid. Cic. ad Att.* ii. 1.

pose men to leisure and privateness, and make men slothful; it were a strange thing if that which accustomed the mind to a perpetual motion and agitation should induce slothfulness: whereas contrariwise it may be truly affirmed, that no kind of men love business for itself but those that are learned; for other persons love it for profit, as a hireling, that loves the work for the wages; or for honour, as because it beareth them up in the eyes of men, and refresheth their reputation, which otherwise would wear; or because it putteth them in mind of their fortune, and giveth them occasion to pleasure and displeasure; or because it exerciseth some faculty wherein they take pride, and so entertaineth them in good humour and pleasing conceits towards themselves; or because it advanceth any other their ends. So that, as it is said of untrue valours, that some men's valours are in the eyes of them that look on; so such men's industries are in the eyes of others, or at least in regard of their own designments: only learned men love business as an action according to nature, as agreeable to health of mind as exercise is to health of body, taking pleasure in the action itself, and not in the purchase: so that of all men they are the most indefatigable, if it be towards any business which can hold or detain their mind.

And if any man be laborious in reading and study and yet idle in business and action, it groweth from some weakness of body or softness of spirit; such as Seneca speaketh of: *Quidam tam sunt umbratiles, ut putent in turbido esse quicquid in luce est*; and not of learning: well may it be that such a point of a man's nature may make him give himself to learning, but it is not learning that breedeth any such point in his nature.

6. And that learning should take up too much time or leisure: I answer, the most active or busy man that hath been or can be, hath, no question, many vacant times of leisure, while he expecteth the tides and returns of business (except he be either tedious and of no dispatch, or lightly and unworthily ambitious to meddle in things that may be better done by others:) and then the question is, but how those spaces and times of leisure shall be filled and spent; whether in pleasures or in studies; as was well answered by Demosthenes to his adversary Æschines, that was a

man given to pleasure, and told him, *That his orations did smell of the lamp: Indeed, (said Demosthenes,) there is a great difference between the things that you and I do by lamp-light.*² So as no man need doubt that learning will expulse business, but rather it will keep and defend the possession of the mind against idleness and pleasure, which otherwise at unawares may enter to the prejudice of both.

7. Again, for that other conceit that Learning should undermine the reverence of laws and government, it is assuredly a mere depravation and calumny, without all shadow of truth. For to say that a blind custom of obedience should be a surer obligation than duty taught and understood, it is to affirm, that a blind man may tread surer by a guide than a seeing man can by a light. And it is without all controversy, that learning doth make the minds of men gentle, generous, maniable,³ and pliant to government; whereas ignorance makes them churlish, thwart, and mutinous: and the evidence of time doth clear this assertion, considering that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned times have been most subject to tumults, seditions, and changes.

8. And as to the judgment of Cato the Censor, he was well punished for his blasphemy against learning, in the same kind wherein he offended; for when he was past threescore years old, he was taken with an extreme desire to go to school again, and to learn the Greek tongue, to the end to peruse the Greek authors; which doth well demonstrate that his former censure of the Grecian learning was rather an affected gravity, than according to the inward sense of his own opinion. And as for Virgil's verses, though it pleased him to brave the world in taking to the Romans the art of empire, and leaving to others the arts of subjects; yet so much is manifest that the Romans never ascended to that height of empire, till the time they had ascended to the height of other arts. For in the time of the two first Cæsars, which had the art of government in

² Plutarch. Told, however, of Pytheas, not Æschines.

³ The edition of 1605 reads *amiable*, that of 1633 *maniable*. I have retained the latter word because I find in the corresponding passage in the Latin edition, *artes—tenueros reddunt, sequaces, cæcos*. It occurs elsewhere in Bacon's writings.

greatest perfection, there lived the best poet, Virgilius Maro; the best historiographer, Titus Livius; the best antiquary, Marcus Varro; and the best, or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that to the memory of man are known. As for the accusation of Socrates, the time must be remembered when it was prosecuted; which was under the Thirty Tyrants, the most base, bloody, and envious persons that have governed; which revolution of state was no sooner over, but Socrates, whom they had made a person criminal, was made a person heroical, and his memory accumulate with honours divine and human; and those discourses of his which were then termed corrupting of manners, were after acknowledged for sovereign medicines of the mind and manners, and so have been received ever since till this day.⁴ Let this, therefore, serve for answer to Politiques, which in their humorous severity, or in their feigned gravity, have presumed to throw imputations upon learning; which redargution nevertheless (save that we know not whether our labours may extend to other ages) were not needful for the present, in regard of the love and reverence towards learning, which the example and countenance of two so learned Princes, Queen Elizabeth, and your Majesty, being as Castor and Pollux, *Lucida sidera*,⁵ stars of excellent light and most benign influence, hath wrought in all men of place and authority in our nation.

III. 1. Now therefore we come to that third sort of discredit or diminution of credit that groweth unto Learning from learned men themselves, which commonly cleaveth fastest: it is either from their fortune; or from their manners; or from the nature of their studies. For the first, it is not in their power; and the second is accidental; the third only is proper to be handled: but because we are not in hand with true measure, but with popular estimation and conceit, it is not amiss to speak somewhat of the two former. The derogations therefore which grow to learning from the fortune or condition of learned men, are either in respect of scarcity of means, or in respect of privateness of life and meanness of employments.

⁴ Whether the Athenians repented so soon of their injustice may be fairly doubted. See Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. viii. ad fin.

⁵ Hor., *Od.* l. iii. 2.

2. Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned men usually to begin with little, and not to grow rich so fast as other men by reason they convert not their labours chiefly to lucre and increase: it were good to leave the common place in commendation of poverty to some friar to handle, to whom much was attributed by Machiavel in this point; when he said, *That the kingdom of the clergy had been long before at an end, if the reputation and reverence towards the poverty of friars had not borne out the scandal of the superfluities and excesses of bishops and prelates.*⁶ So a man might say that the felicity and delicacy of princes and great persons had long since turned to rudeness and barbarism, if the poverty of learning had not kept up civility and honour of life: but without any such advantages, it is worthy the observation what a reverend and honoured thing poverty was for some ages in the Roman state, which nevertheless was a state without paradoxes. For we see what Titus Livius saith in his introduction: *Ceterum aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit aut nulla unquam respublica nec major, nec sanctior, nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit; nec inquam tam seræ avaritia luxuriaque immigraverint; nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac parsimonie honos fuerit.* We see likewise, after that the state of Rome was not itself, but did degenerate, how that person that took upon him to be counsellor to Julius Caesar after his victory where to begin his restoration of the state, maketh it of all points the most summary to take away the estimation of wealth: *Verum hæc, et omnia mala pariter cum honore pecunie desinent: si neque magistratus, neque alia vulgo cupienda, venalia erunt.*⁷ To conclude this point, as it was truly said, that *Rubor est virtutis color*, though sometime it come from vice;⁸ so it may be fitly said that *Paupertas est virtutis fortuna*, though sometime it may proceed from misgovernment and accident. Surely Solomon hath pronounced it both in censure, *Qui festinat ad divitias non erit insons;*⁹ and in precept; *Buy the truth, and*

⁶ Mach. *Disc. on Liv. dec. 1. iii. l.*, speaking of the Franciscan and Dominican orders.

⁷ Epist. 1. *ad C. Cæs. de Rep. ord.* (Sallustio impuit.)

⁸ Diog. Cyn. *ap. Laert.* vi. 54. Compare Tacitus (Agric. 45) of Domitian, "*sævus ille vultus et rubor, a quo se contra pudorem muniebat.*"

⁹ Prov. xxviii. 22.

*sell it not ; and so of wisdom and knowledge ;*¹ judging that means were to be spent upon learning, and not learning to be applied to means. And as for the privateness, or obscureness (as it may be in vulgar estimation accounted) of life of contemplative men ; it is a theme so common to extol a private life, not taxed with sensuality and sloth, in comparison and to the disadvantage of a civil life, for safety, liberty, pleasure, and dignity, or at least freedom from indignity, as no man handleth it but handleth it well ; such a consonancy it hath to men's conceits in the expressing, and to men's consents in the allowing. This only I will add, that learned men forgotten in states and not living in the eyes of men, are like the images of Cassius and Brutus in the funeral of Junia : of which not being represented as many others were, Tacitus saith, *Eo ipso præfulgebant, quod non viscebantur.*²

3. And for meanness of employment, that which is most traduced to contempt is that the government of youth is commonly allotted to them ; which age, because it is the age of least authority, it is transferred to the disesteeming of those employments wherein youth is conversant, and which are conversant about youth. But how unjust this traducement is (if you will reduce things from popularity of opinion to measure of reason) may appear in that we see men are more curious what they put into a new vessel than into a vessel seasoned ; and what mould they lay about a young plant than about a plant corroborate ; so as the weakest terms and times of all things use to have the best applications and helps. And will you hearken to the Hebrew rabbins ? *Your young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams ;*³ say they youth is the worthier age, for that visions are nearer apparitions of God than dreams ? And let it be noted, that howsoever the condition of life of pedants hath been scorned upon theatres, as the ape of tyranny ; and that the modern looseness or negligence hath taken no due regard to the choice of schoolmasters and tutors ; yet the ancient wisdom of the best times did always make a just complaint, that states were too busy with their laws and too negligent in point of education : which excellent part of ancient discipline

¹ Prov. xxiii. 23. ² Tac., *Ann.* iii. 76. *ad fin.* ³ Joel, ii. 28

hath been in some sort revived of late times by the colleges of the Jesuits; of whom, although in regard of their superstition I may say, *Quo meliores, eo deteriores*; yet in regard of this, and some other points concerning human learning and moral matters, I may say, as Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabazus, *Talis quum sis, utinam noster esses*.⁴ And thus much touching the discredits drawn from the fortunes of learned men.

4. As touching the manners of learned men, it is a thing personal and individual: and no doubt there be amongst them, as in other professions, of all temperatures: but yet so as it is not without truth, which is said, that *Abeunt studia in mores*, studies have an influence and operation upon the manners of those that are conversant in them.

But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I for my part cannot find any disgrace to learning can proceed from the manners of learned men inherent⁵ to them as they are learned; except it be a fault (which was the supposed fault of Demosthenes, Cicero, Cato the second, Seneca, and many more) that, because the times they read of are commonly better than the times they live in, and the duties taught better than the duties practised, they contend sometimes too far to bring things to perfection, and to reduce the corruption of manners to honesty of precepts, or examples of too great height. And yet hereof they have caveats enough in their own walks. For Solon, when he was asked whether he had given his citizens the best laws, answered wisely, *Yea, of such as they would receive*.⁶ and Plato, finding that his own heart could not agree with the corrupt manners of his country, refused to bear place or office; saying, *That a man's country was to be used as his parents were, that is, with humble persuasions, and not with contestations*.⁷ And Caesar's counsellor put in the same caveat, *Non ad vetera instituta revocans quæ jam pridem corruptis*

⁴ Conference of Agesilaus and Pharnabazus. Plut., *Vit. Ages.*

⁵ Vulg. *not* inherent. I have cancelled the negative, that the passage may not be misunderstood. The Lat. Edit. has *nullo modo occurrit dedecus Literis ex Litteratorum moribus, quatenus sunt literati, adhucens*, which corrects the error whether it came from the press, or, as is more likely, the pen. Thus, p. 20, we find "*nor never*."

⁶ Plutarch in *Vit. Solon*.

⁷ Plato, Epist. Z. iii. 331, and cf. Epist. F. iii. 316.

*moribus ludibrio sunt:*⁸ and Cicero noteth this error directly in Cato the second, when he writes to his friend Atticus; *Cato optime sentit, sed nocet interdum reipublicæ; loquitur enim tanquam in reipublicâ Platonis, non tanquam in facie Romuli.*⁹ And the same Cicero doth excuse and expound the philosophers for going too far, and being too exact in their prescripts, when he saith, *Isti ipsi præceptores virtutis et magistri, videntur fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet protulisse, ut cum ad ultimum animo contendissemus, ibi tamen, ubi oportet, consisteremus:*¹ and yet himself might have said, *Monitissimum minor ipse meis;*² for it was his own fault, though not in so extreme a degree.

5. Another fault likewise much of this kind hath been incident to learned men; which is, that they have esteemed the preservation, good, and honour of their countries or masters before their own fortunes or safeties. For so saith Demosthenes unto the Athenians; *If it please you to note it, my counsels unto you are not such whereby I should grow great amongst you, and you become little amongst the Grecians: but they be of that nature, as they are sometimes not good for me to give, but are always good for you to follow.* And so Seneca, after he had consecrated that *Quinquennium Neronis*³ to the eternal glory of learned governors, held on his honest and loyal course of good and free counsel, after his master grew extremely corrupt in his government. Neither can this point otherwise be; for learning endueth men's minds with a true sense of the frailty of their persons, the casualty of their fortunes, and the dignity of their soul and vocation: so that it is impossible for them to esteem that any greatness of their own fortune can be a true or worthy end of their being and ordainment; and therefore are desirous to give their account to God, and so likewise to their masters under God (as kings and states that they serve) in these words; *Ecce tibi lucrifeci,* and not *Ecce mihi lucrifeci:*⁴ whereas, the

⁸ Epist. de Rept. ord.

⁹ Cic. ad Att. ii. 1.

¹ Cic. pro Mur. xxxi. 65.

² Ovid. A. Am. ii. 548.

³ The first five years of Nero's reign, during which his evil inclinations were somewhat kept in check; less, however, than Bacon assumes here. Nor had Seneca much real influence over him. The best that can be said for him is, *non repente suaviturpissimus.*

⁴ Matt. xxv. 20.

corrupter sort of mere Politiques, that have not their thoughts established by learning in the love and apprehension of duty, nor never look abroad into universality, do refer all things to themselves, and thrust themselves into the centre of the world, as if all lines should meet in them and their fortunes ; never caring in all tempests what becomes of the ship of estates, so they may save themselves in the cockboat of their own fortune : whereas men that feel the weight of duty and know the limits of self-love, use to make good their places and duties, though with peril ; and if they stand in seditious and violent alterations, it is rather the reverence which many times both adverse parts do give to honesty, than any versatile advantage of their own carriage. But for this point of tender sense and fast obligation of duty which learning doth endue the mind withal, howsoever fortune may tax it, and many in the depth of their corrupt principles may despise it, yet it will receive an open allowance, and therefore needs the less disproof or excusation.

6. Another fault incident commonly to learned men, which may be more properly defended than truly denied, is, that they fail sometimes in applying themselves to particular persons : which want of exact application ariseth from two causes ; the one, because the largeness of their mind can hardly confine itself to dwell in the exquisite observation or examination of the nature and customs of one person : for it is a speech for a lover, and not for a wise man : *Satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus.*⁵ Nevertheless I shall yield, that he that cannot contract the sight of his mind as well as disperse and dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. But there is a second cause, which is no inability, but a rejection upon choice and judgment. For the honest and just bounds of observation by one person upon another, extend no farther but to understand him sufficiently, whereby not to give him offence, or whereby to be able to give him faithful counsel, or whereby to stand upon reasonable guard and caution in respect of a man's self. But to be speculative into another man to the end to know how to work him, or wind him, or govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is double and cloven and not entire and ingenuous ; which as in friendship it is

⁵ A saying of Epicurus. Vid. Seneca, *Epist. Mor.* i. 7.

want of integrity, so towards princes or superiors is want of duty. For the custom of the Levant, which is that subjects do forbear to gaze or fix their eyes upon princes, is in the outward ceremony barbarous, but the moral is good: for men ought not by cunning and bent observations to pierce and penetrate into the hearts of kings, which the Scripture hath declared to be inscrutable.

7. There is yet another fault (with which I will conclude this part) which is often noted in learned men, that they do many times fail to observe decency and discretion in their behaviour and carriage, and commit errors in small and ordinary points of action, so as the vulgar sort of capacities do make a judgment of them in greater matters by that which they find wanting in them in smaller. But this consequence doth often deceive men, for which I do refer them over to that which was said by Themistocles, arrogantly and uncivilly being applied to himself out of his own mouth; but, being applied to the general state of this question, pertinently and justly; when, being invited to touch a lute, he said, *He could not fiddle, but he could make a small town a great state.*⁶ So, no doubt, many may be well seen in the passages of government and policy, which are to seek in little and punctual occasions. I refer them also to that which Plato said of his master Socrates, whom he compared to the gallipots of apothecaries, which on the outside had apes and owls and antiques but contained within sovereign and precious liquors and confections; acknowledging that to an external report he was not without superficial levities and deformities, but was inwardly replenished with excellent virtues and powers.⁷ And so much touching the point of manners of learned men.

8. But in the mean time I have no purpose to give allowance to some conditions and courses base and unworthy, wherein divers professors of learning have wronged themselves and gone too far; such as were those trencher philosophers which in the later age of the Roman state were usually in the houses of great persons, being little better than solemn parasites; of which kind, Lucian maketh a merry description of the

philosopher that the great lady took to ride with her in her coach, and would needs have him carry her little dog, which he doing officiously and yet uncomely, the page scoffed and said, *That he doubted, the philosopher of a Stoic would turn to be a Cynic.*⁸ But above all the rest, the gross and palpable flattery, whereunto many not unlearned have abased and abused their wits and pens, turning, as Du Bartas saith,⁹ Hecuba into Helena, and Faustina into Lucretia, hath most diminished the price and estimation of learning. Neither is the moral¹ dedication of books and writings, as to patrons, to be commended: for that books, such as are worthy the name of books, ought to have no patrons but truth and reason. And the ancient custom was to dedicate them only to private and equal friends, or to entitle the books with their names: or if to kings and great persons, it was to some such as the argument of the book was fit and proper for: but these and the like courses may deserve rather reprehension than defence.

9. Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration or application of learned men to men in fortune. For the answer was good that Diogenes made to one that asked him in mockery, *How it came to pass that philosophers were the followers of rich men, and not rich men of philosophers?* He answered soberly, and yet sharply, *Because the one sort knew what they had need of, and the other did not.*² And of the like nature was the answer which Aristippus made, when having a petition to Dionysius, and no ear given to him, he fell down at his feet; whereupon Dionysius staid, and gave him the hearing, and granted it; and afterward some person, tender on the behalf of philosophy, reproved Aristippus that he would offer the profession of philosophy such an indignity as for a private suit to fall at a tyrant's feet: but he answered, *It was not his fault, but it was the fault of Dionysius, that had his ears in his feet.*³ Neither was it accounted weakness, but discretion in him that would not dispute his best with

⁸ Lucian. *de Merc. Cond.*, 33, 34.

⁹ See *Bethulian's Rescue*, book v., translated by J. Sylvester, 1614.

¹ Vulg. *modern*, but the editions of 1605 and 1633 both have *moral*, which I have therefore restored to the text. The Latin edition has *morem illum receptum*. The word is used in the sense of *customary*.

² Laert. *Vit. Aristippi*, ii. 69.

³ Ibid. ii. 79.

Adrianus Cæsar ; excusing himself, *That it was reason to yield to him that commanded thirty legions.*⁴ These and the like applications, and stooping to points of necessity and convenience, cannot be disallowed ; for though they may have some outward baseness, yet in a judgment truly made they are to be accounted submissions to the occasion, and not to the person.

IV. 1. Now I proceed to those errors and vanities which have intervened amongst the studies themselves of the learned, which is that which is principal and proper to the present argument ; wherein my purpose is not to make a justification of the errors, but by a censure and separation of the errors to make a justification of that which is good and sound, and to deliver that from the aspersion of the other. For we see that it is the manner of men to scandalize and deprave that which retaineth the state⁵ and virtue, by taking advantage upon that which is corrupt and degenerate : as the heathens in the primitive church used to blemish and taint the Christians with the faults and corruptions of heretics. But nevertheless I have no meaning at this time to make any exact animadversion of the errors and impediments in matters of learning, which are more secret and remote from vulgar opinion, but only to speak unto such as do fall under or near unto a popular observation.

2. There be therefore chiefly three vanities in studies, whereby learning hath been most traduced. For those things we do esteem vain, which are either false or frivolous, those which either have no truth or no use : and those persons we esteem vain, which are either credulous or curious ; and curiosity is either in matter or words : so that in reason, as well as in experience, there fall out to be these three distempers, as I may term them, of learning : the first, fantastical learning ; the second, contentious learning ; and the last, delicate learning ; vain imaginations, vain altercations, and vain affectations ; and with the last I will begin. Martin Luther, conducted no doubt by a higher providence, but

⁴ Spartianus, *Vit. Adriani*, § 15. The excuse was made by Favorinus.

⁵ *i. e.* its original, or uncorrupted, state.

in discourse of reason,⁶ finding what a province he had undertaken against the bishop of Rome and the degenerate traditions of the church, and finding his own solitude, being no ways aided by the opinions of his own time, was enforced to awake all antiquity, and to call former times to his succours to make a party against the present time. So that the ancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, which had long time slept in libraries, began generally to be read and revolved. This by consequence did draw on a necessity of a more exquisite travail in the languages original, wherein those authors did write, for the better understanding of those authors, and the better advantage of pressing and applying their words. And thereof grew again a delight in their manner of style and phrase, and an admiration of that kind of writing; which was much furthered and precipitated by the enmity and opposition that the propounders of those primitive but seeming new opinions had against the schoolmen; who were generally of the contrary part, and whose writings were altogether in a different style and form; taking liberty to coin and frame new terms of art to express their own sense, and to avoid circuit of speech, without regard to the pureness, pleasantness, and, as I may call it, lawfulness of the phrase or word. And again, because the great labour that then was with the people, (of whom the Pharisees were wont to say, *Excecrabilis ista turba, quæ non novit legem*),⁷ for the winning and persuading of them, there grew of necessity in chief price and request eloquence and variety of discourse, as the fittest and forciblest access into the capacity of the vulgar sort: so that these four causes concurring, the admiration of ancient authors, the hate of the schoolmen, the exact study of languages, and the efficacy of preaching, did bring in an affectionate study of eloquence and copie of speech, which then began to flourish. This grew speedily to an excess; for men began to hunt more after words than matter; more after the choiceness of the phrase, and the round and clean composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the

⁶ Compare Milton, *Par. Lost*, v. 486, *seq.*; and see Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, p. 157, *On the Difference in Kind of Reason and the Understanding*—where the expression is explained.

⁷ Joh. vii. 49.

clauses, and the varying and illustration of their works with tropes and figures, than after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of argument, life of invention or depth of judgment. Then grew the flowing and watery vein of Osorius⁸ the Portugal bishop, to be in price. Then did Sturmius spend such infinite and curious pains upon Cicero the Orator, and Hermogenes the Rhetorician, besides his own books of Periods and Imitation, and the like. Then did Car of Cambridge, and Ascham with their lectures and writings almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and allure all young men that were studious, unto that delicate and polished kind of learning. Then did Erasmus take occasion to make the scolling Echo: *Decem annos consumpsi in legendo Cicrone*; and the Echo answered in Greek, *Ore Asine*.⁹ Then grew the learning of the schoolmen to be utterly despised as barbarous. In sum, the whole inclination and bent of those times was rather towards copie than weight.

3. Here, therefore, is the first distemper of learning, when men study words and not matter; whereof, though I have represented an example of late times, yet it hath been and will be *secundum majus et minus* in all time. And how is it possible that this should have an operation to discredit learning, even with vulgar capacities, when they see learned men's works like the first letter of a patent, or limued book; which though it hath large flourishes, yet is but a letter? It seems to me that Pygmalion's frenzy is a good emblem or portraiture of this vanity:¹ for words are but the images of matter; and except they have life of reason and invention, to fall in love with them is all one as to fall in love with a picture.

But yet notwithstanding it is a thing not hastily to be condemned, to clothe and adorn the obscurity even of philosophy itself with sensible and plausible clocution. For hereof we have great examples in

⁸ Bishop of Silves. Among his works are a letter to Queen Elizabeth, exhorting her to return to the Romish superstition; and a treatise, *De Gloria*, much lauded for its pure Latinity.

⁹ *Colloq.* between *Jurenis* and *Echo* (p. 459, *Elz.*)

¹ Vid. Ovid., *Metam.* x. 243.

Xenophon, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and of Plato also in some degree; and hereof likewise there is great use: for surely, to the severe inquisition of truth and the deep progress into philosophy, it is some hindrance; because it is too early satisfactory to the mind of man, and quencheth the desire of further search, before we come to a just period. But then if a man be to have any use of such knowledge in civil occasions, of conference, counsel, persuasion, discourse, or the like; then shall he find it prepared to his hands in those authors which write in that manner. But the excess of this is so justly contemptible, that as Hercules, when he saw the image of Adonis, Venus' minion, in a temple, said in disdain, *Nil sacri es*; so there is none of Hercules' followers in learning. that is, the more severe and laborious sort of inquirers into truth, but will despise those delicacies and affectations, as indeed capable of no divineness. And thus much of the first disease or distemper of learning.

4. The second which followeth is in nature worse than the former: for as substance of matter is better than beauty of words, so contrariwise vain matter is worse than vain words: wherein it seemeth the reprehension of St. Paul was not only proper for those times, but prophetic for the times following; and not only respective to divinity, but extensive to all knowledge: *Deritu profanas vocum novitates, et oppositiones falsi nominis scientiæ.*² For he assigneth two marks and badges of suspected and falsified science: the one, the novelty and strangeness of terms; the other, the strictness of positions, which of necessity doth induce oppositions, and so questions and altercations. Surely, like as many substances in nature which are solid do putrify and corrupt into worms; so it is the property of good and sound knowledge to putrify and dissolve into a number of subtle, idle, unwholesome, and, as I may term them, vermiculate questions, which have indeed a kind of quickness and life of spirit, but no soundness of matter or goodness of quality. This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen: who having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and small variety of reading, but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few

² 1 Tim. vi. 20.

authors (chiefly Aristotle their dictator) as their persons were shut up in the cells of monasteries and colleges, and knowing little history, either of nature or time, did out of no great quantity of matter and infinite agitation of wit spin out unto us those laborious webs of learning which are extant in their books.³ For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the stuff, and is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit.

5. This same unprofitable subtilty or curiosity is of two sorts; either in the subject itself that they handle, when it is a fruitless speculation or controversy, (whereof there are no small number both in divinity and philosophy) or in the manner or method of handling of a knowledge, which amongst them was this; upon every particular position or assertion to frame objections, and to those objections, solutions; which solutions were for the most part not confutations, but distinctions: whereas indeed the strength of all sciences is, as the strength of the old man's fagot, in the band. For the harmony of a science, supporting each part the other, is and ought to be the true and brief confutation and suppression of all the smaller sort of objections. But, on the other side, if you take out every axiom, as the sticks of the fagot, one by one, you may quarrel with them, and bend them, and break them at your pleasure: so that, as was said of Seneca, *Verborum minutiis rerum frangit pondera*;⁴ so a man may truly say of the schoolmen, *Quæstionum minutiis scientiarum frangunt soliditatem*. For were it not better for a man in a fair room to set up one great light, or branching candlestick of lights, than to go about with a small watch candle into every corner? And such is their method, that rests not so much upon evidence of truth proved by arguments, authorities, similitudes, examples, as upon particular confutations and solutions of every scruple, cavillation, and objec-

³ For an account of the Schoolmen, see Hampden's *Bampton Lectures*, preached at Oxford 1832.

⁴ *Rerum pondera minutissimis sententiis fregit.*—Quint. *de Inst. Orat.*, x. 1.

tion; breeding for the most part one question as fast as it solveth another; even as in the former resemblance, when you carry the light into one corner, you darken the rest; so that the fable and fiction of Seylla seemeth to be a lively image of this kind of philosophy or knowledge; which was transformed into a comely virgin for the upper parts; but then *candida succinctam latrantibus inguina monstris*:⁵ so the generalities of the schoolmen are for a while good and proportionable; but then, when you descend into their distinctions and decisions, instead of a fruitful womb for the use and benefit of man's life, they end in monstrous alterations and barking questions. So as it is not possible but this quality of knowledge must fall under popular contempt, the people being apt to condemn truth upon occasion of controversies and altercations, and to think they are all out of their way which never meet; and when they see such digladiation about subtilties, and matters of no use or moment, they easily fall upon that judgment of Dionysius of Syracuse, *Verba ista sunt senum otiosorum*.⁶

Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those schoolmen to their great thirst of truth and unwearied travail of wit had joined variety and universality of reading and contemplation, they had proved excellent lights, to the great advancement of all learning and knowledge; but as they are, they are great undertakers indeed, and fierce with dark keeping: but as in the inquiry of the divine truth, their pride inclined to leave the oracle of God's word, and to vanish in the mixture of their own inventions; so in the inquisition of nature, they ever left the oracle of God's works, and adored the deceiving and deformed images which the unequal mirror of their own minds, or a few received authors or principles, did represent unto them. And thus much for the second disease of learning.

6. For the third vice or disease of learning, which concerneth deceit or untruth, it is of all the rest the foulest; as that which doth destroy the essential form of knowledge, which is nothing but a representation of truth: for the truth of being and the truth of knowing are one, differing no more than the direct beam and the beam reflected. This vice therefore

⁵ Virg., *Ecl.* vi. 75.

⁶ Diog. Laert., iii. 18. (*Vit. Platonis.*)

brancheth itself into two sorts; delight in deceiving, and aptness to be deceived; imposture and credulity; which, although they appear to be of a diverse nature, the one seeming to proceed of cunning and the other of simplicity, yet certainly they do for the most part concur: for, as the verse noteth,

*Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est,*⁷

an inquisitive man is a prattler; so, upon the like reason, a credulous man is a deceiver: as we see it in fame, that he that will easily believe rumours, will as easily augment rumours, and add somewhat to them of his own; which Tacitus wisely noteth, when he saith, *Fingunt simul creduntque*:⁸ so great an affinity hath fiction and belief.

7. This facility of credit and accepting or admitting things weakly authorized or warranted, is of two kinds according to the subject: for it is either a belief of history, or, as the lawyers speak, matter of fact; or else of matter of art and opinion. As to the former, we see the experience and inconvenience of this error in ecclesiastical history; which hath too easily received and registered reports and narrations of miracles wrought by martyrs, hermits, or monks of the desert, and other holy men, and their relics, shrines, chapels, and images: which though they had a passage for a time by the ignorance of the people, the superstitious simplicity of some, and the politic toleration of others holding them but as divine poesies; yet after a period of time, when the mist began to clear up, they grew to be esteemed but as old wives' fables, impostures of the clergy, illusions of spirits, and badges of Antichrist, to the great scandal and detriment of religion.

8. So in natural history, we see there hath not been that choice and judgment used as ought to have been; as may appear in the writings of Plinius, Cardanus, Albertus, and divers of the Arabians, being fraught with much fabulous matter, a great part not only untrue, but notoriously untrue, to the great derogation of the credit of natural philosophy with the grave and sober kind of wit: wherein the wisdom and integrity of Aristotle is worthy to be observed; that, having made so diligent and exquisite a history of living creatures, hath mingled it sparingly with any vain or

⁷ Hor., *Ep.* 1. xviii. 69.

⁸ Tac., *Hist.* i. 51.

feigned matter: and yet on the other sake,⁹ hath cast all prodigious narrations, which he thought worthy the recording, into one book:¹ excellently discerning that matter of manifest truth (such whereupon observation and rule were to be built,) was not to be mingled or weakened with matter of doubtful credit; and yet again, that rarities and reports that seem incredible are not to be suppressed or denied to the memory of men.

9. And as for the facility of credit which is yielded to arts and opinions, it is likewise of two kinds; either when too much belief is attributed to the arts themselves, or to certain authors in any art. The sciences themselves, which have had better intelligence and confederacy with the imagination of man than with his reason, are three in number; astrology, natural magic, and alchemy: of which sciences, nevertheless, the ends or pretences are noble. For astrology pretendeth to discover that correspondence or concatenation which is between the superior globe and the inferior: natural magic pretendeth to call and reduce natural philosophy from variety of speculations to the magnitude of works: and alchemy pretendeth to make separation of all the unlike parts of bodies which in mixtures of nature are incorporate. But the derivations and prosecutions to these ends, both in the theories and in the practices, are full of error and vanity; which the great professors themselves have sought to veil over and conceal by enigmatical writings, and referring themselves to auricular traditions and such other devices, to save the credit of impostures: and yet surely to alchemy this right is due, that it may be compared to the husbandman whereof *Æsop* makes the fable; that, when he died, told his sons that he had left unto them gold buried under ground in his vineyard; and they digged over all the ground, and gold they found none; but by reason of their stirring and digging the mould about the roots of their vines, they had a great vintage the year following: so assuredly the search and stir to make gold hath brought to light a great number of good and fruitful inventions and experiments, as well for the disclosing of nature as for the use of man's life.

⁹ Usually printed *side*; but the editions of 1605 and 1633 both have *sake*.

¹ Θανμάσια Ἀκεύσματα.

10. And as for the overmuch credit that hath been given unto authors in sciences, in making them dictators, that their words should stand, and not counsels to give advice; the damage is infinite that sciences have received thereby, as the principal cause that hath kept them low at a stay without growth or advancement. For hence it hath come, that in arts mechanical the first deviser comes shortest, and time addeth and perfecteth; but in sciences the first author goeth farthest, and time leeseth and corrupteth. So we see, artillery, sailing, printing, and the like, were grossly managed at the first, and by time accommodated and refined: but contrariwise, the philosophies and sciences of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, Hippocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of most vigour at the first and by time degenerate and imbasd; whereof the reason is no other, but that in the former many wits and industries have contributed in one; and in the latter many wits and industries have been spent about the wit of some one, whom many times they have rather depraved than illustrated. For as water will not ascend higher than the level of the first springhead from whence it descendeth, so knowledge derived from Aristotle, and exempted from liberty of examination, will not rise again higher than the knowledge of Aristotle. And therefore although the position be good, *Oportet discentem credere*,² yet it must be coupled with this, *Oportet edoctum judicare*; for disciples do owe unto masters only a temporary belief and a suspension of their own judgment until they be fully instructed, and not an absolute resignation or perpetual captivity: and therefore, to conclude this point, I will say no more, but so let great authors have their due, as time, which is the author of authors, be not deprived of his due, which is further and further to discover truth.

V. 1. Thus have I gone over these three diseases of learning; besides the which there are some other rather peccant humours than formed diseases: which nevertheless are not so secret and intrinsic but that they fall under a popular observation and traducement, and therefore are not to be passed over.

Other errors
of Learned
Men which
mar the pro-
gress and
credit of
Learning.

² Aristot. *Soph. El.* 2. (Bekk.)

The first of these is the extreme affecting of two extremities; the one antiquity, the other novelty; wherein it seemeth the children of time do take after the nature and malice of the father. For as he devoureth his children, so one of them seeketh to devour and suppress the other; while antiquity envieth there should be new additions, and novelty cannot be content to add but it must deface: surely the advice of the prophet is the true direction in this matter, *State super vias antiquas, et videte quanam sit via recta et bona et ambulate in ea.*³ Antiquity deserveth that reverence, that men should make a stand thereupon and discover what is the best way; but when the discovery is well taken, then to make progression. And to speak truly, *Antiquitas sæculi juvenus mundi.* These times are the ancient times, when the world is ancient, and not those which we account ancient *ordine retrogrado*, by a computation backward from ourselves.

2. Another error induced by the former is a distrust that anything should be now to be found out, which the world should have missed and passed over so long time; as if the same objection were to be made to time, that Lucian maketh to Jupiter and other the heathen gods; of which he wondereth that they begot so many children in old time, and begot none in his time; and asketh whether they were become septuagenary, or whether the law *Papia*, made against old men's marriages, had restrained them.⁴ So it seemeth men doubt lest time is become past children and generation; wherein, contrariwise, we see commonly the levity and inconstancy of men's judgments, which till a matter be done, wonder that it can be done; and as soon as it is done, wonder again that it was no sooner done: as we see in the expedition of Alexander into Asia, which at first was prejudged as a vast and impossible enterprise: and yet afterwards it pleaseth Livy to make no more of it than this: *Nil aliud quàm bene ausus vana contemnere.*⁵ and the same happened to Columbus in the western navigation. But in intellectual matters it is much more common; as may be seen in most of the propositions of Euclid; which till they

³ Jerem. vi. 16.

⁴ Ascribed to Seneca *ap. Lact., Instit.* i. 20, 13.

⁵ Livy ix. 17.

be demonstrate, they seem strange to our assent; but being demonstrate, our mind accepteth of them by a kind of relation (as the lawyers speak,) as if we had known them before.

3. Another error, that hath also some affinity with the former, is a conceit that of former opinions or sects after variety and examination the best hath still prevailed and suppressed the rest; so as, if a man should begin the labour of a new search, he were but like to light upon somewhat formerly rejected, and by rejection brought into oblivion: as if the multitude, or the wisest for the multitude's sake, were not ready to give passage rather to that which is popular and superficial, than to that which is substantial and profound; for the truth is, that time seemeth to be of the nature of a river or stream, which carrieth down to us that which is light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that which is weighty and solid.

4. Another error, of a diverse nature from all the former, is the over early and peremptory reduction of knowledge into arts and methods; from which time commonly sciences receive small or no augmentation. But as young men, when they knit and shape perfectly, do seldom grow to a further stature; so knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and observations, it is in growth: but when it once is comprehended in exact methods, it may perchance be further polished and illustrated and accommodated for use and practice; but it increaseth no more in bulk and substance.

5. Another error which doth succeed that which we last mentioned, is, that after the distribution of particular arts and sciences, men have abandoned universality, or *philosophia prima*: which cannot but cease and stop all progression. For no perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or a level: neither is it possible to discover the more remote and deeper parts of any science, if you stand but upon the level of the same science, and ascend not to a higher science.

6. Another error hath proceeded from too great a reverence, and a kind of adoration of the mind and understanding of man; by means whereof, men have withdrawn themselves too much from the contemplation of nature, and the observations of experience, and have tumbled up and down in their own reason and conceits. Upon these intellectualists, which are notwithstanding

commonly taken for the most sublime and divine philosophers, Heraclitus gave a just censure, saying, *Men sought truth in their own little worlds, and not in the great and common world;*⁷ for they disdain to spell, and so by degrees to read in the volume of God's works: and contrariwise by continual meditation and agitation of wit do urge and as it were invoke their own spirits to divine, and give oracles unto them, whereby they are deservedly deluded.

7. Another error that hath some connexion with this latter, is, that men have used to infect their meditations, opinions, and doctrines, with some conceits which they have most admired, or some sciences which they have most applied; and given all things else a tincture according to them, utterly untrue and improper. So hath Plato intermingled his philosophy with theology, and Aristotle with logic; and the second school of Plato, Proclus and the rest, with the mathematics. For these were the arts which had a kind of primogeniture with them severally. So have the alchymists made a philosophy out of a few experiments of the furnace; and Gilbertus,⁷ our countryman, hath made a philosophy out of the observations of a loadstone. So Cicero, when reciting the several opinions of the nature of the soul he found a musician that held the soul was but a harmony, saith pleasantly, *Hic ab arte sua non recessit, &c.*⁸ But of these conceits Aristotle speaketh seriously and wisely, when he saith, *Qui respiciunt ad pauca de facili pronunciant.*

8. Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste to assertion without due and mature suspension of judgment. For the two ways of contemplation are not unlike the two ways of action commonly spoken of by the ancients; the one plain and smooth in the beginning, and in the end impassable; the other rough and troublesome in the entrance, but after a while fair and even: so it is in contemplation; if a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties.

9. Another error is in the manner of the tradition

⁶ Ap. Sext. Empir. adv. Math. vii. 133.

⁷ The book alluded to is *Gilbertus de Magnete*. Lond. 1600.

⁸ Tuscul. Disp. i. x. 20. He is speaking of Aristoxenus.

and delivery of knowledge, which is for the most part magistral and peremptory, and not ingenuous and faithful; in a sort as may be soonest believed, and not easiest examined. It is true, that in compendious treatises for practice that form is not to be disallowed: but in the true handling of knowledge, men ought not to fall either on the one side into the vein of Velleius the Epicurean: *Nil tam metuens, quàm ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur*:⁹ nor on the other side into Socrates his ironical doubting of all things; but to propound things sincerely with more or less asseveration, as they stand in a man's own judgment proved more or less.

10. Other errors there are in the scope that men propound to themselves, whereunto they bend their endeavours; for whereas the more constant and devout kind of professors of any science ought to propound to themselves to make some additions to their science, they convert their labours to aspire to certain second prizes: as to be a profound interpreter or commenter, to be a sharp champion or defender, to be a methodical compounder or abridger, and so the patrimony of knowledge cometh to be sometimes improved, but seldom augmented.

11. But the greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking or misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge: for men have entered into a desire of learning and knowledge, sometimes upon a natural curiosity and inquisitive appetite; sometimes to entertain their minds with variety and delight; sometimes for ornament and reputation; and sometimes to enable them to victory of wit and contradiction; and most times for lucre and profession; and seldom sincerely to give a true account of their gift of reason, to the benefit and use of men: as if there were sought in knowledge a couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit; or a tarrasse for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect; or a tower of state, for a proud mind to raise itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground, for strife and contention; or a shop, for profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate. But this is that which will

indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly conjoined and united together than they have been; a conjunction like unto that of the two highest planets, Saturn, the planet of rest and contemplation, and Jupiter, the planet of civil society and action: howbeit, I do not mean, when I speak of use and action, that end before-mentioned of the applying of knowledge to lucre and profession; for I am not ignorant how much that diverteth and interrupteth the prosecution and advancement of knowledge, like unto the golden ball thrown before Atalanta, which while she goeth aside and stoopeth to take up, the race is hindered;

Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit.¹

12. Neither is my meaning, as was spoken of Socrates, to call philosophy down from heaven to converse upon the earth;² that is, to leave natural philosophy aside, and to apply knowledge only to manners and policy. But as both heaven and earth do conspire and contribute to the use and benefit of man; so the end ought to be, from both philosophies to separate and reject vain speculations, and whatsoever is empty and void, and to preserve and augment whatsoever is solid and fruitful: that knowledge may not be, as a courtesan, for pleasure and vanity only, or as a bond-woman, to acquire and gain to her master's use; but as a spouse, for generation, fruit, and comfort.

Thus have I described and opened, as by a kind of dissection, those peccant humours, (the principal of them,) which have not only given impediment to the proficiencie of learning, but have given also occasion to the traducement thereof: wherein if I have been too plain, it must be remembered, *fidelis vulnere amantis, sed dolosa oscula malignantis*.³ This, I think, I have gained, that I ought to be the better believed in that which I shall say pertaining to commendation; because I have proceeded so freely in that which concerneth censure. And yet I have no purpose to enter into a laudative of learning, or to make a hymn to the Muses; (though I am of opinion that it is long since their rites were duly celebrated:) but my intent is, without varnish or amplification justly to weigh the dignity of

¹ Ovid. *Metam.* x. 667. ² Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* v. 4, 10.

³ Prov. xxvii. 6.

knowledge in the balance with other things, and to take the true value thereof by testimonies and arguments divine and human.

VI. First therefore let us seek the dignity of Knowledge in the archetype or first platform, which is in the attributes and acts of God, as far as they are revealed to man and may be observed with sobriety; wherein we may not seek it by the name of Learning; for all Learning is Knowledge acquired, and all Knowledge in God is original: and therefore we must look for it by another name, that of Wisdom or Sapience, as the Scriptures call it.

*Divine
proofs of the
Dignity of
Knowledge.*

It is so then, that in the work of the creation we see a double emanation of Virtue from God; the one referring more properly to Power, the other to Wisdom;⁴ the one expressed in making the subsistence of the matter, and the other in disposing the beauty of the form. This being supposed, it is to be observed that for anything which appeareth in the history of the creation, the confused mass and matter of Heaven and Earth was made in a moment; and the order and disposition of that chaos or mass was the work of six days; such a note of difference it pleased God to put upon the works of Power, and the works of Wisdom; wherewith concurrerth, that in the former it is not set down that God said, *Let there be heaven and earth*, as it is set down of the works following; but actually, that God made Heaven and Earth: the one carrying the style of a Manufacture, and the other of a Law, Decree, or Counsel.

2. To proceed to that which is next in order from God to Spirits; we find, as far as credit is to be given to the celestial hierarchy of that supposed Dionysius the senator of Athens, the first place or degree is given to the angels of Love, which are termed Seraphim; the second to the angels of Light, which are termed Cherubim; and the third, and so following places, to Thrones, Principalities, and the rest, which are all angels of power and ministry; so as the angels of Knowledge and Illumination are placed before the angels of Office and Domination.⁵

3. To descend from Spirits and Intellectual Forms to

⁴ Compare Hooker, v. 56. 5. ⁵ Vid. Dionys. *Hierarch.* 7, 8, 9.

Sensible and Material Forms; we read the first Form that was created was *Light*,⁶ which hath a relation and correspondence in nature and corporal things to Knowledge in Spirits and incorporeal things.

So in the distribution of days we see the day wherein God did rest and contemplate His own works, was blessed above all the days wherein He did effect and accomplish them.⁷

4. After the creation was finished, it is set down unto us that man was placed in the garden to work therein; which work, so appointed to him, could be no other than work of Contemplation; that is, when the end of work is but for exercise and experiment, not for necessity; for there being then no reluctance of the creature, nor sweat of the brow, man's employment must of consequence have been matter of delight in the experiment, and not matter of labour for the use. Again, the first acts which man performed in Paradise consisted of the two summary parts of knowledge; the view of creatures, and the imposition of names.⁸ As for the knowledge which induced the fall, it was, as was touched before, not the natural knowledge of creatures, but the moral knowledge of good and evil; wherein the supposition was, that God's commandments or prohibitions were not the originals of good and evil, but that they had other beginnings, which man aspired to know; to the end to make a total defection from God and to depend wholly upon himself.

5. To pass on: in the first event or occurrence after the fall of man, we see, (as the Scriptures have infinite mysteries, not violating at all the truth of the story or letter,) an image of the two estates, the contemplative state and the active state, figured in the two persons of Abel and Cain, and in the two simplest and most primitive trades of life; that of the shepherd, (who, by reason of his leisure, rest in a place, and living in view of heaven, is a lively image of a contemplative life,) and that of the husbandman:⁹ where we see again the favour and election of God went to the shepherd, and not to the tiller of the ground.

6. So in the age before the flood, the holy records within those few memorials which are there entered and registered, have vouchsafed to mention and honour

the name of the inventors and authors of music and works in metal.¹ In the age after the flood, the first great judgment of God upon the ambition of man was the confusion of tongues;² whereby the open trade and intercourse of learning and knowledge was chiefly imbarred.

7. To descend to Moses the lawgiver, and God's first pen: he is adorned by the Scriptures with this addition and commendation, *That he was seen in all the learning of the Egyptians;*³ which nation, we know, was one of the most ancient schools of the world: for so Plato brings in the Egyptian priest saying unto Solon: *You Grecians are ever children; you have no knowledge of antiquity, nor antiquity of knowledge.*⁴ Take a view of the ceremonial law of Moses; you shall find, besides the prefiguration of Christ, the badge or difference of the people of God, the exercise and impression of obedience, and other divine uses and fruits thereof, that some of the most learned Rabbins have travailed profitably and profoundly to observe, some of them a natural, some of them a moral sense, or reduction of many of the ceremonies and ordinances. As in the law of the leprosy, where it is said, *If the whiteness have overspread the flesh, the patient may pass abroad for clean; but if there be any whole flesh remaining, he is to be shut up for unclean;*⁵ one of them noteth a principle of nature, that putrefaction is more contagious before maturity than after: and another noteth a position of moral philosophy, that men abandoned to vice do not so much corrupt manners, as those that are half good and half evil. So in this and very many other places in that law, there is to be found, besides the theological sense, much aspersation of philosophy.

8. So likewise in that excellent book of Job, if it be revolved with diligence, it will be found pregnant and swelling with natural philosophy; as for example, cosmography, and the roundness of the world. *Qui extendit aquilonem super vacuum, et appendit terram super nihilum;* wherein the pensileness of the earth, the pole of the north, and the finiteness or convexity of heaven are manifestly touched. So again, matter of astronomy; *Spiritus ejus ornavit celos, et obstetricante*

¹ Gen. iv. 21, 22.

² Gen. xi.

³ Act. Ap. vii. 22. ⁴ Plat. *Tim.* iii. 22. ⁵ Levit. xiii. 12-14.

*manu ejus eductus est coluber tortuosus.*⁶ And in another place; *Nunquid conjungere valebis micantes stellas Pleiadas, aut gyrum Arcturi poteris dissipare?*⁷ Where the fixing of the stars, ever standing at equal distance, is with great elegance noted. And in another place, *Qui facit Arcturum, et Orionem, et Hyadas, et interiora Austri;*⁸ where again he takes knowledge of the depression of the southern pole, calling it the secrets of the south, because the southern stars were in that climate unseen. Matter of generation: *Annun sicut lac mulisti me, et sicut caseum coagulasti me?* &c.⁹ Matter of minerals; *Habet argentum renarum suarum principia; et auro locus est in quo conflatur, ferrum de terra tollitur, et lapis solutus calore in aes vertitur;*¹ and so forwards in that chapter.

9. So likewise in the person of Solomon the King, we see the gift or endowment of wisdom and learning, both in Solomon's petition and in God's assent thereunto, preferred before all other terrene and temporal felicity.² By virtue of which grant or donative of God Solomon became enabled not only to write those excellent Parables or Aphorisms concerning divine and moral philosophy; but also to compile a Natural History of all verdure, from the cedar upon the mountain to the moss upon the wall, (which is but a rudiment between putrefaction and a herb.) and also of all things that breathe or move.³ Nay, the same Solomon the king, although he excelled in the glory of treasure and magnificent buildings, of shipping and navigation, of service and attendance, of fame and renown, and the like, yet he maketh no claim to any of those glories, but only to the glory of inquisition of truth; for so he saith expressly, *The glory of God is to conceal a thing, but the glory of the king is to find it out;*⁴ as if, according to the innocent play of children, the Divine Majesty took delight to hide His works, to the end to have them found out; and as if kings could not obtain a greater honour than to be God's playfellows in that game; considering the great commandment of wits and means, whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from them.

10. Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the

⁶ Job xxvi. 7, 13.

⁷ xxxviii. 31.

⁸ ix. 9.

⁹ x. 10.

¹ xxviii. 1. Compare Sir Roderick Murchison's comment on this text in his lecture delivered in 1850, at the Royal Institution.

² 1 Kings iii. 5, seq.

³ iv. 33.

⁴ Prov. xxv. 2.

times after our Saviour came into the world; for our Saviour Himself did first show his power to subdue ignorance, by His conference with the priests and doctors of the law,⁵ before He showed His power to subdue nature by His miracles. And the coming of the Holy Spirit was chiefly figured and expressed in the similitude and gift of tongues, which are but *vehicula scientiæ*.⁶

11. So in the election of those instruments, which it pleased God to use for the plantation of the Faith, notwithstanding that at the first he did employ persons altogether unlearned, otherwise than by inspiration, more evidently to declare His immediate working, and to abase all human wisdom or knowledge; yet, nevertheless, that counsel of His was no sooner performed, but in the next vicissitude and succession He did send His Divine Truth into the world, waited on with other learnings, as with servants or handmaids: for so we see St. Paul, who was the only learned amongst the Apostles, had his pen most used in the Scriptures of the New Testament.

12. So again, we find that many of the ancient Bishops and Fathers of the Church were excellently read, and studied in all the learning of the heathen; insomuch, that the edict of the Emperor Julianus,⁷ whereby it was interdicted unto Christians to be admitted into schools, lectures, or exercises of learning, was esteemed and accounted a more pernicious engine and machination against the Christian Faith, than were all the sanguinary prosecutions of his predecessors; neither could the emulation and jealousy of Gregory the first of that name, bishop of Rome,⁸ ever obtain the opinion of piety or devotion; but contrariwise received the censure of humour, malignity, and pusillanimity, even amongst holy men; in that he designed to obliterate and extinguish the memory of heathen antiquity and authors. But contrariwise, it was the Christian church, which, amidst the inundations of the Scythians on the one side from the north-west, and the Saracens from the east, did preserve in the sacred lap and bosom thereof, the precious

⁵ Luke ii. 46.

⁶ Act. Ap. ii. 1.

⁷ Vid. Gibbon, vol. ii. c. 23, who quotes Julian. *Epist.* xlii.; and Ammian. xxii. 10, xxv. 5.

⁸ Vid. Gibbon, vol. iv. c. 45.

relics even of heathen learning, which otherwise had been extinguished, as if no such thing had ever been.

13. And we see before our eyes, that in the age of ourselves and our fathers, when it pleased God to call the Church of Rome to account for their degenerate manners and ceremonies, and sundry doctrines obnoxious, and framed to uphold the same abuses; at one and the same time it was ordained by the Divine Providence, that there should attend withal a renovation and new spring of all other knowledges. And, on the other side we see the Jesuits, (who partly in themselves, and partly by the emulation and provocation of their example, have much quickened and strengthened the state of learning,) we see, I say, what notable service and reparation they have done to the Roman see.

14. Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be observed, that there be two principal duties and services, besides ornament and illustration, which philosophy and human learning do perform to faith and religion. The one, because they are an effectual inducement to the exaltation of the glory of God: for as the Psalms and other Scriptures do often invite us to consider and magnify the great and wonderful works of God;⁹ so if we should rest only in the contemplation of the exterior of them, as they first offer themselves to our senses, we should do a like injury unto the Majesty of God, as if we should judge or construe of the store of some excellent jeweller, by that only which is set out toward the street in his shop. The other, because they minister a singular help and preservative against unbelief and error: for our Saviour saith, *You err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God;*¹ laying before us two books or volumes to study, if we will be secured from error; first, the Scriptures, revealing the Will of God; and then the creatures expressing His power; whereof the latter is a key unto the former: not only opening our understanding to conceive the true sense of the Scriptures, by the general notions of reason and rules of speech; but chiefly opening our belief, in drawing us into a due meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is chiefly signed and engraven upon His works. Thus much

⁹ Ps. xix. civ. See Humboldt's comment on the latter. *Cosmos*. vol. ii. p. 413.

¹ Matt. xxii. 29.

therefore for divine testimony and evidence concerning the true dignity and value of Learning.

Human Proofs. VII. As for human proofs, it is so large a field, as, in a discourse of this nature and brevity, it is fit rather to use choice of those things which we shall produce, than to embrace the variety of them. First, therefore, in the degrees of human honour amongst the heathen, it was the highest to obtain to a veneration and adoration as a God. This unto the Christians is as the forbidden fruit. But we speak now separately of human testimony: according to which, that which the Grecians call *apotheosis*, and the Latins, *relatio inter divos*, was the supreme honour which man could attribute unto man: especially when it was given, not by a formal decree or act of state, as it was used among the Roman Emperors, but by an inward assent and belief. Which honour, being so high, had also a degree or middle term: for there were reckoned above human honours, honours heroical and divine: in the attribution and distribution of which honours, we see antiquity made this difference: that whereas founders and uniters of states and cities, lawgivers, extirpers of tyrants, fathers of the people, and other eminent persons in civil merit, were honoured but with the titles of worthies or demi-gods; such as were Hercules, Theseus, Minos, Romulus, and the like: on the other side, such as were inventors and authors of new arts, endowments, and commodities towards man's life, were ever consecrated amongst the gods themselves; as were Ceres, Bacchus, Mercurius, Apollo, and others: and justly; for the merit of the former is confined within the circle of an age or a nation; and is like fruitful showers, which though they be profitable and good, yet serve but for that season, and for a latitude of ground where they fall; but the other is indeed like the benefits of heaven, which are permanent and universal. The former, again, is mixed with strife and perturbation; but the latter hath the true character of Divine Presence, coming in *aura leni*, without noise or agitation.

2. Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in repressing the inconveniences which grow from man to man, much inferior to the former, of relieving the necessities which arise from nature; which merit was lively set forth by the ancients in that feigned relation of Orpheus's theatre, where all beasts and birds assembled; and, forgetting their several appetites, some of prey, some of ie, some of quarrel, stood all sociably together listening

to the airs and accords of the harp; the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was drowned by some louder noise, but every beast returned to its own nature: wherein is aptly described the nature and condition of men, who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires of profit, of lust, of revenge; which as long as they give ear to precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence and persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues, so long is society and peace maintained; but if these instruments be silent, or that sedition and tumult make them not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and confusion.

3. But this appeareth more manifestly, when kings themselves, or persons of authority under them, or other governors in commonwealths and popular estates, are endued with learning. For although he might be thought partial to his own profession, that said, *Then should people and estates be happy, when either kings were philosophers, or philosophers kings;*² yet so much is verified by experience, that under learned princes and governors there have been ever the best times: for howsoever kings may have their imperfections in their passions and customs; yet if they be illuminate by learning, they have those notions of religion, policy, and morality, which do preserve them, and refrain them from all ruinous and peremptory errors and excesses; whispering evermore in their ears, when counsellors and servants stand mute and silent. And senators or counsellors likewise, which be learned, do proceed upon more safe and substantial principles, than counsellors which are only men of experience: the one sort keeping dangers afar off, whereas the other discover them not till they come near hand, and then trust to the agility of their wit to ward or avoid them.

4. Which felicity of times under learned princes, (to keep still the law of brevity, by using the most eminent and selected examples,) doth best appear in the age which passed from the death of Domitian the emperor until the reign of Commodus; comprehending a succession of six princes, all learned, or singular favourers and advancers of learning,³ which age for temporal respects, was the most happy and flourishing that ever the Roman empire, (which then was a model of the world,) enjoyed: a matter revealed and prefigured unto Domitian in a dream the night before he was slain; for he thought there was grown behind upon his shoulders a neck and a head of gold: which came

² Plat. (*Rep.* v.) ii. 475.

³ Suet., *Domit. Vit.*, c. 23.

accordingly to pass in those golden times which succeeded: of which princes we will make some commemoration; wherein although the matter will be vulgar, and may be thought fitter for a declamation than agreeable to a treatise infolded as this is, yet because it is pertinent to the point in hand, *Neque semper arcum tendit Apollo*,⁴ and to name them only were too naked and cursory, I will not omit it altogether. The first was Nerva; the excellent temper of whose government is by a glance in Cornelius Tacitus touched to the life: *Postquam diuus Nerva res olim insociabiles miscuisset, imperium et libertatem*.⁵ And in token of his learning, the last act of his short reign left to memory, was a missive to his adopted son Trajan, proceeding upon some inward discontent at the ingratitude of the times, comprehended in a verse of Homer's:

Telis, Phœbe, tuis lacrymas ulciscere, nostras.⁶

5. Trajan, who succeeded, was for his person not learned: but if we will hearken to the speech of our Saviour, that saith, *He that receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet, shall have a prophet's reward*,⁷ he deserveth to be placed amongst the most learned princes: for there was not a greater admirer of learning, or benefactor of learning; a founder of famous libraries, a perpetual advancer of learned men to office, and a familiar converser with learned professors and preceptors, who were noted to have then most credit in court. On the other side, how much Trajan's virtue and government was admired and renowned, surely no testimony of grave and faithful history doth more lively set forth, than that legend tale of Gregorius Magnus, bishop of Rome, who was noted for the extreme envy he bore towards all heathen excellency: and yet he is reported, out of the love and estimation of Trajan's moral virtues, to have made unto God passionate and fervent prayers for the delivery of his soul out of hell: and to have obtained it, with a caveat that he should make no more such petitions. In this prince's time also, the persecution against the Christians received intermission, upon the certificate of Plinius Secundus, a man of excellent learning, and by Trajan advanced.⁸

⁴ Hor. Od. ii. 10, 19.

⁵ Agric. Vit. c. 3.

⁶ Τίμαια Δαναοὶ ἐμὰ δάκρυα σοῖσι βέλεσσιν. Hom. Il. a. 42.

Vid. Dio Cassius lxxviii. p. 771.

⁷ Matt. x. 41.

⁸ C. Plin. Trajan. Imp. x. 97. See an account of the letter referred to, with Trajan's reply, in Paley's *Evidences of Christianity*, Part I. c. i. and Part II. c. ix.

6. Adrian, his successor, was the most curious man that lived, and the most universal inquirer; insomuch as it was noted for an error in his mind, that he desired to comprehend all things, and not to reserve himself for the worthiest things: falling into the like humour that was long before noted in Philip of Macedon; who, when he would needs over-rule and put down an excellent musician in an argument touching music, was well answered by him again, *God forbid, sir, saith he; that your fortune should be so bad, as to know these things better than I.*⁹ It pleased God likewise to use the curiosity of this emperor as an inducement to the peace of his Church in those days. For having Christ in veneration, not as a God or Saviour, but as a wonder or novelty; and having his picture in his gallery, matched with Apollonius, with whom in his vain imagination he thought he had some conformity; yet it served the turn to allay the bitter hatred of those times against the Christian name, so as the Church had peace during his time. And for his government civil, although he did not attain to that of Trajan's in glory of arms, or perfection of justice, yet in deserving of the weal of the subject he did exceed him. For Trajan erected many famous monuments and buildings; insomuch as Constantine the Great in emulation was wont to call him *Parietaria*,¹ (*wall-flower*;) because his name was upon so many walls: but his buildings and works were more of glory and triumph than use and necessity. But Adrian spent his whole reign, which was peaceable, in a perambulation or survey of the Roman empire; giving order and making assignation where he went, for re-edifying of cities, towns, and forts decayed; and for cutting of rivers and streams, and for making bridges and passages, and for policing of cities and commonalties with new ordinances and constitutions, and granting new franchises and incorporations; so that his whole time was a very restoration of all the lapses and decays of former times.

7. Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was a prince excellently learned; and had the patient and subtle wit of a schoolman; insomuch as in common speech, which leaves no virtue untaxed, he was called *Cymini Sector*,² (a carver

⁹ Plutarch. *Apophth.* 179.

¹ *Βοράνη τοίχου*. Adrian he called *ἐργαλεῖον ζωγραφικόν*. So a collection of *Excerpta*, published by Mai, from an anonymous writer, who continued the history of Dio Cassius. I have not been able to meet with the place whence Bacon took the anecdote.

² *Unum de istis puto qui euminum secant*. Julian. *Cas.*

or divider of cummin,) which is one of the least seeds ; such a patience he had and settled spirit, to enter into the least and most exact differences of causes ; a fruit no doubt of the exceeding tranquillity and serenity of his mind ; which being no ways charged or incumbered, either with fears, remorse, or scruples, but having been noted for a man of the purest goodness, without all fiction or affectation, that hath reigned or lived, made his mind continually present and entire. He likewise approached a degree nearer unto Christianity, and became, as Agrippa said unto St. Paul, half a Christian ;³ holding their religion and law in good opinion, and not only ceasing persecution, but giving way to the advancement of Christians.

8. There succeeded him the first *Divi fratres*, the two adoptive brethren, Lucius Commodus Verus,⁴ (son to Ælius Verus, who delighted much in the softer kind of learning, and was wont to call the poet Martial his Virgil,⁵) and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus ; whereof the latter, who obscured his colleague and survived him long, was named the philosopher : who, as he excelled all the rest in learning, so he excelled them likewise in perfection of all royal virtues ; insomuch as Julianus the emperor, in his book entitled *Cæsares*, being as a pasquill or satire to deride all his predecessors, feigned that they were all invited to a banquet of the gods, and Silenus the jester sat at the nether end of the table, and bestowed a scoff on every one as they came in ; but when Marcus Philosophus came in, Silenus was gravelled, and out of countenance, not knowing where to carp at him ; save at the last he gave a glance at his patience towards his wife. And the virtue of this prince, continued with that of his predecessor, made the name of Antoninus so sacred in the world, that though it were extremely dishonoured in Commodus, Caracalla, and Heliogabalus, who all bore the name, yet when Alexander Severus refused the name, because he was a stranger to the family, the senate with one acclamation said, *Quomodo Augustus, sic et Antoninus*.⁶ In such renown and veneration was the name of these two princes, in those days, that they would have it as a perpetual addition in all the emperor's style. In this emperor's time also the Church for the most part was in peace ; so as in this sequence of six

³ Acts Ap. xxvi. 28.

⁴ Better known as L. Aurelius Verus.

⁵ See his life by Spartianus.

⁶ An account of the absurd scene here alluded to is given by Lampridius, in his life of Severus.

princes we do see the blessed effects of learning in sovereignty, painted forth in the greatest table of the world.

9. But for a tablet, or picture of smaller volume, (not presuming to speak of your majesty that liveth,) in my judgment the most excellent is that of Queen Elizabeth, your immediate predecessor in this part of Britain; a princess that, if Plutarch were now alive to write lives by parallels, would trouble him, I think, to find for her a parallel amongst women. This lady was endued with learning in her sex singular, and great⁷ even amongst masculine princes; whether we speak of learning, of language, or of science, modern or ancient, Divinity or Humanity: and unto the very last year of her life she was accustomed to appoint set hours for reading, scarcely any young student in a university more daily, or more duly. As for her government, I assure myself, I shall not exceed, if I do affirm that this part of the island never had forty-five years of better times; and yet not through the calmness of the season, but through the wisdom of her regiment. For if there be considered of the one side, the truth of religion established, the constant peace and security, the good administration of justice, the temperate use of the prerogative, not slackened, nor much strained, the flourishing state of learning, sortable to so excellent a patroness, the convenient estate of wealth and means, both of Crown and subject, the habit of obedience, and the moderation of discontents; and there be considered on the other side the differences of religion, the troubles of neighbour countries, the ambition of Spain, and opposition of Rome; and then, that she was solitary and of herself: these things, I say, considered, as I could not have chosen an instance so recent and so proper, so, I suppose, I could not have chosen one more remarkable or eminent to the purpose now in hand, which is concerning the conjunction of learning in the prince with felicity in the people.

10. Neither hath learning an influence and operation only upon civil merit and moral virtue, and the arts or temperature of peace and peaceable government; but likewise it hath no less power and efficacy in enablement towards martial and military virtue and prowess; as may be notably represented in the examples of Alexander the Great, and Caesar the dictator, mentioned before, but now in fit place to be resumed: of whose virtues and acts in war there needs no note or recital, having been the wonders of time

⁷ Edit. 1633, *rare*.

in that kind: but of their affections towards learning, and perfections in learning, it is pertinent to say somewhat.

II. Alexander^s was bred and taught under Aristotle, the great philosopher, who dedicated divers of his books of philosophy unto him: he was attended with Callisthenes and divers other learned persons, that followed him in camp, throughout his journeys and conquests. What price and estimation he had learning in doth notably appear in these three particulars: first, in the envy he used to express that he bore towards Achilles, in this, that he had so good a trumpet of his praises as Homer's verses; secondly, in the judgment or solution he gave touching that precious cabinet of Darius, which was found among his jewels; whereof question was made what thing was worthy to be put into it; and he gave his opinion for Homer's works: thirdly, in his letter to Aristotle, after he had set forth his books of nature, wherein he expostulated with him for publishing the secrets or mysteries of philosophy; and gave him to understand that himself esteemed it more to excel other men in learning and knowledge than in power and empire. And what use he had of learning doth appear, or rather shine, in all his speeches and answers, being full of science, and use of science, and that in all variety.

And herein again it may seem a thing scholastical, and somewhat idle, to recite things that every man knoweth; but yet, since the argument I handle leadeth me thereunto, I am glad that men shall perceive I am as willing to flatter, if they will so call it, an Alexander, or a Cæsar, or an Antoninus, that are dead many hundred years since, as any that now liveth: for it is the displaying of the glory of learning in sovereignty that I propound to myself, and not an humour of declaiming in any man's praises. Observe then the speech he used of Diogenes, and see if it tend not to the true state of one of the greatest questions of moral philosophy; whether the enjoying of outward things, or the contemning of them, be the greatest happiness: for when he saw Diogenes so perfectly contented with so little, he said to those that mocked at his condition, *Were I not Alexander, I would wish to be Diogenes.* But Seneca invefteth it, and saith; *Plus erat, quod hic nollet accipere, quàm quod ille posset dare.*⁹ (*There were more things which Diogenes would have refused, than there were which Alexander could have given.*)

^s For these anecdotes of Alexander, see Plutarch, *Vit. Alex.*, passim.

⁹ Sen. *De Benef.* v. 5.

Observe again that speech which was usual with him, *That he felt his mortality chiefly in two things, sleep and lust;*¹ and see if it were not a speech extracted out of the depth of natural philosophy, and liker to have come out of the mouth of Aristotle or Democritus, than from Alexander.

See again that speech of humanity and poesy; when upon the bleeding of his wounds, he called unto him one of his flatterers, that was wont to ascribe to him divine honour, and said, *Look, this is very blood; this is not such a liquor as Homer speaketh of, which ran from Venus' hand, when it was pierced by Diomedes.*²

See likewise his readiness in reprehension of logic, in the speech he used to Cassander, upon a complaint that was made against his father Antipater: for when Alexander happened to say, *Do you think these men would have come from so far to complain, except they had just cause of grief?* And Cassander answered, *Yea, that was the matter, because they thought they should not be disproved.* Said Alexander laughing: *See the subtilties of Aristotle, to take a matter both ways, pro et contra, &c.*

But note again how well he could use the same art, which he reprehended, to serve his own humour: when bearing a secret grudge to Callisthenes, because he was against the new ceremony of his adoration, feasting one night where the same Callisthenes was at the table, it was moved by some after supper, for entertainment sake, that Callisthenes, who was an eloquent man, might speak of some theme or purpose, at his own choice: which Callisthenes did: choosing the praise of the Macedonian nation for his discourse, and performing the same with so good manner, as the hearers were much ravished: whereupon Alexander, nothing pleased, said, *It was easy to be eloquent upon so good a subject.* But, saith he, *Turn your style, and let us hear what you can say against us:* which Callisthenes presently undertook, and did with that sting and life, that Alexander interrupted him, and said, *The goodness of the cause made him eloquent before, and despite made him eloquent then again.*

Consider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that excellent use of a metaphor or translation, wherewith he taxed Antipater, who was an imperious and tyrannous governor: for when one of Antipater's friends commended him to Alexander for his moderation, that he did not degenerate,

¹ Vid. Sen., *Ep. Mor.* vi. 7.

² Ἰχὼρ, οὗς πέρ τε ῥέει μακάρισι θεοῖσι. *Il.* ε. 340.

as his other lieutenants did, into the Persian pride, in use of purple, but kept the ancient habit of Macedon, of black; *True*, saith Alexander, *but Antipater is all purple within.*³ Or that other, when Parmenio came to him in the plain of Arbela, and showed him the innumerable multitude of his enemies, especially as they appeared by the infinite number of lights, as it had been a new firmament of stars, and thereupon advised him to assail them by night: whereupon he answered, *That he would not steal the victory.*

For matter of policy, weigh that significant distinction, so much in all ages embraced, that he made between his two friends, Hephestion and Craterus, when he said, *That the one loved Alexander, and the other loved the king:* describing the principal difference of princes' best servants, that some in affection love their person, and others in duty love their crown.

Weigh also that excellent taxation of an error, ordinary with counsellors of princes, that they counsel their masters according to the model of their own mind and fortune, and not of their masters'; when, upon Darius's great offers, Parmenio had said, *Surely I would accept these offers, were I as Alexander;* saith Alexander, *So would I, were I as Parmenio.*

Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply, which he made when he gave so large gifts to his friends and servants, and was asked what he did reserve for himself, and he answered, *Hope:* weigh, I say, whether he had not cast up his account right, because *hope* must be the portion of all that resolve upon great enterprises. For this was Caesar's portion when he went first into Gaul, his estate being then utterly overthrown with largesses. And this was likewise the portion of that noble prince, howsoever transported with ambition, Henry Duke of Guise, of whom it was usually said, that he was the greatest usurer in France, because he had turned all his estate into obligations.

To conclude, therefore: as certain critics are used to say hyperbolically, *That if all sciences were lost they might be found in Virgil!* so certainly this may be said truly, there are the prints and footstaps of learning in those few speeches which are reported of this prince: the admiration of whom, when I consider him not as Alexander the Great, but as Aristotle's scholar, hath carried me too far.

12. As for Julius Caesar, the excellency of his learning needeth not to be argued from his education, or his

³ ὁλοπόρφυρος. *Arrop. Reg. et Imp.*

company, or his speeches; but in a further degree doth declare itself in his writings and works; whereof some are extant and permanent, and some unfortunately perished. For, first, we see there is left unto us that excellent history of his own wars, which he intitled only a Commentary, wherein all succeeding times have admired the solid weight of matter, and the real passages and lively images of actions and persons, expressed in the greatest propriety of words and perspicuity of narration that ever was; which that it was not the effect of a natural gift, but of learning and precept, is well witnessed by that work of his, entitled, *De Analogia*,⁴ being a grammatical philosophy, wherein he did labour to make this same *Vox ad placitum* to become *Vox ad licitum*, and to reduce custom of speech to congruity of speech; and took, as it were, the picture of words from the life of reason.

So we receive from him, as a monument both of his power and learning, the then reformed computation of the year; well expressing that he took it to be as great a glory to himself to observe and know the law of the heavens, as to give law to men upon the earth.

So likewise in that book of his, *Anti-Cato*,⁵ it may easily appear that he did aspire as well to victory of wit as victory of war: undertaking therein a conflict against the greatest champion with the pen that then lived, Cicero the Orator.

So again in this book of Apophthegms, which he collected, we see that he esteemed it more honour to make himself but a pair of tables, to take the wise and pithy words of others, than to have every word of his own to be made an apophthegm or an oracle; as vain princes, by custom of flattery, pretend to do.⁶ And yet if I should enumerate divers of his speeches, as I did those of Alexander, they are truly such as Solomon noteth, when he saith, *Verba sapientum tanquam aculei, et tanquam clavi in altum defixi*.⁷ whereof I will only recite three, not so delectable for elegancy, but admirable for vigour and efficacy.

As, first, it is reason he be thought a master of words, that could with one word appease a mutiny in his army, which was thus: The Romans, when their generals did speak to their army, did use the word *milites*, but when

⁴ Vid. Cic. *Brutus*, 72.

⁵ Vid. Cic. *ad Att.* xii. 40, 41. xiii. 50. and *Top.* xxv.

⁶ Cic. *ad Fam.* ix. 16.

⁷ *Ecc.* xii. 11.

the magistrates spake to the people, they did use the word *Quirites*. The soldiers were in tumult, and seditiously prayed to be cashiered; not that they so meant, but by expostulation thereof to draw Cæsar to other conditions; wherein he being resolute not to give way, after some silence, he began his speech, *Ego Quirites*,⁸ which did admit them already cashiered; wherewith they were so surprised, crossed, and confused, as they would not suffer him to go on in his speech, but relinquished their demands, and made it their suit to be again called by the name of *milites*.

The second speech was thus: Cæsar did extremely affect the name of king; and some were set on as he passed by, in popular acclamation to salute him king: whereupon, finding the cry weak and poor, he put it off thus, in a kind of jest, as if they had mistaken his surname; *Non Rex sum, sed Cæsar*;⁹ a speech, that if it be searched, the life and fulness of it can scarce be expressed. For, first, it was a refusal of the name, but yet not serious: again, it did signify an infinite confidence and magnanimity, as if he presumed Cæsar was the greater title; as by his worthiness it is come to pass till this day: but chiefly it was a speech of great allurements toward his own purpose; as if the state did strive with him but for a name, whereof mean families were vested; for *Rex* was a surname with the Romans, as well as *King* is with us.

The last speech which I will mention, was used to Metellus; when Cæsar, after war declared, did possess himself of the city of Rome; at which time entering into the inner treasury to take the money there accumulated, Metellus, being tribune, forbade him: whereto Cæsar said, *That if he did not desist, he would lay him dead in the place*. And presently taking himself up, he added, *Adolescens, durius est mihi hoc dicere quàm facere*. *Young man, it is harder for me to speak than to do it*.¹ A speech compounded of the greatest terror and greatest clemency that could proceed out of the mouth of man.

But to return and conclude with him; it is evident, himself knew well his own perfection in learning, and took it upon him; as appeared when, upon occasion that some spake what a strange resolution it was in Lucius Sylla to resign his dictatorship; he scoffing at him, to his own advan-

⁸ Suet. in *Vit. Jul. Cæs.*, c. 70.

⁹ *Ibid.* c. 79.

¹ Plutarch; cf. *Cic. ad Att.* x. 8.

tage, answered, *That Sylla could not skill of letters, and therefore knew not how to dictate.*²

13. And here it were fit to leave this point, touching the concurrence of military virtue and learning, for what example would come with any grace after those two of Alexander and Cæsar? were it not in regard of the rareness of circumstance, that I find in one other particular, as that which did so suddenly pass from extreme scorn to extreme wonder; and it is of Xenophon the philosopher, who went from Socrates' school into Asia, in the expedition of Cyrus the younger, against King Artaxerxes. This Xenophon at that time was very young, and never had seen the wars before; neither had any command in the army, but only followed the war as a voluntary, for the love and conversation of Proxenus his friend.³ He was present when Falinus came in message from the great king to the Grecians, after that Cyrus was slain in the field, and they a handful of men left to themselves in the midst of the king's territories, cut off from their country by many navigable rivers, and many hundred miles. The message imported, that they should deliver up their arms, and submit themselves to the king's mercy. To which message before answer was made, divers of the army conferred familiarly with Falinus: and amongst the rest Xenophon happened to say, *Why, Falinus, we have now but these two things left, our arms and our virtue; and if we yield up our arms, how shall we make use of our virtue?* Whereto Falinus smiling on him, said, *If I be not deceived, young gentleman, you are an Athenian: and, I believe you study philosophy, and it is pretty that you say: but you are much abused, if you think your virtue can withstand the king's power.*⁴ Here was the scorn; the wonder followed: which was, that this young scholar, or philosopher, after all the captains were murdered in parley by treason, conducted those ten thousand foot, through the heart of all the king's high countries, from Babylon to Græcia in safety, in despite of all the king's forces, to the astonishment of the world, and the encouragement of the Grecians in time succeeding to make invasion upon the kings of Persia: as was after purposed by Jason the Thessalian, attempted by Agesilaus the Spartan, and achieved by Alexander the Macedonian, all upon the ground of the act of that young scholar.

² Suet. in Vit. c. 77.

³ Xen. Anab. ii. ad fin.

⁴ Ibid. ii. 1. 12.

VIII. To proceed now from imperial and military virtue to moral and private virtue: first, it is an assured truth, which is contained in the verses:

*Further
Proofs of
the same.*

Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes,
Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.⁵

It taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of men's minds; but indeed the accent had need be upon *fideliter*: for a little superficial learning doth rather work a contrary effect. It taketh away all levity, temerity, and insolency, by copious suggestion of all doubts and difficulties, and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on both sides, and to turn back the first offers and conceits of the mind, and to accept of nothing but examined and tried. It taketh away vain admiration of anything, which is the root of all weakness: for all things are admired either because they are new, or because they are great. For novelty, no man that wadeth in learning or contemplation thoroughly, but will find that printed in his heart *Nil novi super terram*.⁶ Neither can any man marvel at the play of puppets, that goeth behind the curtain, and adviseth well of the motion. And for magnitude, as Alexander the Great, after that he was used to great armies, and the great conquests of the spacious provinces in Asia, when he received letters out of Greece, of some fights and services there, which were commonly for a passage or a fort, or some walled town at the most, he said, *It seemed to him, that he was advertised of the Battle of the Frogs and the Mice, that the old tales went of*. So certainly, if a man meditate much upon the universal frame of nature, the earth with men upon it, (the divineness of souls except,) will not seem much other than an ant-hill, whereas some ants carry corn, and some carry their young, and some go empty, and all to-and-fro a little heap of dust. It taketh away or mitigateth fear of death, or adverse fortune; which is one of the greatest impediments of virtue, and imperfections of manners. For if a man's mind be deeply seasoned with the consideration of the mortality and corruptible nature of things, he will easily concur with Epictetus, who went forth one day and saw a woman weeping for her pitcher of earth that was broken; and went forth the next day and saw a woman weeping for her son that was dead, and thereupon said:

⁵ Ov. Ep. Pont. ii. ix. 47.

⁶ Eccl. i. 9.

*Hæri vidi fragilem frangi, hodie vidi mortalem mori.*⁷
 And therefore Virgil did excellently and profoundly couple the knowledge of causes and the conquest of all fears together, as *Concomitantia*.

Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
 Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum
 Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.⁸

2. It were too long to go over the particular remedies which learning doth minister to all the diseases of the mind; sometimes purging the ill-humours, sometimes opening the obstructions, sometimes helping digestion, sometimes increasing appetite, sometimes healing the wounds and exulcerations thereof, and the like; and, therefore, I will conclude with that which hath *rationem totius*, which is, that it disposeth the constitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in the defects thereof, but still to be capable and susceptible of growth and reformation. For the unlearned man knows not what it is to descend into himself, or to call himself to account; nor the pleasure of that *Suavissima vita, indices sentire se fieri meliorem*.⁹ The good parts he hath he will learn to show to the full, and use them dexterously, but not much to increase them: the faults he hath he will learn how to hide and colour them, but not much to amend them: like an ill mower, that mows on still, and never whets his scythe. Whereas with the learned man it fares otherwise, that he doth ever intermix the correction and amendment of his mind with the use and employment thereof. Nay, further, in general and in sum, certain it is that *Veritas* and *Bonitas* differ but as the seal and the print: for Truth prints Goodness; and they be the clouds of error which descend in the storms of passions and perturbations.

3. From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power and commandment, and consider whether in right reason there be any comparable with that wherewith knowledge investeth and crowneth man's nature. We see the dignity of the commandment is according to the dignity of the commanded: to have commandment over beasts, as herdmen have, is a thing contemptible; to have commandment over children, as schoolmasters have, is a matter of small honour; to have commandment over galley-slaves is a disparagement rather than an honour. Neither is the command-

⁷ See Epictetus *Enchir.* c. 33, with the comment of Simplicius.

⁸ *Georg.* ii. 490.

⁹ Vid. Plato. *Alcib. Prim.* ii. 133.

ment of tyrants much better, over people which have put off the generosity of their minds : and therefore it was ever holden that honours in free monarchies and commonwealths had a sweetness more than in tyrannies ; because the commandment extendeth more over the wills of men, and not only over their deeds and services. And therefore, when Virgil putteth himself forth to attribute to Augustus Cæsar the best of human honours, he doth it in these words :

Victorque volentes

Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo.¹

But yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the commandment over the will ; for it is a commandment over the reason, belief, and understanding of man, which is the highest part of the mind, and giveth law to the will itself. For there is no power on earth which setteth up a throne or chair of state in the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and learning. And therefore we see the detestable and extreme pleasure that arch-heretics, and false prophets, and impostors are transported with, when they once find in themselves that they have a superiority in the faith and conscience of men ; so great as if they have once tasted of it, it is seldom seen that any torture or persecution can make them relinquish or abandon it. But as this is that which the author of the Revelation calleth the depth or profoundness of Satan :² so by argument of contraries, the just and lawful sovereignty over men's understanding, by force of truth rightly interpreted, is that which approacheth nearest to the similitude of the Divine Rule.

4. As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence of learning is not so confined to give fortune only to states and commonwealths, as it doth not likewise give fortune to particular persons. For it was well noted long ago, that Homer hath given more men their livings, than either Sylla, or Cæsar, or Augustus ever did, notwithstanding their great largesses and donatives, and distributions of lands to so many legions. And no doubt it is hard to say, whether arms or learning have advanced greater numbers. And in case of sovereignty we see, that if arms or descent have carried away the kingdom, yet learning hath carried the priesthood, which ever hath been in some competition with empire.

¹ *Georg.* iv. 562.

² *Rev.* ii. 24.

5. Again, for the pleasure and delight of knowledge and learning, it far surpasseth all other in nature: for, shall the pleasures of the affections so exceed the senses, as much as the obtaining of desire or victory exceedeth a song or a dinner; and must not, of consequence, the pleasures of the intellect or understanding exceed the pleasures of the affections? We see in all other pleasures there is satiety and after they be used, their verdure departeth; which showeth well they be but deceits of pleasure, and no pleasures: and that it was the novelty which pleased, and not the quality: and therefore we see that voluptuous men turn friars, and ambitious princes turn melancholy. But of knowledge there is no satiety, but satisfaction and appetite are perpetually interchangeable; and therefore appeareth to be good in itself simply, without fallacy or accident. Neither is that pleasure of small efficacy and contentment to the mind of man, which the poet Lucretius describeth elegantly,

Suave mari magno, turbantibus æquora ventis, &c.³

It is a view of delight, saith he, to stand or walk upon the shore side, and to see a ship tossed with tempest upon the sea; or to be in a fortified tower, and to see two battles join upon a plain; but it is a pleasure incomparable, for the mind of man to be settled, landed, and fortified in the certainty of truth; and from thence to descry and behold the errors, perturbations, labours, and wanderings up and down of other men.

6. Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that by learning man excelleth man in that wherein man excelleth beasts that by learning man ascendeth to the heavens and the motions, where in body he cannot come, and the like; let us conclude with the dignity and excellency of knowledge and learning in that whereunto man's nature doth most aspire, which is, immortality or continuance: for to the tendeth generation, and raising of houses and families; to this buildings, foundations, and monuments; to this tendeth the desire of memory, fame, and celebration, and in effect the strength of all other human desires. We see then how far the monuments of wit and learning are more durable than the monuments of power or of the hand. For have not the verses of Homer continued twenty-five hundred years, or more, without the loss of a syllable

³ *De Rer. Nat.*, ii. init.

letter ; during which time, infinite palaces, temples, castles, cities, have been decayed and demolished? It is not possible to have the true pictures or statues of Cyrus, Alexander, Cæsar ; no, nor of the kings or great personages of much later years ; for the originals cannot last, and the copies cannot but lose of the life and truth. But the images of men's wits and knowledges remain in books, exempted from the wrong of time, and capable of perpetual renovation. Neither are they fitly to be called images, because they generate still, and cast their seeds in the minds of others, provoking and causing infinite actions and opinions in succeeding ages : so that, if the invention of the ship was thought so noble, which carrieth riches and commodities from place to place, and consociateth the most remote regions in participation of their fruits, how much more are letters to be magnified, which, as ships, pass through the vast seas of time, and make ages so distant to participate of the wisdom, illuminations, and inventions, the one of the other? Nay further, we see some of the philosophers which were least divine, and most immersed in the senses, and denied generally the immortality of the soul, yet came to this point, that whatsoever motions the spirit of man could act and perform without the organs of the body, they thought might remain after death, which were only those of the understanding, and not of the affection : so immortal and incorruptible a thing did knowledge seem unto them to be. But we, that know by divine revelation that not only the understanding but the affections purified, not only the spirit but the body changed, shall be advanced to immortality, do disclaim in these rudiments of the senses. But it must be remembered both in this last point, and so it may likewise be needful in other places, that in probation of the dignity of knowledge or learning, I did in the beginning separate divine testimony from human, which method I have pursued, and so handled them both apart.

7. Nevertheless, I do not pretend, and I know it will be impossible for me, by any pleading of mine, to reverse the judgment, either of Æsop's Cock, that preferred the barley-corn before the gem ; or of Midas, that being chosen judge between Apollo, president of the Muses, and Pan, god of the flocks, judged for plenty :⁴ or of Paris, that judged for beauty and love against wisdom and power ;⁵ nor of Agrippina, *Occidat matrem, modo imperet*, that preferred

⁴ Ov. *Met.* xi. 153, seq.

⁵ Eurip. *Troad.* 924, sq.

empire with conditions never so detestable;⁶ or of Ulysse *Qui vetulam prætulit immortalitati*,⁷ being a figure of those which prefer custom and habit before all excellency; or a number of the like popular judgments. For these things continue as they have been: but so will that also continue wherupon learning hath ever relied, and which faileth not *Justificata est sapientia a filiis suis*.⁸

⁶ Tacit. *Annal.* xiv. 9.

⁷ Cf. Cic. *de Orat.* i. 44.

⁸ Matt. xi. 19.

THE
SECOND BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON,
OF THE PROFICIENCE AND
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,
DIVINE AND HUMAN.

To the King.

IT might seem to have more convenience, though it come often otherwise to pass, excellent King, that those, which are fruitful in their generations, and have in themselves the foresight of immortality in their descendants, should likewise be more careful of the good estate of future times, unto which they know they must transmit and commend over their dearest pledges. Queen Elizabeth was a sojourner in the world in respect of her unmarried life, and was a blessing to her own times: and yet so as the impression of her good government, besides her happy memory, is not without some effect which doth survive her. But to your Majesty, whom God hath already blessed with so much royal issue, worthy to continue and represent you for ever; and whose youthful and fruitful bed doth yet promise many of the like renovations; it is proper and agreeable to be conversant not only in the transitory parts of good government, but in those acts also which are in their nature permanent and perpetual: amongst the which, if affection do not transport me, there is not any more worthy than the further endowment of the world with sound and fruitful knowledge. For why should a few received authors stand up like Hercules' columns, beyond which there should be no sailing or discovering, since we have so bright and benign a star as your Majesty to conduct and prosper us? To return therefore where we left, it remaineth to consider of what kind those acts are which have been undertaken and performed by kings and others for the increase and advancement of learning: wherein I purpose to speak actively without digressing or dilating.

*The Advancement
of Learning
commended to
the care of
Kings.*

2. Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works are overcome by amplitude of reward, by soundness of direction, and by the conjunction of labours. The first multiplieth endeavour, the second preventeth error, and the third supplieth the frailty of man: but the principal of these is direction: for *Claudius in via antevertit cursorem extra viam*; and Solomon excellently setteth it down, *If the iron be not sharp, it requireth more strength; but wisdom is that which prevaieth*;¹ signifying that the invention or election of the mean is more effectual than any inforcement or accumulation of endeavours. This I am induced to speak, for that (not derogating from the noble intention of any that have been deservers towards the state of learning) I do observe, nevertheless, that their works and acts are rather matters of magnificence and memory, than of progression and proficience; and tend rather to augment the mass of learning in the multitude of learned men, than to rectify or raise the Sciences themselves.

3. The works or acts of merit towards learning are conversant about three objects: the places of learning, the books of learning, and the persons of the learned. For as water, whether it be the dew of heaven, or the springs of the earth, doth scatter and leese itself in the ground, except it be collected into some receptacle, where it may by union comfort and sustain itself, (and for that cause the industry of man hath made and framed spring-heads, conduits, cisterns, and pools, which men have accustomed likewise to beautify and adorn with accomplishments of magnificence and state, as well as of use and necessity) so this excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it descend from divine inspiration, or spring from human sense, would soon perish and vanish to oblivion, if it were not preserved in books, traditions, conferences, and places appointed, as universities, colleges, and schools, for the receipt and comforting of the same.

4. The works which concern the seats and places of learning are four; foundations and buildings, endowments with revenues, endowments with franchises and privileges, institutions and ordinances for government; all tending to quietness and privateness of life, and discharge of cares and troubles; much like the stations which Virgil prescribeth for the hiving of bees:

Principio sedes apibus statioque petenda,
Quo neque sit ventis aditus, &c.²

¹ *Eccles.* 10.

² *Virg. Georg.* iv. 8.

5. The works touching books are two: first, libraries, which are as the shrines where all the relics of the ancient saints, full of true virtue, and that without delusion or imposture, are preserved and reposed: secondly, new editions of authors, with more correct impressions, more faithful translations, more profitable glosses, more diligent annotations, and the like.

6. The works pertaining to the persons of learned men, besides the advancement and countenancing of them in general, are two: the reward and designation of readers in sciences already extant and invented; and the reward and designation of writers and inquirers concerning any parts of learning not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted.

7. These are summarily the works and acts, wherein the merits of many excellent princes and other worthy personages have been conversant. As for any particular commemorations, I call to mind what Cicero said, when he gave general thanks; *Difficile non aliquem, ingratum quenquam præterire*.³ Let us rather, according to the Scriptures,⁴ look unto that part of the race which is before us, than look back to that which is already attained.

8. First, therefore, amongst so many great foundations of colleges in Europe, I find it strange that they are all dedicated to professions, and none left free to arts and sciences at large. For if men judge that learning should be referred to action, they judge well; but in this they fall into the error described in the ancient fable,⁵ in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach had been idle, because it neither performed the office of motion, as the limbs do, nor of sense, as the head doth; but yet, notwithstanding, it is the stomach that digesteth and distributeth to all the rest: so if any man think philosophy and universality to be idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions are from thence served and supplied. And this I take to be a great cause that hath hindered the progression of learning, because these fundamental knowledges have been studied but in passage. For if you will have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is not anything you can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of the earth, and putting new mould about the roots, that must work it. Neither is it to be forgotten, that this dedicating of foundations and dotations to professory learning

³ Quoted from the spurious *Orat. post Redit. in Sen.* xii. 30. Cf. *pro Pl.* xxx. 74.

⁴ Philip. .13.

⁵ See Speech of Menenius Agrippa, *Livy*, ii. 32.

hath not only had a malign aspect and influence upon the growth of sciences, but hath also been prejudicial to states and governments. For hence it proceedeth that princes find a solitude in regard of able men to serve them in causes of state, because there is no education collegiate which is free; where such as were so disposed might give themselves to histories, modern languages, books of policy and civil discourse, and other the like enablements unto service of estate.

9. And because Founders of Colleges do plant, and Founders of Lectures do water, it followeth well in order to speak of the defect which is in public lectures; namely, in the smallness and meanness of the salary or reward which in most places is assigned unto them; whether they be lectures of arts, or of professions. For it is necessary to the progression of Sciences that Readers be of the most able and sufficient men; as those which are ordained for generating and propagating of sciences, and not for transitory use. This cannot be, except their condition and endowment be such as may content the ablest man to appropriate his whole labour, and continue his whole age in that function and attendance; and therefore must have a proportion answerable to that mediocrity or competency of advancement, which may be expected from a profession, or the practice of a profession. So as, if you will have sciences flourish, you must observe David's military law, which was, *That those which staid with the carriage should have equal part with those which were in the action;*⁶ else will the carriages be ill attended. So Readers in Sciences are indeed the guardians of the stores and provisions of Sciences, whence men in active courses are furnished, and therefore ought to have equal entertainment with them: otherwise if the fathers in sciences be of the weakest sort, or be ill-maintained,

Et patrum invalidi referent jejunia nati.⁷

10. Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some alchemist to help me, who call upon men to sell their books, and to build furnaces; quitting and forsaking Minerva and the Muses as barren virgins, and relying upon Vulcan. But certain it is, that unto the deep, fruitful, and operative study of many sciences, especially Natural Philosophy and Physic, books be not the only instrumentals; wherein also the beneficence of men hath not been altogether

⁶ 1 Sam. xxx. 22.

⁷ Virg. Georg. iii. 128.

wanting: for we see spheres, globes, astrolabes, maps, and the like, have been provided as appurtenances to astronomy and cosmography, as well as books: we see likewise that some places instituted for physic have annexed the commodity of gardens for simples of all sorts, and do likewise command the use of dead bodies for anatomies. But these do respect but a few things. In general, there will hardly be any main proficience in the disclosing of nature, except there be some allowance for expenses about experiments; whether they be experiments appertaining to Vulcanus or Dædalus, furnace or engine, or any other kind: and therefore as secretaries and spials of princes and states bring in bills for intelligence, so, you must allow the spials and intelligencers of nature to bring in their bills; or else you shall be ill advertised.

And if Alexander made such a liberal assignation to Aristotle^s of treasure for the allowance of hunters, fowlers, fishers, and the like, that he might compile a history of nature, much better do they deserve it that travail in arts of nature.

11. Another defect which I note, is an intermission or neglect in those which are governors in universities, of consultation; and in princes or superior persons, of visitation: to enter into account and consideration, whether the readings, exercises, and other customs appertaining unto learning, anciently begun, and since continued, be well instituted or no; and thereupon to ground an amendment or reformation in that which shall be found inconvenient. For it is one of your majesty's own most wise and princely maxims, *That in all usages and precedents, the times be considered wherein they first began; which, if they were weak or ignorant, it derogateth from the authority of the usage, and leaveth it for suspect.* And therefore inasmuch as most of the usages and orders of the universities were derived from more obscure times, it is the more requisite they be re-examined. In this kind I will give an instance or two, for example sake, of things that are the most obvious and familiar. The one is a matter, which though it be ancient and general, yet I hold to be an error; which is, that scholars in universities come too soon and too unripe to logic and rhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children and novices: for these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of sciences, being the arts of arts; the one for judgment, the other for ornament: and they be the rules and directions how to set forth and dispose matter; and therefore

* See Blakesley's *Life of Aristotle*, p. 69.

for minds empty and unfraught with matter, and which have not gathered that which Cicero calleth *Sylva* and *Supellex*,⁹ stuff and variety, to begin with those arts, (as if one should learn to weigh, or to measure, or to paint the wind), doth work but this effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great and universal, is almost made contemptible, and is degenerate into childish sophistry and ridiculous affectation. And further, the untimely learning of them hath drawn on, by consequence, the superficial and unprofitable teaching and writing of them, as fitteth indeed to the capacity of children. Another is a lack I find in the exercises used in the universities, which do make too great a divorce between invention and memory; for their speeches are either premeditate, *In verbis conceptis*, where nothing is left to invention, or merely extemporal, where little is left to memory: whereas in life and action there is least use of either of these, but rather of intermixtures of premeditation and invention, notes and memory; so as the exercise fitteth not the practice, nor the image the life; and it is ever a true rule in exercises, that they be framed as near as may be to the life of practice; for otherwise they do pervert the motions and faculties of the mind, and not prepare them. The truth whereof is not obscure, when scholars come to the practices of professions, or other actions of civil life; which when they set into, this want is soon found by themselves, and sooner by others. But this part, touching the amendment of the institutions and orders of universities, I will conclude with the clause of Cæsar's letter to Oppius and Balbus, *Hoc quemadmodum fieri possit, nonnulla mihi in mentem veniunt, et multa reperiri possunt; de iis rebus rogo vos ut cogitationem suscipiatis*.¹

13. Another defect which I note, ascendeth a little higher than the precedent: for as the proficiencie of learning consisteth much in the orders and institutions of universities in the same states and kingdoms, so it would be yet more advanced, if there were more intelligence mutual between the universities of Europe than now there is. We see there be many orders and foundations, which though they be divided under several sovereignties and territories, yet they take themselves to have a kind of contract, fraternity, and correspondence one with the other; insomuch as they have provincials and generals. And surely, as nature createth brotherhood in families, and

Sylva. de Orat. iii. 26. *Supellex*. Orat. 24.

¹ *Cic. ad Att. ix. 7. c.*

arts mechanical contract brotherhoods in commonalties, and the anointment of God superinduceth a brotherhood in kings and bishops; so in like manner there cannot but be a fraternity in learning and illumination, relating to that paternity which is attributed to God, who is called the Father of illuminations or lights.

14. The last defect which I will note is, that there hath not been, or very rarely been, any public designation of writers or inquirers concerning such parts of knowledge as may appear not to have been already sufficiently laboured or undertaken; unto which point it is an inducement to enter into a view and examination what parts of learning have been prosecuted, and what omitted: for the opinion of plenty is among the causes of want, and the great quantity of books maketh a show rather of superfluity than lack; which surcharge, nevertheless, is not to be remedied by making no more books, but by making more good books, which, as the serpent of Moses, might devour the serpents of the enchanter.²

15. The removing of all the defects formerly enumerated, except the last, and of the active part also of the last, (which is the designation of writers,) are *opera basilica*; towards which the endeavours of a private man may be but as an image in a crossway, that may point at the way, but cannot go it: but the inducing part of the latter, which is the survey of learning, may be set forward by private travail. Wherefore I will now attempt to make a general and faithful perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and not improved and converted by the industry of man; to the end that such a plot made and recorded to memory, may both minister light to any public designation, and also serve to excite voluntary endeavours: wherein, nevertheless, my purpose is, at this time, to note only omissions and deficiencies, and not to make any redargution of errors, or incomplete prosecutions; for it is one thing to set forth what ground lieth unmanured, and another thing to correct ill husbandry in that which is manured.

In the handling and undertaking of which work I am not ignorant what it is that I do now move and attempt, nor insensible of mine own weakness to sustain my purpose; but my hope is, that if my extreme love to learning carry me too far, I may obtain the excuse of affection; for that *It is not granted to man to love and to be wise.*

² Exod. vii, 10.

But I know well I can use no other liberty of judgment than I must leave to others; and I, for my part, shall be indifferently glad either to perform myself, or accept from another, that duty of humanity; *Nam qui erranti comiter monstrat viam, &c.*³ I do foresee likewise that of those things which I shall enter and register as deficiencies and omissions, many will conceive and censure that some of them are already done and extant; others to be but curiosities, and things of no great use: and others to be of too great difficulty, and almost impossibility to be compassed and effected. But for the two first, I refer myself to the particulars; for the last, touching impossibility, I take it those things are to be held possible which may be done by some person, though not by every one; and which may be done by many, though not by any *one*: and which may be done in the succession of ages, though not within the hourglass of one man's life; and which may be done by public designation, though not by private endeavour. But, notwithstanding, if any man will take to himself rather that of Solomon, *Dicit piger, Leo est in via*,⁴ than that of Virgil, *Possunt quia posse videntur*,⁵ I shall be content that my labours be esteemed but as the better sort of wishes: for as it asketh some knowledge to demand a question not impertinent, so it required some sense to make a wish not absurd.

I. 1. **T**HE parts of human learning have reference to the three parts of man's understanding, which is the seat of learning: *history* to his *memory*, *poesy* to his *imagination*, and *philosophy* to his *reason*. Divine learning receiveth the same distribution; for the spirit of man is the same, though the revelation of oracle and sense be diverse: so as theology consisteth also of the *history* of the church; of *parables*, which is divine *poesy*; and of holy *doctrine* or *precept*: for as for that part which seemeth supernumerary, which is *prophecy*, it is but Divine History; which hath that prerogative over human, as the narration may be before the fact as well as after.

2. *History* is *natural*, *civil*, *ecclesiastical*, and *literary*; whereof the first three I allow as extant, the fourth I note as deficient. For no man hath propounded to himself the general state of learning to be described and represented

³ *Ulp. Cic. de Off. i. 16.*

⁴ *Prov. xxii. 13.*

⁵ *Virg. Æn. v. 231.*

from age to age, as many have done the works of nature, and the state civil and ecclesiastical; without which the history of the world seemeth to me to be as the statua of Polyphemus with his eye out; that part being wanting which doth most show the spirit and life of the person: and yet I am not ignorant that in divers particular sciences, as of the jurisconsults, the mathematicians, the rhetoricians, the philosophers, there are set down some small memorials of the schools, authors, and books; and so likewise some barren relations touching the invention of arts or usages. But a just story of learning, containing the antiquities and originals of knowledges and their sects, their inventions, their traditions, their diverse administrations and managings, their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, depressions, oblivions, removes, with the causes and occasions of them, and all other events concerning learning, throughout the ages of the world, I may truly affirm to be wanting. The use and end of which work I do not so much design for curiosity or satisfaction of those that are the lovers of learning, but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose; which is this, in a few words, that it will make learned men wise in the use and administration of learning. For it is not St. Augustine's nor St. Ambrose's works that will make so wise a divine, as ecclesiastical history, thoroughly read and observed; and the same reason is of learning.

3. *History of nature* is of three sorts; of *nature in course*, of *nature erring or varying*, and of *nature altered or wrought*; that is, *history of creatures*, *history of marvels*, and *history of arts*. The first of these, no doubt, is extant, and that in good perfection; the two latter are handled so weakly and unprofitably, as I am moved to note them as deficient. For I find no sufficient or competent collection of the works of nature which have a digression and deflexion from the ordinary course of generations, productions, and motions; whether they be singularities of place and region, or the strange events of time and chance, or the effects of yet unknown properties, or the instances of exception to general kinds. It is true, I find a number of books of fabulous experiments and secrets, and frivolous impostures for pleasure and strangeness; but a substantial and severe collection of the *heteroclitics* or *irregulars* of nature, well examined and described, I find not: especially not with due rejection of fables and popular errors: for as things now are, if an untruth in nature be once on foot, what by reason of the neglect of

examination, and countenance of antiquity, and what by reason of the use of the opinion in similitudes and ornaments of speech, it is never called down.

4. The use of this work, honoured with a precedent in Aristotle,⁶ is nothing less than to give contentment to the appetite of curious and vain wits, as the manner of Mirabilaries is to do; but for two reasons, both of great weight; the one to correct the partiality of axioms and opinions, which are commonly framed only upon common and familiar examples; the other because from the wonders of nature is the nearest intelligence and passage towards the wonders of art: for it is no more but by following, and as it were hounding nature in her wanderings, to be able to lead her afterwards to the same place again. Neither am I of opinion, in this history of marvels, that superstitious narrations of sorceries, witchcrafts, dreams, divinations, and the like, where there is an assurance and clear evidence of the fact, be altogether excluded. For it is not yet known in what cases and how far effects attributed to superstition do participate of natural causes: and therefore howsoever the practice of such things is to be condemned, yet from the speculation and consideration of them light may be taken, not only for the discerning of the offences, but for the further disclosing of nature. Neither ought a man to make scruple of entering into these things for inquisition of truth, as your majesty hath showed in your own example; who with the two clear eyes of religion and natural philosophy have looked deeply and wisely into these shadows, and yet proved yourself to be of the nature of the sun, which passeth through pollutions, and itself remains as pure as before. But this I hold fit, that these narrations, which have mixture with superstition, be sorted by themselves, and not be mingled with the narrations which are merely and sincerely natural. But as for the narrations touching the prodigies and miracles of religions, they are either not true, or not natural; and therefore impertinent for the story of nature.

5. For *history of nature wrought or mechanical*, I find some collections made of agriculture, and likewise of manual arts; but commonly with a rejection of experiments familiar and vulgar. For it is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto learning to descend to inquiry or meditation upon matters mechanical, except they be such as may be thought

secrets, rarities, and special subtilties; which humour of vain and supercilious arrogancy is justly derided in Plato; where he brings in Hippias, a vaunting sophist, disputing with Socrates, a true and unfeigned inquisitor of truth; where the subject being touching beauty, Socrates, after his wandering manner of inductions, put first an example of a fair virgin, and then of a fair horse, and then of a fair pot well glazed, whereat Hippias was offended, and said, *More than for courtesy's sake, he did think much to dispute with any that did allege such base and sordid instances:* whereunto Socrates answered, *You have reason, and it becomes you well, being a man so trim in your vestments, &c., and so goeth on in an irony.*⁷ But the truth is, they be not the highest instances that give the securest information; as may be well expressed in the tale so common of the philosopher,⁸ that while he gazed upwards to the stars fell into the water; for if he had looked down he might have seen the stars in the water, but looking aloft he could not see the water in the stars. So it cometh often to pass, that mean and small things discover great, better than great can discover the small: and therefore Aristotle noteth well, *That the nature of everything is best seen in its smallest portions.*⁹ And for that cause he inquireth the nature of a commonwealth, first in a family, and the simple conjugations of man and wife, parent and child, master and servant, which are in every cottage. Even so likewise the nature of this great city of the world, and the policy thereof, must be first sought in mean concordances and small portions. So we see how that secret of nature, of the turning of iron touched with the loadstone towards the north, was found out in needles of iron, not in bars of iron.

6. But if my judgment be of any weight, the use of *history mechanical* is of all others the most radical and fundamental towards natural philosophy; such natural philosophy as shall not vanish in the fume of subtile, sublime, or delectable speculation, but such as shall be operative to the endowment and benefit of man's life: for it will not only minister and suggest for the present many ingenious practices in all trades, by a connexion and transferring of the observations of one art to the use of another, when the experiences of several mysteries shall fall under the consideration of one man's mind; but further, it will give

⁷ Plato, *Hipp. Maj.* iii. 291.

⁸ Thales. See Plat. *Thaet.* i. 174.

⁹ Aristot. *Polit.* i., and *Phys.* i., both ad init.

a more true and real illumination concerning causes and axioms than is hitherto attained. For like as a man's disposition is never well known till he be crossed, nor Proteus ever changed shapes till he was straitened and held fast;¹ so the passages and variations of nature cannot appear so fully in the liberty of nature, as in the trials and vexations of art.

Of Civil
History.

II. 1. For *civil history*, it is of three kinds; not unfitly to be compared with the three kinds of pictures or images: for of pictures or images, we see, some are unfinished, some are perfect, and some are defaced. So of histories we may find three kinds, *memorials*, *perfect histories*, and *antiquities*; for *memorials* are history unfinished, or the first or rough draughts of history; and *antiquities* are history defaced, or some remnants of history which have casually escaped the shipwreck of time.

2. *Memorials*, or *preparatory history*, are of two sorts; whereof the one may be termed *commentaries*, and the other *registers*. *Commentaries* are they which set down a continuance of the naked events and actions, without the motives or designs, the counsels, the speeches, the pretexts, the occasions and other passages of action: for this is the true nature of a commentary; though Cæsar, in modesty mixed with greatness, did for his pleasure apply the name of a commentary to the best history of the world. *Registers* are collections of public acts, as decrees of council, judicial proceedings, declarations and letters of state, orations and the like, without a perfect continuance or contexture of the thread of the narration.

3. *Antiquities*, or remnants of history, are, as was said, *Tanquam tabula naufragii*: when industrious persons, by an exact and scrupulous diligence and observation, out of monuments, names, words, proverbs, traditions, private records and evidences, fragments of stories, passages of books that concern not story, and the like, do save and recover somewhat from the deluge of time.

In these kinds of unperfect histories I do assign no deficiency, for they are *Tanquam imperfecte mista*; and therefore any deficiency in them is but their nature. As for the corruptions and moths of history, which are *epitomes*, the use of them deserveth to be banished, as all men of sound judgment have confessed; as those that have fretted and corroded the sound bodies of many excel-

¹ Virg. Georg. iv. 386, seq.

lent histories, and wrought them into base and unprofitable dregs.

4. History, which may be called *just* and *perfect* history, is of three kinds, according to the object which it propoundeth, or pretendeth to represent: for it either representeth a *time*, or a *person*, or an *action*. The first we call *chronicles*, the second *lives*, and the third *narrations* or *relations*. Of these, although the first be the most complete and absolute kind of history, and hath most estimation and glory, yet the second excelleth it in profit and use, and the third in verity and sincerity. For history of *times* representeth the magnitude of actions, and the public faces and deportments of persons, and passeth over in silence the smaller passages and motions of men and matters. But such being the workmanship of God, as He doth hang the greatest weight upon the smallest wires, *Maxima è minimis suspendens*, it comes therefore to pass, that such histories do rather set forth the pomp of business than the true and inward resorts thereof. But *lives*, if they be well written, propounding to themselves a person to represent in whom actions both greater and smaller, public and private, have a commixture, must of necessity contain a more true, native, and lively representation. So again narrations and relations of actions, as the war of Peloponnesus, the expedition of Cyrus Minor, the conspiracy of Cataline, cannot but be more purely and exactly true than histories of times, because they may choose an argument comprehensible within the notice and instructions of the writer: whereas he that undertaketh the story of a time, especially of any length, cannot but meet with many blanks and spaces which he must be forced to fill up out of his own wit and conjecture.

5. For the History of Times, I mean of Civil History, the providence of God hath made the distribution: for it hath pleased God to ordain and illustrate two exemplar states of the world for arms, learning, moral virtue, policy, and laws; the state of Græcia, and the state of Rome; the histories whereof occupying the *middle part* of time, have more ancient to them, histories which may by one common name be termed the *antiquities* of the world: and after them, histories which may be likewise called by the name of *modern history*.

6. Now to speak of the deficiencies. As to the *heathen antiquities* of the world, it is in vain to note them for deficient: deficient they are no doubt, consisting most of fables and fragments; but the deficiency cannot be holpen;

for antiquity is like fame, *Caput inter nubila condit*,² her head is muffled from our sight. For the history of the *exemplar states*, it is extant in good perfection. Not but I could wish there were a perfect course of history for Græcia from Theseus to Philopœmen, (what time the affairs of Græcia were drowned and extinguished in the affairs of Rome;) and for Rome from Romulus to Justinianus, who may be truly said to be *Ultimus Romanorum*. In which sequences of story the text of Thucydides and Xenophon in the one, and the texts of Livius, Polybius, Sallustius, Cæsar, Appianus, Tacitus, Herodianus in the other, to be kept entire without any diminution at all, and only to be supplied and continued. But this is matter of magnificence, rather to be commended than required: and we speak now of parts of learning supplemental and not of super-erogation.

7. But for *modern histories*, whereof there are some few very worthy, but the greater part beneath mediocrity, (leaving the care of foreign stories to foreign states, because I will not be *curiosus in aliena republica*.) I cannot fail to represent to your Majesty the unworthiness of the history of England in the main continuance thereof, and the partiality and obliquity of that of Scotland in the latest and largest author that I have seen: supposing that it would be honour for your Majesty, and a work very memorable, if this island of Great Britain, as it is now joined in monarchy for the ages to come, so were joined in one history for the times passed; after the manner of the Sacred History, which draweth down the story of the ten tribes and of the two tribes, as twins, together. And if it shall seem that the greatness of this work may make it less exactly performed, there is an excellent period of a much smaller compass of time, as to the story of England; that is to say, from the uniting of the Roses to the uniting of the kingdoms; a portion of time, wherein, to my understanding, there hath been the rarest varieties that in like number of successions of any hereditary monarchy hath been known. For it beginneth with the mixed adoption of a crown by arms and title: an entry by battle, an establishment by marriage, and therefore times answerable, like waters after a tempest, full of working and swelling, though without extremity of storm; but well passed through by the wisdom of the pilot, being one of the most sufficient kings of all the number. Then followeth the reign of a king, whose

² Virg. *Æn.* iv. 177.

actions, howsoever conducted, had much intermixture with the affairs of Europe, balancing and inclining them variably ; in whose time also began that great alteration in the state ecclesiastical, an action which seldom cometh upon the stage. Then the reign of a minor : then an offer of a usurpation, though it was but as *febris ephemera*. Then the reign of a queen matched with a foreigner : then of a queen that lived solitary and unmarried, and yet her government so masculine, that it had greater impression and operation upon the states abroad than it any ways received from thence. And now last, this most happy and glorious event, that this island of Britain, divided from all the world, should be united in itself : and that oracle of rest, given to Æneas, *antiquam exquirite matrem*,³ should now be performed and fulfilled upon the nations of England and Scotland, being now reunited in the ancient mother name of Britain, as a full period of all instability and peregrinations. So that as it cometh to pass in massive bodies, that they have certain trepidations and waverings before they fix and settle ; so it seemeth that by the providence of God this monarchy, before it was to settle in your majesty and your generations, (in which, I hope, it is now established for ever,) had these prelusive changes and varieties.

8. For *lives*, I do find it strange that these times have so little esteemed the virtues of the times, as that the writing of lives should be no more frequent. For although there be not many sovereign princes or absolute commanders, and that states are most collected into monarchies, yet are there many worthy personages that deserve better than dispersed report or barren *eulogies*. For herein the invention of one of the late poets is proper, and doth well enrich the ancient fiction : for he feigneth that at the end of the thread or web of every man's life there was a little medal containing the person's name, and that Time waited upon the shears ; and as soon as the thread was cut, caught the medals, and carried them to the river of Lethe ; and about the bank there were many birds flying up and down, that would get the medals and carry them in their beak a little while, and then let them fall into the river : only there were a few swans, which if they got a name, would carry it to a temple where it was consecrate. And although many men, more mortal in their affections

than in their bodies, do esteem desire of name and memory but as a vanity and ventosity,

*Animi nil magnæ laudis egentes;*⁴

which opinion cometh from that root, *Non prius laudes contempsimus, quam laudanda facere desivimus*: yet that will not alter Solomon's judgment, *Memoria justicū laudibus, at impiorum nomen putrescet*:⁵ the one flourisheth, the other either consumeth to present oblivion, or turneth to an ill odour. And therefore in that style or addition, which is and hath been long well received and brought in use, *Felicitis memoria, piæ memoria, bonæ memoria*, we do acknowledge that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from Demosthenes, that *Bona fama propria possessio defunctorum*;⁶ which possession I cannot but note that in our times it lieth much waste, and that therein there is a deficiency.

9. For *narrations* and *relations* of particular actions, there were also to be wished a greater diligence therein; for there is no great action but hath some good pen which attends it. And because it is an ability not common to write a good history, as may well appear by the small number of them: yet if particularity of actions memorable were but tolerably reported as they pass, the compiling of a complete history of times might be the better expected, when a writer should arise that were fit for it: for the collection of such relations might be as a nursery garden, whereby to plant a fair and stately garden, when time should serve.

10. There is yet another portion of history which Cornelius Tacitus maketh, which is not to be forgotten, especially with that application which he accoupleth it withal, *annals* and *journals*: appropriating to the former matters of estate, and to the latter acts and accidents of a meaner nature. For giving but a touch of certain magnificent buildings, he addeth, *Cum ex dignitate populi Romani repertum sit, res illustres annalibus talia diurnis urbis actis mandare*.⁷ So as there is a kind of contemplative heraldry, as well as civil.

And as nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a state more than confusion of degrees; so it doth not a little embase the authority of a history, to intermingle matters of triumph, or matters of ceremony, or matters of

⁴ *Æn.* v. 751.

⁵ *Demosth. adv. Lept.* 488.

⁶ *Prov.* x. 7.

⁷ *Tac. Annal.* xiii. 31.

novelty, with matters of state. But the use of a *journal* hath not only been in the history of time, but likewise in the history of persons, and chiefly of actions; for princes in ancient time had, upon point of honour and policy both, journals kept of what passed day by day: for we see the chronicle which was read before Abasuerus,⁸ when he could not take rest, contained matter of affairs indeed, but such as had passed in his own time, and very lately before: but the journal of Alexander's house expressed every small particularity, even concerning his person and court; and it is yet a use well received in enterprises memorable, as expeditions of war, navigations, and the like, to keep *diaries* of that which passeth continually.

11. I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writing which some grave and wise men have used, containing a scattered history of those actions which they have thought worthy of memory, with politic discourse and observation thereupon: not incorporate into the history, but separately, and as the more principal in their intention; which kind of *ruminated history* I think more fit to place amongst books of policy, whereof we shall hereafter speak, than amongst books of history: for it is the true office of history to represent the events themselves together with the counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man's judgment. But mixtures are things irregular, whereof no man can define.

12. So also is there another kind of history manifoldly mixed, and that is *history of cosmography*: being compounded of natural history, in respect of the regions themselves; of history civil, in respect of the habitations, regiments, and manners of the people; and the *mathematics*, in respect of the climates and configurations towards the heavens: which part of learning of all others, in this latter time, hath obtained most proficiencie. For it may be truly affirmed to the honour of these times, and in a virtuous emulation with antiquity, that this great building of the world had never *thorough lights* made in it, till the age of us and our fathers: for although they had knowledge of the Antipodes,

Nosque ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis,

• Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper :¹

⁸ Esth. vi. 1.

⁹ See Plutarch. *Sympos.* i., Qu. 6, and *Vit. Alex.* c. 23, 76, et passim.

¹ Virg. *Georg.* i. 251.

yet that might be by demonstration, and not in fact; and if by travel, it requireth the voyage but of half the globe. But to circle the earth, as the heavenly bodies do, was not done nor enterprised till these latter times: and therefore these times may justly bear in their word, not only *plus ultra*, in precedence of the ancient *non ultra*, and *imitabile fulmen*, in precedence of the ancient *non imitabile fulmen*,

Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen;² &c.

but likewise *imitabile cælum*; in respect of the many memorable voyages after the manner of heaven about the globe of the earth.

13. And this proficience in navigation and discoveries may plant also an expectation of the further proficience and augmentation of all sciences; because it may seem they are ordained by God to be coevals, that is, to meet in one age. For so the prophet Daniel, speaking of the latter times, foretelleth *Plurimi pertransibunt, et multiplex erit scientia*:³ as if the openness and thorough passage of the world and the increase of knowledge were appointed to be in the same ages; as we see it is already performed in great part: the learning of these latter times not much giving place to the former two periods or returns of learning, the one of the Grecians, the other of the Romans.

III. 1. *History ecclesiastical* receiveth the same divisions with history civil: but further, in the propriety thereof, may be divided into the *history of the church*, by a general name; *history of prophecy*; and *history of providence*. The first describeth the times of the militant church, whether it be fluctuant, as the ark of Noah; or moveable, as the ark in the wilderness; or at rest, as the ark in the temple: that is, the state of the church in persecution, in remove, and in peace. This part I ought in no sort to note as deficient; only I would that the virtue and sincerity of it were according to the mass and quantity. But I am not now in hand with censures, but with omissions.

2. The second, which is *history of prophecy*, consisteth of two relatives, the prophecy, and the accomplishment; and therefore the nature of such a work ought to be, that every prophecy of the Scripture be sorted with the event fulfilling the same, throughout the ages of the world; both for better confirmation of faith, and for the better illu-

¹ *Æn.* vi. 590.

² *Dan.* xii. 4.

mination of the Church touching those parts of prophecies which are yet unfulfilled: allowing nevertheless that latitude which is agreeable and familiar unto divine prophecies; being of the nature of their Author, with whom a thousand years are but as one day;⁴ and therefore are not fulfilled punctually at once, but have springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages; though the height or fulness of them may refer to some one age. This is a work which I find deficient; but is to be done with wisdom, sobriety, and reverence, or not at all.

3. The third, which is *history of providence*, containeth that excellent correspondence which is between God's revealed will and His secret will: which though it be so obscure, as for the most part it is not legible to the natural man;⁵ no, nor many times to those that behold it from the Tabernacle; yet at some times it pleaseth God, for our better establishment and the confuting of those which are as without God in the world, to write it in such text and capital letters, that as the prophet saith, *He that runneth by may read it*;⁶ that is, mere sensual persons, which hasten by God's judgments, and never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are nevertheless in their passage and race urged to discern it. Such are the notable events and examples of God's judgments, chastisements, deliverances, and blessings: and this is a work which hath passed through the labour of many, and therefore I cannot present as omitted.

4. There are also other parts of learning which are *appendices to history*: for all the exterior proceedings of man consist of words and deeds: whereof history doth properly receive and retain in memory the deeds: and if words, yet but as inducements and passages to deeds: so are there other books and writings, which are appropriate to the custody and receipt of words only: which likewise are of three sorts: *orations, letters, and brief speeches or sayings*. Orations are pleadings, speeches of counsel, laudatives, invectives, apologies, reprehensions, orations of formality or ceremony, and the like. Letters are according to all the variety of occasions, advertisements, advices, directions, propositions, petitions, commendatory, exposulatory, satisfactory; of compliment, of pleasure, of discourse, and all other passages of action. And such as are written from wise men, are of all the words of man, in my judgment, the best; for they are more natural than

⁴ 1 Cor. ii. 14.⁵ Eph. ii. 12.⁶ Habak. ii. 2.

orations and public speeches, and more advised than conferences or present speeches. So again letters of affairs from such as manage them, or are privy to them, are of all others the best instructions for history, and to a diligent reader the best histories in themselves. For apophthegms, it is a great loss of that book of Caesar's;⁷ for as his history, and those few letters of his which we have, and those apophthegms which were of his own, excel all men's else, so I suppose would his collection of Apophthegms have done; for as for those which are collected by others, either I have no taste in such matters, or else their choice hath not been happy. But upon these three kinds of writings I do not insist, because I have no deficiencies to propound concerning them.

Thus much therefore concerning history; which is that part of learning which answereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or offices of the mind of man: which is that of the memory.

Poetry.

IV. 1. *Poesy* is a part of learning in measure of words for the most part restrained, but in all other points extremely licensed, and doth truly refer to the imagination; which, being not tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and sever that which nature hath joined; and so make unlawful matches and divorces of things; *Pictoribus atque poetis, &c.*⁸ It is taken in two senses in respect of words or matter; in the first sense it is but a *character* of style, and belongeth to arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the present: in the latter it is, as hath been said, one of the principal portions of learning, and is nothing else but *feigned history*, which may be styled as well in prose as in verse.

2. The use of this *feigned history* hath been to give some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to the soul; by reason whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of man, a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of things. Therefore, because the acts or events of *true history* have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man, *poesy* feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical: because *true history* propoundeth the successes and issues

⁷ Vid. Cic. *ad Fam.* ix. 16; and Sueton. *Vit. Cæs.*

⁸ Hor. *Ep. ad Pis.* 9.

of actions not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just in retribution, and more according to revealed providence: because true history representeth actions and events more ordinary, and less interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness, and more unexpected and alternative variations: so as it appeareth that poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality, and to delectation. And therefore it was ever thought to have some participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things. And we see, that by these insinuations and congruities with man's nature and pleasure, joined also with the agreement and consort it hath with music, it hath had access and estimation in rude times and barbarous regions, where other learning stood excluded.

3. The division of Poesy which is aptest in the propriety thereof, (besides those divisions which are common unto it with history, as feigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the appendices of history, as feigned epistles, feigned orations, and the rest) is into *poesy narrative, representative, and allusive*. The *Narrative* is a mere imitation of history, with the excesses before remembered; choosing for subject commonly wars and love, rarely state, and sometimes pleasure or mirth. *Representative* is as a visible history; and is an image of actions, as if they were present, as history is of actions in nature as they are, that is past. *Allusive* or *Parabolical* is a *Narrative* applied only to express some special purpose or conceit: which latter kind of parabolical wisdom was much more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables of *Æsop*, and the brief sentences of the *Seven*, and the use of hieroglyphics may appear. And the cause was, for that it was then of necessity to express any point of reason which was more sharp or subtile than the vulgar in that manner, because men in those times wanted both variety of examples and subtilty of conceit: and as hieroglyphics were before letters, so parables were before arguments: and nevertheless now, and at all times, they do retain much life and vigour; because reason cannot be so sensible, nor examples so fit.

4. But there remaineth yet another use of Poesy *Parabolical*, opposite to that which we last mentioned: for that tendeth to demonstrate and illustrate that which is taught or delivered, and this other to retire and obscure it. that

is, when the secrets and mysteries of religion, policy, or philosophy, are involved in fables or parables. Of this in divine poesy we see the use is authorized. In heathen poesy we see the exposition of fables doth fall out sometimes with great felicity; as in the fable that the giants being overthrown in their war against the gods, the earth their mother in revenge thereof brought forth Fame:

Illam terra parens, irâ irritata Deorum,
Extremam, ut perhibent Cæo Enceladogue sororem,
Progeniuit.⁹

expounded, that when princes and monarchs have suppressed actual and open rebels, then the malignity of the people, which is the mother of rebellion, doth bring forth libels and slanders, and taxations of the states, which is of the same kind with rebellion, but more feminine. So in the fable, that the rest of the gods having conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas¹ called Briareus with his hundred hands to his aid, expounded, that monarchies need not fear any curbing of their absoluteness by mighty subjects, as long as by wisdom they keep the hearts of the people, who will be sure to come in on their side. So in the fable, that Achilles was brought up under Chiron the Centaur, who was part a man and part a beast, expounded ingeniously but corruptly by Machiavel,² that it belongeth to the education and discipline of princes to know as well how to play the part of the lion in violence, and the fox in guile, as of the man in virtue and justice. Nevertheless, in many the like encounters, I do rather think that the fable was first, and the exposition devised, than that the moral was first, and thereupon the fable framed. For I find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that troubled himself with great contention to fasten the assertions of the Stoics upon the fictions of the ancient poets; but yet that all the fables and fictions of the poets were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion. Surely of those poets which are now extant, even Homer himself (notwithstanding he was made a kind of Scripture by the latter schools of the Grecians,) yet I should without any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no such inwardness in his own meaning; but what they might have upon a more original tradition, is

⁹ Virg. *Æn.* iv. 170.

¹ Not Pallas, but Thetis, Hom. *Il.* A. 398 *seq.*

² Hom. *Il.* A. 831, and Machiav. *Prince*, c. 48.

not easy to affirm; for he was not the inventor of many of them.

5. In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can report no deficiency. For being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad more than any other kind. But to ascribe unto it that which is due, for the expressing of affections, passions, corruptions, and customs, we are beholding to poets more than to the philosophers' works; and for wit and eloquence, not much less than to orators' harangues. But it is not good to stay too long in the theatre. Let us now pass on to the judicial place or palace of the mind, which we are to approach and view with more reverence and attention.³

V. 1. The knowledge of man is as the waters, some descending from above, and some springing from beneath; the one informed by the light of nature, the other inspired by divine revelation. The light of nature consisteth in the notions of the mind and the reports of the senses: for as for knowledge which man receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative and not original; as in a water that, besides his own spring-head, is fed with other springs and streams. So then, according to these two differing illuminations or originals, knowledge is first of all divided into *divinity* and *philosophy*.

Knowledge divided first into Divinity and Philosophy;

2. In *Philosophy*, the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God,—or are circumscribed to nature,—or are reflected or reverted upon himself. Out of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges, *divine philosophy*, *natural philosophy*, and *human philosophy* or *humanity*. For all things are marked and stamped with this triple character, of the power of God, the difference of nature, and the use of man. But because the distributions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point; but are like branches of a tree, that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and

the latter of which resembles a tree with three main branches.

³ In the Latin edition this discourse on poetry is much enlarged, chiefly with examples of *Poesy Parabolical*; of which he selects three, the fables of Pan, of Perseus, and of Dionysius, to show respectively how physical, political, and moral doctrines were thus delivered. The next chapter begins the third book.

quantity of entireness and continuance, before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs: therefore it is good, before we enter into the former distribution, to erect and constitute one universal science, by the name of *philosophia prima*, *primitive* or *summary philosophy*, as the main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide themselves; which science whether I should report as deficient or no, I stand doubtful. For I find a certain rhapsody of natural theology, and of divers parts of logic; and of that part of natural philosophy which concerneth the principles: and of that other part of natural philosophy which concerneth the soul or spirit: all these strangely commixed and confused; but being examined, it seemeth to me rather a depredation of other sciences, advanced and exalted unto some height of terms, than anything solid or substantive of itself. Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is current, that the same things are handled but in several respects. As for example, that logic considereth of many things as they are in notion, and this philosophy as they are in nature; the one in appearance, the other in existence; but I find this difference better made than pursued. For if they had considered *quantity*, *similitude*, *diversity*, and the rest of those extern characters of things, as philosophers, and in nature, their inquiries must of force have been of a far other kind than they are. For doth any of them, in handling quantity, speak of the force of union, how and how far it multiplieth virtue? Doth any give the reason, why some things in nature are so common, and in so great mass, and others so rare, and in so small quantity? Doth any, in handling similitude and diversity, assign the cause why iron should not move to iron, which is more like, but move to the load-stone, which is less like? Why in all diversities of things there should be certain participles in nature, which are almost ambiguous to which kind they should be referred? But there is a mere and deep silence touching the nature and operation of those common adjuncts of things, as in nature: and only a resuming and repeating of the force and use of them in speech or argument. Therefore, because in a writing of this nature, I avoid all subtilty, my meaning touching this original or universal philosophy is thus, in a plain and gross description by negative: *That it be a receptacle for all such profitable observations and axioms as fall not within the compass of any of the special parts of phi-*

losophy or sciences, but are more common and of a higher stage.

3. Now that there are many of that kind need not to be doubted. For example: is not the rule, *Si inæqualibus æqualia addas, omnia erunt inæqualia*, an axiom as well of justice as of the mathematics? and is there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion? Is not that other rule, *Quæ in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter se conveniunt*,⁴ a rule taken from the mathematics, but so potent in logic as all syllogisms are built upon it? Is not the observation, *Omnia mutantur, nil interit*,⁵ a contemplation in philosophy thus, that the *quantum* of nature is eternal? in natural theology thus, that it requireth the same Omnipotence to make somewhat nothing, which at the first made nothing somewhat? according to the Scripture, *Didici quod omnia opera, quæ fecit Deus, perseverent in perpetuum; non possumus eis quicquam addere nec auferre*.⁶ Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely and largely discourseth concerning governments, that the way to establish and preserve them, is to reduce them *ad principia*, a rule in religion and nature, as well as in civil administration?⁷ Was not the Persian magic a reduction or correspondence of the principles and architectures of nature to the rules and policy of governments? Is not the precept of a musician, to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or sweet accord, alike true in affection? Is not the trope of music, to avoid or slide from the close or cadence, common with the trope of rhetoric of deceiving expectation? Is not the delight of the quavering upon a stop in music the same with the playing of light upon the water?

Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus.⁸

Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs of reflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait determined and bounded? Neither are these only similitudes, as men of narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the same footsteps of nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or matters.

⁴ See Whately, *Logic*, book ii. c. 3, § 1. On *Arguments*.

⁵ Cf. Plat. *Theæt.* i. 152.

⁶ The passage referred to appears to be Ecclus. xlii. 21.

⁷ Discourse on Livy, iii. 1. (quoted above, p. 19.)

⁸ Virg. *Æn.* vii. 9.

This science, therefore, as I understand it, I may justly report as deficient: for I see sometimes the profounder sort of wits, in handling some particular argument, will now and then draw a bucket of water out of this well for their present use; but the spring-head thereof seemeth to me not to have been visited: being of so excellent use, both for the disclosing of nature, and the abridgment of art.

This science being therefore first placed as a common parent like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue, *omnes Cœlicolas, omnes supera alta tenentes*:⁹ we may return to the former distribution of the three philosophies, divine, natural, and human.

VI. 1. And as concerning *divine philosophy* or *natural theology*, it is that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of His creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed divine in respect of the object, and natural in respect of the light. The bounds of this knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion: and therefore there was never miracle wrought by God to convert an atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to confess a God: but miracles have been wrought to convert idolaters and the superstitious, because no light of nature extendeth to declare the will and true worship of God. For as all works do show forth the power and skill of the workman, and not his image; so it is of the works of God, which do show the omnipotency and wisdom of the Maker, but not his image: and therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from the sacred truth; for they supposed the world to be the image of God, and man to be an extract or compendious image of the world; but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the world that honour, as to be the image of God, but only the *work of his hands*:¹ neither do they speak of any other image of God, but man: wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and enforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate His power, providence, and goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been excellently handled by divers.

2. But on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature, or ground of human knowledge, to induce any

⁹ Virg. *Æn.* vi. 787.

¹ Ps. viii. 3, cii. 25, *et al.*

verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment not safe: *Da fidei quæ fidei sunt.* For the heathens themselves conclude as much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: *That men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven.* So as we ought not to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason; but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the divine truth. So as in this part of knowledge, touching divine philosophy, I am so far from noting any deficiency, as I rather note an excess: whereunto I have digressed because of the extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy have received and may receive, by being commixed together; as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy.

3. Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which is an appendix of theology, both divine and natural, and is neither inscrutable nor interdicted; for although the Scripture saith, *Let no man deceive you in sublime discourse touching the worship of angels, pressing into that he knoweth not, &c.,*² yet, notwithstanding, if you observe well that precept, it may appear thereby that there be two things only forbidden, adoration of them, and opinion fantastical of them, either to extol them farther than appertaineth to the degree of a creature, or to extol a man's knowledge of them farther than he hath ground. But the sober and grounded inquiry, which may arise out of the passages of holy Scriptures, or out of the gradations of nature, is not restrained. So of degenerate and revolted spirits, the conversing with them or the employment of them is prohibited, much more any veneration towards them; but the contemplation or science of their nature, their power, their illusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom. For so the apostle saith, *We are not ignorant of his stratagems.*³ And it is no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits, than to inquire the force of poisons in nature, or the nature of sin and vice in morality. But this part touching angels and spirits I cannot note as deficient, for many have occupied themselves in it; I may rather challenge it, in many of the writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastical.

² Coloss. ii. 18.

³ 2 Cor. ii. 11.

*Of Natural
Philosophy,
physical and
metaphy-
sical.*

VII. 1. Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural theology (not divinity or inspired theology, which we reserve for the last of all, as the haven and sabbath of all man's contemplations) we will now proceed to natural philosophy.

If then it be true that Democritus said, *That the truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines and caves*:⁴ and if it be true likewise that the alchemists do so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a second nature, and imitateth that dexterously and compendiously, which nature worketh by ambages and length of time, it were good to divide natural philosophy into the mine and the furnace: and to make two professions or occupations of natural philosophers, some to be pioneers and some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine and hammer: and surely I do best allow of a division of that kind, though in more familiar and scholastical terms; namely, that these be the two parts of natural philosophy, —the *inquisition of causes*, and the *production of effects*; *speculative*, and *operative*; *natural science*, and *natural prudence*. For as in civil matters there is a wisdom of discourse, and a wisdom of direction; so is it in natural. And here I will make a request, that for the latter, or at least for a part thereof, I may revive and reintegrate the misapplied and abused name of *natural magic*; which, in the true sense, is but *natural wisdom*, or *natural prudence*; taken according to the ancient acception; purged from vanity and superstition. Now although it be true, and I know it well, that there is an intercourse between causes and effects, so as both these knowledges, speculative and operative, have a great connexion between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent: ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention of new experiments; therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts be severally considered and handled.

2. *Natural science or theory* is divided into *physique* and *metaphysique*: wherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the word metaphysique in a differing sense from that that is received: and in like manner, I doubt not but it will easily appear to men of judgment, that in this and other particulars, wheresoever my conception and notion

⁴ ἐν βυθῷ γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια. Diog. Laert., ix. 72.

may differ from the ancient, yet I am studious to keep the ancient terms. For hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing of that I do propound; I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as little from antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth and the proficiencie of knowledge. And herein I cannot a little marvel at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a spirit of difference and contradiction towards all antiquity: undertaking not only to frame new words of science at pleasure, but to confound and extinguish all ancient wisdom:⁵ insomuch as he never nameth or mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but to confute and reprove; wherein for glory, and drawing followers and disciples, he took the right course. For certainly there cometh to pass, and hath place in human truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth: *Veni in nomine Patris, nec recipitis me; se quis venerit in nomine suo eum recipietis.*⁶ But in this divine aphorism, (considering to whom it was applied, namely to antichrist, the highest deceiver,) we may discern well that the coming in a man's own name, without regard of antiquity or pater-nity, is no good sign of truth, although it be joined with the fortune and success of an *Eum recipietis*. But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will think of him that he learned that humour of his scholar, with whom, it seemeth, he did emulate; the one to conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer all nations; wherein nevertheless, it may be, he may at some men's hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like title as his scholar did:

Felix terrarum prædo, non utile mundo,
Editus exemplum, &c.

So,

Felix doctrinæ prædo.⁷

But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth in my pen to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and proficiencie, it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity

⁵ For Aristotle's view of his duty as a philosopher, see *Eth. Nic.* i. 2.

⁶ John. v. 43.

⁷ Illic Pellaci proles vesana Philippi
Felix prædo jacet, terrarum vindice fato
Raptus. . . .
Nam sibi libertas unquam si redderet orbem,
Ludibrio servatus erat, non utile mundo
Editus exemplum. Lucan. *Phars.* x. 20.

usque ad aras; and therefore to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and definitions, according to the moderate proceeding in civil government; where although there be some alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, *Eadem Magistratum vocabula*.⁸

3. To return therefore to the use and acceptation of the term Metaphysique, as I do now understand the word; it appeareth, by that which hath been already said, that I intend *philosophia prima*, Summary Philosophy and Metaphysique, which heretofore have been confounded as one, to be two distinct things. For, the one I have made as a parent or common ancestor to all knowledge; and the other I have now brought in as a branch or descendant of natural science. It appeareth likewise that I have assigned to summary philosophy the common principles and axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to several sciences: I have assigned unto it likewise the inquiry touching the operation of the relative and adventive characters of essences, as *quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility*, and the rest: with this distinction and provision; that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically. It appeareth likewise, that Natural Theology, which heretofore hath been handled confusedly with Metaphysique, I have inclosed and bounded by itself. It is therefore now a question what is left remaining for Metaphysique; wherein I may without prejudice preserve thus much of the conceit of antiquity, that Physique should contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory; and Metaphysique that which is abstracted and fixed. And again, that Physique should handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and moving; and Metaphysique should handle that which supposeth further in nature a reason, understanding, and platform. But the difference, perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible. For as we divided natural philosophy in general into the *inquiry of causes*, and *productions of effects*: so that part which concerneth the inquiry of causes we do subdivide according to the received and sound division of causes; the one part, which is Physique, inquireth and handleth the *material and efficient causes*; and the other, which is Metaphysique, handleth the *formal and final causes*.

4. Physique, taking it according to the derivation, and not according to our idiom for *medicine*, is situate in a middle term or distance between Natural History and Meta-

physique. For natural history describeth the variety of things; physique, the causes, but variable or respective causes; and metaphysique, the fixed and constant causes.

Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit,
Uno eodemque igni :⁹

Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay; fire is the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax; but fire is no constant cause either of induration or colliquation: so then the physical causes are but the efficient and the matter. Physique hath three parts; whereof two respect nature united or collected, the third contemplateth nature diffused or distributed. Nature is collected either into one entire total, or else into the same principles or seeds. So as the first doctrine is touching the contexture or configuration of things, as *de mundo, de universitate rerum*. The second is the doctrine concerning the principles or originals of times. The third is the doctrine concerning all variety and particularity of things; whether it be of the differing substances, or their differing qualities and natures; whereof there needeth no enumeration, this part being but as a gloss, or paraphrase, that attendeth upon the text of natural history. Of these three I cannot report any as deficient. In what truth or perfection they are handled, I make not now any judgment; but they are parts of knowledge not deserted by the labour of man.¹

5. For Metaphysique, we have assigned unto it the inquiry of formal and final causes; which assignation, as to the former of them, may seem to be nugatory and void; because of the received and inveterate opinion, that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out essential forms or true differences: of which opinion we will take this hold, that the invention of forms is of all other parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought, if it be possible to be found. As for the possibility, they are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can see nothing but sea. But it is manifest that Plato, in his opinion of Ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff,

⁹ Virg. *Ecl.* viii. 80.

¹ In the Latin edition this discussion is much extended. He proceeds to divide *Physics* into *Physica de Concretis*, and *de Abstractis*, with a notice of *Natural Problems*, and the opinions of ancient philosophers. He takes the opportunity to point out how the idle fictions of Astrology had hindered rational inquiry into the motions of the heavenly bodies.

did descry, *that forms were the true object of knowledge*;² but lost the real fruit of his opinion, by considering of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined and determined by matter; and so turning his opinion upon theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected. But if any man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon action, operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise and take notice what are the forms, the disclosures whereof are fruitful and important to the state of man. For as to the forms of substances, man only except, of whom it is said, *Formavit hominem de limo terræ, et spiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ*, and not as of all other creatures, *Producant aquæ, producat terra*;³ the forms of substances, I say, as they are now by compounding and transplanting multiplied, are so perplexed, as they are not to be inquired; no more than it were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the forms of those sounds which make words, which by composition and transposition of letters are infinite. But, on the other side, to inquire the form of those sounds or voices which make simple letters, is easily comprehensible; and being known, induceth and manifesteth the forms of all words, which consist and are compounded of them. In the same manner to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold; nay, of water, of air, is a vain pursuit: but to inquire the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not many, and of which the essences, upheld by matter, of all creatures do consist; to inquire, I say, the true forms of these, is that part of metaphysique which we now define of. Not but that Physic doth make inquiry, and take consideration of the same natures: but how? Only as to the *material and efficient causes* of them, and not as to the *forms*. For example; if the cause of whiteness in snow or froth be inquired, and it be rendered thus, that the subtilo intermixture of air and water is the cause, it is well rendered; but, nevertheless, is this the form of whiteness? No; but it is the efficient, which is ever but *vehiculum formæ*. This part of metaphysique I do not find laboured and performed: whereat I marvel not: because I hold it not possible to be invented by that course of invention

² Cf. Hooker, i. 3, 4; and see his own note. See also Plato, *Rep. x. init.* and *Timæe. passim*. Compare also Hallam, *Lit. of Eur.* p. 3, p. 402.

³ Gen. i. 20, 24; ii. 7.

which hath been used; in regard that men, which is the root of all error, have made too untimely a departure and too remote a recess from particulars.⁴

6. But the use of this part of Metaphysique, which I report as deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: the one, because it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of individual experience, as much as the conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of *vita brevis, ars longa*;⁵ which is performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of sciences: for knowledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the basis. So of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history; the stage next the basis is physique; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysique. As for the vertical point, *opus quod operatur Deus à principio usque ad finem*,⁶ the summary law of nature, we know not whether man's inquiry can attain unto it. But these three be the true stages of knowledge, and are to them that are depraved no better than the giant's hills:

Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam,
Scilicet, atque Ossæ frondosum involvere Olympum.⁷

But to those who refer all things to the glory of God, they are as the three acclamations, *Sancte, sancte, sancte!* holy in the description or dilatation of his works; holy in the connexion or concatenation of them; and holy in the union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. And therefore the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato, although but a speculation in them, that all things by scale did ascend to unity.⁸ So then always that knowledge is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity; which appeareth to be metaphysique; as that which considereth the simple forms or differences of things, which are few in number, and the degrees and co-ordinations whereof make all this variety.

7. The second respect, which valueth and commendeth this part of metaphysique, is that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest liberty and possibility of works and effects. For physique carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinary flexuous courses of nature; but *lateæ undique sunt sapientibus viæ*: to sapience, which

⁴ With this passage, compare Plat. *Theæt.* i. 155, 156.

⁵ Hippoc. *Aph.* i.

⁶ Eccles. iii. 11.

⁷ *Georg.* i. 281.

⁸ See the conclusion of the dialogue entitled *Parmenides*.

was anciently defined to be *rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia*,⁹ there is ever choice of means: for physical causes give light to new invention in *simili materia*. But whosoever knoweth any form, knoweth the utmost possibility of superinducing that nature upon any variety of matter; and so is less restrained in operation, either to the basis of the matter, or the condition of the efficient; which kind of knowledge Solomon likewise, though in a more divine sort, elegantly describeth: *non arctabuntur gressus tui, et currens non habebis offendiculum*.¹ The ways of sapience are not much liable either to particularity or chance.

8. The second part of metaphysique is the *inquiry of final causes*, which I am moved to report not as omitted, but as misplaced; and yet if it were but a fault in order, I would not speak of it: for order is matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of sciences. But this misplacing hath caused a deficiency, or at least a great improficiency in the sciences themselves. For the handling of final causes, mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery. For this I find done not only by Plato, who ever anchoreth upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others which do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes.² For to say that the hairs of the eye-lids are for a quickset and fence about the sight; or that the firmness of the skins and hides of living creatures is to defend them from the extremities of heat or cold; or that the bones are for the columns or beams, whereupon the frames of the bodies of living creatures are built: or that the leaves of trees are for protecting of the fruit; or that the clouds are for watering of the earth; or that the solidness of the earth is for the station and mansion of living creatures and the like, is well inquired and collected in metaphysique, but in physique they are impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but *remorae*, and hindrances to stay and slug the ship from further sailing; and have brought this to pass, that the search of the physical causes hath been neglected, and passed in silence. And therefore the natural philosophy of Democritus and some others, (who did not suppose a

⁹ Cic. de Off. i. 43.

¹ Prov. iv. 12.

² Cf. Aristot. Phys. ii. 8, quoted by Ritter and Preller, p. 272.

mind or reason in the frame of things, but attributed the form thereof able to maintain itself, to infinite essays or proofs of nature, which they term *fortune*) seemeth to me, as far as I can judge by the recital and fragments which remain unto us, in particularities of physical causes, more real and better inquired than that of Aristotle and Plato; whereof both intermingled final causes, the one as a part of theology, and the other as a part of logic, which were the favourite studies respectively of both those persons. Not because those final causes are not true, and worthy to be inquired, being kept within their own province; but because their excursions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness and solitude in that track. For otherwise, keeping their precincts and borders, men are extremely deceived if they think there is an enmity or repugnancy at all between them. For the cause rendered, that *the hairs about the eye-lids are for the safeguard of the sight*, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that *pilosity is incident to orifices of moisture; muscoli fontes*,³ &c. Nor the cause rendered, that *the firmness of hides is for the armour of the body against extremities of heat or cold*, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that *contraction of pores is incident to the outwardest parts, in regard of their adjacence to foreign or unlike bodies*: and so of the rest: both causes being true and compatible, the one declaring an *intention*, the other a *consequence* only. Neither doth this call in question, or derogate from Divine Providence, but highly confirm and exalt it. For as in civil actions he is the greater and deeper politique, that can make other men the instruments of his will and ends, and yet never acquaint them with his purpose, so as they shall do it and yet not know what they do, than he that imparteth his meaning to those he employeth; so is the wisdom of God more admirable, when nature intendeth one thing, and Providence draweth forth another, than if He had communicated to particular creatures and motions the characters and impressions of His Providence. And thus much for metaphysique: the latter part whereof I allow as extant, but wish it confined to his proper place.⁴

³ Virg. *Ecl.* vii. 45.

⁴ In the Latin edition a supplementary chapter is here introduced, corresponding to that on *Physics* (vid. sup. p. 91). He divides the operative knowledge of Nature into mechanics and magic, with a vindication of the proper sense of the word magic, &c.

Of Mathe-
matics:
Pure and
Mixed.

VIII. 1. Nevertheless there remaineth yet another part of Natural Philosophy, which is commonly made a principal part, and holdeth rank with Physique special and Metaphysique, which is Mathematique; but I think it more agreeable to the nature of things, and to the light of order, to place it as a branch of metaphysique: for the subject of it being *quantity*, (not *quantity indefinite*, which is but a *relative*, and belongeth to *philosophia prima*, as hath been said, but *quantity determined or proportionable*), it appeareth to be one of the essential forms of things; as that that is causative in nature of a number of effects; inso-much as we see, in the schools both of Democritus and of Pythagoras,⁵ that the one did ascribe figure to the first seeds of things, and the other did suppose numbers to be the principles and originals of things: and it is true also that of all other forms, as we understand forms, it is the most abstracted and separable from matter, and therefore most proper to Metaphysique; which hath likewise been the cause why it hath been better laboured and inquired than any of the other forms, which are more immersed in matter.

For it being the nature of the mind of man, to the extreme prejudice of knowledge, to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champain region, and not in the inclosures of particularity; the Mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest fields to satisfy that appetite. But for the placing of this science, it is not much material: only we have endeavoured, in these our partitions, to observe a kind of perspective, that one part may cast light upon another.

2. The Mathematics are either *pure* or *mixed*. To the pure mathematics are those sciences belonging which handle *quantity determinate*, merely severed from any axioms of natural philosophy; and these are two, Geometry and Arithmetic; the one handling quantity continued, and the other dissevered.

Mixed hath for subject some axioms or parts of natural philosophy, and considereth quantity determined, as it is auxiliary and incident unto them. For many parts of nature can neither be invented with sufficient subtilty, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor accommodated

⁵ For the opinions of Democritus and the Pythagoreans here alluded to, see Aristot. *de Anima*, i. 2, and *Met. A.* 4, 6.

unto use with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and intervening of the mathematics; of which sort are *perspective, music, astronomy, cosmography, architecture, enginery*, and divers others.

3. In the Mathematics I can report no deficiency, except it be that men do not sufficiently understand the excellent use of the Pure Mathematics, in that they do remedy and cure many defects in the wit and faculties intellectual. For if the wit be too dull, they sharpen it; if too wandering, they fix it; if too inherent in the sense, they abstract it. So that as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of great use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put itself into all postures; so in the mathematics, that use which is collateral and intervenient is no less worthy than that which is principal and intended. And as for the Mixed Mathematics, I may only make this prediction, that there cannot fail to be more kinds of them, as nature grows further disclosed. Thus much of natural science, or the part of nature speculative.

4. For Natural Prudence, or the part operative of Natural Philosophy, we will divide it into three parts, experimental, philosophical, and magical; which three parts active have a correspondence and analogy with the three parts speculative, natural history, physique, and metaphysique: for many operations have been invented, sometimes by a casual incidence and occurrence, sometimes by a purposed experiment: and of those which have been found by an intentional experiment, some have been found out by varying or extending the same experiment, some by transferring and compounding divers experiments the one into the other, which kind of invention an empiric may manage.

5. Again,⁶ by the knowledge of physical causes there cannot fail to follow many indications and designations of new particulars, if men in their speculation will keep one eye upon use and practice. But these are but coastings along the shore, *Premendo littus iniquum*:⁷ for, it seemeth to me there can hardly be discovered any radical or fundamental alterations and innovations in nature, either by the fortune and essays of experiments, or by the light and direction of physical causes. If therefore we have reported metaphysique deficient, it must follow that we do the like of natural magic, which hath relation thereunto. For as

⁶ In the Latin edition sections 5—7 are omitted; their substance having been inserted in the supplementary chapter mentioned above, p. 95.

⁷ Hor. Od. ii. x. 3.

for the natural magic whereof now there is mention in books, containing certain credulous and superstitious conceits and observations of sympathies and antipathies, and hidden properties, and some frivolous experiments, strange rather by disguisement than in themselves, it is as far differing in truth of nature from such a knowledge as we require, as the story of King Arthur of Britain, or Hugh of Bourdeaux,⁸ differs from Cæsar's Commentaries in truth of story. For it is manifest that Cæsar did greater things *de vero* than those imaginary heroes were feigned to do; but he did them not in that fabulous manner. Of this kind of learning the fable of Ixion⁹ was a figure, who designed to enjoy Juno, the goddess of power; and instead of her had copulation with a cloud, of which mixture were begotten centaurs and chimæras. So whosoever shall entertain high and vaporous imaginations, instead of a laborious and sober inquiry of truth, shall beget hopes and beliefs of strange and impossible shapes.

6. And therefore we may note in these sciences which hold so much of imagination and belief, as this degenerate natural magic, alchemy, astrology, and the like, that in their propositions the description of the mean is ever more monstrous than the pretence or end. For it is a thing more probable, that he that knoweth well the natures of *weight*, of *colour*, of *pliant* and *fragile*, in respect of the hammer, of *volatile* and *fixed* in respect of the fire and the rest, may superinduce upon some metal the nature and form of gold by such mechanic as belongeth to the production of the natures afore rehearsed, than that some grains of the medicine projected should in a few moments of time turn a sea of quicksilver or other material into gold: so it is more probable that he that knoweth the nature of *arefaction*, the nature of assimilation of nourishment to the thing nourished, the manner of increase and clearing of spirits, the manner of the depredations which spirits make upon the humours and solid parts, shall by ambages of diets, bathings, anointings, medicines, motions, and the like, prolong life, or restore some degree of youth or vivacity, than that it can be done with the use of a few drops or scruples

⁸ A knight of romance, of the time of Charlemagne. His exploits may be found in the *Histoire de Huon de Bordeaux, Pair de France, Duc de Guienne*. (Troyes circ. 1727.) A play, founded on this legend, was popular in London about ten years before the publication of the *Advancement of Learning*. See *Henslow's Diary* published by the Shakspeare Society.

⁹ Pind. *Pyth.* ii. 21.

of a liquor or receipt. To conclude, therefore, the true Natural Magic, which is that great liberty and latitude of operation which dependeth upon the knowledge of *forms*, I may report deficient, as the relative thereof is.

7. To which part, if we be serious, and incline not to vanities and plausible discourse, besides the deriving and deducing the operations themselves from metaphysique, there are pertinent two points of much purpose, the one by way of preparation, the other by way of caution: the first is, that there be made a kalendar, resembling an inventory of the estate of man, containing all the inventions, being the works or fruits of nature or art, which are now extant, and whereof man is already possessed; out of which doth naturally result a note, what things are yet held impossible, or not invented: which kalendar will be the more artificial and serviceable, if to every reputed impossibility you add what thing is extant which cometh the nearest in degree to that impossibility; to the end that by these optatives and potentials man's inquiry may be the more awake in deducing direction of works from the speculation of causes: and secondly, that those experiments be not only esteemed which have an immediate and present use, but those principally which are of most universal consequence for invention of other experiments, and those which give most light to the invention of causes; for the invention of the mariner's needle, which giveth the direction, is of no less benefit for navigation than the invention of the sails which give the motion.

8. Thus have I passed through Natural Philosophy, and the deficiencies thereof; wherein if I have differed from the ancient and received doctrines, and thereby shall move contradiction,—for my part, as I affect not to dissent, so I purpose not to contend. If it be truth,

Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvæ:¹

The voice of nature will consent, whether the voice of man do or no. And as Alexander Borgia was wont to say of the expedition of the French for Naples, that they came with chalk in their hands to mark up their lodgings, and not with weapons to fight; so I like better that entry of truth which cometh peaceably, with chalk to mark up those minds which are capable to lodge and harbour it, than that which cometh with pugnacity and contention.

9. But² there remaineth a division of natural philosophy

¹ Virg. *Ecl.* x. 8.

² The substance of this section is inserted in the additional portion of the chapter on physics. See above, p. 91.

according to the report of the inquiry, and nothing concerning the matter or subject: and that is positive and considerative; when the inquiry reporteth either an assertion or a doubt. These doubts or *non liquets* are of two sorts, particular and total. For the first, we see a good example thereof in Aristotle's Problems, which deserved to have had a better continuance; but so nevertheless as there is one point whereof warning is to be given and taken. The registering of doubts hath two excellent uses: the one, that it saveth philosophy from errors and falsehoods; when that which is not fully appearing is not collected into assertion, whereby error might draw error, but reserved in doubt: the other, that the entry of doubts are as so many suckers or sponges to draw use of knowledge; insomuch as that which, if doubts had not preceded, a man should never have advised, but passed it over without note, by the suggestion and solicitation of doubts, is made to be attended and applied. But both these commodities do scarcely countervail an inconvenience which will intrude itself, if it be not debarred; which is, that when a doubt is once received, men labour rather how to keep it a doubt still, than how to solve it; and accordingly bend their wits. Of this we see the familiar example in lawyers and scholars, both which, if they have once admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after authorized for a doubt. But that use of wit and knowledge is to be allowed, which laboureth to make doubtful things certain, and not those which labour to make certain things doubtful. Therefore these kalendars of doubts I commend as excellent things; so that there be this caution used, that when they be thoroughly sifted and brought to resolution, they be from thenceforth omitted, recorded, and not continued to cherish and encourage men in doubting. To which kalendar of doubts or problems, I advise be annexed another kalendar, as much or more material, which is a Kalendar of Popular Errors: I mean chiefly in natural history, such as pass in speech and conceit, and are nevertheless apparently detected and convicted of untruth; that man's knowledge be not weakened nor embased by such dross and vanity.

As for the doubts or *non liquets* general, or in total, I understand those differences of opinions touching the principles of nature, and the fundamental points of the same, which have caused the diversity of sects, schools, and philosophies, as that of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, and the rest. For although Aristotle, as though he had been of the race

of the Ottomans, thought he could not reign except the first thing he did he killed all his brethren;³ yet to those that seek Truth and not magistrality, it cannot but seem a matter of great profit, to see before them the several opinions touching the foundations of nature; not for any exact truth that can be expected in those theories; for as the same phenomena in astronomy are satisfied by the received astronomy of the diurnal motion, and the proper motions of the planets, with their eccentrics and epicycles, and likewise by the theory of Copernicus,⁴ who supposed the earth to move, (and the calculations are indifferently agreeable to both,) so the ordinary face and view of experience is many times satisfied by several theories and philosophies; whereas to find the real truth requireth another manner of severity and attention. For as Aristotle saith,⁵ that children at the first will call every woman mother, but afterward they come to distinguish according to truth, so experience, if it be in childhood, will call every philosophy mother, but when it cometh to ripeness, it will discern the true mother. So, as in the mean time it is good to see the several glosses and opinions upon nature, whereof, it may be, every one in some one point hath seen clearer than his fellows, therefore, I wish some collection to be made, painfully and understandingly, *de antiquis philosophiis*, out of all the possible light which remaineth to us of them: which kind of work I find deficient. But here I must give warning, that it be done distinctly and severally; the philosophies of every one throughout by themselves, and not by titles packed and fagotted up together, as hath been done by Plutarch. For it is the harmony of a philosophy in itself which giveth it light and credence; whereas if it be singled and broken, it will seem more foreign and dissonant. For as when I read in Tacitus the actions of Nero, or Claudius, with circumstances of times, inducements, and occasions, I find them not so strange; but when I read them in Suetonius Tranquillus, gathered into titles and bundles, and not in order of time, they seem more monstrous and incredible: so is it of any philosophy reported entire, and dismembered by articles. Neither do I exclude opinions of latter times to be likewise

³ Referring to the often quoted story of Amurath. So Shakspeare:
Not Amurath an Amurath succeeds,

But Harry Harry.—*Hen. IV.*, Pt. ii. Act v. sc. 2.

⁴ "One guess among many." Paley, *Moral Philos. V.*, *ad fin.*, a passage called by Dr. Parr the finest in English prose literature.

⁵ Aristot. *Phys.* i. 1.

represented in this kalendar of sects of philosophy, as that of Theophrastus Paracelsus, eloquently reduced into a harmony by the pen of Severinus the Dane; and that of Tilesius, and his scholar Donius, being as a pastoral philosophy, full of sense, but of no great depth; and that of Fracastorius, who, though he pretended not to make any new philosophy, yet did use the absoluteness of his own sense upon the old; and that of Gilbertus our countryman, who revived, with some alterations and demonstrations, the opinions of Xenophanes: and any other worthy to be admitted.

Thus have we now dealt with two of the three beams of man's knowledge; that is *radius directus*, which is referred to nature, *radius refractus*, which is referred to God; and cannot report truly because of the inequality of the *medium*: there resteth *radius reflexus*, whereby man beholdeth and contemplateth himself.

IX. 1. We⁶ come therefore now to that *Human Philosophy, or the knowledge of ourselves.* knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is *the knowledge of ourselves*; ⁷ which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature: and generally let this be a rule, that all partitions of knowledges be accepted rather for lines and veins than for sections and separations; and that the continuance and entireness of knowledge be preserved. For the contrary hereof hath made particular sciences to become barren, shallow, and erroneous, while they have not been nourished and maintained from the common fountain. So we see Cicero the orator complained of Socrates and his school, that he was the first that separated philosophy and rhetoric;⁸ whereupon rhetoric became an empty and verbal art. So we may see that the opinion of Copernicus touching the rotation of the earth, which astronomy itself cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the phenomena, yet natural philosophy may correct. So we see also that the science of medicine if it be destituted and forsaken by natural philosophy, it is not much better than an empirical practice. With this reservation therefore we proceed to human philosophy or humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man *segregate*

⁶ In the Latin edition the fourth book commences here.

⁷ Cf. Plat. *Alcib. Prim.* ii. 124.

⁸ De Orat. iii. 16, 17.

or *distributively*; the other *congregate*, or *in society*. So as human philosophy is either simple and particular, or conjugate and civil. Humanity particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the body, and of knowledges which respect the mind; but before we distribute so far, it is good to constitute. For I do take the consideration in general, and at large, of human nature to be fit to be emancipate and made a knowledge by itself: not so much in regard of those delightful and elegant discourses which have been made of the dignity of man, of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his common and undivided nature; but chiefly in regard of the knowledge concerning the sympathies and concordances between the mind and body, which being mixed cannot be properly assigned to the sciences of either.

2. This knowledge hath two branches: for as all leagues and amities consist of mutual intelligence and mutual offices, so this league of mind and body hath these two parts; how the one discloseth the other, and how the one worketh upon the other; discovery and impression. The former of these hath begotten two arts, both of *prediction* or *praenotion*; whereof the one is honoured with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates.⁹ And although they have of later time been used to be coupled with superstitious and fantastical arts, yet being purged and restored to their true state, they have both of them a solid ground in nature, and a profitable use in life. The first is *physiognomy*, which discovereth the disposition of the mind by the lineaments of the body: the second is the *exposition of natural dreams*, which discovereth the state of the body by the imaginations of the mind. In the former of these I note a deficiency. For Aristotle¹ hath very ingeniously and diligently handled the fractures of the body, but not the gestures of the body, which are no less comprehensible by art, and of greater use and advantage. For the lineaments of the body do disclose the disposition and inclination of the mind in general; but the motions of the countenance and parts do not only so, but do further disclose the present humour and state of the mind and will. For

⁹ In his work called *Praenotiones*.

¹ See Aristotle's short treatise on physiognomy. It may perhaps be as well to remind the reader that the word physiognomy is not confined to the *features of the countenance*, as it is vulgarly used in the present day, but to the general outline of the body.

as your majesty saith most aptly and elegantly, *As the tongue speaketh to the ear so the gesture speaketh to the eye*. And therefore a number of subtle persons, whose eyes do dwell upon the faces and fashions of men, do well know the advantage of this observation, as being most part of their ability; neither can it be denied, but that it is a great discovery of dissimulations, and a great direction in business.

3. The latter branch, touching *impression*, hath not been collected into art, but hath been handled dispersedly; and it hath the same relation or *antistrophe* that the former hath. For the consideration is double: either how, and how far the humours and affects of the body do alter or work upon the mind; or again, how and how far the passions or apprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the body. The former of these hath been inquired and considered as a part and appendix of medicine, but much more as a part of religion or superstition. For the physician prescribeth cures of the mind in phrensies and melancholy passions; and pretendeth also to exhibit medicines to exhilarate the mind, to confirm the courage, to clarify the wits, to corroborate the memory, and the like: but the scruples and superstitions of diet and other regimen of the body in the sect of the Pythagoreans, in the heresy of the Manicheans, and in the law of Mahomet, do exceed. So likewise the ordinances in the ceremonial law, interdicting the eating of the blood and the fat, distinguishing between beasts clean and unclean for meat, are many and strict.² Nay the faith itself being clear and serene from all clouds of ceremony, yet retaineth the use of fastings, abstinences, and other macerations and humiliations of the body, as things real, and not figurative. The root and life of all which prescripts is, besides the ceremony, the consideration of that dependency which the affections of the mind are submitted unto upon the state and disposition of the body. And if any man of weak judgment do conceive that this suffering of the mind from the body doth either question the immortality, or derogate from the sovereignty of the soul, he may be taught in easy instances, that the infant in the mother's womb is compatible with the mother and yet separable; and the most absolute monarch is sometimes led by his servants and yet without subjection. As for the reciprocal knowledge, which is the operation of the conceits and passions of the mind upon the body, we see all wise

² Vid. Deut. c. xii.

physicians, in the prescriptions of their regiments to their patients, do ever consider *accidentia animi* as of great force to further or hinder remedies or recoveries: and more especially it is an inquiry of great depth and worth concerning imagination, how and how far it altereth the body proper of the imaginant. For although it hath a manifest power to hurt, it followeth not it hath the same degree of power to help; no more than a man can conclude, that because there be pestilent airs, able suddenly to kill a man in health, therefore there should be sovereign airs, able suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But the inquisition of this part is of great use, though it needeth, as Socrates said, a *Delian diver*,² being difficult and profound. But unto all this knowledge *de communi vinculo*, of the concordances between the mind and the body, that part of inquiry is most necessary, which considereth of the seats and domiciles which the several faculties of the mind do take and occupate in the organs of the body; which knowledge hath been attempted, and is controverted, and deserveth to be much better inquired. For the opinion of Plato,³ who placed the understanding in the brain, animosity (which he did unfitly call *anger*, having a greater mixture with *pride*) in the heart, and concupiscence or sensuality in the liver, deserveth not to be despised; but much less to be allowed. So then we have constituted, as in our own wish and advice, the inquiry touching human nature entire, as a just portion of knowledge to be handled apart.

X. 1. The knowledge that concerneth man's body is divided as the good of man's body is divided, unto which it referreth. The good of man's body is of four kinds, *health, beauty, strength, and pleasure*: so the knowledges are *medicine, or art of cure*: *art of decoration*, which is called *cosmetique*; *art of activity*, which is called *athletique*; and *art voluptuary*, which Tacitus truly calleth *eruditus luxus*.⁴ This subject of man's body is of all other things in nature most susceptible of remedy; but then that remedy is most susceptible of error. For the same subtilty of the subject doth cause large possibility and easy failing; and therefore the inquiry ought to be the more exact.

Of Arts concerning the Body.

² Diog. Laert. ii. 22 (in *Vit. Soc.*) Socrates was speaking of a work of Heraclitus which Euripides had lent him.

³ Vid. Plat. *Timae.* iii. 69, seq.

⁴ Tac. *Ann.* xvi. 18.

To speak therefore of *Medicine*, and to resume that we have said, ascending a little higher: the ancient opinion that man was *microcosmus*, an abstract or model of the world, hath been fantastically strained by Paracelsus and the alchemists, as if there were to be found in man's body certain correspondences and parallels, which should have respect to all varieties of things, as stars, planets, minerals, which are extant in the great world. But thus much is evidently true, that of all substances which nature hath produced, man's body is the most extremely compounded. For we see herbs and plants are nourished by earth and water; beasts for the most part by herbs and fruits; man by the flesh of beasts, birds, fishes, herbs, grains, fruits, water, and the manifold alterations, dressings, and preparations of the several bodies, before they come to be his food and aliment. Add hereunto, that beasts have a more simple order of life, and less change of affections to work upon their bodies: whereas man in his mansion, sleep, exercise, passions, hath infinite variations: and it cannot be denied but that the body of man of all other things is of the most compounded mass. The soul on the other side is the simplest of substances, as is well expressed:

Purumque reliquit

Aethereum sensum atque aurai simplicis iguem.⁶

So that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no rest, if that principle be true, that *Motus rerum est rapidus extra locum, placidus in loco*. But to the purpose: this variable composition of man's body hath made it as an instrument easy to distemper; and therefore the poets did well to conjoin music and medicine in Apollo,⁷ because the office of medicine is but to tune this curious harp of man's body and to reduce it to harmony. So then the subject being so variable, hath made the art by consequence more conjectural; and the art being conjectural hath made so much the more place to be left for imposture. For almost all other arts and sciences are judged by arts, or master-pieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes and events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the cause; the master of the ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage; but the physician, and perhaps the politique, hath no particular acts demonstrative of his ability, but is judged most by the event; which

⁶ Virg. *Æn.* vi. 747.

⁷ Vid. Ovid. *Metam.* i. 521.

is ever but as it is taken: for who can tell, if a patient die or recover, or if a state be preserved or ruined, whether it be art or accident? And therefore many times the impostor is prized, and the man of virtue taxed. Nay, we see the weakness and credulity of men is such, as they will often prefer a mountebank or witch before a learned physician. And therefore the poets were clear-sighted in discerning this extreme folly, when they made *Æsculapius* and *Circe* brother and sister, both children of the sun, as in the verses, *Æn.* vii. 772:

*Ipsæ repertorem medicinæ talis et artis
Fulmine Phœbigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas:*

And again, *Æn.* vii. 11:

Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos, &c.

For in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches and old women and impostors have had a competition with physicians. And what followeth? Even this, that physicians say to themselves as Solomon expresseth it upon an higher occasion; *If it befall to me as befalleth to the fools, why should I labour to be more wise?*⁸ And therefore I cannot much blame physicians, that they use commonly to intend some other art or practice, which they fancy more than their profession. For you shall have of them antiquaries, poets, humanists, statesmen, merchants, divines, and in every of these better seen than in their profession; and no doubt upon this ground, that they find that mediocrity and excellency in their art maketh no difference in profit or reputation towards their fortune; for the weakness of patients, and sweetness of life, and nature of hope, maketh men depend upon physicians with all their defects. But nevertheless, these things which we have spoken of, are courses begotten between a little occasion, and a great deal of sloth and default; for if we will excite and awake our observation, we shall see in familiar instances what a predominant faculty the subtilty of spirit hath over the variety of matter or form. Nothing more variable than faces and countenances: yet men can bear in memory the infinite distinctions of them; nay, a painter with a few shells of colours, and the benefit of his eye, and habit of his imagination, can imitate them all that ever have been, are, or may be, if they were brought before him. Nothing more variable than voices; yet men can likewise discern

them personally: nay, you shall have a buffoon or *pantomimus*, who will express as many as he pleaseth. Nothing more variable than the differing sounds of words; yet men have found the way to reduce them to a few simple letters. So that it is not the insufficiency or incapacity of man's mind, but it is the remote standing or placing thereof, that breedeth these mazes and incomprehensions: for as the sense afar off is full of mistaking, but is exact at hand, so is it of the understanding; the remedy whereof is, not to quicken or strengthen the organ, but to go nearer to the object; and therefore there is no doubt but if the physicians will learn and use the true approaches and avenues of nature, they may assume as much as the poet saith:

Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes;
Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt.⁹

Which that they should do, the nobleness of their art doth deserve; well shadowed by the poets, in that they made *Æsculapius* to be the son of the sun, the one being the fountain of life, the other as the second stream: but infinitely more honoured by the example of our Saviour, who made the body of man the object of his miracles, as the soul was the object of his doctrine. For we read not that ever he vouchsafed to do any miracle about honour or money, except that one for giving tribute to *Cæsar*; but only about the preserving, sustaining, and healing the body of man.

2. Medicine is a science which hath been, as we have said, more professed than laboured, and yet more laboured than advanced; the labour having been, in my judgment, rather in circle than in progression. For I find much iteration, but small addition. It considereth *causes of diseases*, with the occasions or impulsions; the *diseases themselves*, with the accidents; and the *cures*, with the *preservations*. The Deficiencies which I think good to note, being a few of many, and those such as are of a more open and manifest nature, I will enumerate, and not place.

3. The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious diligence of *Hippocrates*, which used to set down a narrative of the special cases of his patients, and how they proceeded, and how they were judged by recovery or death. Therefore having an example proper in the father of the art, I shall not need to allege an example

foreign, of the wisdom of the lawyers, who are careful to report new cases and decisions, for the direction of future judgments. This continuance of *medicinal history* I find deficient ; which I understand neither to be so infinite as to extend to every common case, nor so reserved as to admit none but wonders : for many things are new in the manner, which are not new in the kind ; and if men will intend to observe, they shall find much worthy to observe.

4. In the inquiry which is made by *Anatomy*, I find much deficiency : for they inquire of the *parts*, and their *substances*, *figures*, and *collocations* ; but they inquire not of the *diversities of the parts*, the *secrecies of the passages*, and the *seats or nestlings of the humours*, nor much of the *footsteps and impressions of diseases* : the reason of which omission I suppose to be, because the first inquiry may be satisfied in the view of one or a few anatomies : but the latter, being comparative and casual, must arise from the view of many. And as to the diversity of parts, there is no doubt but the faicture or framing of the inward parts is as full of difference as the outward, and in that is the *cause continent* of many diseases ; which not being observed, they quarrel many times with the humours, which are not in fault ; the fault being in the very frame and mechanic of the part, which cannot be removed by medicine alterative, but must be accommodate and palliate by diets and medicines familiar. As for the passages and pores, it is true which was anciently noted, that the more subtle of them appear not in anatomies, because they are shut and latent in dead bodies, though they be open and manifest in live : which being supposed, though the inhumanity of *anatomia vivorum* was by Celsus justly reprov'd ;¹ yet in regard of the great use of this observation, the inquiry needed not by him so slightly to have been relinquished altogether, or referred to the casual practices of surgery ; but might have been well diverted upon the dissection of beasts alive, which notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts, may sufficiently satisfy this inquiry. And for the humours, they are commonly passed over in anatomies as purgaments ; whereas it is most necessary to observe, what cavities, nests, and receptacles the humours do find in the parts, with the differing kind of the humour so lodged and

¹ *De re Medicâ*, i. 5.

received. And as for the footsteps of diseases, and their devastations of the inward parts, imposthumations, exulcerations, discontinuations, putrefactions, consumptions, contractions, extensions, convulsions, dislocations, obstructions, repletions, together with all preternatural substances, as stones, carnosities, excrescences, worms, and the like; they ought to have been exactly observed by multitude of anatomies, and the contribution of men's several experiences, and carefully set down, both historically, according to the appearances, and artificially, with a reference to the diseases and symptoms which resulted from them, in case where the anatomy is of a defunct patient; whereas now, upon opening of bodies, they are passed over slightly and in silence.

5. In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the cures of many, some as in their nature incurable, and others as past the period of cure; so that Sylla and the Triumvirs never proscribed so many men to die, as they do by their ignorant edicts: whereof numbers do escape with less difficulty than they did in the Roman proscriptions. Therefore I will not doubt to note as a deficiency, that they inquire not the perfect cures of many diseases, or extremities of diseases; but pronouncing them incurable, do enact a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from discredit.

Nay, further, I esteem it the office of a physician not only to restore health, but to mitigate pain and dolours; and not only when such mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when it may serve to make a fair and easy passage: for it is no small felicity which Augustus Caesar was wont to wish to himself, that same *Euthanasia*;² and which was especially noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose death was after the fashion and semblance of a kindly and pleasant sleep. So it is written of Epicurus, that after his disease was judged desperate, he drowned his stomach and senses with a large draught and ingurgitation of wine;³ whereupon the epigram was made, *Hinc Stygius ebrius hausit aquas*; he was not sober enough to taste any bitterness of the Stygian water. But the physicians, contrariwise, do make a kind of scruple and religion to stay with the patient after the disease is deplored; whereas, in my judgment, they ought both to inquire the skill, and to give the attendances, for the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and agonies of death.

² Suet. *Vit. Aug.* c. 100.

³ Diog. Laert. *Vit. Epic.* x. § 15.

6. In the consideration of the cures of diseases, I find a deficiency in the receipts of propriety, respecting the particular cures of diseases: for the physicians have frustrated the fruit of tradition and experience by their magistralities, in adding, and taking out, and changing *quid pro quo*, in their receipts, at their pleasures; commanding so over the medicine, as the medicine cannot command over the diseases: for except it be treacle and *mithridatum*, and of late *diascordium*, and a few more, they tie themselves to no receipts severely and religiously: for as to the confections of sale which are in the shops, they are for readiness and not for propriety; for they are upon general intention of purging, opening, comforting, altering, and not much appropriate to particular diseases: and this is the cause why empirics and old women are more happy many times in their cures than learned physicians, because they are more religious in holding their medicines. Therefore here is the deficiency which I find, that physicians have not, partly out of their own practice, partly out of the constant probations reported in books, and partly out of the traditions of empirics, set down and delivered over certain experimental medicines for the cure of particular diseases, besides their own conjectural and magistral descriptions. For as they were the men of the best composition in the state of Rome, which either being consuls inclined to the people, or being tribunes inclined to the senate; so in the matter we now handle, they be the best physicians, which being learned incline to the traditions of experience, or being empirics incline to the methods of learning.

7. In preparation of medicines, I do find strange, especially considering how mineral medicines have been extolled, and that they are safer for the outward than inward parts, that no man hath sought to make an imitation by art of natural baths and medicinable fountains: which nevertheless are confessed to receive their virtues from minerals: and not so only, but discerned and distinguished from what particular mineral they receive tincture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like; which nature, if it may be reduced to compositions of art, both the variety of them will be increased, and the temper of them will be more commanded.

8. But lest I grow to be more particular than is agreeable either to my intention or to proportion, I will conclude this part with the note of one deficiency more, which seemeth to me of greatest consequence; which is,

that the prescripts in use are too compendious to attain their end: for, to my understanding, it is a vain and flattering opinion to think any medicine can be so sovereign or so happy, as that the receipt or use of it can work any great effect upon the body of man. It were a strange speech, which, spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to which he were by nature subject: it is order, pursuit, sequence, and interchange of application, which is mighty in nature; which, although it require more exact knowledge in prescribing, and more precise obedience in observing, yet is recompensed with the magnitude of effects. And although a man would think, by the daily visitations of the physicians, that there were a pursuance in the cure: yet let a man look into their prescripts and ministrations, and he shall find them but inconstancies and every day's devices, without any settled providence or project. Not that every scrupulous or superstitious prescript is effectual, no more than every straight way is the way to heaven; but the truth of the direction must precede severity of observance.⁴

9. For *cosmetique*, it hath parts civil, and parts effeminate: for cleanness of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due reverence to God, to society, and to ourselves. As for artificial decoration, it is well worthy of the deficiencies which it hath; being neither fine enough to deceive, nor handsome to use, nor wholesome to please.

10. For *athletique*, I take the subject of it largely, that is to say, for any point of ability whereunto the body of man may be brought, whether it be of activity, or of patience; whereof activity hath two parts, strength and swiftness; and patience likewise hath two parts, hardness against wants and extremities, and endurance of pain or torment; whereof we see the practices in tumblers, in savages, and in those that suffer punishment: nay, if there be any other faculty which falls not within any of the former divisions, as in those that dive, that obtain a strange power of containing respiration, and the like, I refer it to this part. Of these things the practices are known, but the philosophy that concerneth them is not much inquired; the rather, I think, because they are supposed to be obtained, either by an aptness of nature, which cannot be taught, or only by continual custom,

⁴ In the Latin edition this section is followed by a discourse on the means of prolonging life.

which is soon prescribed : which though it be not true, yet I forbear to note any deficiencies : for the Olympian games are down long since, and the mediocrity of these things is for use; as for the excellency of them it serveth for the most part but for mercenary ostentation.

11. For *arts of pleasure sensual*, the chief deficiencie in them is of laws to repress them. For as it hath been well observed, that the arts which flourish in times while virtue is in growth, are *military*; and while virtue is in state, are *liberal*; and while virtue is in declination, are *voluptuary*; so I doubt that this age of the world is somewhat upon the descent of the wheel. With arts voluptuary I couple practices jocular; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the pleasures of the senses. As for games of recreation, I hold them to belong to civil life and education. And thus much of that particular human philosophy which concerns the body, which is but the tabernacle of the mind.

XI. 1. For Human Knowledge which concerns the Mind,⁵ it hath two parts; the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of the soul or mind, the other that inquireth of the faculties or functions thereof. Unto the first of these, the considerations of the original of the soul, whether it be native or adventive, and how far it is exempted from laws of matter, and of the immortality thereof, and many other points, do appertain : which have been not more laboriously inquired than variously reported; so as the travail therein taken seemeth to have been rather in a maze than in a way. But although I am of opinion that this knowledge may be more really and soundly inquired, even in nature, than it hath been; yet I hold that in the end it must be bounded by religion, or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion: for as the substance of the soul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and earth by the benediction of *prodeat* but was immediately inspired from God: so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the subject of philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state of the soul must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance. Unto this part of knowledge touching the soul there be two appendices.

Human Philosophy as it concerns the Mind.

⁵ In the Latin edition this section is much enlarged, but nothing very important added.

which, as they have been handled, have rather vapoured forth fables than kindled truth, Divination and Fascination.

2. *Divination* hath been anciently and fitly divided into artificial and natural; whereof artificial is, when the mind maketh a prediction by argument, concluding upon signs and tokens; natural is, when the mind hath a presentation by an internal power, without the inducement of a sign. Artificial is of two sorts; either when the argument is coupled with a derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is only grounded upon a coincidence of the effect, which is experimental: whereof the latter for the most part is superstitious; such as were the heathen observations upon the inspection of sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of bees; and such as was the Chaldean astrology, and the like. For artificial divination, the several kinds thereof are distributed amongst particuliar knowledges. The astronomer hath his predictions, as of conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like. The physician hath his predictions of death, of recovery, of the accidents and issues of diseases. The Politique hath his predictions; *O urbem venulem, et cito perituram, si emptorem invenerit!*⁶ which stayed not long to be performed, in Sylla first, and after in Caesar. So as these predictions are now impertinent, and to be referred over. But the divination which springeth from the internal nature of the soul, is that which we now speak of; which hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive and by influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the supposition, that the mind, when it is withdrawn and collected into itself, and not diffused into the organs of the body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotation; which therefore appeareth most in sleep, in ecstacies, and near death, and more rarely in waking apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences and observances which make the mind most to consist in itself. By influxion, is grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or glass, should take illumination from the foreknowledge of God and spirits: unto which the same regiment doth likewise conduce. For the retiring of the mind within itself, is the state which is most susceptible of divine influxions; save that it is accompanied in this case with a fervency

⁶ Jugurtha: quoted from the *Epitome of Livy*, lxiv. The exclamation is also found in Sall. *Jug.* c. xxxv.

and elevation, which the ancients noted by *fury*, and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other.

3. *Fascination* is the power and act of imagination intensive upon other bodies than the body of the imaginant, for of that we spake in the proper place: wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the disciples of pretended natural magic have been so intemperate, as they have exalted the power of the imagination to be much one with the power of miracle-working faith; others, that draw nearer to probability, calling to their view the secret passages of things, and specially of the contagion that passeth from body to body, do conceive it should likewise be agreeable to nature, that there should be some transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit without the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits have grown, now almost made civil, of the mastering spirit, and the force of confidence, and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry how to raise and fortify the imagination: for if the imagination fortified have power, then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it. And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a great part of ceremonial magic. For it may be pretended that ceremonies, characters, and charms, do work, not by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil spirits, but serve only to strengthen the imagination of him that useth it: as images are said by the Roman church to fix the cogitations, and raise the devotions of them that pray before them. But for mine own judgment, if it be admitted that imagination hath power, and that ceremonies fortify imagination, and that they be used sincerely and intentionally for that purpose: yet I should hold them unlawful, as opposing to that first edict which God gave unto man, *In sudore vultus comedes panem tuum*. For they propound those noble effects, which God hath set forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour, to be attained by a few easy and slothful observances. Deficiencies in these knowledges I will report none, other than the general deficiency, that it is not known how much of them is verity, and how much vanity.⁷

⁷ In the Latin edition two dissertations are here inserted,—of Voluntary Motion, and of the Difference between Perception and Sense,—together with a curious discourse on the Form of Light, in which, however, he confines himself to noting the deficiencies of previous inquirers, and indicating where the difficulties of the subject lie. The next chapter commences the fifth book.

*Division of
Knowledge
into Intel-
lectual and
Moral.*

XII. 1. The Knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man is of two kinds; the one respecting his *Understanding* and *Reason*, and the other his *Will*, *Appetite*, and *Affection*; whereof the former produceth *position* or *decree*, the latter *action* or *execution*. It is true that the Imagination is an agent or *nuncius*, in both provinces, both the judicial and the ministerial. For Sense sendeth over to Imagination before Reason have judged: and Reason sendeth over to Imagination before the decree can be acted: for Imagination ever precedeth Voluntary Motion. Saving that this Janus of Imagination hath differing faces: for the face towards reason hath the print of Truth, but the face towards Action hath the print of Good; which nevertheless are faces,

Quales decet esse sororum.

Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but is invested with, or at leastwise usurpeth no small authority in itself, besides the duty of the message. For it was well said by Aristotle, *That the mind hath over the body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman; but that reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate hath over a free citizen;* who may come also to rule in his turn. For we see that in matters of faith and religion, we raise our imagination above our reason; which is the cause why religion sought ever access to the mind by similitude, types, parables, visions, dreams. And again, in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no cause to alter the former division. For as for poesy, it is rather a pleasure or play of imagination, than a work or duty thereof. And if it be a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as the imagination produceth, but of such sciences as handle and consider of the imagination; no more than we shall speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth, for that extendeth to all philosophy, but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire the faculty of reason: so as poesy had its true place. As for the power of the imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, we

* Aristot. *Polit.* i. 5, 6.

have mentioned it in the doctrine *De Anima*, whereunto it most fitly belongeth. And lastly, for Imaginative or Insinuat-
ive Reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it best
to refer it to the Arts of Reason. So therefore we content
ourselves with the former division, that human philosophy,
which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, hath
two parts, rational and moral.

2. The part of human philosophy which is rational, is
of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful,
and seemeth but a net of subtilty and spinosity. For as it
was truly said, that knowledge is *Pabulum Animi*;⁹ so in
the nature of men's appetite to this food, most men are of
the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that
would fain have returned *ad ollas carniū*, and were weary
of manna; which, though it were celestial, yet seemed less
nutritive and comfortable. So generally men taste well
knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, civil his-
tory, morality, policy, about the which men's affections,
praises, fortunes do turn and are conversant; but this
saine *lumen siccum* doth parch and offend most men's
watery and soft natures. But, to speak truly of things as
they are in worth, Rational Knowledges are the keys of all
other arts; for as Aristotle saith, aptly and elegantly,
*That the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind
is the form of forms*:¹ so these be truly said to be the art
of arts: neither do they only direct, but likewise confirm
and strengthen: even as the habit of shooting doth not
only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to draw a
stronger bow.

3. The *Arts intellectual* are four in number; divided
according to the ends whereunto they are referred: for
man's labour is to invent that which is sought or pro-
pounded: or to judge that which is invented; or to retain
that which is judged; or to deliver over that which is
retained. So as the arts must be four: *Art of Inquiry or
Invention: Art of Examination or Judgment: Art of
Custody or Memory: and Art of Elocution or Tradition.*

XIII. 1. *Invention* is of two kinds, much
differing: the one of *Arts and Sciences*; and the other of *Speech and A. juments*. The
former of these I do report deficient; which seemeth to

*Of Inven-
tion.*

⁹ He seems to refer to Cic. *Acad. Pri.* ii. 41. *Est enim animo-
rum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio
contemplatioque naturæ.*

¹ *Aristot. de part. Anim.* iv. 10. 21.

me to be such a deficiency as if, in the making of an inventory touching the estate of a defunct, it should be set down, *that there is no ready money*. For as money will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the West Indies had never been discovered if the use of the mariner's needle had not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions, and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no farther discovered, if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over.

That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment standeth plainly confessed; for first, Logic doth not pretend to invent sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a *Cuique in sua arte credendum*.² And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the Empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, *That medicines and cures were first found out, and then after the reasons and causes were discoursed; and not the causes first found out, and by light from them the medicines and cures discovered*.³ And Plato, in his *Theætetus*, noteth well, *That particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no sufficient direction: and that the pith of all sciences, which maketh the artsman differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every particular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience*.⁴ And therefore we see, that they which discourse of the inventions and originals of things, refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to men.

Dictamnū genetrix Cretā carpit ab Ida,
 Puberibus caulem foliis et flore comantem
 Purpureo; non illa feris incognita capris
 Gramina, cum tergo volucres hūere sagittæ.⁵

So that it was no marvel, the manner of antiquity being to consecrate inventors, that the Egyptians had so few human idols in their temples, but almost all brute.

Omniūgenūque Deū monstra, et latrator Anubis,
 Contra Neptunū, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &c.⁶

² See Whateley, *Introd.* § 5; *Book* iii. (on *Fallacies*) § 2; and *Book* iv. on the *Province of Reasoning*. Bacon perhaps had in his mind, *Aristot. Eth. Mag.* i. 1, 17. ³ *De re Med.* i. 3.

⁴ I can find no passage in the *Theætetus* which exactly corresponds to this sentence, though its general drift might be easily drawn from that dialogue or others (cf. the *Philebus*). In the Latin edition, he merely says Plato *often observes*, which looks like a tacit correction.

⁵ *Virg. Æn.* xii. 412.

⁶ *Æn.* viii. 697.

And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the first inventions to men; yet you will rather believe that Prometheus first stroke the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when he first stroke the flints he expected the spark: and therefore we see the West Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the European, because of the rareness with them of flint, that gave the first occasion. So as it should seem, that hitherto men are rather beholding to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the pot-lid that flew open for artillery, or generally to chance, or anything else, than to logic, for the invention of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of invention which Virgil describeth much other:

Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes
Paulatim.⁷

For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in ure; which is a perpetual intending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being; for so Cicero saith very truly, *Usus uni rei deditus et naturam et artem sape vincit.*⁸ And therefore if it be said of men,

Labor omnia vicit
Improbis, et duris urgens in rebus egestas!⁹

it is likewise said of beasts, *Quis psittaco docuit suum χαίρει?*¹ Who taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree, where she espied water, that the water might rise so as she might come to it? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea of air, and to find the way from a field in flower, a great way off, to her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and grow? Add then the word *extundere*, which importeth the extreme difficulty, and the word *paulatim*, which importeth the extreme slowness, and we are where we were, even amongst the Egyptians' gods; there being little left to the faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty of art, for matter of invention.

2. Secondly, the Induction which the Logicians speak of, and which seemeth familiar with Plato, (whereby the Principles of Sciences may be pretended to be invented,

⁷ *Georg.* i. 133.

⁸ *Georg.* i. 146.

⁸ *Cic. p. Corn. Balb.* xx.

¹ *Pers. Prol.* 8.

and so the middle propositions by derivation from the Principles;) their form of induction, I say, is utterly vicious and incompetent: wherein their error is the fouler, because it is the duty of Art to perfect and exalt nature; but they contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced nature. For he that shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of, *Aërei mellis celestia dona*,² distilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the field and garden, shall find that the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they describe it. For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can assure, in many subjects, upon those particulars which appear of a side, that there are not other on the contrary side which appear not? As if Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse which were brought before him, and failed of David, which was in the field.³ And this form, to say truth, is so gross, as it had not been possible for wits so subtile as have managed these things to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful toward particulars; which their manner was to use but as *lictors* and *viatores*, for sergeants and whiffers, *ad summoendam turbam*, to make way and make room for their opinions, rather than in their true use and service. Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and human truth: for as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a child; so in human, they reputed the attending the inductions whereof we speak, as if it were a second infancy or childhood.

3. Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced, yet nevertheless certain it is that middle propositions cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature by syllogism, that is, by touch and reduction of them to principles in a middle term. It is true that in sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity, (because it pleaseth God to apply himself to the capacity of the simplest,) that form may have use; and in natural philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, *Quæ assensum parit, operis effeta*

² Virg. Georg. iv. 1.

³ 1 Sam. c. xvi.

est: but the subtlety of nature and operations will not be enclained in those bonds: for arguments consist of propositions and propositions of words; and words are but the current tokens or marks of popular notions of things; which notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out of particulars, it is not the laborious examination either of consequence of arguments, or of the truth of propositions, that can ever correct that error, being, as the physicians speak, in the first digestion: and therefore it was not without cause, that so many excellent philosophers became Sceptics and Academics, and denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension; and held opinion that the knowledge of man extended only to appearances and probabilities. It is true that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of irony, *Scientiam dissimulando simulavit*.⁴ for he used to disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his knowledge: like the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign, but would not acknowledge so much:⁵ and in the later Academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of *acatalepsia*,⁶ I doubt, was not held sincerely: for that all those which excelled in copie of speech seem to have chosen that sect, as that which was fittest to give glory to their eloquence and variable discourses; being rather like progresses of pleasure, than journeys to an end. But assuredly many scattered in both Academies did hold it in subtilty and integrity: but here was their chief error; they charged the deceit upon the senses; which in my judgment, notwithstanding all their cavillations, are very sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always immediately, yet by comparison, by help of instrument, and by producing and urging such things as are too subtile for the sense to some effect comprehensible by the sense, and other like assistance.⁷ But they ought to have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses. This I speak, not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek help: for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be easily done by help of a ruler or compass.

⁴ Vid. Cic. *Acad.* ii. 5. 15.

⁵ Vid. Tac. *Ann.* i. 7. 11.

⁶ Cic. *Acad.* ii. 6. 18.

⁷ See a comparison of the certainty of knowledge derived from sense and from faith in Hooker, *serm. On the Certainty and Perpetuity of Faith in the Elect*, and *Answer to Travers*, § 9.

This part of invention, concerning the invention of sciences, I purpose, if God give me leave, hereafter to propound, having digested it into two parts; whereof the one I term *experientia literata*, and the other *interpretatio nature*: the former being but a degree and rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a promise.⁸

4. The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention. for to *invent* is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know: and the use of this invention is no other but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our consideration. So as to speak truly, it is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an application: which is the cause why the schools do place it after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do account it a chase as well of deer in an inclosed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name, let it be called invention: so as it be perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of this invention is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.

5. To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses, Preparation and Suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the Sophists near his time, saying, *They did as if one that professed the art of shoe-making should not teach how to make a shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes.*⁹ But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoke, he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, speaking of divine knowledge, saith, *that the kingdom of heaven is like a good householder, that bringeth forth both new and old store:*¹ and we see the ancient writers of Rhetoric do give it in precept, that

⁸ In the Latin edition, Bacon explains at great length what he means by *experientia literata*, pointing out various methods of making experiments, with examples. Of the *interpretatio nature* he says nothing, but promises, under God's favour, the speedy production of the *Novum Organum*.

⁹ Aristot. *El. Soph.* 33.

¹ Matt. xiii. 52.

pleaders should have the places, whereof they have most continual use, ready handled in all the variety that may be; as that, to speak for the literal interpretation of the law against equity, and contrary; and to speak for presumptions and inferences against testimony, and contrary. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have occasion to speak of, if he will take the pains, he may have it in effect premeditate, and handled, *in thesi*;² so that when he cometh to a particular he shall have nothing to do, but to put to names, and times, and places, and such other circumstances of individuals. We see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes; who, in regard of the great force that the entrance and access into causes hath to make a good impression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for orations and speeches.³ All which authorities and precedents may overweigh Aristotle's opinion, that would have us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears.

But the nature of the collection of this provision or preparatory store, though it be common both to Logic and Rhetoric, yet having made an entry of it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the further handling of it to Rhetoric.

6. The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth assign and direct us to certain marks, or places, which may excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly collected, to the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this use, truly taken, only to furnish argument to dispute probably with others, but likewise to minister unto our judgment to conclude aright within ourselves. Neither may these places serve only to apprompt our invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato saith, *Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for in a general notion: else how shall he know it when he hath found it*;⁴ and therefore the larger your anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your search. But the same places which will help us what to produce of that which we know already, will also help us, if a man of experience were before us, what questions to ask; or, if we have books and authors to instruct us, what points to search and revolve; so as I cannot report that this part of

² Cic. *Orat.* 14. cf. *ad Att.* xvi. 6.

³ The prefaces referred to are of doubtful authority.

⁴ Plato, *Menon.* ii. 80.

invention, which is that which the schools call *Topics*, is deficient.

7. Nevertheless, *Topics* are of two sorts, general and special. The general we have spoken to ; but the particular hath been touched by some, but rejected generally as in-artificial and variable. But leaving the humour which hath reigned too much in the schools, which is, to be vainly subtle in a few things which are within their command, and to reject the rest; I do receive particular *Topics*, (that is, places or directions of invention and inquiry in every particular knowledge,) as things of great use, being mixtures of Logic with the matter of sciences ; for in these it holdeth, *ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis*; for as in going of a way, we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the better sight of that part of the way which remaineth : so every degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which followeth ; which light if we strengthen by drawing it forth into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our pursuit.⁵

XIV. 1. Now we pass unto the arts of *Of Judgment*. Judgment, which handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations ; which as to induction hath a coincidence with invention. For all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth ; all one as in the sense. But otherwise it is in proof by syllogism ; for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judgment of the consequence is another ; the one exciting only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have spoken of interpretation of nature.

2. For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently and excellently laboured ; for the nature of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his understanding fixed and immovable, and as a rest and support of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion there is some point quiescent :⁶ and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas, that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling, to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the

⁵ In the Latin edition an inquiry *de gravi et levi* is here inserted as an example of right treatment of a topic.

⁶ Aristot. *de Motu Anim.* 3.

conversion is accomplished : so assuredly men have a desire to have an *Atlas* or axle-tree within to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of falling ; therefore men did hasten to set down some principles about which the variety of their disputations might turn.

3. So then this art of judgment is but the reduction of propositions to principles in a middle term : the principles to be agreed by all and exempted from argument ; the middle term to be elected at the liberty of every man's invention ; the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted ; the one when the proposition is reduced to the principle, which they term a *probation ostensive* ;⁷ the other, when the contradictory of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the principle, which is that which they call *per incommodum*, or *pressing an absurdity* ; the number of middle terms to be as the proposition standeth degrees more or less removed from the principle.

4. But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one by way of direction, the other by way of caution : the former frameth and setteth down a true form of consequence, by the variations and deflections from which errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged. Toward the composition and structure of which form, it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple words : and this is that part of Logic which is comprehended in the *Analytics*.

5. The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and assurance sake ; discovering the more subtle forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions, which is that which is termed *elenches*. For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth, as Seneca maketh the comparison well, as in juggling feats, which, though we know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be ;⁸ yet the more subtle sort of them doth not only put a man beside his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment.

6. This part concerning *elenches* is excellently handled by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example, not only in the persons of the Sophists, but even in Socrates himself : who, professing to affirm nothing, but to affirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallacy, and redargu-

⁷ Called *ostensive reduction*, because you must prove either the very same conclusion as before, or one which implies it.—Whately, *Log.* ii. iii. 5.

⁸ Sen. *Epist. Mor.* v. 4.

tion.⁹ And although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of very great advantage: though the difference be good which was made between orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the race, and the other as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker creature.

7. But yet further, this doctrine of *elenches* hath a more ample latitude and extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of knowledge; whereof some are laboured and others omitted. For first, I conceive, though it may seem at first somewhat strange, that that part which is variably referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysics, touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but an *elench*; for the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words and phrase, (especially of such words as are most general, and intervene in every inquiry,) it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use, leaving vain subtilties and speculations, of the inquiry of *majority*, *minority*, *priority*, *posteriority*, *identity*, *diversity*, *possibility*, *act*, *totality*, *parts*, *existence*, *privation*, and the like, are but wise cautions against the ambiguities of speech. So again the distribution of things into certain tribes, which we call *categories* or *predicaments*, are but cautions against the confusion of *definitions* and *divisions*.

8. Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the impression, and not by the subtilty of the illaqueation; not so much perplexing the reason, as overruling it by power of the imagination. But this part I think more proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric.¹

9. But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or inquired at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars,

⁹ Compare the account which Socrates gives of himself in the opening of the *Theaetetus*.

¹ The following section is greatly enlarged and improved in the Latin edition, which should be read, together with *Nov. Org. i. Aph. 47, 59; ii. Aph. 28.*

but doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the mind, beholding them in an example or two; as first, in that instance which is the root of all superstition, namely, *That to the nature of the mind of all men it is consonant for the affirmative or active to affect more than the negative or privative*: so that a few times hitting or presence, counter-vaileth oft-times failing or absence; as was well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him in Neptune's temple the great number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, *Advise now, you that think it folly to invoke Neptune in tempest: Yea, but, saith Diagoras, where are they painted that are drowned?*² Let us behold it in another instance, namely, *That the spirit of man, being of an equal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign in nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth*. Hence it cometh, that the mathematicians cannot satisfy themselves except they reduce the motions of the celestial bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to be discharged of eccentrics.³ Hence it cometh, that whereas there are many things, in nature, as it were, *monodica, sui juris*; yet the cogitations of man do feign unto them *relatives, parallels, and conjugates*, whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned an element of fire, to keep square with earth, water, and air, and the like: nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a number of fictions and fancies the similitude of human actions and arts, together with the making of man *communis mensura*, have brought into natural philosophy; not much better than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and solitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in heathenism, who supposed the Gods to be

² Cic. de Nat. Deor. iii. 37.

³ This reproach was removed by Kepler's discoveries, made known only a few years after the publication of the *Advancement of Learning*. See Hallam. *Hist. of Lit.* iii. 185.

of human shape.⁴ And therefore Velleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked, why God should have adorned the heavens with stars, as if he had been an *ædilis*, one that should have set forth some magnificent shows or plays.⁵ For if that great Work-master had been of a human disposition, he would have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders, like the frets in the roofs of houses; whereas one can scarce find a posture in square, or triangle, or straight line, amongst such an infinite number; so differing a harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of nature.

Let us consider again the false appearances imposed upon us by every man's own individual nature and custom, in that feigned supposition that Plato⁶ maketh of the cave: for certainly if a child were continued in a grot or cave under the earth until maturity of age, and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd imaginations. So in like manner, although our persons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits are included in the caves of our own complexions and customs, which minister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions, if they be not recalled to examination. But hereof we have given many examples in one of the errors, or peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our first book.

And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort: and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well *loquendum ut vulgus sentiendum ut sapientes*; yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment. So as it is almost necessary, in all controversies and disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. For

⁴ See the account of the heresy of Audius. Epiph. *adv. Hær.* p. 811. He held that the expression, "created in the image of God," had reference to the body. Bacon was probably thinking of the squabbles among the ignorant monks of Nitria, some of whom supposed that the Deity had actually feet and hands. Vid. Mosheim. i. 436.

⁵ Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* i. 9.

⁶ Vid. *de Rep.* lib. vii. *init.*

it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, in questions and differences about words. To conclude therefore, it must be confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances, because they are inseparable from our nature and condition of life; so yet nevertheless the caution of them, (for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions,) doth extremely import the true conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches or cautions against these three false appearances, I find altogether deficient.

10. There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also deficient; which is the application of the differing kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of subjects; for there being but four kinds of demonstrations, that is, *by the immediate consent of the mind or sense, by induction, by syllogism, and by congruity* (which is that which Aristotle calleth *demonstration in orb or circle*,⁷ and not *a notioribus*;) every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which respectively they have chiefest use; and certain others, from which respectively they ought to be excluded; and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hindrance to knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstrations, according to the analogy of sciences, I note as deficient.

XV. 1. The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in writing or memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of the character, and the order of the entry; for the art of characters, or other visible notes of words or things, it hath nearest conjugation with grammar; and therefore I refer it to the due place: for the disposition and collocation of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good digest of common-places; wherein I am, not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the use of common-place books, as causing a retardation of reading,

Of the Preservation of Knowledge.

⁷ Aristot. *Analyt. Pri.* ii. 5. 1.

and some sloth or relaxation of memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of common-places, to be a matter of great use and essence in studying, as that which assureth copie of invention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this is true, that of the methods of common-places that I have seen, there is none of any sufficient worth; all of them carrying merely the face of a school, and not of a world; and referring to vulgar matters and pedantical divisions, without all life, or respect to action.

2. For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, which is memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly inquired of. An art there is extant of it; but it seemeth to me that there are better precepts than that art, and better practices of that art than those received. It is certain the art, as it is, may be raised to points of ostentation prodigious: but in use, as it is now managed, it is barren, (not burdensome, nor dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but barren,) that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business and occasions. And therefore I make no more estimation of repeating a great number of names or words upon once hearing, or the pouring forth of a number of verses or rhimes, *ex tempore*, or the making of a satirical simile of everything or the turning of everything to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting of everything by cavil, or the like, (whereof in the faculties of the mind there is great copie, and such as by device and practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder,) than I do of the tricks, of tumblers *funambuloes*, *baladines*; the one being the same in the mind that the other is in the body, matters of strangeness without worthiness.

3. This art of memory is but built upon two intentions; the one prenotation, the other emblem. Prenotation dischargeth the indefinite seeking of that we would remember, and directeth us to seek in a narrow compass, that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our place of memory. Emblem reduceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, which strike the memory more; out of which axioms may be drawn much better practice than that in use; and besides which axioms, there are divers more touching help of memory, not inferior to them. But I did in the beginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but only ill managed.

XVI. 1. There⁸ remaineth the fourth kind of rational knowledge, which is transitive, concerning the expressing or transferring our knowledge to others; which I will term by the general name of tradition or delivery. Tradition hath three parts; the first concerning the organ of tradition: the second concerning the method of tradition; and the third concerning the illustration of tradition.

*Transmis-
sion of
Knowledge.*

2. For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or writing: for Aristotle saith well, *Words are the images of cogitations, and letters are the images of words*; ⁹ but yet it is not of necessity that cogitations be expressed by the medium of words. For *whatsoever is capable of sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense, is in nature competent to express cogitations*. And therefore we see in the commerce of barbarous people, that understand not one another's language, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that men's minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to serve the turn. And we understand further, that it is the use of China, and the kingdoms of the High Levant, to write in characters real, which express neither letters nor words in gross, but things or notions; insomuch as countries and provinces, which understand not one another's language, can nevertheless read one another's writings, because the characters are accepted more generally than the languages do extend; and therefore they have a vast multitude of characters, as many, I suppose, as radical words.

3. These notes of cogitations are of two sorts; the one when the note hath some similitude or congruity with the notion: the other *ad placitum*, having force only by contract or acceptation. Of the former sort are hieroglyphics and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics, things of ancient use, and embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of the most ancient nations, they are but as continued impresses and emblems. And as for gestures, they are as transitory hieroglyphics, and are to hieroglyphics as words spoken are to words written, in that they abide not; but they have evermore, as well as the other, an affinity with the things signified: as Periander, being consulted with how to preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend and report what he saw him do; and went into his garden and topped all the highest flowers: signify-

⁸ In the Latin edition, this chapter opens the sixth book.

⁹ Aristot. *de Interpret.* i. 2.

ing, that it consisted in the cutting off and keeping low of the nobility and grandees.¹ *Ad placitum*, are the characters real before mentioned, and words: although some have been willing by curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning to have derived imposition of names from reason and intendment; a speculation elegant, and, by reason it searcheth into antiquity, reverent; but sparingly mixed with truth, and of small fruit. This portion of knowledge, touching the notes of things, and cogitations in general, I find not inquired, but deficient. And although it may seem of no great use, considering that words and writings by letters do far excel all the other ways; yet because this part concerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge, (for words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as moneys are for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver.) I thought good to propound it to better inquiry.

4. Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them hath produced the science of grammar: for man still striveth to reintegrate himself in those benedictions, from which by his fault he hath been deprived: and as he hath striven against the first general curse by the invention of all other arts, so hath he sought to come forth of the second general curse, which was the confusion of tongues, by the art of grammar; whereof the use in a mother tongue is small, in a foreign tongue more; but most in such foreign tongues as have ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned only to learned tongues. The duty of it is of two natures; the one popular, which is for the speedy and perfect attaining languages, as well for intercourse of speech as for understanding of authors; the other philosophical, examining the power and nature of words, as they are the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy between words and reason is handled *sparsim*, brokenly though not entirely; and therefore I cannot report it deficient, though I think it very worthy to be reduced into a science by itself.

5. Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the consideration of the accidents of words: which are measure, sound, and elevation or accent, and the sweetness

¹ Aristot. *Polit.* iii. 13. The person who sent to consult Periander was Thrasybulus of Miletus. Herodotus (v. 92) gives the opposite version of the story, making Periander consult Thrasybulus. Compare the story of Tarquinius Superbus, told by Ovid. *Fast.* ii. 701.

and harshness of them; whence hath issued some curious observations in rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we consider it, in respect of the verse and not of the argument; wherein though men in learned tongues do tie themselves to the ancient measures, yet in modern languages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses as of dances: for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse is a measured speech. In these things the sense is better judge than the art;

Cœnæ fereula nostræ
Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis.*

And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and an unfit subject, it is well said, *Quod tempore antiquum videtur, id incongruitate est maxime nocum.*

6. For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alphabets, but may be in words. The kinds of ciphers, besides the simple ciphers, with changes, and intermixtures of nulls and non-significants, are many, according to the nature or rule of the infolding, wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, doubles, &c. But the virtues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are three: that they be not laborious to write and read; that they be impossible to decipher; and, in some cases, that they be without suspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write *omnia per omnia*; which is undoubtedly possible, with a proportion quintuple at most of the writing infolding to the writing infolded, and no other restraint whatsoever. This art of ciphering hath for relative an art of deciphering, by supposition unprofitable, but, as things are, of great use. For suppose that ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of them which exclude the decipherer. But in regard of the rawness and unskillfulness of the hands through which they pass, the greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest ciphers.

7. In the enumeration of these private and retired arts, it may be thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences, naming them for show and ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let those which are skilful in them judge whether I bring them in only for appearance, or whether in that which I speak of them, though in few marks, there be not some seed of proficiency. And this must be remembered, that as there be many of great account in their countries and provinces, which, when they come up to the seat of the estate, are but

* Martial. *Epig.* ix. 82.

of mean rank and scarcely regarded; so these arts, being here placed with the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty things: yet to such as have chosen them to spend their labours and studies in them, they seem great matters.

Of the Methods of transmitting Knowledge. XVII. 1. For the method of tradition, I see it hath moved a controversy in our time. But as in civil business, if there be a meeting, and men fall at words, there is commonly an end of the matter for that time, and no proceeding at all; so in learning, where there is much controversy, there is many times little inquiry. For this part of knowledge of method seemeth to me so weakly inquired as I shall report it deficient.

2. Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in Logic, as a part of judgment: for as the doctrine of syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of judgment upon that which is invented, so the doctrine of method containeth the rules of judgment upon that which is to be delivered; for judgment precedeth delivery, as it followeth invention. Neither is the method or the nature of the tradition material only to the use of knowledge, but likewise to the progression of knowledge: for since the labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of knowledge, the wisdom of the tradition is that which inspireth the felicity of continuance and proceeding. And therefore the most real diversity of method, is of method referred to use, and method referred to progression: whereof the one may be termed magistral, and the other of probation.

3. The latter whereof seemeth to be *via deserta et interclusa*. For as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of contract of error between the deliverer and the receiver: for he that delivereth knowledge, desireth to deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not as may be best examined; and he that receiveth knowledge, desireth rather present satisfaction, than expectant inquiry; and so rather not to doubt, than not to err: glory making the author not to lay open his weakness, and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength.

4. But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on, ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same method wherein it was invented: and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet nevertheless, *secundum majus et minus*, a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of his know-

ledge and consent; and so transplant it into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots; but if you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips: so the delivery of knowledges, as it is now used, is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots; good for the carpenter, but not for the planter. But if you will have sciences grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you look well to the taking up of the roots: of which kind of delivery the method of the mathematics, in that subject, hath some shadow: but generally I see it neither put in ure nor put in inquisition, and therefore note it for deficient.

5. Another diversity of method there is, which hath some affinity with the former, used in some cases by the discretion of the ancients, but disgraced since by the impostures of many vain persons, who have made it as a false light for their counterfeit merchandises; and that is, enigmatical and disclosed. The pretence whereof is, to remove the vulgar capacities from being admitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can pierce the veil.

6. Another diversity of method, whereof the consequence is great, is the delivery of knowledge in aphorisms, or in methods; wherein we may observe that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a few axioms or observations upon any subject, to make a solemn and formal art, filling it with some discourses, and illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into a sensible method. But the writing in aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, whereto the writing in method doth not approach. For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid: for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of illustration is cut off: recitals of examples are cut off; discourse of connexion and order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off. So there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good quantity of observation: and therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt to write aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But in methods,

Tantum series juncturaque pollet,
Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris;³

as a man shall make a great shew of an art, which, if it

³ Hor. *Epist. ad Pis.* 242.

were disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods are more fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to point to action ; for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, and therefore satisfy ; but particulars, being dispersed, do best agree with dispersed directions. And lastly, aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire farther ; whereas methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they were at farthest.

7. Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great weight, is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or by questions and their determinations ; the latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning, as it is to the proceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little fort or hold. For if the field be kept, and the sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller things will come in of themselves : indeed a man would not leave some important piece enemy¹ at his back. In like manner, the use of confutation in the delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing ; and to serve to remove strong pre-occupations and prejudgments, and not to minister and excite disputations and doubts.

8. Another diversity of method is, according to the subject or matter which is handled ; for there is a great difference in delivery of the mathematics, which are most abstracted of knowledges, and policy, which is the most immersed : and howsoever contention hath been moved, touching a uniformity of method in multiformity of matter, yet we see how that opinion, besides the weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards learning, as that which taketh the way to reduce learning to certain empty and barren generalities ; being but the very husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced out and expulsed with the torture and press of the method. And therefore as I did allow well of particular topics for invention, so I do allow likewise of particular methods of tradition.

9. Another diversity of judgment in the delivery and teaching of knowledge is, according unto the light and presuppositions of that which is delivered ; for that knowledge which is new, and foreign from opinions received, is to be delivered in another form than that that is agreeable

¹ Vulg. *with an enemy* ; but the reading in the text is found in the editions of 1605 and 1633. The Latin edition has *urbem aliquam magnam et munitam a tergo relinquere handquaquam semper tutum esse.*

and familiar; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith, *If we shall indeed dispute, and not follow after similitudes, &c.* For those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions, need only but to prove or dispute; but those whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate: so that it is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations to express themselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning, and in rude times, when those conceits which are now trivial were then new, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else would men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for paradoxes that which was offered before they had understood or judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and tropes are: for it is a rule, that whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in aid of similitudes.

10. There be also other diversities of methods vulgar and received: as that of resolution or analysis, of constitution or systasis, of concealment or cryptic, &c., which I do allow well of, though I have stood upon those which are least handled and observed. All which I have remembered to this purpose, because I would erect and constitute one general inquiry, which seems to me deficient, touching the wisdom of tradition.

11. But unto this part of knowledge concerning methods doth farther belong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a work, but also the several beams and columns thereof: not as to their stuff, but as to their quantity and figure. And therefore method considereth not only the disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise the propositions: not as to their truth or matter, but as to their limitation and manner. For herein Ramus⁵ merited better a great deal in reviving the good rules of propositions, *Καθόλου πρώτον κατὰ παντός*, &c., than he did in introducing the canker of epitomes; and yet (as it is the condition of human things that, according to the ancient fables, *the most precious things have the most pernicious keepers*;) it was so, that the attempt of the one made him fall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted that should design to make axioms convertible, if he make them not withal circular, and *non promoveant*, or incurring into themselves; but yet the intention was excellent.

⁵ For an account of Ramus, see Hooker, i. 6, with Keble's note.

12. The other considerations of method, concerning propositions, are chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which limit the dimensions of sciences : for every knowledge may be fitly said, besides the profundity, (which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it solid,) to have a longitude and a latitude; accounting the latitude towards other sciences, and the longitude towards action; that is, from the greatest generality to the most particular precept. The one giveth rule how far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the province of another, which is the rule they call *Kathavro*; the other giveth rule unto what degree of particularity a knowledge should descend : which latter I find passed over in silence, being in my judgment the more material; for certainly there must be somewhat left to practice; but how much is worthy the inquiry. We see remote and superficial generalities do but offer knowledge to scorn of practical men; and are no more aiding to practice, than an Ortelius's universal map is to direct the way between London and York. The better sort of rules have been not unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished, where you may see the images of things, but first they must be filed : so the rules will help, if they be laboured and polished by practice. But how crystalline they may be made at the first, and how far forth they may be polished aforehand, is the question; the inquiry whereof seemeth to me deficient.

13. There hath been also laboured and put in practice a method, which is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture; which is, to deliver knowledges in such manner, as men may speedily come to make a show of learning who have it not: such was the travail of Raymundus Lullius, in making that art which bears his name:⁶ not unlike to some books of typocosmy, which have been made since; being nothing but a mass of words of all arts, to give men countenance, that those which use the terms might be thought to understand the art; which collections are much like a fripper's or broker's shop, that hath ends of everything, but nothing of worth.

XVIII. 1. Now we descend to that part *Of Rhetoric*. which concerneth the illustration of tradition, comprehended in that science which we call *rhetoric, or art of eloquence*; a science excellent, and ex-

⁶ *Ars Lulliana*. An account of this worthy and his doctrines may be found in the *Biographie Universelle*. He flourished in the thirteenth century.

cellently well laboured. For though in true value it is inferior to wisdom, (as it is said by God to Moses, when he disabled himself for want of this faculty, *Aaron shall be thy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as God:*)⁷ yet with people it is the more mighty: so Solomon saith, *Sapiens corde appellabitur prudens, sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet;*⁸ signifying, that profoundness of wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration, but that it is eloquence that prevailth in an active life. And as to the labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of rhetorics exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of examples of eloquence in the orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this art; and therefore the deficiencies which I shall note will rather be in some collections, which may as hand-maids attend the art, than in the rules or use of the art itself.

2. Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots of this science, as we have done of the rest; the duty and office of rhetoric is, to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will. For we see reason is disturbed in the administration thereof by three means; by *illaqueation* or *sophism*, which pertains to logic; by *imagination* or *impression*, which pertains to rhetoric; and by *passion* or *affection*, which pertains to morality. And as in negotiation with others, men are wrought by cunning, by importunity, and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within ourselves, men are undermined by inconsequences, solicited and importuned by impressions or observations, and transported by passions. Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts should have force to disturb reason, and not to establish and advance it. For the end of logic is, to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the end of morality is to procure the affections to obey reason, and not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is, to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it: for these abuses of art come in but *ex obliquo*, for caution.

3. And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though springing out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the pleasure of

⁷ Exod. vii. 1.

⁸ Prov. xvi. 21.

the taste.⁹ For we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that which is good, than in colouring that which is evil; for there is no man but speaketh more honestly than he can do or think: and it was excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon, that because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was ever inveighing against eloquence and good speech;¹ knowing that no man can speak fair of courses sordid and base. And therefore as Plato said elegantly, *That virtue, if she could be seen, would move great love and affection*;² so seeing that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next degree is to show her to the imagination in lively representation: for to show her to reason only in subtilty of argument, was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of the Stoics;³ who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the will of man.

4. Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason, it were true, there should be no great use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs; but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections,

Video meliora, proboque;

Deteriora sequor:⁴

reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the affections' part, and contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against the affections; for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth. The difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And therefore the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaieth.

⁹ Plat. *Gorg.* i. 462. seq.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 42.

² Plat. *Phaedr.* iii. 250. Quoted also by Cicero, *de Off.* i. 5, and *de Fin.* ii. 16.

³ In the Latin edition he says, "by Cicero," alluding probably to such passages as the following: "Stoici . . . contortulis quibusdam ac minutis conclusionumculis, nec ad sensus permanentibus, effici volunt, non esse malum dolorem." *Tusc. Disp.* ii. 18. 42. Cf. *Parad. Proæ.*

⁴ Ovid. *Metam.* vii. 20.

5. We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged with the colouring of the worse part, than logic with sophistry, or morality with vice. For we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use be opposite. It appeareth also that logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close, the other at large; but much more in this, that logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle⁵ doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of both: for the proofs and demonstrations of logic are towards all men indifferent and the same; but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors:

Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinus Arion.⁶

Which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend so far, that if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should speak to them all respectively and several ways: though this politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for the greatest orators to want: whilst, by the observing their well-graced forms of speech, they leese the volubility of application: and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better inquiry, not being curious whether we place it here, or in that part which concerneth policy.

6. Now therefore will I descend to the deficiencies, which, as I said, are but attendances: and first, I do not find the wisdom and diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a collection of the popular signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and comparative, which are as the sophisms of rhetoric, as I touched before.⁷ For example:

Sophisma.

Quod laudatur, bonum : quod vituperatur, malum.

Redargutio.

Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.⁸

*Malum est, malum est, inquit emptor: scilicet cum recesserit, tum gloriabitur!*⁹ The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three: one, that there be but a few of many; another,

⁵ Vid. Aristot. *Rhet.* i. 2. 7.

⁶ Virg. *Ecl.* viii. 56.

⁷ Vid. *Top.* i. 15, 12, *et al.*

⁸ Hor. *Ep.* ii. 2. 11.

⁹ Prov. xx. 11.

that their elenches are not annexed; and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use of them: for their use is not only in probation, but much more in impression. For many forms are equal in signification which are differing in impression; as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same: for there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said, *Your enemies will be glad of this*:

Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ:¹

than by hearing it said only, *This is evil for you*.

7. Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, touching provision or preparatory store, for the furniture of speech and readiness of invention, which appeareth to be of two sorts; the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces un-made up, the other to a shop of things ready made up; both to be applied to that which is frequent and most in request: the former of these I will call *antitheta*, and the latter *formulæ*.

Antitheta are *theses* argued *pro et contra*;² wherein men may be more large and laborious: but, in such as are able to do it, to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, but to be as skains or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be used; supplying authorities and examples by reference.

Pro verbis legis.

Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quæ recedit a literâ:
Cum receditur a literâ, judex transit in legislatorem.

Pro sententia legis.

Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula.

Formulæ are but decent and apt passages or conveyances of speech, which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of *preface*, *conclusion*, *digression*, *transition*, *excusation*, &c. For as in buildings, there is great pleasure and use in the well casting of the stair-cases, entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech, the conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect.

¹ Virg. *Æn.* ii. 104.

² Compare Cic. *Orat.* c. 50.

A conclusion in a deliberative.

So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences future.³

XIX. 1. There remain two appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, the one critical, the other pedantical. For all knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by men's proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly in writing of books, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading of books; whereunto appertain incidently these considerations. The first is concerning the true correction and edition of authors; wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great prejudice. For these critics have often presumed, that that which they understand not is false set down: as the priest that, where he found it written of St. Paul, *Demissus est per sportam*⁴ mended his book, and made it *Demissus est per portam*; because *sporta* was a hard word, and out of his reading: and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, are yet of the same kind. And therefore, as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct.

*Appendices
to the Me-
thods of
transmitting
Knowledge.*

The second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors, which resteth in annotations and commentaries: wherein it is over usual to blanch the obscure places, and discourse upon the plain.

The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great light to true interpretations.

The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the authors; that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what books to read.

And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies; that men may know in what order or pursuit to read.

2. For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of tradition which is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers considerations of great fruit.

As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as

³ In the Latin edition he inserts at this place a large number of examples of each of these topics (*colores boni et mali, antithetarum*, and *formulae minores*) annexing to the first the *elunches*, or refutations,

⁴ Acts ix. 25.

with what to initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them.

Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so proceed to the more difficult; and in what courses to press the more difficult, and then to turn them to the more easy: for it is one method to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise dancing with heavy shoes.

A third is the application of learning according unto the propriety of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual, but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies: as, for example, if a child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is to begin anew. And as sciences have a propriety towards faculties for cure and help, so faculties or powers have a sympathy towards sciences for excellency or speedy profiting: and therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom, what kinds of wits and natures are most apt and proper for what sciences.

Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to hurt or help: for, as is well observed by Cicero, men in exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise their faults and get ill habits as well as good; so there is a great judgment to be had in the continuance and intermission of exercises. It were too long to particularize a number of other considerations of this nature, things but of mean appearance, but of singular efficacy. For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants is that that is most important to their thriving: (and as it was noted that the first six kings, being in truth as tutors of the state of Rome in the infancy thereof, was the principal cause of the immense greatness of that state which followed :) so the culture and manurance of minds in youth, hath such a forcible, though unseen operation, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour can countervail it afterwards. And it is not amiss to observe also how small and mean faculties gotten by education, yet when they fall into great men or great matters, do work great and important effects; whereof we see a notable example in Tacitus^b of two stage players, Percennius and Vibulenus, who by their faculty of playing put the Pannonian armies into an extreme tumult and

^b Tacit. *Ann.* i. 22, 23.

combustion. For there arising a mutiny amongst them upon the death of Augustus Cæsar, Blæsus the lieutenant had committed some of the mutineers, which were suddenly rescued; whereupon Vibulenus got to be heard speak, which he did in this manner:—*These poor innocent wretches appointed to cruel death, you have restored to behold the light; but who shall restore my brother to me, or life unto my brother, that was sent hither in message from the legions of Germany, to treat of the common cause? and he hath murdered him this last night by some of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his executioners upon soldiers. Answer, Blæsus, what is done with his body? The mortalest enemies do not deny burial. When I have performed my last duty to the corpse with kisses, with tears, command me to be slain beside him; so that these my fellows, for our good meaning, and our true hearts to the legions, may have leave to bury us.* With which speech he put the army into an infinite fury and uproar: whereas truth was he had no brother, neither was there any such matter; but he played it merely as if he had been upon the stage.

3. But to return: we are now come to a period of rational knowledges; wherein if I have made the divisions other than those that are received, yet would I not be thought to disallow all those divisions which I do not use. For there is a double necessity imposed upon me of altering the divisions. The one, because it differeth in end and purpose, to sort together those things which are next in nature, and those things which are next in use. For if a secretary of state should sort his papers, it is like in his study or general cabinet he would sort together things of a nature, as treaties, instructions, &c., but in his boxes or particular cabinet he would sort together those that he were like to use together, though of several natures; so in this general cabinet of knowledge it was necessary for me to follow the divisions of the nature of things; whereas if myself had been to handle any particular knowledge, I would have respected the divisions fittest for use. The other, because the bringing in of the deficiencies did by consequence alter the partitions of the rest. For let the knowledge extant, for demonstration sake, be fifteen; let the knowledge with the deficiencies be twenty; the parts of fifteen are not the parts of twenty; for the parts of fifteen, are three and five; the parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten. So as these things are without contradiction, and could not otherwise be.

*Of Ethics in
general.*

XX. 1. **W**E proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the appetite and will of man:⁶ whereof Solomon saith, *Ante omnia, fili, custodi cor tuum; nam inde procedunt actiones vite.*⁷ In the handling of this science, those which have written seem to me to have done as if a man, that professed to teach to write, did only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars and copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures of *good, virtue, duty, felicity*; propounding them well described as the true objects and scopes of man's will and desires. But how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true and conformable to these pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly and unprofitably. For it is not the disputing that moral virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not by nature, or the distinguishing that generous spirits are won by doctrines and persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment, and the like scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the absence of this part.

2. The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden rock wh. reupon both this and many other barks of knowledge have been cast away; which is, that men have despised to be conversant in ordinary and common matters, the judicious direction whereof nevertheless is the wisest doctrine, (for life consisteth not in novelties or subtilties,) but contrariwise they have compounded sciences chiefly of a certain resplendent or lustrous mass of matter, chosen to give glory either to the subtilty of disputations, or to the eloquence of discourses. But Seneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence; *Nocet illis eloquutio, quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit, sed sui.* Doctrine should be such as should make men in love with the lesson, and not with the teacher; being directed to the auditor's benefit, and not to the author's commendation. And therefore these are of the right kind which may be concluded as Demosthenes concludes his counsel, *Quæ si feceritis, non oratorum duntaxat in præsentia laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos etiam novita multo post statu rerum vestrarum meliore.*⁸

⁶ In the Latin edition, this chapter commences the seventh book. With the opening paragraphs compare Aristotle, *Eth. Nic. passim.*

⁷ Prov. iv. 23.

⁸ Vide Demosth. *Olynth. B. ad fin.*

3. Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have despaired of a fortune, which the poet Virgil promised himself, and indeed obtained, who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing of the observations of husbandry, as of the heroical acts of Æneas:—

Nec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum
Quam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem.⁹

And surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, not to write at leisure that which men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and suborn action and active life, these Georgics of the mind, concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical descriptions of virtue, duty, and felicity. Wherefore the main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the exemplar or platform of good, and the regiment or culture of the mind: the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto.

4. The doctrine touching the platform or nature of good considereth it either simple or compared; either the kinds of good, or the degrees of good; in the latter whereof those infinite disputations which were touching the supreme degree thereof, which they term felicity, beatitude, or the highest good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen divinity, are by the Christian faith discharged. And as Aristotle saith, *That young men may be happy, but not otherwise but by hope*;¹ so we must all acknowledge our minority, and embrace the felicity which is by hope of the future world.

5. Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of the philosopher's heaven, whereby they feigned a higher elevation of man's nature than was, (for we see in what a height of stile Seneca writeth, *Vere magnum, habere fragilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei.*) we may with more sobriety and truth receive the rest of their inquiries and labours. Wherein for the nature of good positive or simple, they have set it down excellently, in describing the forms of virtue and duty, with their situations and postures; in distributing them into their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, and administrations, and the like: nay farther, they have commended them to man's nature and spirit, with great quickness of argument and beauty of persuasions; yea, and fortified and entrenched them, as much as discourse can do, against corrupt and popular opinions. Again, for

the degrees and comparative nature of good, they have also excellently handled it in their triplicity of good, in the comparison between a contemplative and an active life,² in the distinction between virtue with reluctance and virtue secured, in their encounters between honesty and profit, in their balancing of virtue with virtue, and the like; so as this part deserveth to be reported for excellently laboured.

6. Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the popular and received notions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and the rest, they had stayed a little longer upon the inquiry concerning the roots of good and evil, and the strings of those roots, they had given, in my opinion, a great light to that which followed; and especially if they had consulted with nature, they had made their doctrines less prolix and more profound: which being by them in part omitted and in part handled with much confusion, we will endeavour to resume and open in a more clear manner.

7. There is formed in every thing a double nature of good: the one, as every thing is a total or substantive in itself; the other, as it is a part or member of a greater body; whereof the latter is in degree the greater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general form. Therefore we see the iron in particular sympathy moveth to the loadstone; but yet if it exceed a certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection to the loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth to the earth, which is the region and country of massy bodies: so may we go forward, and see that water and massy bodies move to the centre of the earth; but rather than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance of nature, they will move upwards from the centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to the earth in regard to their duty to the world. This double nature of good, and the comparative thereof, is much more engraven upon man, if he degenerate not: unto whom the conservation of duty to the public ought to be much more precious than the conservation of life and being: according to that memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, when being in commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with great vehemency and instance by his friends about him, that he should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather, he said only to them, *Necesse est ut eam, non ut vivam.*³ But it may be

¹ Vide Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* i. 3. seq.

³ Plut. *in vit. Pomp.*

truly affirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is communicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, as the Holy Faith; well declaring that it was the same God that gave the Christian law to men, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate creatures that we spoke of before; for we read that the elected saints of God have wished themselves anathematized and razed out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of communion.

8. This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and determine most of the controversies wherein moral philosophy is conversant. For first, it decideth the question touching the preferment of the contemplative or active life, and decideth it against Aristotle. For all the reasons which he bringeth for the contemplative are private, and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a man's self, (in which respects, no question, the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence) not much unlike to that comparison, which Pythagoras made for the gracing and magnifying of philosophy and contemplation: who being asked what he was, answered, *That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian games, he knew the manner, that some came to try their fortune for the prizes, and some came as merchants to utter their commodities, and some came to make good cheer and meet their friends, and some came to look on; and that he was one of them that came to look on.* But men must know, that in this theatre of man's life it is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers on: neither could the like question ever have been received in the church (notwithstanding their *Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanctorum ejus*,⁴ by which place they would exalt their civil death and regular professions,) but upon this defence, that the monastical life is not simply contemplative, but performeth the duty either of incessant prayers and supplications, which hath been truly esteemed as an office in the church, or else of writing or in taking instructions for writing concerning the law of God, as Moses did when he abode so long in the mount. And so we see Enoch the seventh from Adam, who was the first contemplative, and walked with God, yet did also endow the church with prophecy, which St. Jude citeth.⁵ But for contemplation which should be finished in itself,

⁴ Ps. cxvi. 15.

⁵ Ep. Jude. v. 14.

without casting beams upon society, assuredly divinity knoweth it not.

9. It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and Socrates, and their schools and successions, on the one side, who placed felicity in virtue simply or attended, the actions and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace and concern society; and on the other side, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans,⁶ who placed it in pleasure, and made virtue, (as it is used in some comedies of errors, wherein the mistress and the maid change habits,) to be but as a servant, without which pleasure cannot be served and attended, and the reformed school of the Epicureans, which placed it in serenity of mind and freedom from perturbation, (as if they would have deposed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the first age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring nor autumn, but all after one air and season,) and Herillus, who placed felicity in extinguishment of the disputes of the mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming things according to the clearness of the desires, or the reluctance; which opinion was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring things according to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy or wavering of belief: all which are manifest to tend to private repose and contentment, and not to point of society.

10. It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance: as if it were not a thing much more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than to obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper fortune; as Gonsalvo said to his soldiers, showing them Naples, and protesting, *He had rather die one foot forwards, than to have his life secured for long by one foot of retreat.* Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that *a good conscience is a continual feast;*⁷ showing plainly that the conscience of good intentions, howsoever succeeding, is a more continual joy to nature, than all the provision which can be made for security and repose.

⁶ For an account of the sects alluded to in this place, see Ritter and Preller's *History of Philosophy*, in which very useful book will be found an excellent collection of passages, drawn from ancient authorities, and, as far as possible, from the writings of philosophers of the different schools. The English reader may refer to Smith's *Dictionary of Biography and Mythology*.

⁷ Prov. xv. 15.

11. It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy, which grew general about the time of Epictetus, in converting it into an occupation or profession; as if the purpose had been, not to resist and extinguish perturbations, but to fly and avoid the causes of them, and to shape a particular kind and course of life to that end; introducing such a health of mind, as was that health of body of which Aristotle speaketh of Herodius, who did nothing all his life long but intend his health:⁸ whereas if men refer themselves to duties of society, as that health of body is best, which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremities; so likewise that health of mind is most proper, which can go through the greatest temptations and perturbations. So as Diogenes's opinion is to be accepted, who commended not them which abstained, but them which sustained, and could refrain their mind *in præcipitio*, and could give unto the mind, as is used in horsemanship, the shortest stop or turn.

12. Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of application in some of the most ancient and reverend philosophers and philosophical men, that did retire too easily from civil business, for avoiding of indignities and perturbations: whereas the resolution of men truly moral ought to be such as the same Gonsalvo said the honour of a soldier should be *e telâ crassiore*, and not so fine as that every thing should catch in it and endanger it.

XXI. 1. To resume *private or particular good*, it falleth into the division of *good active and passive*: for this difference of good, not unlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed in the familiar or household terms of *promus* and *condus*,⁹ is formed also in all things, and is best disclosed in the two several appetites in creatures; the one to preserve or continue themselves, and the other to dilate or multiply themselves; whereof the latter seemeth to be the worthier: for in nature the heavens, which are the more worthy, are the agent; and the earth, which is the less worthy, is the patient. In the pleasures of living creatures, that of generation is greater than that of food; in divine doctrine, *beatius est dare quam accipere*,¹ and in life, there is no man's spirit so soft, but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire,

⁸ Aristot. *Rhet.* i. 5. 10.

⁹ *Condus*, *promus*, *procurator peni*. Plaut. *Pseud.* ii. 2. 14.

¹ Acts xx. 35.

more than sensuality; which priority of the active good, is much upheld by the consideration of our estate to be mortal and exposed to fortune. For if we might have a perpetuity and certainty in our pleasures, the state of them would advance their price: but when we see it is but *magni æstimamus mori tardius*, and *ne glorieris de crastino, nescis partum dici*,² it maketh us to desire to have somewhat secured and exempted from time, which are only our deeds and works: as it is said *opera eorum sequuntur eos*.³ The preeminence likewise of this active good is upheld by the affection which is natural in man towards variety and proceeding; which in the pleasures of the sense, which is the principal part of passive good, can have no great latitude: *Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris; cibus, somnus, ludus per hunc circulum curritur; mori velle non tantum fortis, aut miser, aut prudens, sed etiam fastidiosus potest*. But in enterprises, pursuits, and purposes of life, there is much variety; whereof men are sensible with pleasure in their inceptions, progressions, recoils, reintegrations, approaches and attainings to their ends: so as it was well said *Vita sine proposito languida et vaga est*. Neither hath this active good an identity with the good of society, though in some case it hath an incidence into it; for although it do many times bring forth acts of beneficence, yet it is with a respect private to a man's own power, glory, amplification, continuance; as appeareth plainly, when it findeth a contrary subject. For that gigante⁴ state of mind which possesseth the troublers of the world such as was Lucius Sylla, and infinite other in smaller model, who would have all men happy or unhappy as they were their friends or enemies, and would give form to the world, according to their own humours, (which is the true theomachy,) pretendeth and aspireth to active good, though it recedeth farthest from good of society, which we have determined to be the greater.

2. To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of conservative and perfective. For let us take a brief review of that which we have said: we have spoken first

² Prov. xxvii. 1.

³ Revel. xiv. 13.

⁴ So Barrow *Serm.* iii. *On Universal Redemption*. "There are some persons of that wicked and *gigantick* disposition, contracted by evil practice, that, should one offer to instruct them in truth, or move them to piety, would be ready to say with Polyphemus—

Νήπιος εἰς ὧ ξεῖν' ἢ τηλόθεν ἐλθὶ λουθας,
ὅς με θεοὺς κέλειαι ἢ δευδιμεν, ἢ ἀλέασθαι.—*Odyss.* ι. 273, 4.

of the good of society, the intention whereof embraceth the form of human nature, whereof we are members and portions, and not our own proper and individual form: we have spoken of active good, and supposed it as a part of private and particular good: and rightly, for there is impressed upon all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding from love to themselves; one of preserving and continuing their form; another of advancing and perfecting their form; and a third of multiplying and extending their form upon other things: whereof the multiplying, or signature of it upon other things, is that which we handled by the name of active good. So as there remaineth the conserving of it, and perfecting or raising of it; which latter is the highest degree of passive good. For to preserve in state is the less, to preserve with advancement is the greater. So in man,—

*Ignescit ollis vigor, et cœlestis origo.*⁵

His approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is the perfection of his form; the error or false imitation of which good is that which is the tempest of human life; while man, upon the instinct of an advancement formal and essential, is carried to seek an advancement local. For as those which are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up and down and change place, as if by a remove local they could obtain a remove internal; so is it with men in ambition, when failing of the means to exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their place. So then passive good is, as was said, either conservative or perfective.

3. To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which consisteth in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures; it seemeth to be the most pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and the lowest. And this also receiveth a difference, which hath neither been well judged of, nor well inquired: for the good of fruition or contentment is placed either in the sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness and vigour of it; the one superinduced by equality, the other by vicissitude; the one having less mixture of evil, the other more impression of good. Which of these is the greater good is a question controverted; but whether man's nature may not be capable of both, is a question not inquired.

4. The former question being debated between Socrates

⁵ *Æn.* vi. 730.

and a sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of mind, and the sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell from argument to ill words: the sophist saying that Socrates' felicity was the felicity of a block or stone; and Socrates saying that the sophist's felicity was the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch.⁶ And both these opinions do not want their supports. For the opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general consent even of the Epicures themselves, that virtue beareth a great part in felicity; and if so, certain it is, that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations than in compassing desires. The sophist's opinion is much favoured by the assertion we last spoke of, that good of advancement is greater than good of simple preservation; because every obtaining a desire hath a show of advancement, as motion though in a circle hath a show of progression.

5. But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the former superfluous. For can it be doubted, but that there are some who take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some other, and yet, nevertheless, are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them? so as this same, *Non uti ut non appetas, non appetere ut non metuas, sunt animi pusilli et diffidentis*. And it seemeth to me, that most of the doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautionary than the nature of things requireth. So have they increased the fear of death in offering to cure it. For when they would have a man's whole life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, they must needs make men think that it is a terrible enemy, against whom there is no end of preparing. Better saith the poet:

Qui spatium vitæ extremum inter munera ponat
Naturæ.⁷

So have they sought to make men's minds too uniform and harmonical, by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary motions: the reason whereof I suppose to be, because they themselves were men dedicated to a private, free, and unapplied course of life. For as we see, upon the lute or like instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have show of many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stops and passages, as a set song or voluntary; much after the same manner was the diversity between a philosophical and a civil life. And therefore

⁶ Vid. Plat. *Gorg.* i. 492, 494.

⁷ *Juv. Sat.* x. 358.

men are to imitate the wisdom of jewellers; who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice which may be ground forth without taking too much of the stone, they help it; but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much, they will not meddle with it: so ought men so to procure serenity as they destroy not magnanimity.

6. Having therefore deduced the good of man which is private and particular, as far as seemeth fit; we will now return to that good of man which respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may term duty; because the term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed and disposed towards others, as the term of virtue is applied to a mind well formed and composed in itself: though neither can a man understand virtue without some relation to society, nor duty without an inward disposition. This part may seem at first to pertain to science, civil and politic: but not if it be well observed; for it concerneth the regiment and government of every man over himself, and not over others. And as in architecture the direction of framing the posts, beams, and other parts of building, is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting the building; and in mechanicals, the direction how to frame an instrument or engine, is not the same with the manner of setting it on work and employing it, (and yet nevertheless in expressing of the one you incidentally express the aptness towards the other;) so the doctrine of conjugation of men in society differeth from that of their conformity thereunto.

7. This part of duty is subdivided into two parts: the common duty of every man, as a man or member of a state; the other, the respective or special duty of every man, in his profession, vocation, and place. The first of these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said. The second likewise I may report rather dispersed than deficient; which manner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument I acknowledge to be best. For who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue, challenge, and right of every several vocation, profession, and place? For although sometimes a looker on may see more than a gamester, and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound, *that the rale best discovereth the hill*; yet there is small doubt but that men can write best, and most really and materially, in their own professions; and that the writing of speculative men of active matter, for the most part, doth seem to men of experience, as Phormio's argument of the wars seemed to Hannibal, to be but dreams

and dotage.⁸ Only there is one vice which accompanieth them that write in their own professions, that they magnify them in excess. But generally it were to be wished, as that which would make learning indeed solid and fruitful, that active men would or could become writers.

8. In which kind I cannot but mention, *honoris causa*, your majesty's excellent book touching the duty of a king: a work richly compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, with great aspersion of all other arts; and being, in mine opinion, one of the most sound and healthful writings that I have read; not distempered in the heat of invention, nor in the coldness of negligence; not sick of business, as those are who lose themselves in their order, nor of convulsions, as those which cramp in matters impertinent; not savouring of perfumes and paintings, as those do who seek to please the reader more than nature beareth; and chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for action; and far removed from that natural infirmity, whereunto I noted those that write in their own professions to be subject, which is, that they exalt it above measure: for your majesty hath truly described, not a king of Assyria or Persia in their extern glory, but a Moses or a David, pastors of their people. Neither can I ever leese out of my remembrance, what I heard your majesty, in the same sacred spirit of Government, deliver in a great cause of judicature, which was, *That kings ruled by their laws, as God did by the laws of nature; and ought as rarely to put in use their supreme prerogative, as God doth his power of working miracles.* And yet notwithstanding, in your book of a free monarchy, you do well give men to understand, that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a king, as well as the circle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to allege this excellent writing of your majesty, as a prime or eminent example of Tractates concerning special and respective duties: wherein I should have said as much, if it had been written a thousand years since: neither am I moved with certain courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in presence: no, it is flattery to praise in absence; that is, when either the virtue is absent, or the occasion is absent; and so the praise is not natural, but forced, either in truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his oration *pro Marcello*, which is nothing but an excellent table of Cæsar's virtue, and made to his face;

⁸ Cic. de Orat. ii. 18. 75.

besides the example of many other excellent persons, wiser a great deal than such observers; and we will never doubt, upon a full occasion, to give just praises to present or absent.

9. But to return: there belongeth further to the handling of this part, touching the duties of professions and vocations, a relative or opposite, touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession, which hath been likewise handled: but how? rather in a satire and cynically, than seriously and wisely: for men have rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions, than with judgment to discover and sever that which is corrupt. For, as Solomon saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure, shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no matter for his instruction: *Quærenti derisorii scientiam ipsa se abscondit; sed studioso fit obviam.*⁹ But the managing of this argument with integrity and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted. For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk, that if he see you first, you die for it; but if you see him first, he dieth: so it is with deceits and evil arts; which, if they be first espied they leese their life; but if they prevent, they endanger. So that we are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest; that is, all forms and natures of evil: for without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them, without the help of the knowledge of evil. For men of corrupted minds presuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and believing of preachers, schoolmasters, and men's exterior language: so as, except you can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality; *Non recipit stultus verba prudentie, nisi ea dixeris quæ versantur in corde ejus.*¹

10. Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also appertain the duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant: so likewise the laws of friend-

⁹ Prov. xiv. 6.

¹ Prov. xviii. 2.

ship and gratitude, the civil bond of companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties; not as they are parts of government and society, but as to the framing of the mind of particular persons.

11. The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth handle it also, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties between person and person, case and case, particular and public: as we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which was so much extolled; yet what was said?

*Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores.*²

So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again, we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their associates, and cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant being a usurper, they were divided in opinion;³ some holding that servitude was the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was better than a civil war: and a number of the like cases there are of comparative duty; amongst which that of all others is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice. Which Jason of Thessalia determined against the truth: *Aliqua sunt injuste facienda, ut multa juste fieri possint.*⁴ But the reply is good, *Auctorem præsentis justitiæ habes, sponsorem future non habes.* Men must pursue things which are just in present, and leave the future to the divine Providence. So then we pass on from this general part touching the exemplar and description of good.

XXII. 1. Now therefore that we have
Of Moral Culture. spoken of this fruit of life, it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto; without which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image, or statua, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and motion; whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words: *Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. Inutile enim fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse, acquirenda autem ejus modos et vias ignorare: non enim de virtute*

² Virg. *Æn.* vi. 823.

³ See the discussion between Brutus, Favonius, and others, described by Plutarch, *Life of Brutus*.

⁴ Plut. *Præc. Ger. Reip.* 24.

*tantum, qua specie sit, quærendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat: utrumque enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse, et ejus compotes fieri: hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo.*⁵ In such full words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part. So saith Cicero in great commendation of Cato the second, that he had applied himself to philosophy, *Non ita disputandi causa, sed ita vivendi.*⁶ And although the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold any consultations touching the reformation of their life, (as Seneca excellently saith) *De partibus vite quisque deliberat, de summâ nemo,* may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with that aphorism of Hippocrates, *Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, eis mens egrotat;*⁷ they need medicine, not only to assuage the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be said, that the cure of men's minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true: but yet moral philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, *that the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress,*⁸ and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the handmaid, to discern of the mistress's will; so ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself, within due limits, many sound and profitable directions.

2. This part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry: the rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and action is often conversant; and such wherein the common talk of men, (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass,) is wiser than their books. It is reasonable therefore that we propound it in the more particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient; which seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have written. We will therefore enumerate some heads or points thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.

3. First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical, we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of application

Eth. Mag. A. ad init.
Hippoc. Aph. ii. 6.

Cic. p. Mur. xxx.
Ps. cxxiii. 2.

only. The husbandman cannot command, neither the nature of the earth, nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the physician the constitution of the patient, nor the variety of accidents. So in the culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command; points of nature, and points of fortune. For to the basis of the one, and the conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied. In these things therefore, it is left unto us to proceed by application.

Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo :⁹

and so likewise,

Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo.

But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary; which is that property which we call accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto which we do apply: for we cannot fit a garment, except we first take measure of the body.

4. So then the first article of this knowledge is, to set down sound and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and tempers of men's natures and dispositions; especially having regard to those differences which are most radical in being the fountains and causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention. For if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which are proportioned to great matters, and others to small,¹ (which Aristotle handleth, or ought to have handled, by the name of magnanimity;) doth it not deserve as well to be considered, that there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others to few? So that some can divide themselves: others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in few things at once: and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are proportioned to that which may be dispatched at once, or within a short return of time; others to

⁹ Virg. *Æn.* v. 710.

¹ See Aristotle. *Eth. Nic.* iv. 7, and cf. *Polit.* i. 4, seq.

that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of pursuit:

Jam tum tenditque fovetque.²

So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved it to be considered by Aristotle;³ *that there is a disposition in conversation, (supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man's self,) to soothe and please; and a disposition contrary to contradict and cross: and deserveth it not much better to be considered, that there is a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more serious nature, (and supposing it still in things merely indifferent,) to take pleasure in the good of another: and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at the good of another?* which is that properly which we call good nature or ill nature, benignity or malignity: and therefore I cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the several characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in morality and policy; considering it is of so great ministry and suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the traditions of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men's natures, according to the predominances of the planets: *lovers of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth.* A man shall find in the wisest sort of these relations which the Italians make touching conclaves, the natures of the several cardinals handsomely and lively painted forth: a man shall meet with in every day's conference, the denominations of *sensitive, dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, huomo di prima impressione, huomo di ultima impressione*, and the like: and yet nevertheless this kind of observation wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions are found, many of them, but we conclude no precepts upon them: wherein our fault is the greater; because both history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly fields where these observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectinary, that receipts might be made of them for use of life.

5. Of much like kind are those impressions of nature, which are imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age,

² Virg. *Æn.* i. 22.

³ *Eth. Nic.* iv. 12.

by the region, by health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent and not externe; and again, those which are caused by extern fortune; as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, variable fortune, rising *per saltum, per gradus*, and the like. And therefore we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent, *benignitas hujus ut adolescentuli est*.⁴ St. Paul concludeth, that severity of discipline was to be used to the Cretans, *increpa eos durè*, upon the disposition of their country, *Cretenses semper mendaces, malae bestiae, ventres pigri*.⁵ Sallust noteth, that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories: *Sed plerumque regiae voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles, saepeque ipsae sibi adversae*.⁶ Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition: *solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius*.⁷ Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men *qui magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt*.⁸ So the psalm sheweth it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase of fortune: *divitiae si affluent, nolite cor apponere*.⁹ These observations, and the like, I deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle, as in passage in his Rhetorics, and are handled in some scattered discourses: but they were never incorporated into moral philosophy, to which they do essentially appertain; as the knowledge of the diversity of grounds and moulds doth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of complexions and constitutions doth to the physician; except we mean to follow the indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines to all patients.

6. Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the affections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first to know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases; and lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of the divers characters of men's natures, it followeth, in order, to know the diseases and infirmities of the mind, which

⁴ Plaut. *Mil. Glor.* iii. 1. 39.

⁵ Tit. i. 12.

⁶ *Bell Jug.* 113.

⁷ Ambigua de Vespasiano fama; solusque omnium ante se principum in melius mutatus est. *Hist.* i. 50.

⁸ καταπέψαι μέγαν ἄλβον οὐκ ἐδυνάσθη. *Olym.* i. 55.

⁹ Ps. lxii. 10.

are no other than the perturbations and distempers of the affections. For as the ancient politiques in popular states were wont to compare the people to the sea, and the orators to the winds; because as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable, if the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation: so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written divers volumes of ethics, and never handled the affections, which is the principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are considered but collaterally, and in a second degree, as they may be moved by speech, he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the quantity; but where their true place is, he pretermitteth them.¹ For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry, no more than he that should generally handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are to the particular affections, as light is to particular colours. Better travails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which we have at second hand. But yet, it is like, it was after their manner, rather in subtilty of definitions, (which in a subject of this nature are but curiosities,) than in active and ample descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some particular writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the affections; as of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of countenance, and other.

7. But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth with great life, how affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose themselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify; how they are inwrapped one within another; and how they do fight and encounter one with another; and other the like particularities: amongst the which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters; how, I say, to set affection against affection, and to master one by another; even as we use to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwise percase we could

¹ See the second book and conf. *Eth. Nic.* ii. 4. 1.

(whereby they have persuaded unto virtue most effectually, by representing her in state and majesty, and popular opinions against virtue in their parasites' coats fit to be scorned and derided,) are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not read and revolved by men in their mature and settled years, but confined almost to boys and beginners? But is it not true also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy, till they have been thoroughly seasoned in religion and morality; lest their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no true differences of things, but according to utility and fortune, as the verse describes it,

Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur;⁶

and again,

Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, hic diadema:⁷

which the poets do speak satirically, and in indignation on virtue's behalf; but books of policy do speak it seriously and positively; for so it pleaseth Machiavel to say, *That if Cæsar had been overthrown, he would have been more odious than ever was Catiline*; as if there had been no difference, but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world? Again, is there not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities themselves, (some kinds of them,) lest they make men too precise, arrogant, incompatible; as Cicero saith of Cato, *In Marco Catone hæc bona quæ videmus divina et egregia, ipsius scitote esse propria; quæ nonnunquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a naturâ, sed a magistro?*⁸ Many other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties and effects, which studies do infuse and instil into manners. And so likewise is there touching the use of all those other points, of company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in the doctrine of morality.

15. But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground; that the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfect, and at other times in a state more depraved. The purpose, therefore, of this practice is, to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been practised by two means, vows or constant reso-

⁶ Senec. *Herc. Fur.* 251.

⁷ Juv. *Sat.* xiii. 105.

⁸ Cic. *p. Mur.* xxix. 61.

lutions, and observances or exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because they keep the mind in continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath been practised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of that which is past, and an inception or account *de novo*, for the time to come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all good moral philosophy, as was said, is but a handmaid to religion.

16. Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of all other means the most compendious and summary, and again, the most noble and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; which is, the electing and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute, constant, and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like the work of nature; whereas the other course is like the work of the hand. For as when a carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh, (as if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till such time as he comes to it;) but, contrariwise, when nature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time: so in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like: but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express himself, that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine: his words are these: *Immanitati autem consentaneum est opponere eam, quæ supra humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam virtutem*: and a little after, *Nam ut feræ neque vitium neque virtus est, sic neque Dei: sed hic quidem status altius quiddam virtute est, ille aliud quiddam a vitio*.⁹ And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan¹ in his funeral oration;

⁹ Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* vii. 1. 1.

¹ There is some mistake here, as the Panegyric referred to was delivered at the beginning of Trajan's reign, and he outlived the speaker. Perhaps prospective prayers may be meant. Vid. Plin. *Paneg.* c. 94.

where he said, *That men needed to make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as good Lords to them as Trajan had been*; as if he had not been only an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting upon their souls charity, which is excellently called the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together.² And as it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a false imitation of divine love, *Amor melior Sophista læro ad humanam vitam*, that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist or preceptor; which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules and precepts, he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do: so certainly, if a man's mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him suddenly into a greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay further, as Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, though they raise the mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses; but only love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle and compose it: so in all other excellences, though they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess; only charity admitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring to be like God in power, the angels transgressed and fell; *Ascendam, et ero similis altissimo*:³ by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; *Eritis sicut Dii, scientes bonum et malum*:⁴ but by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that imitation we are called: *Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, et orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos, ut sitis filii Patris vestri qui in cælis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super justos et injustos*.⁵ So in the first platform of the divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, *Optimus Maximus*: and the sacred Scriptures thus, *Misericordia ejus super omnia opera ejus*.⁶

17. Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning the culture and regimen of the mind;

² Coloss. iii. 14.

³ Isai. xiv. 14.

⁴ Gen. iii. 5.

⁵ Luke vi. 27, 28.

⁶ Ps. cxlv. 9.

wherein if any man, considering the parts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to collect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted by others, as matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well. But as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, *You may not marvel, Athenians, that Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I drink wine;*⁷ and like as we read of an ancient parable of *the two gates of sleep*,

Sunt geminæ somni portæ: quarum altera fertur
Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:
Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,
Sed falsa ad cælum mittunt insonnia manes:⁸

so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor of wine is the more vaporous, and the braver gate of ivory sendeth forth the falser dreams.

18. But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth of body and spirit. Whercin we may further note, that there seemeth to be a relation or conformity between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For as we divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and pleasure; so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and strong and agile for all duties of life. These three, as in the body, so in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy to observe, that many have strength of wit and courage, but have neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings: some again have an elegance and fineness of carriage, which have neither soundness of honesty, nor substance of sufficiency: and some again have honest and reformed minds, that can neither become themselves nor manage business: and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure, we have likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to stupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it, than in the strength and vigour of it.

⁷ Demosth. *de Fals. Leg.* p. 355.

⁸ Virg. *Æn.* vi. 893.

Distribution
of Civil
Knowledge.

XXIII. 1. CIVIL knowledge⁹ is conversant about a subject which of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, *That the Romans were like sheep, for that a man might better drive a flock of them, than one of them; for in a flock, if you could but get some few to go right, the rest would follow:*¹ so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an external goodness; for that as to society sufficeth. And therefore it cometh oft to pass that there be evil times in good governments: for so we find in the holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, *Sed adhuc populus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum.*² Again, states, as great engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of frame: for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so governments for a time well grounded, do bear out errors following; but the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted. These respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge.

2. This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation, and government. For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection: and they be three wisdoms of divers natures, which do often sever: wisdom of the behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state.

The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much affected, but much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an influence also into business and government. The poet saith, *Nec vultu destrue verba tuo:*³ a man may destroy the force of his words with his countenance: so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his brother affability and easy access; *Nil interest habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum;*⁴ it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and to

⁹ In the Latin edition the eighth book begins here.

¹ Plut. in *Vit. Cat.* ² 2 Chron. xx. 33. ³ Ovid. A. A. ii. 312.

⁴ The following is the passage referred to: "Cura ut aditus ad te diurni atque nocturni pateant; neque foribus solum aedium tuarum sed etiam vultu ac fronte quae est animi janua; quae si significat voluntatem auditam esse ac retrusam, parvi refert patere ostium." Q. Cic. de *Petit. Consul.* xi. 44.

receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. So, we see, Atticus, before the first interview between Cæsar and Cicero, the war depending, did seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture.⁵ And if the government of the countenance be of such effect, much more is that of the speech, and other carriage appertaining to conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me well expressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose: *Ne aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius; quorum alterum est alienæ libertatis oblitus, alterum suæ*.⁶ The sum of behaviour is to retain a man's own dignity, without intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other side, if behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass into affectation, and then *Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam transferre* (to act a man's life)? But although it proceed not to that extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. And therefore as we use to advise young students from company keeping, by saying, *Amici fures temporis*: so certainly the intending of the discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. Again, such as are accomplished in that hour of urbanity please themselves in it, and seldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in it do seek comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything becometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by puntos, and compliments. Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is time and season. For as Solomon saith, *Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminat; et qui respicit ad nubes, non metet*:⁷ a man must make his opportunity, as oft as find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind, and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait, or restrained for exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.

3. The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been hitherto collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning, and the professors of learning.

⁵ He seems to refer to the letter *ad Att.* ix. 9.

⁶ Livy xxiii. 12.

⁷ Eccles. xi. 4.

For from this root springeth chiefly that note or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect, that there is no great concurrence between learning and wisdom. For of the three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, as an inferior to virtue, and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of government, they acquit themselves well, when they are called to it, but that happeneth to few; but for the wisdom of business, wherein man's life is most conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scattered advertisements, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject. For if books were written of this, as the other, I doubt not but learned men with mean experience, would far excel men of long experience without learning, and outshoot them in their own bow.

4. Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should be so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is much less infinite than science of government, which, we see, is laboured and in some part reduced. Of this wisdom, it seemeth some of the ancient Romans, in the saddest and wisest times, were professors; for Cicero reporteth, that it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to walk at certain hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that would use their advice; and that the particular citizens would resort unto them, and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and every other occasion incident to man's life. So as there is a wisdom of counsel and advice even in private causes, arising out of a universal insight into the affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon particular causes propounded, but is gathered by general observation of causes of like nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth to his brother. *De petitione consulatus*, (being the only book of business that I know written by the ancients,) although it concerned a particular action set on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But chiefly we may see in those aphorisms which have place among divine writings, composed by Solomon the king, (of whom the Scriptures testify that his heart was as the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly matters,) we see, I say,

not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts, positions, extending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will stay awhile, offering to consideration some number of examples.

5. *Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem tuam, ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi.*⁸ Here is concluded the provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find: as it was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius's papers unperused.⁹

*Vir sapiens, si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur, sive rideat, non inveniet requiem.*¹ Here is described the great disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than himself; which is such an engagement as, whether a man turn the matter to jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways quit himself well of it.

*Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum, postea sentiet eum contumacem.*² Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and unthankfulness.

*Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo? coram regibus stabit, nec erit inter ignobiles.*³ Here is observed, that of all virtues for rising to honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors many times love not to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and diligent.

*Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole, cum adolescenti, secundo qui consurgit pro eo.*⁴ Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius; *Plures adorant solem orientem quam occidentem vel meridianum.*⁵

*Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne demiseris; quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima.*⁶ Here caution is given, that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the unfittest; for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of means to make them better.

Erat civitas parva, et pauci in ea viri: venit contra eam, rex magnus, et vadavit eam, instruxitque munitiones per gyrum, et perfecta est obsidio; inventusque est in ea vir pauper et, sapiens, et liberavit eam per sapientiam suam;

⁸ Eccles. vii. 21.

⁹ See Plut. in Vit. Pomp.

¹ Prov. xxix. 9.

² xxix. 21.

³ xxii. 29.

⁴ Eccles. iv. 15.

⁵ Plut. Vit. Pomp. and Tacit. Ann. vi. 46.

⁶ Eccles. x. 4.

*et nullus deinceps recordatus est hominis illius pauperis.*⁷ Here the corruption of states is set forth, that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of it.

*Mollis responsio frangit iram.*⁸ Here is noted that silence or rough answer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth.

*Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum.*⁹ Here is lively represented how laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred till the last instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth a brier or an impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.

*Melior est finis orationis quam principium.*¹ Here is taxed the vanity of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, than upon the conclusions and issues of speech.

*Qui cognoscit in iudicio faciem, non bene facit; iste et pro bucella panis deseret veritatem.*² Here is noted, that a judge were better be a briber than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge offendeth not so highly as a facile.

*Vir pauper calumnians pauperes similis est imbri vehementi, in quo paratur fames.*³ Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry horseleech.

*Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, est justus cadens coram impio.*⁴ Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the face of the world, doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many particular injuries passed over by connivance.

*Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et dicit hoc non esse peccatum, particeps est homicidii.*⁵ Here is noted, that whereas men in wronging their best friends use to extenuate their fault, as if they might presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety.

*Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato cum homine furioso.*⁶ Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do principally avoid those which are impatient, as those that will espouse us to many factions and quarrels.

*Qui conturbat domum suam, possidebit ventum.*⁷ Here is noted, that in domestical separations and breaches men

⁷ Eccles. ix. 14, 15.

⁸ Prov. xv. 1.

⁹ xv. 19.

¹ Eccles. vii. 8.

² Prov. xxviii. 21.

³ xxviii. 3.

⁴ xxv. 26.

⁵ xxviii. 24.

⁶ xxii. 24.

⁷ xi. 29.

do promise to themselves quieting of their mind and contentment; but still they are deceived of their expectation, and it turneth to wind.

*Filius sapiens lætificat patrem: filius vero stultus mœstitia est matri suæ.*⁸ Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort of the good proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of their ill proof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but of fortune.

*Qui cœlat delictum, quærit amicitiam; sed qui altero sermone repetit, separat fœderatos.*⁹ Here caution is given, that reconciliation is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that which is past, than by apologies and excusations.

*In omni opere bono erit abundantia; ubi autem verba sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egestas.*¹ Here is noted, that words and discourse abound most where there is idleness and want.

*Primus in sua causa justus; sed venit altera pars, et iniquet in eum.*² Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale possesseth much; in such sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed, except some abuse or falsity in the information be detected.

*Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora ventris.*³ Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation, which seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far; but that entereth deep which hath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity.

*Qui erudit derisorem, ipse sibi injuriam facit; et qui arguit impium, cibi maculam generat.*⁴ Here caution is given how we tender reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to esteem it for contumely, and accordingly to return it.

*Da sapienti occasionem, et addetur ei sapientia.*⁵ Here is distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verbal, and swimming only in conceit; for the one upon occasion presented is quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and confused.

*Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus.*⁶ Here the mind of a wise man is compared to a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures and customs are represented; from which representation proceedeth that application,

Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit.⁷

⁸ Prov. x. 1.

⁹ xvii. 9.

¹ xiv. 23.

² xviii. 17.

³ xviii. 8.

⁴ ix. 7.

⁵ ix. 9.

⁶ xxvii. 19.

⁷ Ovid. de Art. Am. i. 760.

Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences politic of Solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led with a desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also attended them with brief observations, such as to my understanding offer no violence to the sense, though I know they may be applied to a more divine use: but it is allowed, even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea, and some writings, have more of the eagle than others; but taking them as instructions for life, they might have received large discourse, if I would have broken them and illustrated them by deducements and examples.

6. Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; that as men found out any observation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it, and express it in parable, or aphorism, or fable. But for fables, they were vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: now that the times abound with history, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And therefore the form of writing which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of negotiation and occasions is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories or examples. For knowledge drawn freshly, and in our view, out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again; and it hath much greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance: for when the example is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set down with all circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it as a very pattern for action; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse's sake are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a servile aspect towards the discourse which they are brought in to make good.

7. But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as history of times is the best ground for discourse of government, such as Machiavel handleth, so history of lives is the most proper for discourse of business, for discourse of business is more conversant in private actions.^a

^a The edd. of 1605, 1629, and 1633, all read *history of lives is the most proper; for discourse of business is more conversant in*

Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, which is discourse upon letters, such as are wise and weighty, as many are of Cicero *ad Atticum*, and others. For letters have a great and more particular representation of business than either chronicles or lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this part of civil knowledge, touching negociation, which we note to be deficient.

8. But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much from that whereof we have spoken as *sapere* and *sibi sapere*, the one moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre. For there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a man's own fortune; and they do sometimes meet, and often sever. For many are wise in their own ways that are weak for government or counsel; like ants, which is a wise creature for itself, but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge of: *Nam pol sapiens*, saith the comical poet, *fugit fortunam sibi*;⁹ and it grew to an adage, *Faber quisque fortunæ propriæ*; and Livy attributed it to Cato the first, *in hoc viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat, ut quocunque loco natus esset sibi ipse fortunam facturum videretur*.¹

This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and professed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed in Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done many great services to the estate in his government, and giving an account thereof to the people, as the manner was, did conclude every particular with this clause, And in this fortune had no part. And it came so to pass, that he never prospered in any thing he took in hand afterwards: for this is too high and too arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, *Dicis, Fluvius est meus et ego feci memet ipsum*:² or of that which another prophet speaketh, that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and that which the poet expresseth,

Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint!³

for these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed:

private actions. The Latin edition has *Ita historiae vitarum optimè adhibentur ad documenta de negotiis; quoniam omnium occasionum et negotiorum tam graudium quam leviorum, varietatem complectuntur*. I have ventured to insert the words which seemed wanting to complete the sense.

⁹ Plaut. *Trin* ii. 2 87.

¹ Liv. xxxix. 40.

² Ezek. xxix. 3.

³ Virg. *Æn*. x. 773.

and therefore those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed their successes to their felicity, and not to their skill or virtue. For so Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus: so Cæsar said to the master of the ship, *Cæsarem portas et fortunam ejus*.⁴

9. But yet nevertheless these positions, *Faber quisque fortunæ suæ: sapiens dominabitur astris: invia virtuti nulla est via*,⁵ and the like, being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to insolency, rather for resolution than for presumption or outward declaration, have been ever thought sound and good; and are, no question, imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this opinion, as they can scarce contain it within. As we see in Augustus Cæsar, (who was rather diverse from his uncle, than inferior in virtue,) how when he died, he desired his friends about him to give him a *plaudite*, as if he were conscient to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage.⁶ This part of knowledge we do report also as deficient: not but that it is practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to writing. And therefore lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible by axiom, it is requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some heads or passages of it.

10. Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted argument to teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein every man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till he see the difficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is as hard and severe a thing to be a true politique, as to be truly moral. But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and in substance: in honour, because pragmatical men may not go away with an opinion that learning is like a lark, that can mount, and sing, and please herself, and nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey: in substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, that nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the globe of crystal, or form; that is, that

⁴ Compare with this a curious letter from Cato to Cicero (*ap. Cic. ad Fam. xv. 5*), wherein he says: Supplicationem decretam, si tu, quâ in re nihil fortuito, sed summa tua ratione et continentia reipublicae, provisum est, dis immortalibus gratulari nos quam tibi referre acceptum mavis, gaudeo.

⁵ Ovid. *Met. xiv. 113*.

⁶ See Sueton. *Vit. Aug. c. 99*.

there be not any thing in being and action, which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and doctrine. Neither doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of fortune, otherwise than as of an inferior work: for no man's fortune can be an end worthy of his being; and many times the worthiest men do abandon their fortune willingly for better respects: but nevertheless fortune, as an organ of virtue and merit, deserveth the consideration.

11. First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most summary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus did require:⁷ who seeing in the frame of man's heart such angles and recesses, found fault that there was not a window to look into them; that is, to procure good informations of particulars touching persons, their natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand: so again their weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they lie most open and obnoxious; their friends, factions, and dependencies; and again their opposites, enviers, competitors, their moods and times, *Sola viri molles aditus et tempora noras*;⁸ their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and this not only of persons, but of actions; what are on foot from time to time, and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and the like. For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous: for men change with the actions; and whiles they are in pursuit they are one, and when they return to their nature they are another. These informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the minor propositions in every active syllogism; for no excellency of observations, which are as the major propositions, can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.

That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety; who saith, *Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda; sed vir prudens exhaustiet illud*.⁹ And although the knowledge itself falleth not under precept, because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for the obtaining of it may.

12. We will begin, therefore, with this precept, ac-

⁷ Lucian. *Hermot.* 20. See also Erasm. *Chil.* i. v. 74.

⁸ Virg. *Æn.* iv. 423.

⁹ Prov. xx. v.

cording to the ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to words: and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised words than to set and purposed words. Neither let that be feared which is said, *fronti nulla fides*:¹ which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and not of the private and subtile motions and labours of the countenance and gesture; which as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is *Animi janua, the gate of the mind*.² None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, *Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat*.³ So again, noting the differing character and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in the senate, he saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech of Germanicus, thus; *Magis in speciem adornatis verbis, quam ut penitus sentire crederetur*: but of Drusus thus: *Paucioribus sed intentior, et fida oratione*.⁴ and in another place, speaking of his character of speech, when he did any thing that was gracious and popular, he saith, that in other things he was *reluct eluctantium verborum*; ⁵ but then again, *solutius vero loquebatur quando subiret*. So that there is no such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance, *vultus jussus*, that can sever from a feigned tale some of these fashions, either a more slight and careless fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious and wandering, or coming from a man more drily and hardly.

13. Neither are deeds such assured pledges, as that they may be trusted without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: *Fraus sibi in parvis fidem prestruit ut majore emolumento fallat*: and the Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is better used than he was wont to be, without manifest cause. For small favours, they do but lull men asleep, both as to caution and as to industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, *Alimenta socordiae*. So again we see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and unfaithful reconciliation which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus advanced many of the friends of Antonius: *simul amicis ejus prefecturas et tribunatus largitur*:⁶ wherein, under pretence to

Juv. Sat. ii. 8.

¹ Tacit. Ann. i. 12.

Ibid. iv. 31.

² *De Petit. Consul.* xi. 44.

⁴ i. 52.

⁶ Tacit. Hist. iv. 39.

strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from him his dependences.

14. As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, full of flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised, especially with the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius, upon a stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his dissimulation, when he said, *You are hurt because you do not reign*; of which Tacitus saith, *Audita hæc raram oculi pectoris rocam elicere; correptamque Græco versu admonuit, ideo lædi, quia non regnaret.*⁷ And therefore the poet doth elegantly call passions, tortures that urge men to confess their secrets:

Vino tortus et ira.⁸

And experience sheweth, there are few men so true to themselves and so settled, but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open themselves; especially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation, according to the proverb of Spain, *Dí mentira, y sacaras verdad* (*Tell a lie and find a truth.*)

15. As for the knowing of men, which is at second hand from reports; men's weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends, with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and the opinions conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to such, men are more masked: *Verior fama e domesticis emanat.*⁹

16. But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by their natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was both pleasantly and wisely said, though I think very untruly, by a nuncio of the pope, returning from a certain nation where he served as lidger; whose opinion being asked touching the appointment of one to go in his place, he wished that in any case they did not send one that was too wise; because no very wise man would ever imagine what they in that country

⁷ Tacit. *Ann.* iv. 52, and cf. Suet. *Vit. Tib.* c. 53.

⁸ Hor. *Epist.* i. xviii. 38.

⁹ Ferè omnis sermo ad forensem famam e domesticis emanat auctoribus. Q. Cic. *de Petit Consul.* v. 17.

were like to do. And certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to suppose deeper ends, and more compass-reaches than are: the Italian proverb being elegant, and for the most part true:

Di danari, di senno, e di fede,
C'e ne manco che non credi.

(There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith than men do account upon.)

17. But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted by their natures, and private persons by their ends. For princes being at the top of human desires, they have for the most part no particular ends whereto they aspire, by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of the rest of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes that maketh their hearts more inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to inform ourselves in men's ends and natures, of the variety of them only, but also of the predominancy, what humour reigneth most, and what end is principally sought. For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero's humours of pleasures, *metus ejus rimatur*¹ (he wrought upon Nero's fears), whereby he brake the other's neck.

18. But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way resteth in three things: the first, to have general acquaintance and inwardness with those which have general acquaintance and look most into the world; and especially according to the diversity of business, and the diversity of persons, to have privacy and conversation with some one friend, at least, which is perfect and well intelligenced in every several kind. The second is, to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy; in most things liberty: secrecy where it importeth; for liberty of speech inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much to a man's knowledge; and secrecy, on the other side, induceth trust and inwardness. The last is, the reducing of a man's self to this watchful and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every conference and action, as well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus would have a philosopher in every particular action to say

¹ This expression occurs Tacit. *Ann.* xiv. 57. It is spoken, however, of the intrigues of Tigellinus against Plantus and Silla, by which he induced Nero to have both of them murdered. Petronius Turpilianus was put to death by Galba, solely because he had enjoyed Nero's confidence. Vid. Tacit. *Hist.* i. 6.

to himself, *Et hoc volo, et etiam institutum servare*;² so a politic man in everything should say to himself, *Et hoc volo, ac etiam aliquid addiscere*. I have stayed the longer upon this precept of obtaining good information, because it is a main part by itself, which answereth to all the rest. But, above all things, caution must be taken that men have a good stay and hold of themselves, and that this much knowledge do not draw on much meddling; for nothing is more unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling in many matters. So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but only to this, to make a better and freer choice of those actions which may concern us, and to conduct them with the less error and the more dexterity.

19. The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men to take good information touching their own person, and well to understand themselves: knowing that, as St. James saith, though men look oft in a glass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves; wherein as the divine glass is the word of God, so the politic glass is the state of the world, or times wherein we live, in the which we are to behold ourselves.

20. For men ought to take an impartial view of their own abilities and virtues; and again of their wants and impediments; accounting these with the most, and those other with the least; and from this view and examination to frame the considerations following.

First, to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth with the general state of the times; which if they find agreeable and fit, then in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty; but if differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to be more close, retired, and reserved: as we see in Tiberius, who was never seen at a play, and came not into the Senate in twelve of his last years; whereas Augustus Cæsar lived ever in men's eyes, which Tacitus observeth, *alia Tiberio morum via*.³

21. Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with professions and courses of life, and accordingly to make election, if they be free; and, if engaged, to make the departure at the first opportunity: as we see was done by Duke Valentine, that was designed by his father to a sacerdotal profession, but quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and inclination; being such, nevertheless, as a

² Vid. Epictet. *Enchir.* c. 4.

³ Tacit. *Ann.* i. 54.

man cannot tell well whether they were worse for a prince or for a priest.

22. Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they are like to have competitors and concurrents; and to take that course wherein there is most solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent: as Cæsar Julius did, who at first was an orator or pleader; but when he saw the excellency of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others, for eloquence, and saw there was no man of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom the state was forced to rely, he forsook his course begun toward a civil and popular greatness, and transferred his designs to a martial greatness.

23. Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependences, to proceed according to the composition of their own nature: as we may see in Cæsar; all whose friends and followers were men active and effectual, but not solemn, or of reputation.

24. Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves by examples, in thinking they can do as they see others do; whereas perhaps their natures and carriages are far differing. In which error it seemeth Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith, that he was wont often to say, *Sylla potuit—ego non potero!*¹ Wherein he was much abused, the natures and proceedings of himself and his example being the unlikeliest in the world; the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemn, and full of majesty and circumstance, and therefore the less effectual.

But this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves, hath many other branches, whereupon we cannot insist.

25. Next to the well understanding and discerning of a man's self, there followeth the well opening and revealing a man's self; wherein we see nothing more usual than for the more able man to make the less show. For there is a great advantage in the well setting forth of a man's virtues, fortunes, merits; and again, in the artificial covering of a man's weaknesses, defects, disgraces; staying upon the one, sliding from the other; cherishing the one by circumstances, gracing the other by exposition, and the like: wherein we see what Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the greatest politique of his time, *Omnium que*

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 10. 2.

dixerat feceratque arte quâdam ostentator:⁵ which requireth indeed some art, lest it turn tedious and arrogant; but yet so, as ostentation, though it be to the first degree of vanity, seemeth to me rather a vice in manners than in policy: for as it is said, *Audacter calumniare, semper aliquid hæret*: so, except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity, *Audacter te vendita, semper aliquid hæret*. For it will stick with the more ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom and rank do smile at it, and despise it; and yet the authority won with many doth countervail the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and government, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; or at times when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety, as in military persons; or at times when others are most envied; or with easy and careless passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being too serious; or with an equal freedom of taxing a man's self, as well as gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling or putting down others' injury or insolence; it doth greatly add to reputation: and surely not a few solid natures, that want this ventosity, and cannot sail in the height of the winds, are not without some prejudice and disadvantage by their moderation.

26. But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they are not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that virtue be not disvalued and imbasèd under the just price; which is done in three manners: by offering and obtruding a man's self; wherein men think he is rewarded, when he is accepted; by doing too much, which will not give that which is well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety; and by finding too soon the fruit of a man's virtue, in commendation, applause, honour, favour; wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let him hear what is truly said: *Cave ne insuctus rebus majoribus videaris, si hæc te res parca sicuti magna delectat*.

27. But the covering of defects is of no less importance than the valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise in three manners, by *caution*, by *colour*, and by *confidence*. *Caution* is when men do ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for which they are not proper: whereas, contrariwise, bold and unquiet spirits will thrust themselves into matters without difference, and so publish and proclaim all their wants. *Colour*

⁵ Tacit. *Hist.* ii. 80.

is, when men make a way for themselves, to have a construction made of their faults or wants, as proceeding from a better cause, or intended for some other purpose: for of the one it is well said,

Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni,^a

and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he pretend the virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must affect gravity; if a coward, mildness; and so the rest: for the second, a man must frame some probable cause why he should not do his best, and why he should dissemble his abilities; and for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities which are notorious in him, to give colour that his true wants are but industries and dissimulations. For *confidence*, it is the last but surest remedy; namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man cannot attain; observing the good principle of the merchants, who endeavour to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat down the price of others. But there ~~is~~ a confidence that passeth this other; which is, to face out a man's own defects, in seeming to conceive that he is best in those things wherein he is failing; and, to help that again, to seem on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in those things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in poets, that if they show their verses, and you except to any, they will say, *that that line cost them more labour than any of the rest*; and presently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line, which they know well enough to be the best in the number. But above all, in this righting and helping of a man's self in his own carriage, he must take heed he show not himself dismantled, and exposed to scorn and injury, by too much dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of fortified carriage, with a ready rescuing of a man's self from scorns, is sometimes of necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune; but it ever succeedeth with good felicity.

28. Another precept of this knowledge is, by all possible endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing hindereth men's fortunes so much as this: *Idem manebat, neque idem decebat*, men are where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore

^a Ovid. *A. Am.* ii. 662.

to Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth, that he had *versatile ingenium*.⁷ And thereof it cometh that these grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves, and cannot make departures, have more dignity than felicity. But in some it is nature to be somewhat viscous and inwrapped, and not easy to turn; in some it is a conceit, that is almost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe that they ought to change their course, when they have found good by it in former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely, how Fabius Maximus would have been temporizing still, according to his old bias, when the nature of the war was altered and required hot pursuit. In some other it is want of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not discern when things have a period, but come in too late after the occasion; as Demosthenes⁸ compareth the people of Athens to country fellows, when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some other it is a lothness to leese labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring about occasions to their ply; and yet in the end, when they see no other remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of Sibylla's books the treble price, when he might at first have had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune.

29. Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with that we last spake of, but with difference, is that which is well expressed, *Fatis accede deisque*,⁹ that men do not only turn with the occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit or strength to over hard or extreme points; but choose in their actions that which is most passable: for this will preserve men from foil, not occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please the most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake; which cannot but mightily increase reputation.

30. Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I under-

⁷ Livy xxxix. 40.

⁸ Demosth. *Phil.* i. 51.

⁹ Lucan. viii. 486. Quoted also by Jeremy Taylor. *Life of Christ, Pref. ad init.*

stand it; and it is that which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms; *Et quemadmodum receptum est, ut exercitum ducat imperator, sic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ ducendæ; ut quæ ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, et non ipsi eventus tantum persequi cogantur.*¹ For, if we observe, we shall find two differing kinds of sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; either of which is very imperfect without the other.

31. Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in the declaring, or not declaring a man's self: for although depth of secrecy, and making way, *qualis est via navis in mari*, (which the French calleth *sourdes menées*, when men set things in work without opening themselves at all,) be sometimes both prosperous and admirable; yet many times *dissimulatio errores parit, qui dissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant*; and therefore, we see the greatest politiques have in a natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of profession, *that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they stood his friends or enemies*. So Caesar, when he went first into Gaul, made no scruple to profess *that he had rather be first in a village, than second at Rome.*² So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see what Cicero saith of him, *Alter* (meaning of Caesar) *non recusat, sed quodammodo postulat, ut, ut est, sic appelletur tyrannus.*³ So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Caesar, in his very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet in his harangues to the people would swear, *Ita parentis honores consequi liceat*,⁴ which was no less than the tyranny; save that, to help it, he would stretch forth his hand towards a statua of Caesar's that was erected in the place: whereat many men laughed, and wondered, and said, Is it possible? or, Did you ever hear the like to this? and yet thought he meant no hurt; he did it so handsomely and ingenuously. And all these were prosperous: whereas Pompey, who tended to the same end, but in a more dark and dissembling manner, as Tacitus saith of him,

Demosth. *Phil.* i. 51.

² Both anecdotes are from Plutarch.

³ Cic. *ad Att.* x. 4. 2.

⁴ *Ad Att.* xvi. 15. 3.

Occultior, non melior,⁵ wherein Sallust concurrereth, *ore probo, animo inverecondo*,⁶ made it his design, by infinite secret engines, to cast the state into an absolute anarchy and confusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms for necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon him, and he never seen in it: and when he had brought it, as he thought, to that point, when he was chosen consul alone, as never any was, yet he could make no great matter of it, because men understood him not; but was fain, in the end, to go the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by colour of the doubt of Cæsar's designs: so tedious, casual, and unfortunate are these deep dissimulations: whereof, it seemeth, Tacitus made his judgment, that they were a cunning of an inferior form in regard of true policy; attributing the one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius; where, speaking of Livia, he saith, *Et cum artibus mariti simulatione filii bene composita*:⁷ for surely the continual habit of dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly politic.

32. Another precept of this architecture of fortune is, to accustom our minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they conduce and are material to our particular ends: and that to do substantially, and not superficially. For we shall find the logical part, as I may term it, of some men's minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they can well judge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparisons, preferring things of show and sense before things of substance and effect. So some fall in love with access to princes, others with popular fame and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase, when in many cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. So some measure things according to the labour and difficulty, or assiduity, which are spent about them; and think, if they be ever moving, that they must needs advance and proceed; as Cæsar saith in a despising manner of Cato the second, when he describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose; *Hæc omnia magno studio agebat*. So in most things men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best, when it should be the fittest.

⁵ Tacit. *Hist.* ii. 38.

⁶ [Sueton.] *de cl. Gram.* § xv.

⁷ Tacit. *Annal.* v. 1.

33. As for the true marshalling of men's pursuits towards their fortune, as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand thus: first the amendment of their own minds. For the remove of the impediments of the mind will sooner clear the passages of fortune, than the obtaining fortune will remove the impediments of the mind. In the second place, I set down wealth and means; which I know most men would have placed first, because of the general use which it beareth towards all variety of occasions. But that opinion I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel⁸ doth that other, that moneys were the sinews of the wars: whereas, saith he, the true sinews of the wars are the sinews of men's arms, that is, a valiant, populous, and military nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority of Solon, who, when Cræsus showed him his treasury of gold, said to him, that if another came that had better iron, he would be master of his gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed, that it is not moneys that are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men's minds, wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. In the third place I set down reputation, because of the peremptory tides and currents it hath; which, if they be not taken in their due time, are seldom recovered, it being extreme hard to play an after game of reputation. And lastly, I place honour, which is more easily won by any of the other three, much more by all, than any of them can be purchased by honour. To conclude this precept, as there is order and priority in matter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of the commonest errors: while men fly to their ends when they should intend their beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as they come on, but marshal them according to greatness, and not according to instance; not observing the good precept, *Quod nunc instat agamus*.⁹

34. Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any matters which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that sounding in a man's ears, *sed fugit interea fugit irreparabile tempus*:¹ and that is the cause why those which take their course of rising by professions of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful divines, and the like, are not commonly so politic for their own

⁸ Machiav. *Disc. on Liv.* ii. 10.

⁹ Virg. *Ecl.* ix. 66.

¹ Georg. iii. 284.

fortunes, otherwise than in their ordinary way, because they want time to learn particulars, to wait occasions, and to devise plots.

35. Another precept of this knowledge is, to imitate nature, which doth nothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do well interlace his business, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally intendeth. For a man ought in every particular action so to carry the motions of his mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if he cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a second, or so in a third; and if he can have no part of that which he purposed, yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else; and if he cannot make anything of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come; and if he can contrive no effect or substance from it, yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like. So that he should exact account of himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that doth so leaseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are many times more proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need afterwards, than for that which he urgeth for the present; and therefore men must be perfect in that rule, *Hæc oportet facere, et illa non omittere.*²

36. Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a man's self peremptorily in any thing, though it seem not liable to accident; but ever to have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire: following the wisdom in the ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash was dry whither they should go; and the one moved to go down into a pit, because it was not likely the water would dry there; but the other answered, *True, but if it do, how shall we get out again?*

37. Another precept of this knowledge is, that ancient precept of Bias, construed not to any point of perfidiousness, but only to caution and moderation, *Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus et odi tanquam amaturus*;³ for it utterly betrayeth all utility for men to embark themselves too far in unfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and humorous envies or emulations.

38. But I continue this beyond the measure of an

² Matth. xxiii. 23.

³ Aristot. *Rhet.* ii. 13. 4. and cf. Cic. *Lael.* xvi.

example; led, because I would not have such knowledges, which I note as deficient, to be thought things imaginative or in the air, or an observation or too much made of, but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is hardlier made than a beginning. It must be likewise conceived, that in these points which I mention and set down, they are far from complete tractates of them, but only as small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no man, I suppose, will think that I mean fortunes are not obtained without all this ado; for I know they come tumbling into some men's laps; and a number obtain good fortunes by diligence in a plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping themselves from gross errors.

39. But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect orator, doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a prince or a courtier hath been described by such as have handled those subjects, the mould hath used to be made according to the perfection of the art, and not according to common practice: so I understand it, that it ought to be done in the description of a politic man, I mean politic for his own fortune.

40. But it must be remembered all this while, that the precepts which we have set down are of that kind which may be counted and called *Bone Artes*. As for evil arts, if a man would set down for himself that principle of Machiavel,⁴ *that a man seek not to attain virtue itself, but the appearance only thereof; because the credit of virtue is a help, but the use of it is cumber*: or that other of his principles, *that he presuppose, that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by fear; and therefore that he seek to have every man obnoxious, low, and in strait*, which the Italians call *seminar spine*, to sow thorns: or that other principle, contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, *Cadant amici, dummodo inimici intercedant*,⁵ as the triumvirs, which sold, every one to other, the lives of their friends for the deaths of their enemies: or that other protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap their fortunes. *Ego si quid in fortunis meis excutatum sit incendium, id non aqua sed ruina restinguam*:⁶ or that other principle of Lysander, *that children are to be deceived with confits, and men with oaths*: and the like evil and corrupt positions, whereof, as in all things, there are more in number

⁴ Prince, c. 17, 18.

⁵ *Pro Reg. Diet.* ix. 25.

⁶ *Cic. pro Mur.* xxv. 51.

than of the good: certainly with these dispensations from the laws of charity and integrity, the pressing of a man's fortune may be more hasty and compendious. But it is in life as it is in ways, the shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the fairer way is not much about.

41. But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and sustain themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of ambition, ought, in the pursuit of their own fortune, to set before their eyes not only that general map of the world, *that all things are vanity and vexation of spirit,*⁷ but many other more particular cards and directions: chiefly that—that being without well-being is a curse—and the greater being the greater curse; and that all virtue is most rewarded, and all wickedness most punished in itself: according as the poet saith excellently:

Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri, pro laudibus istis
Præmia posse rear soivi? pulcherrima primum
Dii moresque dabunt vestri.⁸

And so of the contrary. And, secondly, they ought to look up to the eternal providence and divine judgment, which often subverteth the wisdom of evil plots and imaginations, according to that Scripture, *He hath conceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing.*⁹ And although men should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this incessant and Sabbathless pursuit of a man's fortune leaveth not the tribute which we owe to God of our time; who we see demandeth a tenth of our substance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of our time: and it is to small purpose to have an erected face towards heaven, and a perpetual grovelling spirit upon earth, eating dust, as doth the serpent, *Atque affigit humo divinæ particulam aure.*¹ And if any man flatter himself that he will employ his fortune well, though he should obtain it ill, as was said concerning Augustus Cæsar, and after of Septimus Severus, *that either they should never have been born, or else they should never have died,* they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of their greatness, and so much good when they were established; yet these compensations and satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss for men in their race toward their fortune, to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is elegantly expressed by the Emperor Charles the Fifth, in his

⁷ Eccl. ii. 11.

⁹ Job xv. 35.

⁸ Virg. *Æn.* ix. 252.

¹ Hor. *Sat.* ii. 2. 79.

instructions to the king his son, *That fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that if she be too much wooed, she is the farther off.* But this last is but a remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted: let men rather build upon that foundation which is a corner-stone of divinity and philosophy, wherein they join close, namely, that same *Primum quærite.* For divinity saith, *Primum quærite regnum Dei, et ista omnia adjicientur vobis:*² and philosophy saith, *Primum quærite bona animi; cætera aut aderunt, et non oberant.* And although the human foundation hath somewhat of the sands, as we see in M. Brutus, when he brake forth into that speech,

Te colui, Virtus, ut rem; at tu nomen inanie es;³

yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may serve for a taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.

42. Concerning Government,⁴ it is a part of knowledge secret and retired, in both these respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things are secret because they are hard to know, and some because they are not fit to utter. We see all governments are obscure and invisible:

Totamque infusa per artus

Meus agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.⁵

Such is the description of governments. We see the government of God over the world is hidden, inasmuch as it seemeth to participate of much irregularity and confusion: the government of the soul in moving the body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity, (the shadows whereof are in the poets,) in the description of torments and pains, next unto the crime of rebellion, which was the giants' offence, doth detest the offence of futility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus.⁶ But this was meant of particulars: nevertheless even unto the

² Matth. vi. 33.

³ ὦ τλήμων ἀρετῇ, λόγος ἄρ' ἦσθ', ἐγὼ δ' ἐε σε,
ὥς ἔργον ἦσκουν· σὺ δ' ἄρ' ἐξούλευς τόχην.

Dio Cass. xlvii. 49.

⁴ The remaining part of this chapter is omitted in the Latin edition, and in its place are inserted two Dissertations; the first a treatise on the Enlargement of the Bounds of Empire (*Consul Paulatus, sive de proferendis Imperii finibus*), and the second a sketch in ninety-seven aphorisms of the principles of universal law (*Idea Justitiæ Universalis sive de Fontibus Juris*).

⁵ Virg. *Æn.* vi. 726.

⁶ Vid. Pind. *Ol.* l. 55.

general rules and discourses of policy and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling.

43. But contrariwise, in the governors toward the governed, all things ought as far as the frailty of man permitteth, to be manifest and revealed. For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the government of God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and shady body, is in the view of God as crystal: *Et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare vitreum simile crystallo.*⁷ So unto princes and states, especially towards wise senates and councils, the natures and dispositions of the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions and combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, in regard of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations, and the height of their station where they keep sentinel, in great part clear and transparent. Wherefore, considering that I write to a King that is a master of this science, and is so well assisted, I think it decent to pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain the certificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired it might be certified for his part, *that there was one that knew how to hold his peace.*

44. Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which is laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all those which have written of laws, have written either as philosophers or as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths; and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light, because they are so high. For the lawyers, they write according to the states where they live, what is received law, and not what ought to be law: for the wisdom of a lawmaker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are in nature certain fountains of justice, whence all civil laws are derived but as streams: and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains. Again, the wisdom of a lawmaker consisteth not only in a platform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what are

⁷ Rev. iv. 6.

the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and incertainty of law; by what means laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what are the impediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what influence laws touching private right of *meum* and *tuum* have into the public state, and how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and delivered, whether in *tests* or in *acts*, brief or large, with preambles, or without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time, and what is the best means to keep them from being too vast in volumes, or too full of multiplicity and crossness; how they are to be expounded, when upon causes emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon responses and conferences touching general points or questions; how they are to be pressed, rigorously or tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to be mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts; again, how the practice, profession, and erudition of law is to be censured and governed: and many other points touching the administration, and, as I may term it, animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less, because I purpose, if God give me leave, (having began a work of this nature in aphorisms,) to propound it hereafter, noting it in the mean time for deficient.

45. And for your Majesty's laws of England, I could say much of their dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they cannot but excel the civil laws in fitness for the government: for the civil law was *non hoc quesitum necius in usus*;⁸ it was not made for the countries which it governeth: hereof I cease to speak because I will not intermingle matter of action with matter of general learning.

Conclusion
of the Review
of Philosophy
in
General.

XXIV. **T**HUS have I concluded this portion of learning touching civil knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; and with human philosophy, philosophy in general. And being now at some pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth to me, *si nunquam fuit imago*,⁹ (as far as a man can judge of his own work,) not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while they are tuning their

⁸ Virg. *Æn.* iv. 647.

⁹ Virg. *Ecl.* ii. 27.

instruments: which is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards: so have I been content to tune the instruments of the Muses, that they may play that have better hands. And surely, when I set before me the condition of these times, in which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit in all the qualities thereof—as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails of ancient writers; the art of printing, which communicateth books to men of all fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation, which hath disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history; the leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so generally in civil business, as the states of Græcia did, in respect of their popularity, and the state of Rome, in respect of the greatness of their monarchy; the present disposition of these times at this instant to peace; the consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies of religion, which have so much diverted men from other sciences; the perfection of your Majesty's learning, which as a Phenix may call whole vollicies of wits to follow you; and the inseparable propriety of time, which is ever more and more to disclose truth—I cannot but be raised to this persuasion that this third period of time will far surpass that of the Grecian and Roman learning: only if men will know their own strength, and their own weakness both; and take one from the other, light of invention, and not fire of contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or ornament; and employ wit and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar and of popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall please himself or others in the reprehension of them, they shall make that ancient and patient request, *Verbera, sed audi;*¹ let men reprehend them, so they observe and weigh them: for the appeal is lawful, though it may be it shall not be needful, from the first cogitations of men to their second, and from the nearer times to the times farther off. Now let us come to that learning, which both the former times were not so blessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and port of all men's labours and peregrinations.

Of Theology. XXV. 1. **T**HE² prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the will of man; so that as we are to obey His law, though we find a reluctation in our will, so we are to believe His word, though we find a reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense, we give consent to the matter, and not to the author; which is no more than we would do towards a suspected and discredited witness; but that faith which was accounted to Abraham for righteousness was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed,³ who therein was an image of natural reason.

Howbeit, if we will truly consider it, more worthy it is to believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man's mind suffereth from sense; but in belief it suffereth from spirit, such one as it holdeth for more authorized than itself, and so suffereth from the worthier agent. Otherwise it is of the state of man glorified; for then faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are known.

Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology, (which in our idiom we call divinity,) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature: for it is written *Cali enarrant gloriam Dei*;⁴ but it is not written, *Cali enarrant voluntatem Dei*: but of that it is said, *Ad legem et testimonium: si non fecerint secundum verbum istud*,⁵ &c. This holdeth not only in those points of faith which concern the mysteries of the deity, of the Creation, of the Redemption, but likewise those which concern the law moral truly interpreted: *Love your enemies: do good to them that hate you; be like to your heavenly Father, that suffereth his rain to fall upon the just and unjust*,⁶ To this it ought to be applauded, *nec vox hominum sonat*:⁷ it is a voice beyond the light of nature. So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a libertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moralities, as if they were opposite and malignant to nature; *Et quod natura remittit, invida jura negant*.⁸ So said Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander's messengers, *That he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other of the wise men of Greece, and that he held them for excellent men: but that they had a fault, which was that they had in too great reverence and*

² The ninth Book of the Latin Edition.

³ Vid. Gen. xviii.

⁵ Isai. viii. 20.

⁷ Virg. *Æn.* 1. 328.

⁴ Ps. xix. 1.

⁶ Matth. v. 44.

⁸ Ovid. *Met.* x. 350.

veneration a thing which they called law and manners. So it must be confessed, that a great part of the law moral is of that perfection, whereunto the light of nature cannot aspire: how then is it that man is said to have, by the light and law of nature, some notions and conceits of virtue and vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus, because the light of nature is used in two several senses; the one, that which springeth from reason, sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven and earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an inward instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of his first estate; in which latter sense only he is participant of some light and discerning touching the perfection of the moral law: but how? sufficient to check the vice, but not to inform the duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as well moral as mystical, is not to be attained but by inspiration and revelation from God.

2. The use, notwithstanding, of reason in spiritual things, and the latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is not for nothing that the apostle calleth religion *our reasonable service of God*; insomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the old law were full of reason and signification, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and magic, that are full of non-significants and surd characters. But most especially the Christian faith, as in all things, so in this deserveth to be highly magnified; holding and preserving the golden mediocrity in this point between the law of the heathen and the law of Mahomet, which have embraced the two extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no constant belief or confession, but left all to the liberty of argument: and the religion of Mahomet, on the other side, interdicteth argument altogether: the one having the very face of error, and the other of imposture: whereas the faith doth both admit and reject disputation with difference.

3. The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by way of illustration, and not by way of argument: the latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument. In the former, we see, God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us; and doth graft his Revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his inspira-

tions to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock: for the latter, there is allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and respective, although not original and absolute. For after the articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from, and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction. In nature this holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and besides, those principles or first positions have no discordance with that reason which draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not in religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller nature, namely, wherein there are not only *posita* but *placita*; for in such there can be no use of absolute reason. We see it familiarly in games of wit, as chess, or the like: the draughts and first laws of the game are positive, but how? merely *ad placitum*, and not examinable by reason; but then how to direct our play thereupon with best advantage to win the game, is artificial and rational. So in human laws, there be many grounds and maxims which are *placita juris*, positive upon authority, and not upon reason, and therefore not to be disputed: but what is most just, not absolutely but relatively, and according to those maxims, that affordeth a long field of disputation. Such therefore is that secondary reason, which hath place in divinity, which is grounded upon the *placets* of God.

4. Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not been, to my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the true limits and use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic: which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of true conceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine into that which is not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences and contradictories, to examine that which is positive: the one sort falling into the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made more sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal them, *Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit senex?*¹ the other sort into the error of the disciples, which were scandalized at a show of contradiction, *Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis? Modicum, et non videbitis me; et iterum, modicum, et videbitis me, &c.*¹

5. Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of

the great and blessed use thereof; for this point, well laboured and defined of, would in my judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but the fury of controversies, wherewith the church laboureth. For it cannot but open men's eyes, to see that many controversies do merely pertain to that which is either not revealed, or positive; and that many others do grow upon weak and obscure inferences or derivations: which latter sort, if men would revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the Gentiles, would be carried thus, *ego, non dominus*;² and again, *secundum consilium meum*, in opinions and counsels, and not in positions and oppositions. But men are now over-ready to usurp the style, *non ego, sed dominus*; and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those which have not sufficiently learned out of Solomon, that *the causeless curse shall not come*.³

6. Divinity hath two principal parts; the matter informed or revealed, and the nature of the information or revelation: and with the latter we will begin, because it hath most coherence with that which we have now last handled. The nature of the information consisteth of three branches; the limits of the information, the sufficiency of the information, and the acquiring or obtaining the information. Unto the limits of the information belong these considerations; how far forth particular persons continue to be inspired; how far forth the Church is inspired; how far forth reason may be used: the last point whereof I have noted as deficient. Unto the sufficiency of the information belong two considerations; what points of religion are fundamental, and what perfective, being matter of further building and perfection upon one and the same foundation; and again, how the gradations of light, according to the dispensation of times, are material to the sufficiency of belief.

7. Here again I may rather give it in advice, than note it as deficient, that the points fundamental, and the points of farther perfection only, ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished: a subject tending to much like end as that I noted before; for as that other were like to abate the number of controversies, so this is likely to abate the heat of many of them. We see Moses when he saw the Israelite and the Ægyptian fight, he did not say, *Why strive you?* but drew his sword and slew the Ægyptian:

² 1 Cor. vii. 12. 40.

³ Prov. xxvi. 2.

but when he saw the two Israelites fight, he said *You are brethren, why strive you?*⁴ If the point of doctrine be an Ægyptian, it must be slain by the sword of the spirit, and not reconciled; but if it be an Israelite, though in the wrong, then, *Why strive you?* We see of the fundamental points, our Saviour penneth the league thus, *He that is not with us, is against us;*⁵ but of points not fundamental, thus, *He that is not against us, is with us.*⁶ So we see the coat of our Saviour was entire without seam,⁷ and so is the doctrine of the Scriptures in itself; but the garment of the Church was of divers colours,⁸ and yet not divided: we see the chaff may and ought to be severed from the corn in the ear, but the tares may not be pulled up from the corn in the field.⁹ So as it is a thing of great use well to define what, and of what latitude those points are, which do make men merely aliens and disincorporate from the Church of God.

8. For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the true and sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountains of the water of life. The interpretations of the Scriptures are of two sorts: methodical, and solute or at large. For this divine water,¹ which excelleth so much that of Jacob's Well, is drawn forth much in the same kind as natural water useth to be out of wells and fountains; either it is first forced up into a cistern, and from thence fetched and derived for use; or else it is drawn and received in buckets and vessels immediately where it springeth. The former sort whereof, though it seem to be the more ready, yet in my judgment is more subject to corrupt. This is that method which hath exhibited unto us the scholastical divinity; whereby divinity hath been reduced into an art, as into a cistern, and the streams of doctrine or positions fetched and derived from thence.

9. In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity, a compacted strength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two first they fail to find, and the last they ought not to seek. For as to brevity we see, in all summary methods, while men purpose to abridge, they give cause to dilate. For the sum or abridgment by contraction becometh obscure; the obscurity requireth exposition, and the exposition is diduced into large commentaries, or into

⁴ Exod. ii. 11—14.

⁵ Matth. xii. 30.

⁶ Luke ix. 50.

⁷ Joh. xix. 23.

⁸ See Ps. xlv. 10, (Prayer Book version.)

⁹ Maith. xiii. 29.

¹ Joh. iv. 13, 14.

common places and titles, which grow to be more vast than the original writings, whence the sum was at first extracted. So, we see, the volumes of the schoolmen are greater much than the first writings of the fathers, whence the Master of the Sentences made his sum or collection. So, in like manner, the volumes of the modern doctors of the civil law exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which Tribonian compileth the digest. So as this course of sums and commentaries is that which doth infallibly make the body of sciences more immense in quantity, and more base in substance.

10. And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced into exact methods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth to support and sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory than substantial: like unto buildings which stand by architecture and compaction, which are more subject to ruin than those which are built more strong in their several parts, though less compacted. But it is plain that the more you recede from your grounds, the weaker do you conclude: and as in nature, the more you remove yourself from particulars, the greater peril of error you do incur: so much more in divinity, the more you recede from the Scriptures by inferences and consequences, the more weak and dilute are your positions.

11. And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is not to be sought; which makes this course of artificial divinity the more suspect. For he that will reduce a knowledge into an art, will make it round and uniform: but in divinity many things must be left abrupt, and concluded with this: *O altitudo sapientie et scientie Dei! quam incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus, et non investigabiles viæ ejus!*² So again the apostle saith, *Ex parte scimus*:³ and to have the form of a total, where there is but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies by supposition and presumption. And therefore I conclude, that the true use of these sums and methods hath place in institutions or introductions preparatory unto knowledge: but in them, or by deducement from them, to handle the main body and substance of a knowledge, is in all sciences prejudicial, and in divinity dangerous.

12. As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at large, there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some of them rather curious and unsafe than sober and warranted. Notwithstanding, thus much must

² Rom. xi. 33.

³ 1 Cor. xiii. 9.

be confessed, that the Scriptures being given by inspiration, and not by human reason, do differ from all other books in the author: which, by consequence, doth draw on some difference to be used by the expositor. For the inditer of them did know four things which no man attains to know; which are, the mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, the secrets of the heart of man, and the future succession of all ages. For as to the first it is said, *He that presseth into the light, shall be oppressed of the glory.* And again, *No man shall see my face and live.*⁴ To the second, *When he prepared the heavens I was present, when by law and compass he inclosed the deep.*⁵ To the third, *Neither was it needful that any should bear witness to him of man, for he knew well what was in man.*⁶ And to the last, *From the beginning are known to the Lord all his works.*⁷

13. From the former of these two have been drawn certain senses and expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the bounds of sobriety; the one anagogical, and the other philosophical. But as to the former, man is not to prevent his time: *Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem:*⁸ wherein, nevertheless, there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as the polishing of this glass, or some moderate explication to this enigma. But to press too far into it, cannot but cause a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of man. For in the body there are three degrees of that we receive into it, aliment, medicine, and poison; whereof aliment is that which the nature of man can perfectly alter and overcome: medicine is that which is partly converted by nature, and partly converteth nature; and poison is that which worketh wholly upon nature, without that, that nature can in any part work upon it. So in the mind, whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at all work upon and convert is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a dissolution of the mind and understanding.

14. But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of late time by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have pretended to find the truth of all natural philosophy in the Scriptures; scandalizing and traducing all other philosophy as heathenish and profane. But there is no such enmity between God's word and His works; neither do they give honour to the Scriptures, as they

⁴ Exod. xxxiii. 20.⁵ Prov. viii. 27.⁶ Joh. ii. 25.⁷ Acts xv. 18.⁸ 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

suppose, but much imbase them. For to seek heaven and earth in the word of God, (whereof it is said, *Heaven and earth shall pass, but my word shall not pass,*⁹) is to seek temporary things amongst eternal: and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead amongst the living: neither are the pots or lavers, whose place was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in the holiest place of all, where the ark of the testimony was seated. And again, the scope or purpose of the spirit of God is not to express matters of nature in the Scriptures, otherwise than in passage, and for application to man's capacity, and to matters moral or divine. And it is a true rule, *auctoris aliud agentis parva auctoritas*; for it were a strange conclusion, if a man should use a similitude for ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from nature or history according to vulgar conceit, as of a basilisk, an unicorn, a centaur, a Briareus, an hydra, or the like, that therefore he must needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof positively to be true. To conclude, therefore, these two interpretations, the one by reduction or ænigmatical, the other philosophical or physical, which have been received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and cabalists, are to be confined with a *noli altum sapere, sed time*.¹

15. But the two latter points, known to God and unknown to man, touching the secrets of the heart, and the successions of time, do make a just and sound difference between the manner of the exposition of the Scriptures and all other books. For it is an excellent observation which hath been made upon the answers of our Saviour Christ to many of the questions which were propounded to him, how that they are impertinent to the state of the question demanded; the reason whereof is, because, not being like man, which knows man's thoughts by his words, but knowing man's thoughts immediately, he never answered their words, but their thoughts: much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, which being written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the church, yea and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and respectively towards that present occasion whereupon the words were uttered,

⁹ Matth. xxiv. 35.

¹ Rom. xi. 20.

or in precise congruity or contexture with the words before or after, or in contemplation of the principal scope of the place; but have in themselves, not only totally or collectively, but distributively in clauses and words, infinite springs and streams of doctrine to water the church in every part. And therefore as the literal sense is, as it were, the main stream or river; so the moral sense chiefly, and sometimes the allegorical or typical, are they whereof the church hath most use; not that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or indulgent or light in allusions; but that I do much condemn that interpretation of the Scripture which is only after the manner as men use to interpret a profane book.

16. In this part, touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I can report no deficiency; but by way of remembrance this I will add: in perusing books of divinity, I find many books of controversies, and many of commonplaces and treatises, a mass of positive divinity, as it is made an art: a number of sermons and lectures, and many prolix commentaries upon the Scriptures, with harmonies and concordances: but that form of writing in divinity which in my judgment is of all others most rich and precious, is positive divinity, collected upon particular texts of Scriptures in brief observations; not dilated into commonplaces, not chasing after controversies, not reduced into method of art; a thing abounding in sermons, which will vanish, but defective in books which will remain; and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am persuaded, (and I may speak it with an *absit invidia verbo*, and no ways in derogation of antiquity, but as in a good emulation between the vine and the olive,) that if the choice and best of those observations upon texts of Scriptures, which have been made dispersedly in Sermons within this your Majesty's island of Britain by the space of these forty years and more, leaving out the largeness of exhortations and applications thereupon, had been set down in a continuance, it had been the best work in divinity which had been written since the Apostles' times.

17. The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds: matter of belief and truth of opinion, and matter of service and adoration; which is also judged and directed by the former: the one being as the internal soul of religion, and the other as the external body thereof. And therefore the heathen religion was not only a worship of idols, but the whole religion was an idol in itself; for it had no soul, that is, no certainty of belief or confession: as a man may

well think, considering the chief doctors of their church were the poets: and the reason was, because the heathen gods were no jealous gods, but were glad to be admitted into part, as they had reason. Neither did they respect the pureness of heart, so they might have external honour and rites.

18. But out of these two do result and issue four main branches of divinity; *faith, manners, liturgy, and government*. Faith containeth the doctrine of the nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of the works of God. The nature of God consisteth of three persons in unity of Godhead. The attributes of God are either common to the Deity, or respective to the persons. The works of God summary are two, that of the *creation* and that of the *redemption*; and both these works, as in total they appertain to the unity of the Godhead, so in their parts they refer to the three persons: that of the creation, in the mass of the matter, to the Father; in the disposition of the form, to the Son; and in the continuance and conservation of the being, to the Holy Spirit. So that of the redemption, in the election and counsel, to the Father; in the whole act and consummation to the Son; and in the application, to the Holy Spirit; for by the Holy Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by the Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit. This work likewise we consider either effectually, in the elect; or privately in the reprobate; or according to appearance, in the visible church.

19. For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the law, which discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, according to the edition thereof, into the law of nature, the law moral, and the law positive; and according to the style, into negative and affirmative, prohibitions and commandments. Sin, in the matter and subject thereof, is divided according to the commandments; in the form thereof, it referreth to the three persons in Deity: sins of infirmity against the Father, whose more special attribute is power; sins of ignorance against the Son, whose attribute is wisdom; and sins of malice against the Holy Ghost, whose attribute is grace or love.² In the motions of it, it either moveth to the right hand or to the left; either to blind devotion, or to profane and libertine transgression; either in imposing restraint where God granteth

² For a truer division of the Attributes of the Godhead, see Hooker v. 56. 5.

liberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. In the degrees and progress of it, it divideth itself into thought, word, or act. And in this part I commend much the deducing of the law of God to cases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be a breaking, and not exhibiting whole of the bread of life. But that which quickeneth both these doctrines of faith and manners, is the elevation and consent of the heart; whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy meditation, Christian resolution, and the like.

20. For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the reciprocal acts between God and man; which, on the part of God, are the preaching of the word, and the sacraments, which are seals to the covenant, or as the visible word; and on the part of man, invocation of the name of God; and under the law, sacrifices; which were as visible prayers or confessions: but now the adoration being *in spiritu et veritate*,³ there remaineth only *rituli labiorum*;⁴ although the use of holy vows of thankfulness and retribution may be accounted also as sealed petitions.

21. And for the government of the church, it consisteth of the patrimony of the church, the franchises of the church, and the offices and jurisdictions of the church, and the laws of the church directing the whole; all which have two considerations, the one in themselves, the other how they stand compatible and agreeable to the civil estate.

22. This matter of divinity is handled either in form of instruction of truth, or in form of confutation of falsehood. The declinations from religion, besides the privative, which is atheism, and the branches thereof, are three; *Heresies*, *Idolatry*, and *Witchcraft*; heresies, when we serve the true God with a false worship; idolatry, when we worship false gods, supposing them to be true; and witchcraft, when we adore false gods, knowing them to be wicked and false: for so your Majesty doth excellently well observe, that witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And yet we see though these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are all of a nature, when there is once a receding from the word of God; for so he saith. *Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare et quasi scelus idololatriæ notie acquiescere.*⁵

23. These things I have passed over so briefly because

³ Joh. iv. 23, 24.

⁴ Hosea xiv. 2.

⁵ 1 Sam. xv. 23.

I can report no deficiency concerning them: for I can find no space or ground that lieth vacant and unsown in the matter of divinity: so diligent have men been, either in sowing of good seed, or in sowing of tares.

THUS have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual world, as truly and faithfully as I could discover; with a note and description of those parts which seem to me not constantly occupate, or not well converted by the labour of man. In which, if I have in any point receded from that which is commonly received, it hath been with a purpose of proceeding *in melius*, and not *in aliud*; a mind of amendment and proficiency, and not of change and difference. For I could not be true and constant to the argument I handle, if I were not willing to go beyond others; but yet not more willing than to have others go beyond me again: which may the better appear by this, that I have propounded my opinions naked and unarmed, not seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men's judgments by confutations. For in anything which is well set down, I am in good hope, that if the first reading move an objection, the second reading will make an answer. And in those things wherein I have erred, I am sure I have not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments; which certainly have this contrary effect and operation, that they add authority to error, and destroy the authority of that which is well invented: for question is an honour and preferment to falsehood, as on the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claim and challenge to myself as mine own: the good, if any be, is due *tanquam adops sacrificii*, to be incensed to the honour, first of the Divine Majesty, and next of your Majesty, to whom on earth I am most bounden.

DEO GLORIA.

GLOSSARY.

Adventive, from without, foreign.

Apprompt, stir up, quicken.

Aspersion, besprinkling.

Cautel, caution, scruple. So Shakspeare :

“ For now no soil or cautel doth besmirch
The virtue of his will.” — *Hamlet*, i. 3.

Civil, popular, prevailing.

Coarctation, restraint.

Contentation, content. So p. 18, we find contestations.

Contristation, weariness, sorrow.

Copie (for Latin *copia*), abundance.

Corroborate, strengthened, matured.

Digladiation, sparring.

Elench, refutation.

Estuation, agitation.

Expulse, expel.

Ground, a theme in music.

Holding, pertaining to.

Hours, seasons, dispositions (Fr. *de bonnes heures*).

Humorous, petulant.

Idols, illusions, false appearances.

Illuqueation, ensnaring.

Leese, lose.

Lidger, legate.

Maniable, tractable.

Moe, according to Latham, the old positive form whence *more* is derived, and so used by Hooker (i. 4.), but by Bacon as a comparative.

Mo~~u~~gation, submission.

Parcel, part.

Peccant humours, corrupt tendencies. (Fr.) Cf. *Le médecin malgré lui*, ii. 4.

Percase, perchance.

Politique, politician.

Pray in aid, call in. A legal term. So Shakspeare :

“ You shall find
A conqueror that will pray in aid for kindness.”
Ant. and Cleop. v. 2.

Prenotion, foreknowledge.

Presention, perception beforehand.

Propriety, property.

Punctual, as small as a point, trivial. So Milton, of the earth :

“ This punctual spot.”—*Par. Lost*, viii. 23.

Punto, punctilio.

Redargution, confutation.

Reintegration, renewal.

Reluctation, resistance.

Respective, careful, attentive.

Saddest, gravest.

Secured, without hindrance.

Statua, for *statue*. So Shakspeare :

“ Ev'n at the base of Pompey's *statua*.”—*Jul. Cæs.* iii. 2

Typocosmy, a representation of the world.

Ure, practice.

Vermiculate, intricate, subtle. (Fr. *vermiculé*.)

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

(For the references marked 'N. & Q.' I am indebted to an article in *Notes & Queries*, May 21st, 1853.)

- Page 9, line 19, top ... Plin. *Nat. Hist.* vii. 31.
 — 18, „ 14, top ... Ovid. *Ep.* xv. 83. (N. & Q.)
 — 19, „ 20, top ... *Vid.* Demosth. *Chers.* 106.
 — 21, „ 12, bot. ... *Vid.* prolog. to Gargantua.
 — 34, „ 5, top ... For '7' read '6.'
 — 35, § With this section cf. S. Bernard *Serm.* 36. in *Cant.*
 — 44, note 2, ... *Add* cf. Rabel. *Garg.* i. 45.
 — 44, line 2, bot. ... After 'gold' add '3.'
 — 46, note 2, ... *Add*, The word *κυμνοπρίστης* occurs in Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* iv. 3. (N. & Q.)
 — 50, line 10, top ... Cf. Sen. *ad Lucil.* 59.
 — 56, „ 22, top ... The figure '9' should have been placed after the word 'account.'
 — 60, note 7 ... *Vid.* Plut. *Gryll.* i. and cf. Essay viii.
 — 63, heading ... For *Advantages* read *Disadvantages*.
 — 67, line 2, bot. ... Amare et sapere vix Deo conceditur.
 — Publ. Syr. *Sent.* 15.
 Compare Menand. *Andr. fr.* i. and Ovid. *Met.* ii. 846
 (N. & Q.) cf. also Essay viii.
 — 74, „ 21, top ... Cic. *de Off.* i. 34.
 — 75, „ 13, bot. ... 'One of the late poets.' Ariosto,
 Orl. Fur. 34. 35. (N. & Q. vol. v. p. 232.)
 — 76, „ 5, top ... Plin. *Epist.* iii. 21.
 — 82, „ 11, bot. ... *Vid.* Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* i. xv.
 39. seq.
 — 83, „ 3, bot. ... For Dionysius read Dionysus.
 — 85, note 5, ... Ovid. *Met.* xv. 165. (N. & Q.)
 — 94, „ 2, ... *Add* cf. Plat. *Tim.* iii. 70, seq., and
 Galen *de Usu Partium.* passim.

Page 102, note 7, ... *Add* Prot. i. 343.

— 119, line 11, top ... Of the ibis. cf. Ben Jonson's
Poetaster Apol. Dial. ad fin.

— 120, *Whiffler*, a fifer, or piper.—Douce: Shaksp. *Hen. V.*

— — — The deep mouthed sea,
Which, like a mighty whiffler 'fore the king
Seems to prepare his way.

— 137, line 4, top ... Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* vi. 3. (N. & Q.)

— 140, note 2, ... *Add*, And by Rabelais, *Pantag.* ii. 18.

— 146, line 11, bot. ... Sen. *ad Lucil.* 52.

— 147, „ 12, bot. ... Sen. *ad Lucil.* 53.

— 152, „ 7, top ... Sen. *Nat. Qu.* ii. 59.

— 152, „ 15, top ... Sen. *ad Lucil.* 77.

— 152, „ 22, top ... Sen. *ad Lucil.* 95.

— 156, „ 2, bot. ... It should be observed that in the
opinion of F. A. Wolf and Niebuhr, this
speech is a forgery.

— 159, „ 12, top ... Sen. *ad Lucil.* 71.

— 163, „ 3, top ... Solon. *Fr.* i. 8. Gaisf. (N. & Q.)

— 166, „ 20, top ... Vid. *Disc. sop. Liv.* i. 10.

— 172, „ 22, bot. ... Cic. *de Orat.* iii. 83. (N. & Q.)

— 178, note 6, ... Niebuhr takes a different view of
Augustus's character. See his *Lectures on*
Roman History. xlix. (vol. ii. p. 103.)

— 180, line 3, top ... *νᾶφε καὶ μεμνᾶσ' ἀπιστεῖν, ἄρθρα*
ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν.—Epicharm. *ap. Suid.*
(N. & Q.)

— 186, „ 3, bot. ... Cic. *Brut.* 95.

— 187, „ 11, top ... Mach. *Disc. sop. Liv.* iii. 9.

— 192, „ 4, bot. ... Plut. *vit. Lep.* 8.

— 198, „ 8, bot. ... Plut. *vit. Alex.* 65.

— 206, „ 17, bot. ... Livy ix. 19.

— 211, *Vermiculate.* Rather Ital. than Fr., being applied to
a kind of mosaic.

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riens."

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1833.

PREFACE.

If "a great book" be "a great evil," a long preface is surely a still greater, especially when it amounts to nothing more than a mawkish apology for doing that, which *not* to do might have been imputed to indolence or indifference at least to the call of a harmless though perhaps mistaken ambition. The intellectual world is a *pic-nic* in which each is

expected to contribute his share; if, therefore, the observations which are contained in the following pages should serve to beguile a lonely hour, or divert, but for a moment, the mind of any one in whose way they may fall, the Author will feel no regret in having submitted them to the public eye.

ERRATA.

- Page 29, line 6, for "*matters,*" read "*matter.*"
- 63, last line but one, comma after "*then.*"
- 91, line 8, comma after "*globe.*"
- 112, For
 " If ignorance is bliss, 'tis
 Folly to be wise."
 Read
 " Where ignorance is bliss,
 'Tis folly to be wise."
- 128, line 3, dele comma after "*place.*"
- 137, line 22, for "*for ourselves,*" read "*of our-*
 selves."
- 153, line 9, before "*restraint,*" add "*by.*"
- 180, line 1, for "*the other.*" read "*another.*"
- 182, line 1, for "*feel,*" read "*are.*"
- 184, line 24, for "*him, painful,*" read "*how*
 Painful."
- 205, line 8, for "*is*" read "*are.*"
- 223, line 9, for "*prejudices and opinions,*" read
 "*prejudices are opinions.*"
- 233, note, for "*in his glory,*" read "*with his*
 glory."
- 262, line 5, comma after "*is.*"
- 267, line 3, dele "*them.*"

MOMENTS OF IDLENESS.

I.

A new idea reconciles us to life. A new truth does more—it reconciles us to death.

II.

If ambition would only listen to reason, how often would she be advised to look behind instead of before—to count how many she has left in the rear, rather than to count how many there may still remain to be outstripped in the race.

III.

He that is rich in self can afford to be poor in everything else.

IV.

Suicide is peculiar to man. Is it because of all living beings he is the most reasonable?

V.

The past may always be redeemed in the eye of God, but not without the price of amendment. In the eye of man, who governs only by general laws, there are acts which are not redeemable at any price.

VI.

It is not slavery itself, but the abuse of slavery, or rather the abuse of power, that is necessarily an evil; unless we can get rid of responsibility altogether, there will always be some power or authority superior to our own, and to which we must render an account.

VII.

Not the least useful of mankind was he who first invented a grammar and dictionary of his vernacular tongue, convenient indeed to the native, but absolutely necessary to enable others, who are not

so, to acquire it. Before the introduction of grammar and dictionary, language was like the common law of England before the era of Blackstone, and could be acquired by no other means, than hearing it spoken by others.

VIII.

If we speak a language correctly, without having previously made ourselves acquainted with the rules or fundamental principles of that language, it must be entirely a matter of accident; as he who is able to play without having studied the rudiments of music, must be indebted to chance, if he play either in time or in tune.

IX.

There are some persons to whom it were no less idle to appeal on the score of honour than it would be to attempt to divert a highwayman from his purpose by pleading the inviolability of property, or to reason with a soldier on the crime and immorality of war; so necessary is it, in our intercourse with the world, to address every one in the

language, not that we understand best, but which is best understood by others.

X.

Listen, O ye who are still permitted to bask in the smile of her, to whom you are indebted for your existence, and consequently for everything you now enjoy—of her, under the shadow of whose wing you have so often taken refuge from the storms and vicissitudes to which you were exposed in your youth. Reflect, ere it be too late, ere you learn by cruel experience to feel the want of a mother's care; reflect, I say, when the world appears to lour, and misfortunes to cross thy path, on her who is sure to greet thee under every change of circumstance, in good fortune or in bad, in health or in sickness, with a kind and affectionate look, to share with thee in thy happiness, and sympathize with thee in thy distress:—think of that love which is a stranger to all hypocrisy, which knows no alloy, endureth unto the end, and so disinterested as to expect no return;—think of the sacrifices which, independently of what she may have undergone

in giving you existence, she has made for you—the anxiety which on numerous occasions she has felt for you—the sleepless nights, the sighs by day, which (perhaps unwittingly indeed) you may have occasioned her: think on all this, and tell me if you do not feel your heart glow with the most lively and generous emotion, which you feel the more as you feel unequal to make an adequate return? tell me whether your heart does not expand with, nay overflow with a sense of kindness, something co-existent with humanity itself, some irresistible impulse, some imperative instinct, call it by what name you may, that throws even duty in the shade, and speaks to your soul with all the authority of Nature herself:—tell me if there be any blessing in life, any friend to be compared to her whom heaven has provided for thee from thy birth; old enough in years*—so wise are the dispensations of Providence—to guide thee with her experience, to protect and support you, during the helpless period of ~~of~~ your infancy—that weak and helpless age which only makes her love you

* The age of child-bearing.

the more in proportion as you stand in need of her assistance :—think of all this, and tell me, if the longest life adorned with the greatest virtues will more than repay her for all she has done for you, and all she has suffered for you. To be happy yourself is to make her so. Her happiness is identified with, or rather reflected in your own, and never forget that, so long as she lives, you never can suffer, never can be unhappy, without causing another, however undeservedly, to share in your affliction.

XI.

The regular appropriation of our time * is in some cases indispensably necessary, and in all cases desirable, if for no other reason than because it makes the time, as it were,* pass more quickly, and consequently more agreeably, or rather more quickly because more agreeably.

* At no period of our life does the time pass so quickly as when we are at school for the reason assigned; and for the same reason a monastic life, monotonous as it may appear, is far from being some.

XII.

Unfold the map of life, and you will find the roads to happiness as numerous as are the individuals who go in search of it.

XIII.

Religion and education must ever go hand in hand—it is not easy to separate one from the other. Education, unless built on a religious foundation, may be prostituted to the worst of purposes, and instead of proving beneficial to the individual or that society of which he is only a component part, may become a dangerous instrument when it is not directed by judgement, and associated with the better feelings of the heart, and it is dangerous in proportion to the rank or position we may enjoy—in proportion, in short, as we may be endowed with the means and opportunities of doing good or harm. Religion is the ballast that weathers the storm, and that enables us to ride safely over the troubled deep; it is the trusty and skilful pilot that guides our wandering steps over the pathless ocean of life; for whilst we

advocate the cause of education—whilst we proclaim truth and knowledge the common and lawful inheritance of all, (like the air we breathe,) and which is beyond the reach of man to arrest or even to controul, let us bear in mind, also, that after all, it is like a valuable medicine, the virtue of which, if misapplied, may become a deadly poison—let us never forget, that learning and education is not necessarily a good itself, but must be judged of like every thing else in consequence of the fruit it may produce—that it is not the thing itself but the effect, use, end, and design; and that to be wiser to day than we were yesterday is but of little value, unless, as we grow wiser, we grow better and happier—better because wiser—and happier because better.

XIV.

We never can gain an ascendancy over others, until we first learn to govern ourselves.

XV.

We should avoid as much as possible increasing the number of our wants, or rather

acquiring artificial ones; they are so many evils as often as we have not an opportunity of gratifying them, and where is the man who can conjure up opportunities at his will?

XVI.

There is no virtue without a corresponding temptation, to the opposite vice; and the stronger the temptation, the greater is our virtue in resisting it.

XVII.

Virtue is best learned in solitude, but it is only in society that we can verify our principles by our practice.

XVIII.

There are few things in life worth pursuing for their own sake alone, without reference to some ulterior purpose, as the step of a ladder is of no other use than to enable us to ascend still higher. We set out in life with professing ourselves to be only sojourners in the land,—to be as it were birds of passage to another and a better world; and as with this life so is it with our mode

and manner of passing through it. Do we go to school for the sake of the education alone? or is it not for the sake of qualifying us for becoming better and more useful citizens? Our education or apprenticeship is no sooner finished than we engage in some calling or profession, in all probability fixed upon by circumstances, and at some other period of our life we marry, but, in few instances, it is to be feared, for the sake of the individual alone. And even amongst the number of those pursuits which are specifically distinguished as amusements, however much they may be extolled, or whatever reputation they may enjoy, how few are those that are resorted to for the pleasure to be derived from the pursuit itself, but rather as a substitute for something more important—an expedient to employ or rather to murder our time; and sometimes we pursue them for no other reason than for fashion's sake; thus we easily reconcile ourselves to what may not be agreeable to our inclinations by the ultimate benefit we expect to derive. Life, in short, is a game of hazard, where we stake a certain benefit or positive good for the sake of a possible and ulterior advantage.

XIX.

How often it happens, nay I believe it to be an invariable rule, that we mistake opinions for facts, until we are undeceived by hearing other and different opinions on the same subject, which may still be equally mistaken for facts or the truth, and which will continue to be the case so long as we do not allow ourselves to reflect and make use of our own unbiassed judgment. The mind of man is naturally credulous, and generally believes every thing to be true till he is convinced of the contrary; mankind are by nature so indolent they would rather that others should think for them than have the trouble of thinking for themselves. All our knowledge in early life—and knowledge then acquired always makes the greatest impression—is, the whole of it, borrowed on credit.

XX.

Occupation and employment, more especially of an intellectual kind, is so essential to the comfort and well-being of man, that it may be considered the *sine-quâ-non* of human

happiness. ~~Occupation~~, indeed, may be productive of ~~advantage~~ in various ways, both to ourselves and to others; but occupation would still be desirable, did it answer no other purpose than that of preventing the necessity of reflection; for the constitution of our mind is such, that if not interested in any present pursuit, it has a natural tendency to revert to that which is past, which, under any circumstances, must be at least an unprofitable waste of time, as no event, whether good or bad, which once has happened, can ever be recalled. Reflection, however, be it observed, in the sense here implied is widely different from that voluntary act of the mind directed to a given point, which is more properly attention or consideration. It is impossible but in reviewing the past some uneasy thoughts must occasionally occur to every one, which will lie on the mind, like so much crude and indigestible matter, until removed by some counteracting cause. So have I seen the vane of a weathercock point, 'day after day, to the inhospitable east, until a breeze springing up from a more genial

quarter, has, at length, occasioned it to point in a different direction.

XXI.

We object to change, not because the past, or that which has the sanction of time to recommend it, is necessarily better than the future, but because the future is more doubtful than the past. In avoiding one evil there is danger of our incurring a still greater. It is on this account that great changes in the political or religious institutions of a country are seldom produced by the acts of a single individual, or even by any number of individuals, but are more frequently brought about apparently by accident, but in reality by the slow hand of time and the fortuitous conjunction of circumstances. As in every sublunary thing, however perfect, is concealed the principle of decay, so every moral malady or political abuse contains within itself the means of effecting its own cure; in other words, the principle of regeneration. Owing, therefore, to the want of human foresight, it is safer as a general rule to rely more upon precedent and the experience of the past, (which, intoxicated as we

are with knowledge, it is too much the fashion in the present age to decry,) than to trust to the conclusions of the soundest judgment or the forecastings of the most enlightened understanding, which have not the advantage of being supported by experience and the evidence of facts.

XXII.

Hypocrisy is at once the test and reproach of civilization.*

XXIII.

Hypocrisy is a game that is licensed in society, but it is poison to the relationships of private life.

XXIV.

The foundation of civilization is the subjugation of the passions. Civilization progresses in proportion as our passions are neutralized or controlled by reason, it being more difficult to sacrifice passion to reason than reason to passion; the latter being, in fact, nothing more than a restoration to

* "Language," says a disciple of the Machiavellian school, "was given us to conceal our thoughts."

nature of her lawful right,—a transition, as it were, from the act of swimming in an element that is not natural to us to that of walking on our parent earth; whereas, to obtain the mastery of our passions is a work of time, and is never accomplished but at the expense of many a painful struggle.

XXV.

It is the novelty, the rarity, in other words the comparative difficulty with which an object may be obtained, that adds a charm to it not its own, and renders that a luxury, which, under other circumstances, might be looked upon with the most perfect indifference: hence what is an object of desire to one may not be so to another, nor the same object equally desired by the same individual under every change of circumstance. In what would the value of a peerage consist, if peers were as numerous as commoners? There is nothing (the necessities of life excepted) that possesses any intrinsic value of its own, but all things acquire a relative or artificial value in proportion to the difficulty of obtaining them,—the time, talent, labour,

or money, which must be expended before they can be procured ; whereas, on the other hand, it sometimes happens that that which is esteemed a luxury by some, may, owing to the abundance of the supply, become not only an object of indifference, but even of aversion to others : hence it is that sportsmen are indifferent to game. Gardeners care little about fruit, and would, at all times, exchange the produce of their garden for more substantial diet, for the same reason, I presume, that cooks prefer drinking to eating ; and pastry-cooks are said to allow their apprentices to indulge in pastry *usque ad nauseam*, in order that more may be left for their customers !

XXVI.

How valuable is fire ! The very sight of it cheers and enlivens us, and warms us by the very act of enlivening us ; nor can we be surprised that, in some countries, it should have been made an object of worship, as the fountain of life and heat : the actual heat imparted by fire is direct and instantaneous, therefore positive enjoyment ;

whereas the warmth communicated by food and raiment is more gradual and indirect; consequently we are not so sensible of its effects. If, for instance, we place our hand near to our cloak or mantle, even though it be lined with fur, we perceive no heat,—our hand is not warmer than if the cloak or mantle were not there; but we cannot place our hand the same distance from the fire without perceiving the heat, and the nearer we place it the more heat we shall feel. It is one of those necessities of life, which, were it even as cheap and plentiful as water, would never cease to be a luxury; and in the climate of England there is scarcely a day, during some portion of which its presence would not be hailed as an acceptable addition to our comforts.

XXVII.

Occupation or employment, in the abstract, is not necessary to the happiness of man, because labour, attended with any degree of trouble and personal inconvenience, is not natural to him, and it is seldom voluntarily resorted to by any one, but as a means

of subsistence. When we speak of occupation as contributing to human happiness, it is of that mental character which becomes desirable, I may say necessary, in proportion as our mind has been cultivated, and our intellectual powers called into existence by education: nor, indeed, will intellectual labour be of much avail in satisfying the want or desire of occupation thus artificially created, unless it be of a kind most suited to our taste, and most adapted to our capacity and disposition.

XXVIII.

Public life is not without its share of those cares and anxieties, vexations and disappointments, which attach to trust and responsibility of any kind; but, generally speaking, they do not make so much impression—they do not come, if I may so say, so home to our feelings; they are less gnawing and corroding: there is, in short, less wear and tear to our health and peace of mind in the public concerns of life than there is in those trials of a more domestic nature, to which we are so often exposed

in private life ; and for this reason,—in the one case we are only transacting the business of others, to which we must necessarily be comparatively indifferent. This holds good of all professions and offices, especially those to which fixed and limited salaries may be attached : whereas, in the other case, we are parties concerned in our own affairs exclusively. Add to which that public life, in a sense, is a matter of choice ; we can enter and retire at pleasure : whereas the relationships of private life may be more or less multiplied indeed by ourselves, but are never entirely within our own power and control. We cannot rid ourselves of those ties and domestic duties which are created by circumstances ; and with some of which, perhaps, were it in our power, we would willingly dispense. The cares of public life, if abandoned with honour, may be abandoned at any time ; but the cares of domestic life have no intermission : it is the poisonous epidemic we inhale at every breath. It is the festering sting of the wasp. It never ceases to haunt us like the shadow that follows in our path, or the atmosphere

that accompanies the world wherever it goes ; we have no sooner avoided one evil than another supervenes to occasion us a fresh source of anxiety. Domestic cares, as compared with public duties, arduous, important, and harassing as they may be, is the homethrust of the rapier, as compared to the flourish of a broad sword. It is the light troops harassing our rear, while the great guns of life are only thundering in the distance. It is the loss of property, if not of life, we sustain when our own house is on fire : whereas the annoyances of public life is only the scar or contusion we receive in affording succour to our neighbour under similar circumstances. It is the hired soldier that is fighting the battle of another. He may be exposed, indeed, to the random shot of the enemy, but he is as careless about the result of the action, as he is forgetful of the action itself, when once it has been decided.

XXIX.

Courage ! whence and what art thou ? Thou, whose influence is so great as to be idolized by some and admired, if not re-

spected, by all. Whence is it that thou hast been extolled in all ages and countries, and that achievements performed in thy name have been handed down as matter of historical interest to all succeeding generations, and have resounded from pole to pole? Whence, I say, and what art thou? Great and mighty power! it never can be that thou, who art spoken of as a "thing of life," a being that lives, moves, and breathes, it never can be that thou art an "airy nothing" — a mere phantom of the brain; yet I know not where is thy dwelling-place, or where thou art to be found. I know not thy nature and essence, nor have I ever yet beheld thy form, thy aspect, thy symmetry, and proportion. Such were my thoughts as I lay one sleepless night on my bed, musing on man and his attributes, natural and acquired; on the influence of public opinion, on conscience, on duty, on custom and habit, on laws, morality, and religion, on those conditions of society which, though not expressed, have all the force of law, and to which we virtually give our tacit assent, on happiness and

unhappiness, and on the various relationships of man in his social capacity.

It was then, in more serious mood, that I asked myself to what cause it is owing that courage is held in such high estimation, that, let it be found where it may, it invariably recommends us to one of the sexes, and still more so, if possible, to the other; to be, in short, so essential to our well-being in the world, that to be deficient in courage is of all sins the most unpardonable; but to possess it, or even to have the name or reputation of possessing it, is to possess all the other virtues, or at least to possess *that* one virtue which supplies the place of all the rest. I began to despair of resolving to my satisfaction so obscure and intricate, and yet important question, when, in the endeavour to place myself in a position more favourable to sleep, I suddenly turned round in my bed, and lo! a finger was seen to trace something on the wall, which I straightway deciphered as follows:—" Fool that thou art, wilt thou never learn to separate sense from sound, and to distinguish words

from things? That which thou supposest to be something superhuman, or at least something possessing size, form, and colour, is but a shadow, and has no other than an ideal existence. Courage is a byeword, which means nothing; or if it have any meaning, it implies only that some are less fearful than others, or the same person is less fearful at one time than another. Know, then, for the future, that what is commonly known by the name of courage is an adventitious being, represented indeed to our imagination in the imposing gait of an ancient warrior, which has been bequeathed to us by by-gone ages of chivalry and romance when there was no other pursuit cultivated but that of war, or none, at least, that was considered so honourable, and honourable because it was useful, but which has since been superseded by the more sublime and self-denying virtues of Christianity. Courage is commonly spoken of as if it were an abstract principle—as if there were something positive and definite in its nature; whereas there is nothing more essentially *relative*. We are courageous

only in proportion as we are are less fearful ; and rest assured that that which is named, or rather misnamed, courage, (and to which the palm of merit is so often and sometimes so undeservedly awarded—I say *undeservedly*, because it is the cause or occasion alone in which it is displayed that alone gives a value to its existence,) is nothing more than the temporary absence of fear ; or, rather, it is the momentary triumph of some adventitious and stimulating cause over that powerful and insurmountable principle of our nature ; a principle which is implanted in us for the wisest and most salutary purpose, and which is known by the name of—fear.

XXX.

The proud man will get credit for being more proud than he is, if at the same time he be naturally reserved.

XXXI.

It cannot be denied that wealth in itself does not constitute happiness ; in other words, wealth, in the abstract, has no ne-

cessary connexion with happiness ; but it is no less true that wealth, in the relative sense of the term, contributes to our happiness, for no one can be completely happy without possessing the means of satisfying his natural and more reasonable wants ; for, deprived of such means, we should ill exchange our natural rights for the adventitious advantages of society: and were it not, indeed, for the hope we might entertain of bettering ourselves here or hereafter, our condition would not, in some cases, be so desirable as that even of the brute creation.

XXXII.

Old as the world is, it is nevertheless but partially civilized ; and even in those countries which profess to be the most enlightened, society is far from having reached as yet that degree of perfection of which it is capable.

XXXIII.

The happiness or unhappiness of man and that of animals in general, will scarcely admit of a comparison. **Man**, being a moral and

accountable agent, never can be completely happy without enjoying the approbation of his own conscience ; whereas other animals, not being able to sin either legally or morally, the term unhappiness, in the sense of self-reproach, can scarcely be applied to them : but they are indebted to other causes, peculiar to themselves, for that happiness, or rather that even and uninterrupted flow of spirits, of which they give so many unequivocal proofs of enjoying in a high degree. It is true, notwithstanding, that they are equally susceptible with ourselves of pleasure and pain ; but this can only be understood in a physical sense, and has nothing in common with happiness or unhappiness, properly so called.

XXXIV.

Every one at his birth virtually enters into a tacit compact to give a *consideration* for the advantages he derives from society ; by society, I mean more especially those laws which protect our lives and property, and every thing we hold most dear. This consideration, which is no other than what

we call social duty, and all those minor obligations which the term necessarily implies, existed before religion (the ceremonial part at least) existed, and it would still exist, under some name or other, were there no such thing as religion.

XXXV.

He that retires from the world and absolves himself from the discharge of his social duties, except in cases of necessity, commits a moral suicide.

XXXVI.

Money, influential as it is, is not the only mode by which one individual can serve another. The poor man has sometimes an opportunity of conferring such an obligation on his richer neighbour as money would but ill repay. Mankind is too apt to interpret Christian charity in a pecuniary sense exclusively.

XXXVII.

Though we cannot anticipate a passion that is implanted in us by nature, at the

dictation of our own will, we have, notwithstanding, the means of regulating and controuling, and even diminishing its fire ; but we cannot increase any passion, appetite, feeling, or inclination, that we have inherited from nature ; we cannot, if I may so say, raise it to a higher power : still less can we create, in reality, a new passion, (though we may indeed deceive the world by assuming sometimes what we do not really feel,) any more than we can add an eye to our head or another muscle to the human frame. We can, for instance, love ourselves less, that is to say, we may be less selfish to day than we were a year ago, but to hate or love another more at one time or another, at the dictation of our own will, is not within our own control. Hence there is much to console and reconcile those whose feelings are more than usually sensitive, nor can it, on the whole, be considered so great a misfortune to be endued with more as it would be to be endued with less than an ordinary share of sensibility.

XXXVIII.

Man is unquestionably the privileged sex by nature as well as by law, and by law because by nature.

XXXIX.

Matters and mind are too nearly allied to disparage in all cases the efficiency of medicine, even though the disease may have originated in a moral cause. At the same time the cases are not a few when a word of consolation proves a more powerful antidote than all the nostrums in Christendom.

XL.

There is no disease incident to humanity, call it by what name you may, which is not materially influenced by moral causes, that is to say, by the operations of the mind. If, in the enjoyment of health, our animal functions are disturbed and excited by moral causes, how much more must this be the case, when the body is debilitated by sickness and disease.

XLI.

Nature supplies the raw material, education is the manufacturer.

XLII.

Women have proved, on different occasions, that their understanding and intellectual endowments are not inferior to those of men; although, physically, man is, in some respects, more highly favoured by nature. In the brute creation, indeed, the male is not in all cases possessed of greater muscular strength, though generally they surpass the other sex in form, colour, and size; nor (what is essentially imputed to them as a characteristic weakness of their sex) are females more susceptible of flattery by nature than the other sex. Ambition, be it of what kind or of what degree it may, is nothing more than a desire of courting admiration, in short, of intoxicating ourselves with the incense of flattery. Constituted as society is, the female sex are perhaps too apt to believe that personal advantages, though depending not on our will, and, therefore, possessing no merit

of their own, are the only passport to worldly advancement; nor, indeed, under all the circumstances, is it to be wondered at that the duties of the toilette, if duties they can be called, should occupy too much of their attention, while the cultivation of their mind—the more unfading part of their nature—should be comparatively neglected. The circumstance of education, after all, makes the main difference between the sexes, as it does between two individuals of the same sex.

XLIII.

If inequality of rank, fortune, and condition be inseparable from a state of society—be, in short, a necessary condition of society—it must follow, in the nature of things, that there will be a continual and never-ceasing struggle for precedence, in some shape or other, by man over man all the world over. Equality to any extent, and for any time, is no less impossible in a state of society, than it would be desirable, were it so. The rivalry and competition it engenders between individuals (though associated, indeed, with the less amiable feelings of our nature) con-

tribute, like the war of the elements, to the order, the beauty, the proportion of the whole. Founded as such a desire of precedence may be in avarice, self-interest, or pride, it is, nevertheless, a powerful, perhaps the most powerful, motive for physical and intellectual exertion. It is the basis and main-spring of every great and useful (would that I could add of every virtuous) action.

XLIV.

Man abhors equality in his fellow-man no less than nature is said to abhor a vacuum. Such is human nature, that it is a less evil to be inferior to our neighbour in every thing than to be superior to him in nothing.

XLV.

It has been said that certain individuals, Napoleon among the number, held mankind in contempt ; be this as it may, most certain it is that no one can despise human nature (bad as it may be) without at the same time despising himself.

XLVI.

If there were no such thing as flattery, there could be no such thing as vanity in the one sex or ambition in the other ; human pride, in short, whatever form it may assume, would not, but for flattery, have wherewithal to support itself—it would die for want of nourishment.

XLVII.

The bravest man is he who acknowledges himself to be a coward.

XLVIII.

When we are in good health, troubles are pleasures ; in illness, pleasures are troubles.

XLIX.

The most infallible criterion of health is neither the pulse nor the tongue, but dreamless nights—he who dreams is still awake, though his eyes may be shut.

L.

Pain without intermission cannot last long—perpetual pain is impossible.

LI.

If we can venture to reason at all on the subject, the most we can say of matrimony, when we are about to be married, is that the object of our choice is more dear to us than any other person we are at present acquainted with, nor could we say more than this were we to wait all our lives. While this consideration is a good argument, on the one hand, for marrying without delay, it is an equally good one, on the other, for not marrying at all.

LII.

Inequality of rank and fortune, which has ever been considered a necessary condition of society, (I say considered, because there are some theorists of the present day who maintain a different opinion,) renders all men competitors, but none enemies; the word enemy implying one from whom we have received, or from whom we have reason to apprehend, an injury, under the influence of an improper motive. The pivot on which society turns is not to hate our neighbours

but to love ourselves;* just like officers of the same regiment, we should make no objection to be promoted till we had attained the highest rank in the regiment, although we might at the same time deplore the causes that might give birth to our elevation.

LIII.

When we speak of public opinion, it is always, in its relationship to individuals, to be understood in a qualified sense; it does not imply, in the literal sense of the words, the opinion of the public, or that of the world at large, but the opinion of our equals; or, more strictly speaking, the opinion of those generally, be they ever so few in number, with whom we more immediately associate. It is the opinion, in short, which prevails in the orbit we move in, be it ever so circumscribed; for we can scarcely be said to have any thing in common with those with whom, by circumstances and the adventitious regulations of society, intercourse is almost

* Repugnant, it is true, to Christianity in a *literal*, but not in a *more general and enlarged* sense.

forbidden. Before we meet our adversary in the field, by whom we consider ourselves aggrieved, do we not previously consult our most intimate friend, and not every one we casually meet with in the streets, on the expediency of obtaining redress? Public opinion, then, is not necessarily the opinion of the many, it is sometimes the opinion of the few. Hence it happens that, even in the same country, where the same language is spoken, and the same laws and customs prevail, a man will be more influenced by the opinion of half a dozen individuals than by the opinion of as many thousands, if it should differ from that of his immediate associates.

LIV.

Insult implies equality between the aggressor and the party insulted; hence it is that we do not feel disposed to avenge an insult on the part of a female, nor on the part of any one who is personally unknown to us.

LV.

A disinterested act without any hope of

return is alone entitled to be considered virtuous ; at the same time those acts where both parties mutually oblige and are obliged, and which is nothing more, in fact, than a bargain or contract, are nevertheless more agreeable to the feelings of mankind, inas-much as our avarice is gratified without a wound being inflicted on our pride.

LVI.

Climate may in some degree be modified by the art of man, but a foreign climate is one of the few things, if not the only thing, that cannot be imported at any price—that cannot be considered an article of commerce, desirable as it sometimes may be, and unequal though we may be to go in pursuit of it. Still there is no part of the globe where the climate is so perfect as to leave nothing to desire ; there is no climate, on the other hand, of so bad a quality as not to be favourable to the production of some animal and vegetable substance peculiar to itself, and no where else to be met with in so great perfection.

LVII.

He who sacrifices his own opinion on the altar of public opinion is a traitor to himself.

LVIII.

He who disregards the opinion of the world in the conscientious discharge of his duty is (for they do not necessarily coincide) no less bold than respectable; he who disregards the opinion of the world in violation of his duty is a still bolder man, but the respect which courage, even when misapplied, in some degree commands, is in this instance far outweighed by feelings of a different kind.

LIX.

Self interest and the interest of others by acting and re-acting on each other, (like gravity and centrifugal force in the physical world,) preserve and consolidate the harmony of the social system.

LX.

A man is said, in the language of social

diplomacy, to be dishonoured by the misconduct of his wife; if this were any thing more than a mere *façon de parler*, we should fall into the absurdity of making the innocent pay the penalty of another person's guilt. We should be disgraced, not by our own acts, but by the acts of others over whom we might have had no controul. In the name of common sense, a husband who has reason to complain of his wife's infidelity ought rather to be the object of the world's indulgence and sympathy, than, in addition to his other misfortunes, to have that of being *dishonoured* by the world. Never, surely, was language so strangely misapplied as under such circumstances to attach dishonour, (which in all cases involves a violation of principle,) not to the character of the seducer or that of the faithless wife, but to the party against whom an offence has been committed. What infatuation! When shall we learn to separate sense from sound, words from ideas, and to call things by their right names? Shall we never cease to take things for granted, and believe only because others believe, or because it is a crime to dis-

believe? How long shall we continue to sanction the grossest inconsistencies, the most monstrous absurdities, and the most flagrant acts of injustice, because we are too supine, or too cowardly, or, may-be, too indolent, to exercise our judgment upon them?

LXI.

Whilst the intellectual world is advancing with a momentum which shakes the very spheres, and threatens to overwhelm every thing that opposes itself to its march—invisible as the tornado, like that also pursuing its noiseless but irresistible course, dispelling, as it proceeds, the impenetrable mists of ignorance and error, and scattering abroad the barriers that have hitherto arrested its progress:—whilst, I say, we witness the prodigious strides that are daily being made in the acquisition of knowledge, shall we allow ourselves any longer to be chained down by senseless and unmeaning habit? Shall mere custom alone, which, be it borne in mind, is no less the minister of evil than of good, continue still to blind the eye of Reason? Will the swaddling clothes of his

infancy never drop from the mind of man? Will the "image of God" never dare to think for himself?"

LXII.

A state of nature does not yield perfect happiness, nor does a state of society. He only has arrived at the "ne plus ultra" of human happiness who has discovered the precise point which separates the good to be desired from one of the states, from the evil to be avoided in the other;—he in short who, as far as circumstances permit, lives in such a way as to enjoy the advantages of both states without the disadvantages of either. It is the pleasure, such as it is, of being alone in a crowd, of looking down from an upper window on the little intrigues and turmoils which agitate the busy world below, whilst you feel yourself the sole and undisputed monarch of the aerial world around. Perhaps the subject cannot be better illustrated than by supposing the case of an individual travelling, than which there are few things more agreeable, provided only he has money at command. He will find he enjoys

a greater share of civil or social advantages at less expense of natural right at an inn than he can at any other place. At an inn we are surrounded with every comfort, luxury, and convenience. Our wants are no sooner expressed than immediately supplied, and in some cases even anticipated; we are more independent than under any other circumstances, and considerably more so than in our own house, where we cannot but feel the weight of the responsibility which attaches to power, and pay dearly enough for the authority and apparent liberty we there enjoy. Even if we are known, we are not supposed to be so; no introduction is required; we are not obliged to bring any credentials, no vouchers for our credit and respectability. If we are kings, we cannot be treated with more respect and consideration; if we are not kings, we are not treated with less. We receive, in short, for the time being, all the advantages, without being expected to give any thing in return. We are living in the world and out of it at the same time, and in leaving the house all the obligation appears to be on the

side of the party who has entertained us, whilst we are sure to receive a thousand benedictions on the part of the grateful host.

LXIII.

The English climate is such that, as far as comfort is concerned, there are five months in the year we cannot do without a fire, three that we cannot do with one, and the rest of the year neither with nor without.

LXIV.

I may acquire a knowledge of myself, but I can never form a just estimate of others by comparing them with myself; the more knowledge I acquire of others, the better able shall I be to appreciate my own powers and capabilities, my own weakness, imperfections, and infirmities.

LXV.

We may often see ourselves reflected in the character of others, but to judge of others by ourselves is to view them through a distorted and fallacious medium, as it is not in human nature to form a disinterested

and impartial opinion of ourselves added to which there are not two individuals in the world between whom there is a moral (as there is not a physical) resemblance.

LXVI.

Human happiness by some has been supposed to consist in the gratification of the ruling passion, whatever it may happen to be ; whilst others have attributed it to different causes, moral as well as physical, such as health, riches, the testimony of a good conscience, not one of which in itself we find, by experience, is sufficient to constitute happiness. Man being viewed in his social or relative, as well as in his individual capacity, I would say that it consisted in attaining the greatest possible amount of physical and intellectual enjoyment as is compatible with the conscientious discharge of one's social duties.

LXVII.

There is a greater inclination in man to talk than to hear, to write than to read, to give than to receive ideas from others ; in

some instances, indeed, they may be mutually cause and effect, but there is no necessary reciprocity between them. The latter is in a great measure an act of his own will; the former is also in some degree under his control, but it is the necessary consequence of a pre-existing cause. We cannot, in short, give without first having received; we cannot reap without having previously sown; to communicate, therefore, our ideas to others may be considered, in our social capacity, a positive want of our nature, while the inclination we may feel of receiving ideas from others, is a want indeed, which, like most other wants, increases by indulgence and habit; but it is acquired and artificial—it is an effort of the will, as compared with that of restoring what we have received, and, at best, is a want only of a secondary nature—secondary, I mean, to that of discharging the contents of our minds. It is true that ideas, which are received through the organs of sensation, are involuntarily admitted into the mind, independently of the human will; but then again, besides the natural produce of the soil, what a swarm of

artificial ideas, if I may so call them, are generated and forced into existence by the hotbed of education, and the multifarious and endless combinations of the human mind.

LXVIII.

We are told we ought not to be anxious—there are few things in life, it is said, that are worth being anxious about: all very well, it is true, and delightful, if it could be put in practice; but it is one of those things, which by the way are not few in number, that is more easily said than done. What absurdity!—just as if we could help feeling anxious at one time and not anxious at another—just as if anxiety were some newly invented clock or thermometer, which we expected to rise or to fall, or go quicker or slower, according to the dictates of our will or the suggestions of our reason. I am far, however, from asserting that all are equally anxious; the degree of anxiety we may feel depends upon causes over which human reason has but little control. But, after all, what is anxiety? Is it not hope under a different

name?—not hope, indeed, without some mixture of fear; but shew me, if you can, that hope which does not in its very nature imply some degree of doubt or apprehension. Hope, indeed, were dead without fear, as fear without any mixture of hope is no longer fear, but despair. Is anxiety, then, a thing to be desired, or shall we call it a positive good? No—that would be as far from the truth as to call it a positive evil; if an evil at all, it is a negative one. I will venture to say that, were we without some degree of anxiety, life would be but a dreary waste; it is the breeze which produces a wholesome agitation of the waters; it is the salt which gives a flavour to our existence.

LXIX.

There is not so much virtue in exercise as is generally supposed. I doubt much, on the whole, whether it is not more productive of evil than of good. A state of repose is natural to man, as it is to the brute creation. In civilized countries, indeed, means have long been adopted of transporting ourselves from one place to another, so as to obviate

the fatigue of carrying our own weight ; nor, if the humble peasant enjoy better health than his richer neighbour, is it to be attributed to the greater use that one may make of his limbs than the other, or, at least, not to that cause alone. I would say,—contrary, indeed, to the practice of the world,—that rest ought to be the rule, and motion the exception to that rule.

LXX.

Honour in the worldly or conventional sense of the word, has so little in common with morality, that the most unprincipled scoundrel passing under the equivocal name of *gentleman*, provided only he transgresses not against the sacred code of honour, (a term, indeed, too often misapplied, for the most dishonourable acts are sometimes committed without any loss of character,) will claim the same right to be received in society as the most correct and virtuous character, although, indeed, the better thinking part of the community cannot but sincerely regret that the practice of the world is so much at variance with the better feelings of our nature.

LXXI.

The proud man may be respected but can never be popular, for two reasons, because, born proud, he can never be otherwise than proud ; is the first. The next is, because we do not like to be reminded of our own inferiority.

LXXII.

There is no one, from the highest to the lowest, without his modicum of pride : pride is at once the weakness and the ornament of our nature ; for in this respect also are we distinguished from the inferior species of animals, though the object of that pride may be widely different in different persons, and is often abused and misapplied. The pure and spotless maid, for instance, is as proud of her uncontaminated innocence or the beauty of her person as the debauchee of his conquests over his own, or perhaps, what is worse, over the unsuspecting innocence of others, deriving nothing to himself, certainly gaining nothing in character or fortune, but pursuing his career of profligacy and vice, ap-

parently for no other reason—and he could not have a worse—than that of obtaining among his comrades the mistaken reputation of being the deliberate assassin of the happiness of others. Of all robbers and assassins he is the basest as well as the most cowardly, because he is unable to make adequate restitution, who invades the sanctuary of private life in order to sever the ties of conjugal affection, and sow the seeds of dissension where harmony and unanimity existed before, depriving thereby one at least of his fellow-creatures of that happiness which alone gives a value to life. Such a hero indeed deserves no less than heroes of a better class, that monuments should be raised to his memory, not, however, as an example to follow, but an example to avoid.

LXXIII.

Reason has but little, too little influence in the common concerns of life, especially among the poorer and less educated classes of society. All the world is governed by love or hate, hope of reward, or fear of punishment, which after all is only an appeal

to the selfishness of human nature ; sometimes applying the one expedient, sometimes the other, as the case may be and as circumstances may require ;—the just art of governing others being, as far as it is possible, to be equally loved and feared, or rather, perhaps, sometimes loved and sometimes feared.

LXXIV.

It was said that the reason assigned every night by a celebrated warrior* of the present age, for attacking the enemy the following day, which he did for forty days in succession, was, not that he saw any positive good would result from it, but in his own very expressive words, “ that he might as well attack him, for if he did not, the enemy would only be teasing him.” What a picture this of the civil warfare of life !

LXXV.

It is better to be loved than to be feared, but it is worse to be hated than feared. Love will always do you an act of kindness

Blucher.

if she can; fear never will, unless she be compelled; but hate, if she do you no positive harm, will at least rejoice in your misery.

LXXVI.

Fear has two supporters for her armorial bearings; hate on the one side, and respect on the other.

LXXVII.

It is said that it is better to be envied than pitied; this is matter of opinion. Envy is too nearly allied to the more hostile feelings of our nature as not to be considered a tax upon our happiness. It is the consideration we pay for that which others do not share in common with ourselves.

LXXVIII.

Pity is the link that binds the poor man to the rich,—him that rejoices to him that weeps. If it make not the poor man as rich as ourselves, it is, nevertheless, always graceful and seldom unwelcome.

LXXIX.

Books, that is, reading, is so far from being a substitute for society, that it only renders it still more indispensable—still more imperatively necessary. Now we all know from experience that a current of ideas is continually passing through our mind, and to give vent to them, either by speaking or writing, becomes a positive want of our nature ; this want becomes, of course, more urgent in proportion as we increase the stock of our ideas or fund of knowledge we may have acquired by education (or any other means.) I believe it to be as natural to man to be continually talking as to be continually thinking ; and this would, I have no doubt, really, in a great measure, be the case, were it not for those various considerations in social life which impose a restraint on the free and undisguised interchange of thought : hence it happens that solitary confinement, which forbids all intercourse with our species, after a time becomes insupportable to human nature, and often ends in insanity, man not being able to bear beyond a limited time

the oppressive weight of his own unemployed thoughts, unprofitable alike to himself and others: hence we may often hear those, who are much alone, talking to themselves, which, in other words, is only thinking aloud: hence it is that many hail with delight the return of bed-time, in order that they may unburthen, as it were, their minds in sleep; whilst others again have recourse to a less harmless narcotic in the pleasures of the pipe or the bottle. To the same cause, also, may be attributed the habit we may have observed in some people, when alone, of humming over to themselves some favourite and familiar air.

LXXX.

All philosophers who have written on the subject of duelling, have fallen into the error of supposing it to be an expedient resorted to for the purpose of proving our courage, or at least of avoiding the imputation of cowardice. Now this is not the light in which we ought to view it, for it is well known that mankind by nature are all equally courageous, or, rather, that nature has made us all equally fearful; nor can it be denied that if we were

cowards before, an hundred duels would not make us otherwise. Depend upon it *fashion* has more to do with duelling than is generally supposed, especially as we find the practice only to exist amongst those classes of society who are more especially under the influence of fashion ; and, be the custom good or bad, legal or illegal, I should not, I must confess, augur well of that state of society* in which the practice was not found to exist. Do what we may to extirpate it, though it sometimes, indeed, may be attended with results which we cannot do otherwise than deplore, public opinion will ever be found ready to lend its “ still small voice ” in approbation of what it is inclined to look upon as a venial offence ; and, indeed, who is there that can do otherwise than feel respect for him who is ready at any time to put his life in jeopardy rather than do or *suffer* any thing which may be

* Duelling has been called a barbarous custom, which existed only in a state of comparative darkness : in this opinion I cannot entirely concur. I conceive, rather, duelling, as it is *understood* and *practised* in the present day, to be full as much a proof of improved civilization as it is of man's degeneracy.

considered derogatory to the name of a gentleman?

LXXXI.

What shall we say of education? It has no definite meaning, and therefore we cannot argue upon it as a thing in the abstract;

* I have given the subject deep consideration for years, and on no subject have I been more perplexed in endeavouring to arrive at a conclusion satisfactory to myself. It has been considered a "necessary evil:" now, in my opinion, it is neither an evil (at least an unmixed one) nor is it necessary, or, if an evil, certainly not necessary. On the contrary, I believe it to be an unnecessary good. One point, however, has always struck me most forcibly—unless it can be shown that the redress which is desired cannot be obtained unless one of the combatants forfeit his life, or at least receive some bodily harm, then if death should ensue after but not in consequence of the first exchange of shots, the offence should in all cases be murder. It may be said that by the laws of England it is so already; but then, I ask, is it always acted upon as such? Now if such a rule were never deviated from, if it did not tend to abolish duelling, it would at least abridge it of its worst consequence—loss of life; and in that case death on the field would rarely ensue except in gratification of a spirit of revenge.

we can speak of it only in general terms. If it be a necessary good, it is often strangely misapplied—if a necessary evil, it is open to innumerable exceptions. When we consider the number of years that are employed in our education, and the no inconsiderable time we voluntarily employ in educating ourselves—in other words, in acquiring experience, and disabusing ourselves of errors and mistaken opinions we may previously have contracted—what a very small portion of our life can be calculated on as applicable to any practical purpose; and when we consider that, long as our life may be, we never can know every thing, life itself would appear to be a sort of emporium of learning, a university not limited to age or sex, a state of progressive improvement from beginning to end. But education, after all, is only a means to an end, and can only be judged of by its effects on the individual and on society at large, and this must depend on the use we may make of it. If we were only taught in our youth those branches of education which we showed the

greatest disposition to learn, and in which, consequently, we were likely to attain the greatest proficiency, what a saving would there be both in the quantum of time and expense which is now appropriated, and often too, uselessly, to the purposes of education.*

LXXXII.

Talents and genius, which are only called

* A certain Italian nobleman is said to have denied to his sons the benefit of an education, and, no doubt, was prompted to so unusual a course by the most conscientious motives. However plausible his reasons may have been, he at all events proved himself deficient in judgment; because, even assuming education not to be a *necessary* good, there are always more reasons *for* it than *against* it: if it have no other use, it has, at least, the advantage of diverting us from sensual pursuits. Man, as a physical being, is *stationary*—he is the same to day as he was yesterday, and the same yesterday as he was the day before, whereas the mind is in a state of perpetual progression; nor can any conceivable limit be assigned to the extent of her march—no period marked out for the termination of her course; nor can we imagine any possible obstacle to arise to intercept her in her onward path of intellectual improvement.

forth by circumstances, can never be taught or acquired by education—they are an original gift of nature. Newton would not have been less a philosopher without the advantages of education.

LXXXIII. .

We can scarcely be called happy in our own estimation, at least until we have attained the object of our pursuit, whatever it may be; but the object being once obtained, our happiness no sooner begins than it ends.

LXXXIV.

Beauty is not necessarily beauty—that is to say, it does not follow that the idea of beauty in the mind of one man should correspond with the idea of beauty that may be entertained by another. It is the vision that is stamped on our brain in the delirium of a fever, which is seen by ourselves, but invisible to others—it is an image of the mind that is felt but cannot be described; there are no data on which we can ground a definition of it; it is purely a matter of taste.

LXXXV.

The love which an individual may feel for another is a mighty lever, and in our dealings with the other sex seldom fails of success ; but the love that an individual may feel for himself is a mightier still—it is the only argument or record which has never been known to have been appealed to in vain.

LXXXVI.

The principle of gravitation, which is said to have been discovered or rather suggested to Newton in consequence of seeing an apple fall, was one of the greatest triumphs that ever was achieved—not a triumph over falsehood, error, or ignorance, because every one knew before that the apple always fell downwards, as we knew that it did not go upwards. We did not reason upon the phenomenon indeed, nor did we draw any inferences or any deductions from it, nor apply it to any practical purpose ; but the fact, as an universal law of nature, as an everyday occurrence, like the smoke ascending upwards, was not the less known to us,

though it remained for Newton to institute an inquiry into the relative connexion between cause and effect, and to argue from particular causes to general effects. The discovery, then, of the principle of gravitation was a triumph over what? It was a triumph over the all but irresistible power of habit—not any physical habit, but the habit of thinking, or rather of *not* thinking,—the next to impossibility of breaking through, as it were, a certain accustomed train of thought. It certainly was not the effect of perseverance or laborious research, whether or not it may be called intuition, or the apparently preternatural agency we call inspiration. Such was the merit of Newton (but not more merit than had he who first discovered the revolution of the earth round the sun) in discovering what is called gravitation, or the tendency of all bodies towards a common centre, or rather, perhaps, in discovering that the same principle that regulated the fall of the apple, combined indeed with others, was the universal principle of motion and order in the physical world.

For gravitation itself, like all the other laws of nature, had its existence since the creation of the world, and after all it is not so much a matter of surprise that Newton made the discovery when he did, as that it had never been discovered before.

LXXXVII.

The great secret of enjoying health and peace of mind is as far as is possible to avoid every occasion of undue excitement, whether of joy, grief, hope, fear, or any other passion of our nature; for joy, hope, love, and the like, if allowed too great an ascendancy, are not less, perhaps even more, pernicious to the health than the influence of passions of an opposite and depressing nature; but this is better effected by mixing in than by avoiding society—by facing the enemy than by flying at his approach. We cannot ascertain, until we have made the experiment, that our very interest renders necessary the government of the temper and feelings, and the due regulation of the passions. By

avoiding society and retiring from the world, (though such a course can scarcely be reconciled, except in a case of urgent necessity, with the duties we are bound to perform,) the same end, it is true, may be obtained, but obtained at too great a cost—we are exchanging only a less for a greater evil—the remedy would be worse than the disease. Be it remembered, also, that it is an easy matter to retire from the world, but, once retired, it is next to impossible to return.

LXXXVIII.

Women may, at least, compete with men in the exercise of the passive virtues—they have far more patience, forbearance, and endurance; hence it is that, indispensable as are women on all occasions to the wants and comforts of man, it is in illness that they shine pre-eminent.

LXXXIX.

Animals never eat except when they are actually hungry, and always then if they have the wherewithal to satisfy their appe-

tite. Man, who boasts of his superiority over other animals, in this respect at least, does not act so rationally as the brute creation. He sometimes denies himself food when he feels the greatest inclination for it, but more frequently sits down to his meal without any appetite to enjoy it, and with the certainty of not being able to digest it; and as often as not are we in the habit of eating for no other reason than because the hour may have arrived when we think we *ought* to feel hungry.

XC.

Men that set themselves above the reach of public opinion, are either too good or too bad for this life, and in either case may be considered outcasts from society.

XCI.

Take away public opinion, what becomes of fashion?—It withers, fades, and dies for want of an atmosphere to live in congenial with itself; but it may be said, those who generally are most alive to the influence of public opinion often disdain to follow the fashion. The truth is, they are not ~~less~~ alive

to public opinion, but they are courting it at the very time in some other shape.

XCII.

I do not profess to inquire how far mankind has been a gainer by the institution of society—how far the sum of human happiness may have been increased since the introduction of civilization as compared with a state of nature. Whatever difference of opinion may exist on the subject, whatever evils may be avoided in the one, or good obtained in the other, certain it is that human nature is such, that perfect happiness in either state is unattainable. In favour, however, of a social state, it must be admitted that if the number of our senses are not increased, physical and sensual enjoyments at least are not diminished; many of them, indeed, by the ingenuity of man, are capable of affording a greater degree of pleasure, and if society give rise to and engender some vices, and call into existence the baser passions of our nature, such as avarice, ambition, pride, envy, &c. not to mention those diseases which are unknown,

or at least more rare, in a state of nature—not to mention the evil arising from luxury and intemperance, and the misfortunes of poverty and distress, to which may be added the catalogue of penalties annexed to the commission of certain acts against society;—it is, at the same time, the parent of all the virtues, and there can be no doubt moreover that to it we are indebted for the extraordinary developement of the human faculties, and the triumphs of science and of art, the fruits of the industry and ingenuity of man; every thing, in short, that exalts and dignifies our nature, and raises us in the scale of the animal creation. Without attempting to draw any comparison between the two states, all I am contending for is that self-interest* is

* I doubt not the philanthropy of individuals, but I contend that no system of society can be formed which has not for its basis *self-interest*. It is a mockery to think otherwise—as soon as man loses sight of that benefit which did or might accrue to himself in any given social system, from that moment he would return to a state of nature, whence he came, where, if he did no good, he at least would have no temptation to do harm. When a man offers us the newspaper after he has digested it to his heart's content, he undoubtedly renders us a

in all cases the ruling passion with man, and is the spring and motive of all his actions, and that every one, in becoming a member of society, expects to be benefited, aye, personally benefited by the change; that it is no less, or scarcely less, the real though not the ostensible motive of all our actions, after being civilized, than it would be were we to return to our primitive condition. If there be less violence committed in a state of society, there is more fraud. If society and civilization contribute to the comforts and conveniences of life, it also, on the other hand, multiplies our wants, which are so many evils, unless we have the means of gratifying them. If society supplies us with many medicinal remedies, we cannot but charge it, at the same time, with being itself the author of many diseases, not to mention those fractures, accidents, and casualties, which are unknown, or, at least, more rare in a state of nature. The object then, and end

service, and we have no more right to ask him why he did not offer it before, than we should have had a right to complain had he not offered it at all. This is an exact illustration of the principle on which society is founded.

of society is not, strictly speaking, the happiness of the community at large, but rather the greatest possible degree of happiness or interest (for they may be considered synonymous terms,) of each individual, as far as it is compatible with the happiness or interest of others. Such, however, is the imperfection of all human institutions that with all the advantages which society affords, we must not feel surprised if virtue often go unrewarded, and acts of positive injustice occasionally committed.

XCIII.

Punch (say the French) is a mixture of contradictions ; there is sugar to make it sweet, lemon to make it sour, brandy to make it strong, and water to make it weak. So it is with life—it is neither uniformly happy, nor uniformly unhappy, but a mixture of ingredients of different and opposite qualities.

XCIV.

What is life, or in what the principle of vitality consists—whence the sense of feeling,

the origin of motion—the principle of propagation, the very act or process of growing (imperceptible in its progress to the human eye, though continually travelling to its appointed end), during a certain period, and then the commencement of gradual decay ; the attaining a certain height and dimensions, the limits of which we can neither exceed nor reduce ; and above all the nature of those intellectual faculties with which all living animals are in a greater or less degree endowed, and which develop themselves exactly in the same ratio with the physical or animal part of our being, and are improved by cultivation, as the latter is strengthened by exercise ;—are questions not easily explained, and probably placed out of the reach of our intellectual faculties. All that it is permitted to us to know for certain, is the fact of our existence, and that we are endowed by nature with certain faculties and capabilities necessary to our preservation as well as to that of the species—adapted to our wants, and calculated to answer the purposes of our existence.

XCV.

If a special argument in favour of divine benevolence cannot be drawn from the actual existence of flowers, inasmuch as they may be applied to medicinal purposes, we at least can assign no other reason for the endless variety of them differing, as they do, one from the other in form, size, and colour, and some of which, such as the rose, and the violet, appear to be created for no other purpose than to administer to the gratification of our senses.*

XCVI.

Health, it is true, we cannot enjoy without life, but the latter is only a sort of *substratum* to the former — an indispensable something, like the canvass which is essential to a painting ; or the words which form the

* Madame De Stael speaks of the apparent inutility of music as an instance of the gratuitous goodness of Providence ; in this assertion I do not concur, because, in the first place, music is not useless, more especially since its application to the cure of insanity, nor is it, in the next place, a natural production.

subject of an opera; but life itself is of no more value without health, than the useless bowl after its contents are exhausted. Without health life is not desirable, a gift not worthy of our acceptance. Health is the object and end—life only a pre-existing state that is necessary to adapt the means to the end: health in another point of view is the effect, be the cause what it may; life only the means or instrument without which it cannot be obtained, like the key which can scarcely be said to open the door though the lock would be useless without it. In the same manner, the fire that warms us pre-supposes the existence of a coal-mine, which but for the heat it produces would be useless and unproductive matter. Such then is the relationship that exists between life and health—the one without the other is, as it were, a horse without a bridle—a carriage without wheels—a ship without its crew—a house without a chimney—a field without its produce.

XGVII.

Most of our greatest discoveries in the

physical and intellectual world have been the result of *accident*—they may, indeed, have subsequently been improved upon and applied to the practical purposes of life, yet we could not honour the memory of those who first made such discoveries, more than we do, had they laboured all their life with the view and design of promoting the best interests of society.

XCVIII.

True honour is that which refrains to do in secret what it would not do openly, and, where other laws are wanting, imposes a law upon itself.

XCIX.

Relatives are not necessarily our best friends, but they cannot do us an injury without being enemies to themselves.

C.

To err on the side of feeling and humanity is never a disgrace.

CI.

Nature, in the distribution of her gifts, has in some instances bestowed too much sensibility, in other instances too little; in either case, if it amount not to a positive disease, there is at least a departure from that balance and equipoise which constitutes the true standard of health; but if the due proportion be not attainable, it were surely better to have more than to have less than our share of sensibility. In the one case the chords of life may be too much relaxed, and in the other wound up to that degree of tension as to be deprived of their wholesome elasticity; for, were I deprived of that capability of feeling, that zest of being, that keen relish of life which is enjoyed only by the gifted few,—were I doomed to exist only as a walking automaton or a piece of intellectual mechanism—I might indeed wind my unobtrusive way through the world with greater but not more enviable security;—I might be proof, to be sure, against a thousand calamities, I might escape perhaps many of those troubles and vexations in life which derive their chief

magnitude from our feelings being of too high a polish, and from our imagination, which may judge of everything by itself; but, compared to such a state of apathy and death-like inanition, such a state of insipidity as must be the life of him whose soul is a stranger to those emotions which raise us above the common level of animal existence; compared, I say, to such a state—why, it were delightful to tempt the dangerous precipice, to invite the cannon's roar, to “ride the whirlwind and direct the storm,” to battle with the mountain wave on the troubled ocean of life. Excitement, in some shape or another, were comparative happiness at least, if not a positive luxury; it were a relief from that dead calm which affects to imitate but is not repose; or if it be, it loses more than half its charm from the want of being contrasted with what alone gives a relish to our enjoyments—it were, at all events, a change, and any change were sometimes grateful even though it were a change for the worse.

CII.

Let there be as many fires in a house as

there are chimneys, or it were better to have no fire at all, for in making only one of the rooms warmer, we render all the others doubly cold. The economist too may reconcile to his conscience the apparent prodigality in the reflection that so many small fires are after all no more than equal to one large one, as a pound of sugar, when broken, costs no more than the same weight in gross. Sudden alternations of heat and cold cannot be otherwise than injurious.

CIII.

If I have at times been disposed to cavil at the formation of society, and to regret the imperfections and evils which perhaps necessarily affect every human institution, I shall be immediately reconciled to my change of condition, (from a state of nature) on reflecting—nay but for a moment—on the protection afforded me by society during the helpless and defenceless state of sleep. To be able to lie down in our bed after the fatigues of the day without feeling any anxiety or apprehension of danger to our person or property is one of the blessings which belongs to civilization alone.

CIV.,

The influence of the press is tremendous, and the more so, because what it contains comes in an oracular form from an unknown and invisible quarter. It is the secrecy, which, whilst it enables the author to write with greater freedom, makes at the same time a greater impression on the imagination of the reader. On more occasions than one I have entertained as many opinions on any given subject as I have read journals by which respectively it was discussed, and have invariably been convinced by the last that I have read, and for no other reason than because it was the last. It is this variety of opinion on any given subject, whether sincere or not, which enables us, on reflection, to arrive at a just conclusion, and thus, by paring the talons of the press, to render it, as a whole, comparatively harmless and impotent to mischief.* So long as the

* The only occasion on which I recollect a similarity of political sentiment to have existed on the part of all the principal journals was during the short administration of Mr. Canning, which led to a belief that the press had

press is permitted to take its eagle-flight as far as thought can reach, and to explore unmolested the inexhaustible regions of knowledge and truth, it matters not in what direction she may go or who may be the companions of her voyage; for let an opinion be advanced, let it be ever so injurious to the interests of society, it will no sooner have made its appearance in the world (I speak of politics especially) but it will be neutralized and strangled at its birth, and driven out of the field by an opinion of an opposite tendency, and thus an antidote will always be found to counteract the effects of any poison that may have been propagated; and truth itself, which is eternally the same, has nothing to fear from the operation of conflicting opinions. She lies upon her quiet bed like a sparkling gem at the bottom of the sea, whilst the surface of the element that forms her gentle covering has perchance been agitated by many a naval conflict. Perish

been bribed. The heterogeneous materials of which that administration was composed, were sufficient, perhaps, to account for so unusual a circumstance.

the press, perish England ! So deeply rooted is the love of political or civil liberty in this country, that it were as easy to stop the Ganges in its course as to attempt to shackle this great mouth-piece of intelligence. It is the telegraph that makes the " still small voice" of poverty and distress be heard at the remotest corners of the earth, and conveys the tale of misery from the poor man's cot to the abode of royalty and the palaces of the rich; the tribunal that administers impartial justice to the rich and to the poor, and affords a wholesome check to the otherwise irresponsible exercise of power. We may succeed in shackling it for a time, but the great stream of knowledge will only overflow its banks the more, and, like the current of a water-mill, will only acquire a greater momentum from its being pent up in a narrower channel. Setting at defiance the puny attempts that are made to interrupt her in her progress, and disdaining, as she does, to be tried by any other judge than wisdom resulting from experience, she soars majestically beyond the reach of human laws, and challenges every jury other than that which

is composed of the congregated good feeling of the country.

CV.

Revolution is never a present good nor always a future blessing.

CVI.

If time be "the enemy," what must eternity be?

CVII.

There is a species of fearlessness which may be mistaken for courage, and which arises from the ignorance or inexperience of danger, not danger in general, but some specified or particular danger. The nerves of the soldier, for instance, are stronger in the first action he may be in than the second, although in every subsequent action he may gradually regain his original courage.

CVIII.

To be a slave to the opinion of the world is one thing; to take it at a fair valuation is another.

CIX.

The object of society is to promote the happiness of each individual, provided it be not inconsistent with the happiness of others. It is very possible, however, for the happiness of both parties, that is, the individual and the public at large, to be promoted by one and the same act, as may be exemplified by the reduction of a tax which, whilst ostensibly the individual only is benefited, produces not unfrequently a more ample revenue to the government.

CX.

That life, on the whole, is productive of more happiness than misery may, in addition to other evidence of a more conclusive nature, be inferred from the undoubted fact that the latter in general makes a much greater impression on our feelings at the time and on our memory for the future. This would not be the case were it not that we are more accustomed to one than the other, and is a satisfactory proof that the good we enjoy preponderates over the evil we endure.

CXI.

Life is desirable, were it only for the sake of enjoying those sensations of calm*repose, when man feels at peace with himself and all the world besides; sensations such as these, though "few," indeed, "and far between," while they are the best criterion of sound health, constitute real happiness, for being generated by no artificial or extraneous cause, they leave no alloy and are followed by no re-action, nor are they, for a moment, to be confounded with the deceitful smiles of pleasure.

CXII.

Amusement is always occupation, though occupation is not necessarily amusement.

CXIII.

We go to bed because we choose it, we go to sleep because we cannot help it.

CXIV.

In matrimony indifference is impossible—
if we cannot love we must hate.

CXV.

To be able to propagate beings of either sex at pleasure would undoubtedly be an important accession to human knowledge, and gratifying to the pride of man ; but were mankind possessed of this power, it is easy to foresee that the purposes of nature might possibly be defeated ; and thus is afforded an additional proof of the wisdom of Providence.

CXVI.

Nothing can be more contrary to every principle of good government than to take the law into our own hands ; and yet, in the common occurrences of life, how often it happens that we have no other alternative.

CXVII.

The most influential man, in a free country at least, is the man who has the ability as well as the courage to speak what he thinks, when occasion may require it.

CXVIII.

War is undoubtedly an evil in itself, but it

is a necessary condition of society. In civilized countries, it is no longer the effect of impulse and feeling, but is a matter of reason and calculation. It may be considered, indeed, as a science founded on certain rules and principles, or, at all events, a game in which there is more skill than chance. So far from being in all cases unjustifiable, it is often expedient and sometimes inevitable.

CXIX.

A genius for music is as much a gift of nature as a genius for poetry. In either case the human will appears so little concerned in giving birth to our ideas, that they appear rather to be the effect of inspiration; and there can be no doubt but the best productions, either in music or poetry, have been extemporaneous and unpremeditated effusions.

CXX.

Men seldom marry the object to whom, at some period of their lives, they have been most attached—and women still more rarely.

CXXI.

Courage is in a great measure the effect of constitution, but still more of habit—courage, that is, in the legitimate sense of the term, because there is a sort of factitious courage, an *exotic* as it were, transplanted and naturalized in society, and which is nothing more than the fear of being thought afraid.

CXXII

There is nothing so absurd and unreasonable in itself as may not be reconciled to our minds by the magic influence of fashion; whilst, on the other hand, there is nothing so reasonable as may not become ridiculous if it receive not the sanction of the same omnipotent chief.

CXXIII.

The enjoyment of good health is no otherwise valuable than as a means to be employed in the attainment of ulterior objects.

CXXIV.

Happiness is the sun of the moral world, that never ceases to shine, and shine too, like its archetype in heaven, with an equal degree of splendour during every part of our life, though ever and anon it may be eclipsed by a passing cloud.

CXXV.

Perhaps there is no occasion on which the condition of the rich and the poor is more on an equality than in the event of losing those that are dearest to them; or rather, the rich man has in this respect no advantage over his poorer neighbour. It may be said, indeed, that the rich are no less exempt than the poor from pain, sickness, and disease; this is true; they are no doubt equally liable to the same infirmities; but on the other hand we must recollect that, in the event of illness, the former enjoy in a greater degree the means of procuring assistance, and in all probability sustain no pecuniary loss from the interruption it may occasion to their daily avocations—but with regard to the loss

of friends, it is common to both alike, and the blow falls with no less severity on the one than it does on the other.

CXXVI.

Of all the wants of our nature, the most urgent and irresistible is that of sleep. We can exist longer without food than we can without sleep.

CXXVII.

In accepting a favour, the man of tact will appear to confer an obligation. On other occasions, when he in reality confers an obligation, he will appear himself to be the party obliged.

CXXVIII.

Love is so far from affording the best security for matrimonial happiness, that there are but few instances where, sooner or later, it is not diminished; still fewer where it is increased; too many where it is totally extinguished; and not a few where it is changed into positive and incurable dislike.

CXXIX.

Honour, in the conventional sense of the term, is a paper-currency, not without its use to society, though it possess no intrinsic value.

CXXX.

We can but be happy, let the cause of our happiness be what it may; and he who is happy, aye, though it be but for a time, during that time at least has attained all the earth can give, and Heaven can give no more.

CXXXI.

Can we be surprised, or rather can we reasonably complain of the selfishness of human nature, when society itself is built on no other basis than the principle of gaining more than we lose—of giving up part of our natural rights in order to enjoy the remainder in greater security? In short, what is society but a combination of separate, and frequently of opposite interests,

kept within proper control, and made subservient to the good of the whole ?

CXXXII.

Popularity should be the effect, and not the cause and motive from which our actions spring.

CXXXIII.

There is said to be "honour amongst thieves." This is, undoubtedly, true; and virtue on a graduated scale is often found to exist amongst those who are supposed to be lost to all sense of shame. It does not necessarily follow that those are without virtue, whose opinions and practices do not happen to correspond with our own. In a word, there is no one so abandoned as totally to disregard the opinion of his particular caste or daily associates, however indifferent he may be to the opinion of the world in general.

CXXXIV.

Sleep is one of the greatest luxuries in

life, and a luxury moreover that costs us nothing.

CXXXV.

Women are more bashful than men ; but there is as much modesty in one sex as in the other.

CXXXVI.

Were we eye-witnesses of but half the misery (although I believe all evil, both moral and physical, to be directly or indirectly of our own creation) that exists in the world, it would be sufficient to embitter the rest of our lives, not only with the pain that would be excited in us from beholding the misfortunes of others, but also from the apprehension we should feel that the same misfortunes might befall us.



CXXXVII.

Matrimony was invented, in no case, for the benefit of the parties married, but, in a general sense, for the benefit of the state ; and, in a particular sense, for the benefit of those (viz. children) who may never exist.

CXXXVIII.

The poor take wine medicinally ; the rich abstain from it for the same reason.

CXXXIX.

An insult is a moral or imaginary injury we are supposed by others to have received, though we may be totally unconscious of it ourselves; being an injury of such a nature as is founded entirely on public opinion: hence it occasionally happens that an insult may sometimes be taken for a compliment, and a compliment misconstrued into an insult.*

CXL.

The more a man is occupied about the concerns of other people, the more time he

* It is the *animus* with which a thing is said or done that constitutes the offence and which can only be inferred from circumstances. A soldier in Napoleon's army was never more flattered than when the latter trod upon his toe or slapped his face; and a private in the Imperial Guard, boasting among his comrades that the Emperor had done him the honour to speak to him on parade, is said to have admitted that the only words which were addressed to him were "damn your eyes."

will find to attend to his own. Whereas, he who is always busy about nothing, in other words the idle man, has seldom a minute to call his own. Paradoxical as it may appear, it is nevertheless practically true, and arises from the necessity there exists for *regularity* in the one case and not in the other; regularity being the foundation of economy no less in time than it is in money.

CXLI.

Where mutual love is not attainable, it may be a question whether, on the whole, it be better to love or be loved. I would say, that both sexes are equally capable of loving, and both may be equally worthy of being loved; but that man is more especially formed to love—woman to be loved.

CXLII.

To love is a positive pleasure; but to be loved by others, (however desirable it may be,) not being a passion of our nature, no more satisfies the soul of man, than it is possible for one individual to partake of a repast with the appetite of another.

CXLIII.

Superiority of any kind naturally begets envy, which is too often mistaken for hatred.

CXLIV.

We are the creatures of circumstance and opportunity ; without them we can do nothing ; but there are few things we cannot do with them,

CXLV.

The fear of Hell* does not operate so forcibly as might be supposed in deterring mankind

* The learned and excellent Paley, himself a dignitary of the establishment, observes, “ It seems most agreeable to our conceptions of justice, and is consonant enough to the language of Scripture,” (and here he quotes several passages in the New Testament, to corroborate his assertion,) “ to suppose that there are prepared for us rewards and punishments of all possible degrees, from the most exalted happiness down to extreme misery.”

“ It has been said, that it can never be a just economy of Providence to admit one part of mankind into Heaven and condemn the other to Hell, since there must be very little to choose between the worst man

from sin, not because we do not believe it, but because we have never duly reflected upon it. The truth of the gospel history is admitted by the world in general on the faith of others. If the truth of Hell, for instance, were in all cases the result of deliberate conviction, the world would soon be turned into a general asylum for lunatics.

CXLVI.

Fire is a sun of our own creation. It is a sun, moreover, the heat of which can be increased or diminished at pleasure or altogether decomposed; whereas the sun, necessary indeed as it is to the well-being of the

who is received into Heaven and the best who is excluded; and how know we, it might be answered, but that there may be as little to choose in the conditions."

Moral Philosophy, vol. i. c. 7. To this may be added, that it is inconsistent with the idea we cannot do otherwise than entertain of the moral government of the universe, to suppose that *perpetual* punishment will, in any case, be awarded to the commission of any human offence—an offence, consequently, which in its nature and effects must be of *limited* duration.

system of which it is the centre, is a perpetual fire that burns as it were both summer and winter, and must, consequently, sometimes be too hot, and at other times not hot enough. It cannot, in short, be modified or adapted to the wants of different individuals, dispersed as they are over different parts of the globe at one and the same time.

CXLVII.

If we should occasionally feel tired of life, we have only to ask ourselves how we have managed to live as long as we have; and by the same rule let us continue to live.

CXLVIII.

How often it happens that we are left to the alternative of choosing between two evils. Happy indeed is he who possesses sufficient discernment as well as presence of mind, on every emergency, to select the less evil of the two.

CXLIX.

The ruling passion of every one, insipid

as life would be without it, is nevertheless a species of insanity.

CL.

It is impossible to combat grief by direct and positive means. It is more generally cured, or at least mitigated, by some other grief supervening in its place, than by any other expedient. In other words, pain is cured by pain, as one pleasure ceases to please when another pleasure succeeds in its place. For the same reason love is the best cure for love, as one wave melts into nothing at the approach of another wave; or, like the stars, which shine not the less by day than by night, though they may be concealed from our view by the more powerful light of other celestial bodies. Above all things, we should endeavour to persuade ourselves, that every thing—every event, at least, over which we have no control—however painful to us it may be at the time, will eventually turn out for the best—nay, the best for ourselves. It is true that such a consideration affords no positive cure. It does not eradi-

cate the evil ; it cannot undo what is done ; nor can it erase from our minds the recollection of the past ; but it blunts the edge of our feelings and will enable us to bear our grief with a greater degree of firmness, patience, and resignation.

CLI.

Acts of omission, depending on the human will alone, are always in our power. And hence the foundation, in every civilized society, of the penal code. Acts of commission, on the other hand, may depend on circumstances over which we have no control.

CLII.

How many are there who, in the matrimonial state, (and sometimes *out* of it,) fall into the fatal error of mistaking indifference, arising, perhaps, only from the effects of protracted intercourse, for positive and personal dislike.

CLIII.

It has been said that more courage is required to refuse than to accept a duel ; and

suicide, which in the heathen world was looked upon as an act of magnanimity, is stigmatised by others as an act of cowardice. Be this as it may, it cannot be denied that the mere act of fighting a duel does not necessarily prove the courage of the duellist ; nor can it make *him* courageous who was not so before. And, with regard to suicide, whilst in some cases it may be considered an act of cowardice, in other cases it is not unaccompanied with a certain greatness of soul ; and, on the whole, is less calculated to draw down our condemnation than it is to excite our compassion.

CLIV.

The wisest of us are only boys at play running after a bubble, which no sooner bursts than our happiness is at end !

CLV.

While courage is generally the effect of habit and experience, there is a negative sort of courage arising from causes directly the reverse, *viz.* ignorance of danger, and instances of which are not unfrequently witnessed in women and children.

CLVI.

It is not every one we should condescend to be offended with, for by so doing it should not be forgotten we place him, whoever he may be, upon an *equality*, at least, with ourselves. We should be above resenting an injury on some occasions, whilst, on others, it may be but due to ourselves to show that we are capable of being offended.

CLVII.

The acquisition of what is not our own, or, rather, the desire of making it so, is the mainspring that sets all the world in motion.

CLVIII.

We acquire wealth not for the sake of being rich, but for the sake of being richer.

CLIX.

It is said that the best way of enjoying peace is to be prepared for war; so the best way of enjoying good health is to live as if we were ill.

CLX.

Poverty and riches are essentially relative. To speak of a man being rich or poor without some standard of comparison, is to count the waves of the sea, or to measure the falls of Niagara by gallons. The pleasure we feel in acquiring rank and fortune always has a reference to something beyond ourselves, and consists, not in raising ourselves, but in lowering others in proportion as we advance in the world ; in the same manner as we are repaid the trouble of mounting to the dome of St. Paul's, not by observing the Heavens, which have the same appearance above as below,—but by looking down upon the Lilliputian world at our feet.

CLXI.

He that sets himself above the reach of public opinion, so as neither to be overawed by its frowns nor encouraged by its smiles, is either too good or too bad for this life. In either case he is an outcast from society ; or if there be any difference, it is that in the one case he is banished against his will, and in the other, like the cloistered nun, he banishes himself.

CLXII.

There are many things, it is true, that are harmless in themselves but may still be inexpedient ; but what is not a crime in one sex can scarcely be deemed a crime in the other ; otherwise this would be making the accident of birth a criterion of right and wrong. Virtue and vice, properly so called, are independent of time, place, or circumstance, and must always and every-where be the same.

CLXIII.

He who in no single instance has been a benefactor to his race, may be harmless indeed, and innocent as a dove ; but society is no more indebted to him for his negative virtue than we are indebted to the gateway that affords us shelter from the storm, though it were designed for other and more useful purposes.

CLXIV.

Many secrets undoubtedly die as such with the party to whom they were confided ; but let a secret once pass the lips of the

original trustee, and there is no security against its further propagation ; but, on the contrary, it will proceed like the descent of bodies in the material world, with a velocity proportioned to the distance it may have travelled.*

CLXV.

Man is more easily crushed by a fly than by an elephant ; by trifles, that is, more than by those astounding and *grandiose* calamities of life, which perhaps appeal more to the head than the heart : is it because the one we conceive to be the work of men's malice, and the other a judgement of the Deity to which we think it a duty to submit ? or is it because a volley of small shot does more execution amongst a covey of partridges, than the more formidable discharge of a cannon-ball ?

“ it Fama per urbes ;
Fama malum, quo non velocius ullum :
Mobilitate viget, viresque acquirit eundo.”

Æneid, l. iv. p. 173.

CLXVI.

With whom did Adam talk before Eve was created, and what was the name of the language in which he addressed her after her creation ; or supposing Eve first to have addressed Adam, how, in either case, was the language learnt by the one and understood by the other ?

CLXVII.

Eve had no right to have it recorded ~~on~~ her monument that she was a faithful wife, for she had no temptation to be otherwise.

CLXVIII.

The wise and humane injunction of the poet, *viz.*

“ Be to her faults a little blind,
Be to her virtues very kind,”

is a general rule with but one exception, *viz.* that we should never apply it to ourselves.

CLXIX.

There may be beings actually in existence

(as we hope may be the case hereafter with ourselves) who may be exempt from even the liability to evil ; and in whom a sense of feeling is, in all cases, a sense of pleasure !

CLXX.

Life itself may be compared to a majestic river that rolls on in an even and uninterrupted course ; but not so with its pleasures, which are, as it were, the shreds and patches, or the grains of gold dust that are intermixed with the sands of our existence ; something that is accidentally picked up on the road-side,—the *hors d'œuvres* or upshots of life ; a landscape more beautiful than usual, or some unexpected dainty that is set before us. Pleasure is rather a circumstance or occasion than a thing of positive and definite existence. It is the spire and pinnacles peeping out here and there as we approach a town. It is the picture we occasionally come to in turning over the leaves of a book. It is the red-lettered day—the additional week to our holidays—the favourite air of an opera—a rose in the wilderness—the woodbine in a hedge-row—good

post-horses when we are in a hurry—bad ones when we are short of money—the fox by the covert-side—the vintage of 1825—twins to the old man—a miscarriage to the poor man.

CLXXI.

We deceive ourselves if we imagine that avarice, or the love of money for its own sake, is the foundation of gambling; for we find the gaming table resorted to by the richest as well as the poorest: and it is preferred to speculations of every other kind, for no other reason than because the road to happiness, or what we suppose, at least, to be happiness, is shorter and easier than any other; that is, it is a mode of attaining our ends at the least possible cost of time and trouble; although the fascination of gaming after all consists in our mind being intensely engaged, and thereby diverted from reflecting on subjects of a less agreeable nature. Be this, however, as it may, we pursue our fatal career until goaded on by losses, or flushed with success, for they operate equally as a stimulus, and what was

resorted to in the first instance as an occasional resource, degenerates at last into a confirmed habit or passion, which, like the love of spirituous liquors, is increased by indulgence though ruin may stare us in the face. It finally becomes, without our knowing why or wherefore, an aliment which is necessary to our existence ; and the victim of so unfortunate a passion allows himself, with his eyes open, to be drawn into that vortex which he knows to have been the grave of so many before him.

CLXXII.

Little did I think that music was capable of exercising such a tyranny over our feelings, until one day as I happened to be loitering with V * * * in the streets of Munich, he gave way, all at once, to a flood of tears, on a certain favourite air meeting his ear—what the instrument might have been I forget—nor did he appear to be the less affected, though it were performed neither in time nor in tune. It matters not in these cases how inharmonious the sounds, —the torch ~~was~~ already applied, it mattered not by whom—it mattered not how rude and

unskilful the hand might be who had thus unknowingly awakened the celestial fire in his soul. The emotions he felt would not have been greater, perhaps not so great, had the air been played in the most finished style, and in strict conformity to the rules and principles of the art. It was neither the instrument, nor the musician, nor the sounds themselves, any otherwise than as they were associated with feelings which were thus awakened in his breast, and were the means of reviving those tender and painful recollections which the softening hand of time had nearly erased from his memory, and causing the wound, which was already beginning to heal, to bleed afresh. So powerful is the association of ideas, so vivid the recollection of past enjoyments! He had spent a fortune early in life, in cultivating and encouraging what he now could no longer endure to hear without pain, and which he avoided as a pestilential disease: so true is it that there is a common point of affinity at which extremes are said to meet; so true is it, that there is a point beyond which it is not lawful to gratify a passion apparently so harmless and innocent as that of music.

Nor could I have believed it possible, had I not witnessed the fact, for any one to have been possessed of feelings of so refined a texture as to have converted into pain that which before was a source of such exquisite pleasure. The images, however, thus recalled to his mind, evidently stood before him like the resurrection of some departed spirit—some form and countenance that once was dear to him, and associated with his most tender recollections; which reappeared only to taunt him with his loneliness and desolation, and to remind him, though but for a moment, of pleasure gone by, and which he was no longer permitted to enjoy—of happiness that never could return, and which, like the broken spell of a dream, only added to his misery by reminding him of prospects which were destined never to be realized, of hopes blighted in the bud, and affections so deeply engraven on the heart that so far from being effaced by the corroding hand of time, they appeared to gather strength with his years, leaving him nothing to desire but the welcome arrival of that last best day, when, if happiness return not, grief at least shall be no more.

" He who hath bent him o'er the dead
 Ere the first day of death is fled,
 The first dark day of nothingness,
 The last of danger and distress,
 (Before Decay's effacing fingers
 Have swept the lines where beauty lingers,)
 And marked the mild angelic air,
 The rapture of repose that's there,
 The fix'd yet tender traits that streak
 The languor of the placid cheek,
 And—but for that sad shrouded eye,
 That fires not, wins not, weeps not, now,
 And but for that chill changeless brow,
 Where cold Obstruction's* apathy
 Appals the gazing mourner's heart,
 As if to him it could impart
 The doom he dreads, yet dwells upon ;
 Yes, but for these and these alone,
 Some moments, ay, one treacherous hour,
 He still might doubt the tyrant's power ;
 So fair, so calm, so softly seal'd,
 The first, last look by death reveal'd !"

* " Ay, but to die and go we know not where,

" To lie in cold obstruction."

Measure for Measure, act iii. scene 2.

These lines are of such matchless beauty, that it is to be regretted that the noble Bard should have condescended to sift the embers of the sixteenth century for one of the most unpoetical words in the English language. Byron, like the Indian who covers himself with

CLXXIII.

Laws are made for the evil, and not for the good. If we were all as virtuous as we ought to be, laws would become a dead letter.

CLXXIV.

True virtue is exempt from any motive of self-interest ; that is to say, it is exempt from fear on the one hand, and the hope of remuneration on the other.

CLXXV.

Many splendid instances of public and private virtue are recorded by historians to the honour of those who lived in an age less civilized, and in times less enlightened, than

shells to adorn his person, was too apt to sacrifice his own judgment to a prevailing mania for imitating those who are gone before us, and a mistaken rage for authorities less authentic, perhaps, than our own. He might have recollected before he referred to his brother poet, that it was not a dictionary he was compiling ; and so inharmonious, not to say ill-applied, is the word, that it is with pain we declare our conviction that, like the fire-stealer from Heaven, he, or rather the reputation of his poem, has in this instance suffered by his own imprudence.

our own. But virtue itself, before the introduction of Christianity, was an obscure and indefinite principle, the nature of which the philosophers and moralists of those times were but ill agreed upon, and for want of a better base to rest it upon, was recommended to mankind for its own sake alone, in consideration of its own intrinsic beauty ;* whereas the virtue of Christianity is founded on the love of our fellow-creatures, and though enforced by the expectation of future reward and punishment, requires, nevertheless, no other recommendation than its practical utility to society.

CLXXVI.

What adds to the value of sleep is that body and mind are simultaneously at rest ; whereas, when we are awake, it often happens that the mind is disturbed when the body is at rest, or the body may have cause to complain though the mind may be undisturbed.

CLXXVII.

Sleep is as essential a part of our exis-

* Το καλόν.

tence as the converse, *viz.* the act of being awake; and, indeed, in some cases it may be considered rather the effect or end desired than a means of obtaining an ulterior end; as death is sometimes more desirable than life, so it were worth while to encounter the labour and anxieties of the day, were it only to enjoy with a greater relish the refreshing respite which awaits us during the hours of sleep.

CLXXVIII.

It is true, no doubt, that in the present age we are enjoying the use of many valuable discoveries and inventions which were unknown to our ancestors, such as the manufacture of glass,* clocks, watches, &c.;

* When we go into an optician's shop, and observe the vast variety of purposes to which glass is made subservient in promoting the ends of science, and in aiding imperfect vision; when we consider, moreover, the power of *reflecting* we are able to bestow on the same material, and its universal application in the shape of windows, not to mention those numerous articles of domestic use which are no less ornamental than useful, and all of which were formerly unknown, we cannot but look upon the manufacture of glass as one of the greatest discoveries of modern times.

and the comforts, conveniences, and embellishments of life may be still further multiplied by future generations, but we have no reason, on that account, to envy posterity, because we can never feel the want of that to which we have never been accustomed, and of which, perhaps, we are incapable of forming any idea or conception. Our ancestors were probably unacquainted with many luxuries of modern invention, but they were not, on that account, less happy than ourselves—So true are the words of the poet,

“ If ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly
To be wise.”

CLXXIX.

Bashfulness has as little in common with modesty as impudence has with courage.

CLXXX.

It is in the power of any one to be fashionable, but it is not in the power of every one to be (what is understood by the word) *genteel*. Fashion is ever varying; is always a robber and a copyist, and never original. Whereas gentility imitates nothing but itself. It is every-

where and always the same, and springs rather from the inward soul than from dress or any other adventitious or external circumstance. Fashion is the ephemeral creature of the day, at whose shrine we kneel with servile subjection ; and so capricious is she, that we have no sooner obeyed one of her laws than it is repealed, and we are called upon to swear the same fidelity to others that may be equally short-lived. Whereas gentility is the amulet that we inherit from our birth—the robe, which, as it cost us nothing at first, so is never the worse for wear. It is a gift of nature—the shadow that follows in our path, and a part, as it were, of ourselves.

CLXXXI.

I have been the slave—but not I alone—of many tyrants in my time. Conscience is a tyrant—conscience that condemns and conscience that approves are equally and indifferently tyrants ; so are all the wants of our nature which we are unable to supply ; so is poverty ; so is ignorance and superstition ; so is sleep—dear sleep !—sleep which

never vanquishes us without our wishing to be vanquished again ; so is woman's love ; so is fear—fear, which we try, though in vain, to subdue ; so is old age ; so is sickness and disease. Other tyrants I could name whom to resist were no less difficult, and to subdue no less impossible, but the most inexorable tyrant of all, and from whose bondage there is no hope of redemption, is—habit.

CLXXXII.

If courage imply danger, it cannot be natural to man, unless it can be shewn that we love danger for its own sake.

CLXXXIII.

If ignorance and credulity be so nearly allied that one is the necessary consequence of the other, then we cannot feel surprised that we may be brought up to believe the most preposterous absurdities. The wonder, indeed, would consist in our expressing any want of belief in the truth of what we are instructed to believe, be it what it may ; for the probability or improbability of any as-

sumed hypothesis must depend entirely on experience, in the absence, at least, of reason ; and how many are there who, after even their reasoning faculties have arrived at maturity, pass through life without caring to exercise them in the investigation of truth. It matters not to our argument whether the parties themselves believe the truth of what they teach, or not believing may nevertheless, from the best of motives, consider it expedient to inculcate what may be, in their estimation, an innocent fraud. It is not in the nature of things for the mind of any one to become distrustful and suspicious before he has been deceived himself or known others to have been deceived, by the testimony of his own senses, or such evidence as cannot be mistaken, than it is possible for us to appreciate the value of health until we have known what it is to be ill ; or be able to distinguish a bad shilling without having seen a good one ; and the infant who has nothing to guide him but his senses, is in the same situation as the dog in the fable, who, for want of experience and the capability of reasoning, lost his dinner by mistaking the

shadow for the substance ; the unsubstantial for that which was real ; the false and erroneous for that which was true.

CLXXXIV.

Sleep should be considered a repast* rather than forming, as it does, an integral part of our existence. Supposing the length of the night to average that of the day the year round, it is evident that we consume just half the short period that is allowed us here on earth, in sleeping or *quasi* sleeping. If we observe the habits of the brute creation, we shall find that they sleep as much by day as by night, and hence I am led to infer that the general practice of appropriating that part of our time to sleep when we are deprived of the light of the sun to be a mere matter of convenience rather than any instinct or desire which may have been implanted in us by nature. The older we grow the less sleep we require, and it is obvious

* That sleep has all the properties of food is proved by some well-attested cases of individuals sleeping several days and even weeks in succession.

that if we indulge in sleep on such occasions, and such only, when nature seems most to require it without regard to time or place, instead of wasting half our life as we do at present, under the pretence of recruiting and refreshing our strength, but more generally of enervating our frame, we might nearly double, for all practical purposes at least, the whole term of our existence, and thus purchase, as it were, with our savings an additional life.

CLXXXV.

The main difference between the poor and the rich is this,—the poor man rests at least one day out of seven—to the rich all days are alike.

CLXXXVI.

Flatter your equals, and they will soon become your superiors: what we add to others is so much taken from ourselves.

CLXXXVII.

There are some people who pass half their life in considering what they shall do,

and the other half in regretting what they have done.

CLXXXVIII.

Selfishness is natural to man ; but wanton cruelty, God be thanked ! forms no part of our nature.

CLXXXIX.

Human nature, like some large pictures, is seen to most advantage at a distance.

CXC.

Noise is occupation ; the roaring of the waves, and even the ticking of a clock, is music to the ear, and lulls us for a time into a forgetfulness of our existence.

CXCI.

To sleep after the wants of our nature have once been satisfied is taking a meal too much ; and hence, I presume, the *dictum* that has become proverbial in our language, viz. that one hour before midnight is worth two hours afterwards.

CXCII.

To promote the happiness of mankind as far as our means and opportunities allow, whilst it affords the best security for our own happiness, is at once a Christian duty, the noblest work in which philosophy can be engaged, and the end of all morality.

CXCIII.

It is not the accident of birth which makes one man a Mahometan and another a Christian, but the *design* of education: an inhabitant of the eastern world educated as a Christian will be a Christian let him live where he may.

CXCIV.

Love is a religion peculiar to itself: like that, indeed, of the Jews, it believes in the unity of the Godhead, and discards all other objects of worship: and while some of its disciples have been allowed to have a foretaste of Paradise in this world, others, rather than abandon their faith, have been doomed to suffer martyrdom in its cause.

CXC.V.

Love is the tempest of the passions, and like the bursting of a cloud, the more violent the storm the shorter is its duration; and the shorter its duration—would that I could say--the *less* violent is the storm.

CXC.VI.

If you wish to raise yourself in the world or bring others down to a level with yourself, be honest. There is no greater *democrat* than honesty: it places a peasant at once on a footing with the peer, if not above his head; because the temptation to be dishonest in one case is less than in the other.

CXC.VII.

Well has it been observed, "*de gustibus non est disputandum*,"—we know as little of taste as we do of the wind. One and both come we know not whence, and go we know not where.

CXCVIII.

Let us look back to past occurrences, and then say whether Providence has not been kind to us; nay, kinder than we are to ourselves.

CXCIX.

Some of our finest exotics have been imported from barren deserts—some of our noblest ideas have been the offspring of an uncultivated mind.

CC.

There is no pursuit in life, be its denomination what it may, other than that of turning to the best account the capital we may possess or acquire; labour and industry, intellectual no less than manual, being capital *par excellence*.

CCI.

So, because we are allowed to sojourn here seventy years or more, we think it a hardship to die. How unreasonable is man! Did the allotted span of human life consist

only of so many days or minutes, so far from thinking it a hardship to die, we should wonder why we lived at all, rather than wonder why we died so soon.

CCII.

It is some consolation to us, as we advance in years, to know that health may be equally enjoyed during every stage of our existence ; our pulse may beat as regularly, though not so quickly, at seventy as at seventeen.

CCIII.

There are as many cowards in the army as there are heroes out of it.

CCIV.

Courage is nothing more than fear under the influence of some stimulant more powerful than itself.

CCV.

The origin of evil has puzzled many a magician ; it will be time enough to discuss that matter when we have discovered the origin of *good*.

CCVI.

The Venus de Medicis, mutilated * as she is, is still the Venus de Medicis ; nor should we idolize her the more were she perfect in all her parts. The Christian religion, disarmed of her terrors, is still the Christian religion ; and if we feared her less, we should only love her the more.

CCVII.

Do you expect others to serve you in thought, word, or deed ? Make up your mind for the worst, and think yourself fortunate if they do you no harm.

CCVIII.

It has been reported of a celebrated diplomatist of the present day, that he has been known to assert that a great man never writes, and has instanced Socrates and still higher authorities as a case in point ; the assertion,

* It is to the mutilated state of the statue when first discovered that the author alludes, the left hand and part of the arm, to the best of his recollection, being wanting.

in my opinion, is not borne out in fact. There appears to be scarcely less reason for their not writing than for not speaking. If it had been asserted that great men never read and are consequently original in any thing they may write, I should not have hesitated to have concurred in such an opinion ; not that they refrained from reading because they thought it a waste of time, but because, in all probability, they were otherwise if not better employed ; and it is on this account I have ever considered it a mistake on the part of statesmen and orators to interlard their speeches so frequently with quotations from other authors, more especially in those languages which must necessarily be unknown to a great part of the public, nor can it be considered otherwise than as an admission, on their part, that others are more capable of illustrating their own subjects than themselves—Demosthenes quoted from no one but himself.

CCIX.

Elizabeth in framing the poor-laws was too good a judge of mankind to leave her sub-

jects at the discretion of those who wear Christianity only on their lips.

CCX.

Money, it is said, is the root of all evil. It may be so; but, paradoxical as it may appear, were money not the root of all good, it could not be the root of all evil.

CCXI.

Human laws may fail us in the time of need, and even be perverted to our prejudice; nor is justice always impartial in her decisions even in those countries where the rights of the subject are best secured; but the law of conscience never deceives us. There is no ground to stand upon, no security, no rest for the sole of our foot, but in the conscientious discharge of our social duties. I might, indeed, have said religious duties, for in effect our social and religious duties may be said to be one and the same: it is impossible to separate them. Our duties do not cease, though we pass the confines of the land that gave us birth; we may get rid, it is true, of some local ties and absolve our-

selves from some fiscal obligations—we may place ourselves out of the pale of our national law, but the wide field of Christianity still lies extended before us. Christianity, like the sword of Empedocles, hangs over our head go where we may, whether we frequent the busy haunts of man, or traverse in solitude the wilds of the pathless desert. Our duties are not limited to those who may be natives of the same country as ourselves, but Christianity enjoins us to do good to all alike, however much they may differ from us in their customs, language, or religion. Our duties, in a word, are no less coeval with the span of our existence than they are co-existent with the globe which we inhabit.

CCXII.

Those who have attained a more than ordinary degree of eminence in the world, it will be found, have had more than an ordinary share of intellect, but less than an ordinary share of the social affections, which, however endearing they may be in private life, disqualify us from figuring in the higher walks of ambition. Look around and you will

invariably observe that those who have been destined to play a prominent part on the stage of life, whether for good or for evil, have betrayed a sort of cold indifference to the more benevolent feelings of our nature, which is any thing but amiable, but most admirably adapted to the prosecution of their own selfish purposes, assuming as it may the name of ambition, and productive as it may be, notwithstanding, of benefit to others. And the influence and ascendancy which those who have figured in the page of history may have acquired in the world has been derived, be assured, from no other principle than that by means of which a team of horses is made to obey a stripling scarcely out of his teens.

CCXIII.

How closely sometimes does vice tread upon the heels of virtue; we might instance the assassination of Cæsar; the act was undoubtedly a violation of the laws, still it was not an unmixed crime—like the colours of the rainbow, which, though different in hue, form but one arch.

CCXIV.

The affections of a woman are too sacred to be trifled with, those of a man are more easily alienated. A bankrupt in one place, he speculates in another ; but a woman, in bestowing her heart, gives us the fee-simple of her affections, and in giving us what cannot be given twice over, she gives us that, which gold with all its power is unable to supply.

CCXV.

Give a woman the choice of power with all its responsibility, or the *use* only of power, in nine cases out of ten she will shew her good sense by preferring the latter—Many a time have I seen a fly ride to market on the same horse as old *Barleycorn*, and return again by the same conveyance, leaving old *Barleycorn* to pay all the expenses.

CCXVI.

Genius which is not directed by judgment is like the electric fluid, which, beautiful and dazzling as it is, is too often

the messenger of harm, and descends upon its victim in the form of a destroying angel.*

CCXVII.

One victory over oneself is worth ten thousand over others.

CCXVIII.

How can the condition of our existence be considered too hard, or how can it be said we pay too dearly for the term of years that has been assigned to us, when, at the expiration of that term, nature requires at our hands, not what she had given us, but what she has only entrusted to our care.

CCXIX.

The history of the world, with all its

* Byron! had thy powers been employed in painting nature as she ought to be, instead of exposing, as thou didst, her naked deformity, nobly wouldst thou have redeemed thyself in the eye of insulted virtue, and thousands of pilgrims would now have been flocking to thy shrine to do homage to a genius of no ordinary stamp.

changes, moral, political, and religious, is little more than a newspaper report of births, deaths, and marriages.

CCXX.

When we say "I am as good as you," we mean, though we dare not avow it, I am not *more bad* than you. Mankind would be found to be much on a par, if all their vices and all their virtues were publicly revealed.

CCXXI.

There are few things more agreeable than to go to bed, and few things less so than to go from it, especially when we take into consideration the "never failing" ceremonial of the toilette.

CCXXII.

Let us do any thing rather than violate a principle which is already established, nor in establishing a great principle ought we to be influenced by personal considerations; for we are conferring a benefit on myriads yet unborn, in whose veins, be it remem-

bered, our blood may still continue to circulate.*

CCXXIII.

By means of the press we are not only enabled to speak to those who are too far off to hear the sound of our voice, but to hold communion with those that are yet unborn.

* A fearful experiment is about to be tried in the gradual abolition of negro slavery: whether the physical condition of the negro may or may not be improved by such a change, is evidently not the paramount object with those who advocate the abolition. To judge of the numerous petitions that have been presented on the subject, it is evident the question has been taken up by many well-intentioned persons with other views and on other grounds. If England so will it that slavery shall exist no longer with her concurrence, then we are bound, as Englishmen, to assist, by all fair and proper means, to carry her resolutions into effect in every part of her own dominions, leaving the force of example to do the rest.

CCXXIV.

There are pleasures in life that are not
 dearly bought,
 Though we pay for them twice as much
 pain ;
 There are moments in life, be they ever so
 few,
 Worth more than all those that remain.*

CCXXV.

A man may always render his own name illustrious ; but there is no name, however associated it may be with honourable recollections, which in itself can confer real dignity on him to whom by accident it ~~may~~ have descended.

* The introduction of poetry into a work of this kind cannot but be considered bad taste ; the author, however, has only to assure his readers that the words fell from his pen as they appear in the text, and he does not see that by any alteration of the words, or transposition of the order in which they follow, he could render the *sense* more clear and explicit.

CCXXVI.

A statesman ought to legislate for the general good, and not for particular interests alone ; for posterity, and not for the existing generation ; or, at all events, not for the existing generation at the expense of future generations. He ought to consider his country as an estate in perpetuity, which he holds in trust for countless generations to come.

CCXXVII.

“ Virtue is its own reward,” says the proverb ; and well for us it is so, because the world is so constituted that virtue is sometimes not only of no use to us, but even sometimes stands in our way ; whilst vice and impudence alone, without the aid of any other pretension, are too often successful.

CCXXVIII.

We lose nothing by death, come when it may, unless after death we retain a recollection of the past.

CCXXIX.

Books (excepting those which form the groundwork of education) should never be resorted to but as a substitute for society ; because it is always in our power to command the one, but not the other.

CCXXX.

In all nervous disorders,—disorders, that is, that originate in moral causes,—diet can do but little for us, and medicine still less.

CCXXXI.

Such is the force of habit that it is easier to learn anything *de novo*, than to unlearn that which has already been acquired.

CCXXXII.

It is the angry passions of our nature, excited by the various causes that grow out of the combinations of society, which are the most formidable enemies to the health of man.

CCXXXIII.

If I meet by accident an individual, whom there is no probability of my ever seeing again, that individual and myself, to all intents and purposes, are, in relation to each other, as much dead as if we had never been born ; or, having been born, as if we were already consigned to the grave.

CCXXXIV.

Our political principles, no less than our religious principles, are seldom the result of conviction. They are sometimes engrafted in us by education, but more frequently descend to us by inheritance.

CCXXXV.

Writing is only a modification of speaking ; or, perhaps, more properly it may be called an expedient to supply the place of the human voice. Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to the origin of language, writing is at least the invention of man ; and has been no less the cause than the effect of 'civilization and intellectual improvement. It

is the art of conversing with those who are absent. It is the power, in short, of communicating our ideas with the pen instead of the voice, and transmitting them through all ages and countries.

CCXXXVI.

As our bodily health cannot be improved from any cause, without producing, at the same time, a beneficial effect on the mind, so we cannot be out of health, without our mental powers being at the same time impaired in a corresponding degree.

CCXXXVII.

There are few who have not occasionally felt within themselves ideas and sensations widely different from those which they felt only a short time before; and those same ideas and sensations again returning, perhaps, in a time equally short, without being able to trace so great and sudden a change in the *morale* to any apparent or ostensible cause; and, therefore, can only be accounted for by some change having taken place in the state of their bodily health, let the

original and primary cause be what it may. Energy, courage, resolution, self-content, satisfaction, cheerfulness, serenity of mind, a sense of calm repose, a disposition to please and be pleased with every thing and every body; good humour, and all those other symptoms which usually characterize and accompany good health, are sometimes exchanged all at once, without our knowing why, for timidity, irresolution, vacillation, infirmity of purpose, anxiety, apprehension, unprofitable regret, diminished hopes, magnified fears, restlessness, petulancy and irritability of temper, and what is worse, an incapacity, perhaps, to amuse ourselves, or be amused by others, which is no uncommon case in the worst stages of any nervous disorder, and other symptoms of weakness or debility too numerous to mention. When we are labouring under any physical malady, we see every thing through a distorted medium. We are no longer masters for ourselves, but the victims of a distempered imagination.

CCXXXVIII.

' As we advance in years, we gradually

become less anxious, less susceptible, less liable to excitement, more calm, tranquil, and composed in our minds. The moral perceptions of man diminish and decay with his physical perceptions ; and that intensity of feeling and impulse, that restless activity, those schemes of worldly ambition, that yearning after novelty and variety, so conspicuous and predominant in youth, give way to a state of mind more consistent with the mellowness of age. In the soft twilight of our latter days, the mind imperceptibly sinks into a state of listless repose ; and the busy scenes of life, as they gradually retire from our view, are beheld by us from the “ loop-hole of our retreat ” with an eye of comparative indifference.

CCXXXIX.

Man is a fungous substance which, to enjoy perfect health, must be continually exuding as well as continually absorbing at all its pores ; receiving and rendering, giving and taking. We exist only by exhaustion and supply, exhaling as well as inhaling. The very act of our receiving

nourishment involves the necessity of our being deprived of it, at least partially so, which again involves the necessity of further supply, and so on in continual rotation ; but of all discharges and secretions, which are incidental to the human frame, there is none of so much importance to our health, and yet none so little regarded, because the least observable, as insensible perspiration ; so called, I presume, to distinguish it from that more profuse, and, consequently, more perceptible perspiration which is occasioned by voluntary exercise, or by the operation of artificial means. Illness and disease would scarcely be known in the world, were it not that the natural exhalations from the skin were so suddenly and frequently obstructed by causes necessarily connected with the practices and usages of society, and almost inseparable from the artificial habits of man in a state of society. It is the sudden transition from heat to cold, and from cold to heat, to which we are so often, and I may say so unavoidably exposed, that proves so fatal to our health, and lays the foundation of those disorders that embitter, and too frequently

shorten our existence. Whereas, on the other hand, many diseases are prevented, if not entirely cured, by the application of those means alone that occasion a profuse perspiration. We cannot go from one house into another, nor out of one room into another; we can scarcely, in short, go fifty yards in any direction without migrating into a different climate, and breathing a different air, which cannot but be attended with consequences more or less injurious to the health. Nor can any other reason (derived at least from physical causes) be assigned for that better state of health, or rather, that state of absolute health, which is so evidently enjoyed by animals in a state of nature—their total exemption from that numerous class of diseases which “human flesh is heir to,”—than the simplicity of their habits in general, but more particularly, the circumstance of their being continually exposed to the influence of a pure and unadulterated atmosphere, of their being constantly and habitually, night and day, at all seasons and all weathers, immersed in that element in which they were

born, and in which nature designed them to live.

CCXL.

There is a tendency to melancholy and despondency in the character of the English, as compared, at least, with our more mercurial neighbours, the French, and which is still further increased by those habits of thought, reflection, and calculation, which so eminently distinguish the former, and perhaps every commercial nation more or less. It gives a colour and tinge more or less to every thing we say and do. Nor ought we to be surprised that our very music and poetry, as well as other productions of genius, should inherit in some degree the same tone and character. So accustomed are we to the grave deportment and serious air of an Englishman, that if we observe any one to enjoy an unusual flow of spirits, or more than an ordinary degree of cheerfulness and gaiety, we may fairly presume that it is forced and assumed; or that it arises from the operation of some exciting or artificial cause.

Whether or no the animal and vegetable world are influenced by the same physical causes as ourselves it is not easy to determine; at the same time I cannot but think that our characters and dispositions in a great measure depend on the nature of the climate, soil, and its natural productions. Other causes, no doubt, may be assigned for those different shades of character and disposition which distinguish different nations one from the other. Much will depend on the nature of their public and political institutions, and, more especially, on the genius and character of the established religion.

CCXLI.

We are so constituted by nature, that it seems ordained that we should travel, in this life, through pleasure to pain, and through pain to pleasure. The same medium (*viz.* our nerves or organs of sense) which communicate the sensation of pain, communicate also the sensation of pleasure; so that if there were no such thing as pain, there could be no such thing as pleasure.

Life, indeed, is a chequered scene, a combination of good and of evil, a combination, if you will, of opposite principles. That much evil exists in the world, is, indeed, but too true ; but of all the evils incident to human nature, the pains of childbirth (setting aside the explanation afforded by the scriptures) have fixed the attention of philosophers of all ages and countries, and given rise to more surmise and speculation than any other we are acquainted with, not only because it would appear to an unreflecting mind, and, indeed, to the most reflecting, with ~~such~~ limited powers as we possess, to militate ~~again~~ against the acknowledged justice and benevolence of the Deity, of which there exist in ~~the~~ the world so many positive and unequivocal proofs, so much satisfactory and incontrovertible evidence ; but because the pains of delivery, unlike to other physical evils, instead of being the effect of a violation or deviation from the laws of nature, arise, as it would appear, from a faithful though involuntary obedience to the very laws she has prescribed. It cannot be denied that the

question is involved in some degree of obscurity, although circumstances of our own creation may tend to aggravate the pain and severity of the ordeal. The luxurious and effeminate habits, for instance, of social life may have a tendency to impair our physical strength, and so far render us less fit to encounter the labours of childbirth; for there is no reason founded on the principles of physiology that affords a ground for believing, that the sufferings of the human species on that occasion must necessarily be greater than other animals, which amongst those that live in a complete state of nature are not considerable, and are no sooner over than forgotten. Admitting, then, the pains of childbirth to be an evil contingent to humanity, (for there is no such thing as evil *ex necessitate rei*,) though it be confined to one of the sexes, I still think we should feel the less disposed to call in question, or to entertain any doubts about the justice, impartiality, and benevolence of the Deity, when we consider that the other sex are liable (and women, so long as they have the power of resisting and

preventing the evil in question, are no more than *liable*) to other physical pains equally and perhaps even more severe;* besides, I will not allow that bodily pain has any thing to do with happiness properly so called, which is the object and design of our creation, and the means of attaining which are equally and indiscriminately imparted to all alike without regard to person or sex. And **after** all I will appeal to mankind in general, **whatever** may be their age, rank, or sex, **whatever** language they may speak, and **under** whatever clime they may have been born; nay, I will appeal to the more unfortunate of the species to which I belong, whether in life, after making ample allowance for the ills to which it may be exposed, be not on the whole a desirable possession—a gift that is worthy of our acceptance; whether, in short, the evil we may occasionally suffer be not far more than balanced by the good we enjoy. Good, then, is the object and purpose of our existence, whereof evil is only

* Nephritic diseases, for instance.

the absence of good ; or rather, let us say, that good is the rule, and evil the exception.

CCXLII.

Private happiness and national prosperity are so far from being the necessary consequences one of the other, that they are frequently found to exist in an inverse ratio.

CCXLIII.

To look back with satisfaction on a life that has been well spent and employed in the faithful and conscientious discharge of our social duties, is one of the prerogatives as it is one of the consolations of old age.

CCXLIV.

The feast of nature is spread before us, and it is our own loss if we do not partake of it; not to enjoy is little short of ingratitude towards the Giver of all good, though to exceed the bounds of moderation is to abuse the favours of a kind and benevolent Providence.

CCXLV.

The more we become acquainted with mankind, the less we see in them to fear and the more to pity.

CCXLVI.

Were it possible for us to preserve a just balance between our hopes and our fears, we should enjoy a state of being very nearly approaching to complete happiness—disappointments would be avoided on the one hand, ~~and~~ despair on the other.

CCXLVII.

There are few who possess the powers of conversation in an eminent degree. The art of conversation, in the present enlightened state of the world, may almost rank among the sciences in which we cannot expect to excel, unless (as must be the case in all other acquirements) we are trained and accustomed to it from our earliest years.

CCXLVIII.

Such is the difference in religious customs,

that whereas suspension of labour and abstaining from all worldly pursuits on the Sabbath day is rigidly enforced by the Protestant Church, actual pleasure and positive enjoyment is a point of conscience with the more light-hearted votary of the Catholic persuasion.

CCXLXIX.

Any gratification of the senses—even the smell of a rose—is favourable to digestion, and so far favourable to health ; nor, on the other hand, can we suffer physical pain of any kind, or in any degree, without our health being *pro tanto* impaired. Pleasure, therefore, may be called the rule of nature, while pain is only the exception, and arising, in most instances, from a deviation from that rule. I am far, however, from contending that the state of our health depends entirely and exclusively on the operation of physical causes, because in a state of society it cannot be otherwise than materially and powerfully affected by the influence of moral or metaphysical causes.

CCL.

If it be admitted that life itself, making ample allowance for the ills to which it may be exposed, be on the whole a desirable possession; if this point be conceded to us, whatever may be the difficulties with which the much-mooted question of the origin of evil may still be surrounded—let the obscurity in which it may still be involved be ever so great—let the different opinions and conjectures entertained by different individuals on the subject be ever so various and dissimilar one from the other; whether the evil to which we are liable, and the frailties, infirmities, and imperfections of our nature may arise from the Deity not being capable to make it otherwise, although his power and wisdom, as far as we can judge of it from the works of the creation, is so immeasurably great that we can scarcely imagine it to be less than infinite, or whether it be a point of the divine economy to govern the universe by general instead of special and particular laws; from whatever cause, in short, the evil may arise, which the limited powers of man, (boundless as is his curiosity,) have hitherto

been unable to discover; one thing, at least, is certain—one truth is established—of one fact we are assured on the testimony of the most undoubted evidence—one conclusion we cannot fail of arriving at, viz. that there is no ground, no reason whatever, in the apparent economy of the creation, for entertaining any doubt of the goodness and benevolence of the Great Author of our being. Whatever misgivings we may entertain respecting his other attributes—whatever surmises may otherwise be suggested in order to reconcile our minds to a state of things which, in some respects, we could wish otherwise; to reconcile us, in short, to the world as it is—whatever evils and misfortunes may befall us in life, it is a source of no little consolation to us to know that no argument can be drawn from reason or natural religion—no evidence deduced from our organs of sensation to lead us to suppose that we are the objects of divine displeasure, that the Deity can have any motive to hate us—any motive to be cruel and revengeful—any motive to wish us otherwise than happy—nor have we any reason to doubt but the object and end of our creation

is our happiness, aye! even in this life. Though fortune frown upon us, though disease and sickness may visit our couch, though the cares and anxieties of life may disturb our rest—we shall be supported in all our trials with a belief and persuasion, nay a clear and decided conviction, (a conviction without which life itself, with all its pleasures, would not be desirable, nay, would be a positive evil; a conviction so much wanted, so desirable, so absolutely necessary to enable us—weak, helpless, and infirm as we are—to surmount all our difficulties, and to console us in all our misfortunes) that God has at heart the happiness of his creatures.*

CCLI.

If there be such a thing in nature as wanton cruelty—a love of cruelty for its own sake not qualified by any motive of revenge or necessity—we should occasionally see animals exercising cruelty, not only towards other animals less powerful than them-

* Vide Paley's *Philosophy*, vol. i. c. 5.

selves and incapable of resistance, but even towards their own offspring; but so far from this being the case, we find animals of the more ferocious kind entertaining the same degree of attachment for their helpless offspring, and rearing them with no less care and attention, and supplying all their wants, as others of a more gentle and harmless disposition, and not unfrequently affording examples of parental solicitude not unworthy of the imitation of the human species itself.

CCLII.

To serve others on occasions when we sustain no loss or inconvenience, is a duty which as men and Christians we are bound to perform; to do less is to do nothing—nay, it is a positive sin of omission. To do more—that is, to serve others at our own expense—is a virtue, which, amiable as it is in theory, is too seldom realized in practice.

CCLIII.

Anxiety is an intermediate state between hope and fear—it is not necessarily an evil though it is generally understood in that

sense, but it will be a source of pleasure or of pain in proportion as hope or fear shall predominate in the scale.

CCLIV.

Love, which it is the custom, or perhaps the policy of society to condemn as a weakness, is, notwithstanding, one of the strongest and most irresistible passions of our nature; and it is the restraint which the exigences of society necessarily impose on the gratification of this passion that occasionally is produced that moral and physical ill which too many of us, alas! have, at some period of our lives, been doomed to experience, and which is unknown among animals whose intercourse with each other is not fettered and controuled by those artificial restraints (restraints to which, it must be admitted, we are in some degree familiarized by habit and education) which are rendered expedient by the wants of civilized life.

CCLV.

The cares and anxieties of life will be felt by us in a greater or less degree in exact

proportion as we enjoy at the time a greater or less degree of health.

CCLVI.

In order to be respected by others, we must learn first to respect ourselves.

CCLVII.

Dignity is as far removed from pride as servility is from condescension and affability.

CCLVIII.

A regard to the preservation of our health supersedes every other consideration. It stands at the head of all our duties, inasmuch as without health we are disabled from performing our duties to others.

CCLIX.

Let us be careful not to confound the use of a thing with the abuse of it. No argument can be drawn from exceptions.

CCLX.

By preserving and defending the customs and institutions of our country, we are pay-

ing to posterity the debt we have contracted with our ancestors.

CCLXI.

Of all those of whom we have any knowledge, there are none less known to us than we are to ourselves.

CCLXII.

It rarely happens that the same individual shines equally as an author and an orator, because the same habits of life, viz. seclusion and retirement, which qualify us for being the one, disqualify us from being the other.

CCLXIII.

The longer we live in the world, the more necessary we shall find it to disregard all that is said in our absence as well as much that is said in our presence. Tenacious as we ought to be in upholding character, an insult is a species of injury so equivocal in its nature and so liable to misconstruction, (as it depends entirely on the *motive* of the party offending,) that we may often err as much in resenting as in not resenting it. It is only

the raw recruit, who, watching an opportunity to signalize his courage, sees an insult in every look, and hears one in every wind that blows.

CCLXIV.

Ignorance is as much allied to timidity as it is to credulity.

CCLXV.

The end and object of conversation is not to prove that A is right, or B is wrong, but mutually to inform and be informed.

CCLXVI.

Possession is the parent of satiety.

CCLXVII.

It often happens that he who envies others is himself the object of envy, and not unfrequently with the very individual he envies. The same is true of pity.

CCLXVIII.

Time is a medicine which is slow in its operation, but sure in its effects.

CCLXIX.

The existence of a Supreme Being is the foundation of all religions, and may be said to be the universal belief of mankind; but scarcely two individuals, still less are there two nations, whose conceptions and notions of the Deity exactly correspond.

CCLXX.

Matrimony is a balance of inconveniences.

CCLXXI.

The physical world is the creation of God —the intellectual world is the creation of man.

CCLXXII.

The law which, in this country, forbids a man from marrying a female from the moment that you may have become united to her sister, affords at least as great a premium to prostitution after the death of the sister as it may have done to chastity during her life.

CCLXXIII.

Short absence increases love—long absence extinguishes it.

CCLXXIV.

There are some persons whose enmity is more to be desired than their friendship.

CCLXXV.

There are some persons who may be too much honoured by condescending to quarrel with them.

CCLXXVI.

To breathe a pure air is more essential to health than exercise; and the beneficial effects which result from the one alone, are often, by mistake, attributed to the other.

CCLXXVII.

With man every day is a new life—with the brute creation life is but one day.

CCLXXVIII.

When we labour under any nervous in-

disposition, we can do little more for ourselves than prevent its recurrence by avoiding, if possible, the causes which produced it.

CCLXXIX.

The difficulty, nay the impossibility, of treating nervous disorders (disorders, I mean, that arise from moral causes) by any other means than alteratives or negative means, arises from body and mind acting and re-acting on each other. The mind is never affected by any circumstance, whether of joy or grief, without producing a corresponding effect on the body, and *vice versa*. Thus, if a misfortune befall us, our health is, *pro tanto*, impaired; and in the same degree as our health is impaired, the misfortune will apparently be aggravated, or rather the impression on our mind will be increased: this again becomes a cause in its turn, and operates in a corresponding manner on the corporeal functions. Hence it is that the same event which makes a great impression on us in illness is scarcely felt in a sound state of health: in the same manner as we

frequently find the same event affect different people in different ways. Considering, therefore, the intimate connexion between body and mind, and that they reciprocally act and re-act on each other, it is no matter of surprise that even the strongest minds, and fortified too by religion, are unable to bear up against some of those severer misfortunes which occasionally befall us; and that insanity, if not death, has occasionally been the consequence. A broad distinction, however, should be drawn between those events over which we have no control, and which are misfortunes, properly so called, and other misfortunes which we may have brought upon ourselves by our own voluntary acts. An ordinary share of philosophy, or reason, will, without much difficulty, reconcile us to the one, whilst I know of no antidote sufficiently powerful to counteract the united effects of misfortune coupled with the sting of self-reproach.

CCLXXX.

The origin of language may be involved in obscurity, and its progress towards per-

fection no less surprising, but it is undoubtedly the offspring of acquisition.*

CCLXXXI.

Power of any kind, in a civilized state, is only a trust delegated for the benefit of others, and for the abuse of which we are morally responsible.

CCLXXXII.

The amputation of a limb, the extraction of a tooth, swallowing any medicine of a nauseous nature, plunging into a cold bath when the thermometer stands below zero, or any act of self-denial, whether moral or physical, is courage as far as it goes, but of that passive kind for which we obtain no credit in the eyes of the world; and for no other reason than because it is without any apparent use to society.

* It is well known that those who are born deaf and dumb are dumb for no other reason than because they are deaf. How then can this fact be reconciled with the hypothesis of speech being an innate gift? besides, the organs of other animals are as fitted to produce sound as those of the human species.

CCLXXXIII.

Property, or rather its representative, money, influential and powerful as it is, cannot purchase every thing. It can neither purchase health, youth, or beauty, nor can it bestow happiness in this world or immortality in the next.

CCLXXXIV.

The love of money, for its own sake, which generally increases with our years, may be traced to the same cause, or rather accounted for on the same principle, as a comparative disregard to it in our youth. Avarice, which is characteristic of old age, is the last twig we catch at in drowning.

CCLXXXV.

The happiness of many consists in representing themselves to others as the unhappiest of their species.

CCLXXXVI.

Health and friends may prove treacherous

and forsake us, but property, if we have any, will stand by us to the last.

CCLXXXVII.

To realize an independence ought to be our first care ; nor ought it to be our last to obtain even more than we want.

CCLXXXVIII.

Command of temper is more easily admired in others than attained by ourselves ; it is our best ally in battle.

CCLXXXIX.

The influence of imagination may not be suited to the practical purposes of life ; but do what we may to regulate and diminish its force, it is a powerful ingredient in the composition of our nature. We cannot entirely subdue it ; nor is it, perhaps, to be desired, because much of our happiness, although not a tittle of our misery, is derived from this source alone.

CCXC.

In a state of nature, the gratification of

our several appetites is the end and business of life. In the social state they are rather to be considered as the means of existence.

CCXCI.

The only difference between public speaking, and speaking in the general sense of the word, is the difference that exists between ninety-nine and a hundred.

CCXCII.

The human mind, except, perhaps, during the hours of sleep, cannot stand still. Like the tide of the sea it is continually in motion, and when unemployed, must, in its very nature, be either anticipating the future, or reflecting on the past.

CCXCIII.

That manure, or the excrements of animals, should supply the means of reproduction is a law or provision of nature no less distinguished for its wisdom than it is for its goodness.

CCXCIV.

If you observe a person to be in good health and spirits, it is presumptive evidence that he is doing what is right, in his own opinion at least—that he is acting, in other words, in obedience to the dictates of his conscience. And, on the other hand, if we always act in obedience to the dictates of our conscience, it is not only presumptive evidence, it is morally certain, nay, it is impossible we can be otherwise than happy; not completely happy perhaps, (for perfect and unmixed happiness is hardly attainable, scarcely, I may say, consistent with the nature of things,) but still he will be—he *must* be happy—happy in a greater or less degree.

CCXCV.

There is a secretion of the mind as well as physical or bodily secretions. The very act of acquiring or laying in a stock of ideas involves the necessity of refunding or discharging them afterwards. Hence it is that solitary confinement, or the being de-

prived of that mutual intercourse which is so essential to our happiness, is found to be a punishment of the severest kind, more difficult even to bear than physical pain.

CCXCVI.

To sleep longer than necessary is like excess in eating and drinking; it not only does no good, but it does positive harm. It is better to be deprived of one hour of our natural rest, than to sleep one minute after the demand of nature has been satisfied.

CCXCVII.

Crying and laughing, which are so many outward signs of our inward feeling, are not acquired, as language is, by habit and imita-

* This circumstance has led many to believe that man, in a state of nature, is a gregarious animal, which is not the fact—the desire of social intercourse being the creation of society; for those tribes and clans which are found to exist in uncivilized countries, are only congregations of individuals united together by the ties of blood, and for the purposes of mutual defence, and scarcely afford a proof of the social disposition of man.

tion, although, indeed, there is something sympathetic in the effects they produce on others; but are rather to be considered as propensities or passions implanted in our nature, and peculiar to the human species.

CCXCVIII.

Confidence is one thing—presumption is another.

CCXCIX.

It is difficult to say which is the greater virtue of the two—moderation and forbearance in victory, or fortitude under reverses of fortune.

CCC.

Nothing so much betrays our want of experience as to expect to succeed in every thing we undertake, or our pusillanimity in not attempting the same thing a second time.

CCCI.

We may have too much health—we may have too little health. There is a medium—

a sort of balance or equilibrium in the human machine, which constitutes health properly so called, arising, perhaps, from all the different parts of the animal machine duly and simultaneously performing their respective functions: in other words, arising from a good digestion; and this again is followed by that regulated circulation of the blood, which is not the cause of good health, but rather the symptom or effect of it. Taking into consideration the number of causes, both moral as well as physical, but more especially moral, which disturb and derange the health of man in his progress through life, I doubt whether any one can be said to enjoy a complete and perfect state of health except at the moment of his birth; and so far from wondering that there is so much disease in the world, we ought rather to be surprised that the stock of human health is as great as it is.

CCCC.

Power is one thing—the exercise of it another.

CCCIII.

Happiness is a relative term, and depends on a variety of causes—hence the difficulty of defining it. On the whole it is more easy to say what is not happiness than what is. Were mankind to be considered only in their capacity as moral agents, I should have no hesitation in pronouncing happiness to consist exclusively in the testimony of an approving conscience; multiplied as our relationships, as members of society, must necessarily be, many other causes may undoubtedly contribute to the happiness of man, still an approving conscience is in all cases indispensable; it is that without which no one can be completely happy.

CCCIV.

There is no point in which a female is more vulnerable than personal beauty. You may apply to her any epithet however opprobrious, and an apology is scarcely necessary: you may even strike her, and, perhaps, she will love you the more (if she loved you at all); she certainly will not love

you the less: but tell her that she is ugly when she knows it to be false, we cannot offend her more, except it be, to tell her so when she knows it to be true.

CCCV.

Never condemn yourself till you have been condemned by the world.

CCCVI.

Mental or intellectual exercise is more wearing and exhausting to the human frame than bodily exercise. We sleep better, and eat and drink with a keener appetite after the mind has been agreeably engaged, than we do after the greatest bodily fatigue.

CCCVII.

So essential is novelty and variety to the happiness of man, that the most delicious and bewitching airs that have ever been composed, the very sounds which used to transport us as it were into a happier world, will by dint of repetition lose their charms and pall upon the senses; and the smell of the

violet itself would soon be forgotten, but for the short time in the year we are permitted to enjoy it.

CCCVIII.

Life is a sort of sham fight, a struggle for priority, a struggle not only for rank, power, and wealth, the ordinary objects of worldly ambition, but a struggle for pre-eminence in some shape or other, let the object be what it may, throughout every class of society, from the highest to the lowest, from our earliest infancy to the latest period of our existence.

CCCIX.

Our health is of too much importance to us to be submitted to the rules of fashion and caprices of society. We ought never to take anything, nor abstain from taking anything that we desire, for the sake of mere custom alone.

CCCX.

There is not a more fertile source of complaint, and at the same time a more un-

reasonable one, than the weather, forgetting as we are apt to do, that the changes in the weather, like the changes of the seasons, are regulated by the laws of nature. Let the weather be what it may, it is never found to give universal satisfaction—it is sometimes too hot, sometimes too cold, there is too much rain for one, too little for another. When we wish to put to sea, the wind is sure to be against us. When we are anxiously expecting the return of a friend from a distant shore, it is the winds that are made responsible for the delay. Thus we absurdly inveigh against the established order of nature, which cannot be otherwise, and which is totally independent of human control. Instead of repining at what we cannot help, it would be wise in us to reflect that the worst of weather, even the storm and tempest though productive of partial ill, is not without its beneficial consequences and effects, that the same degree of heat or cold, the same kind of weather, in short, which is unfavourable to some persons, is favourable to others, in the same manner as the same quality of soil will not produce everything,

nor the same plant be the growth of every climate, but different soils and different climates are found to be adapted to different species of vegetable productions. If we occasionally feel indisposed, not being able to account for it by any apparent or ostensible cause, the weather is sure to be in fault. Nor are we convinced of our mistake until the experiment of a different climate has been tried and too often without success. Let it be observed, moreover, that there is no climate, however bad it may generally be considered, in which animal life is not supported, and the effects of which, however baneful to some constitutions, may not be materially corrected and qualified by regulating accordingly our habits and mode of living.

CCCXI.

The climate of England may not be the best in the world, yet there are many days in the course of the year, many weeks, I may say, when the weather is such as not to be surpassed under any other meridian of the globe.

CCCXII.

Sleep is so identified with health, that one is the necessary consequence of the other, in fact, it may be said to mean one and the same thing, for we cannot be in good health without being capable of enjoying sound and refreshing sleep, and if we sleep well we cannot be otherwise than in good health: the same, it is true, may be said of our physical wants, passions, and appetities, as affecting and being affected by the state of our health; but sleep appears to be a physical want of a nature peculiar to itself,—it seems to have a more powerful influence over us than the other wants of our nature, and to be less under the control of the human will. It is not only essential to our health, but it is as necessary to our support as the air we breathe—it is as necessary a condition of our existence as death itself, of which it is the image and type. We may pass whole days without food and, perhaps, not be the worse for it, but deprive a man of sleep even for a single night, and you deprive him of half his existence.

CCCXIII.

The doctrine of doing as we would be done by, if universally acted upon, (which is next to impossible,)* would prove to be no less politic in practice than it is to be respected and admired as the basis of the sublimest morality.

CCCXIV.

The happiness of an individual depends upon himself ; it can neither be bought, sold, nor exchanged ; it is unalienable and *sui generis*.

CCCXV.

The man of feeling is not fitted to fight his way in the world, and yet sentiment, honour, nay, religion itself, can be called by no other name ; it is not courage or intellectual capacity which are common in a greater or less degree to the brute creation, but the kindlier affections of the heart that exalt and dignify our nature, that

* The instances are very rare where an individual has been known to change places with even his best friend at the moment of execution.

elevate us in the scale of created beings, and in the cultivation of which consists the special purpose, the object, and design of Christianity.

CCCXVI.

We go to church to learn our duty, perhaps rather to be reminded of it.—We come out of church to practise it.

CCCXVII.

The succession of different characters we meet with in travelling by public conveyances is one of the best schools for instruction and improvement. There is no distinction of persons; you are bound to the same port, and the expenses of the voyage are equally divided; all are equally respected, because, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that all are equally respectable. Fortune and rank must be left at home. It is a republic that admits of no inequality, no adventitious distinctions, the master fares no better than his servant, and the humblest and most obscure individual acknowledges no authority superior to his own. We are

all kings, all beggars, all thieves, or all philosophers, as the case may be. It is the olla podrida of society—an intellectual picnic—the emporium of useful knowledge—a moving panorama—the world in miniature.

CCCXVIII.

There is no evil in life (amongst those, at least, over which we have no controul) from which good may not be extracted, and I am bold to assert that we are warranted in concluding that every thing turns out *ultimately* for our advantage, although our limited powers may not enable us to discover in every case the connexion between cause and effect.

CCCXIX.

The mind, like the body, may be injured by excessive rest as well as by excessive labour. Exercise without fatigue is as essential to one as the other.

CCCXX.

In all nervous cases, there is nothing to

be done but to wait patiently the return of departed health—as most assuredly it will return ; we only retard our recovery by attempting to go after it.

CCCXXI.

Instances of strong and mutual attachment are undoubtedly to be met with in the world, but that principle of attraction which, for the wisest and most benevolent purposes, binds the female to her offspring, I consider is the only tie in nature which is incapable of being alienated by time and circumstances, and which is totally devoid of self-interest, inasmuch as it is seldom returned on the part of the offspring, at least, in an equal degree.

CCCXXII.

If we meet with any individual in society for whom we cannot entertain the same respect as for others—let us, in the true spirit of Christian charity, regard him as an exception to the general rule, instead of prejudging others by so fallacious a criterion.

CCCXXIII.

Civil liberty is rational restraint.

CCCXXIV.

Ill health is premature old age.

CCCXXV.

There is something exceedingly exhilarating in travelling, more especially by a public conveyance, provided, however, the journey be not too long to become tedious. The society—the ever-changing landscape—nay, the very music of the wheels, not to mention that freedom from all care and responsibility which must necessarily, in some cases, be so great a drawback to the pleasures of travelling—all contribute to divert the mind and elevate the spirits; nay, the very noise is companionable, to which may be added the benefit that must infallibly arise from sailing, as it were, through a current of pure and unadulterated air, and changing the climate every step we go. Such a mode of travelling is flying from one place

to the other without even the trouble of moving our wings.

CCCXXVI.

If power be entrusted to us, (and in no case is it other than a trust,) let us govern, if possible, rather by the influence of love than by the influence of fear, but govern by what means we may, to govern well we ought not to appear to govern.

CCCXXVII.

Human nature is such that we cannot be governed by any principle so powerful as that of self-interest. Religion itself soon ceases to influence our conduct were it not for the doctrine of a future state — were it not, in short, for the appeal thus made to the passions of hope and fear; for how can we have a greater personal interest in any thing than that of attaining, on the one hand, everlasting happiness, or avoiding, on the other, everlasting pain.

CCCXXVIII.

Whenever we feel the time hanging heavy

on our hands, and are at a loss to know how to get through the day, we have only to ask ourselves how we have managed to get through so many days—nay, so many years that are past, and by the same rule let us continue to live.

CCCXXIX.

There are many who are at a loss how to dispose of their time, though there are few who are not anxious to prolong the natural course of their existence.

CCCXXX.

Pleasure when pursued as a business ceases to be pleasure.

CCCXXXI.

I believe that the unhappiness of mankind, especially of those amongst the higher orders of society, mainly arises from the circumstance of creating for themselves so many artificial wants, both moral as well as physical, which, if not constantly satisfied, must prove to be so many evils.

CCCXXXII.

When we feel unhappy, we cannot help feeling a malicious satisfaction in thinking that others may be even more so than ourselves.

CCCXXXIII.

A blush is a greater proof of innocence than it is of guilt, or rather, it is not so much a proof of being guilty as it is of a fear we entertain of being thought so—hence, it generally happens that the less reason people have to feel ashamed the more they appear so, and the reverse; for when vice and immorality once become a habit, and grow into a principle, if such it can be called, man is no longer influenced by public opinion, and shame becomes a word without meaning.

CCCXXXIV.

Men, as a sex, are not by nature less vain of their personal beauty than the other sex—and personal attraction in a man is as much admired by women as personal attrac-

tion in the latter is admired by the former. The only difference appears to be that women are more in the habit than men of considering (though often with little reason) personal beauty as the only stepping-stone to preferment—as affording, in short, the only ground of pretension to the favour and consideration of the other sex.

CCCXXXV.

As far as hope contributes to our happiness, the poor are better off than the rich, as they have more to hope for and less to fear ; more to gain and less to lose.

CCCXXXVI.

Such is the frailty of human nature, that we shall only deceive ourselves by supposing matrimony, however promising its appearance, to be a state of uninterrupted happiness. Experience and reason forbids us to expect perpetual sunshine in this world, whatever pains may be taken on our part in order, as we think, to secure it. Nor ought we either to be surprised or disappointed if the stream of matrimony be oc-

asionally ruffled or agitated by the unruly passions of our rebel nature, by the weakness, the infirmity, and imperfections of fallen and degenerate humanity. Strife and altercation will occasionally ensue among parties professedly the most attached to each other; but let us guard against the fatal error of supposing strife and altercation to be the necessary consequence of matrimony, or, on the other hand, that peace and unanimity are to be met with only out of the pale of the married state. If we cannot agree when married, it is to be presumed that the same would be the case were we unmarried; and for the same reason, those who are happy in each other's society when single, would, in all probability, be no less so if united in matrimony.

CCCCXXVII.

It is not probable that Napoleon would have been happy had he been allowed, agreeably to his own desire, to retire into private life. The change of habit would have been too much for him, painful as must have been the confinement of the

latter part of his life to a man of his active mind, and scarcely past the meridian of life; still there must have been something gratifying to the pride of human nature in the very danger that was supposed to exist had he been permitted to have lived at large, and in the extraordinary precautions that were consequently resorted to to prevent his escape from the state of confinement to which he was condemned.

CCCXXXVIII.

If there be happiness in contributing to the happiness of others, morality in this instance is policy, and policy is morality.

CCCXXXIX.

We are in the habit of presuming, or rather concluding, every thing we see in print to be true, though we probably should not feel the same conviction were we to read the same work or production in manuscript. We have a right to doubt every thing till it is proved, because what is not proved is but an assertion or opinion; the very circum-

stance of the author, who may be dead, being unknown to us, the oracular tone and air of authority which characterise many works, especially those intended to convey information, have a tendency to impose on our credulity; hence the danger—and the younger we are the greater the danger—of our being misled, especially by works of imagination. Too much information we cannot have; too much knowledge it is impossible to acquire; and on controversial subjects the only means of arriving at truth is by listening to the arguments that may be urged on either side, and to form our own conclusion out of the conflict of opposite opinions: at the same time we should never take up a book to read, whatever its reputed merits may be, without reserving to ourselves the right of exercising upon it our own unbiassed judgement. The saving of time and advantage to the youthful inquirer of truth would be incalculable if he could always command the services of one who was both able and willing to direct him in the choice of his studies.

CCCXL.

Change of labour is comparative rest.

CCCXLI.

The great difference between our civil and our religious code is, that the former forbids us to do evil ; the latter not only forbids us to do evil, but enjoins us to do good.

CCCXLII.

Pleasure is purely passive: we suffer pleasure as we suffer pain. &c.

CCCXLIII.

Matrimony is like the door of a gin-shop, made to open but one way.

CCCXLIV.

Assuming as a fact that self-interest is the basis of all our actions, I see no reason that on that account we should be disgusted with the world. Every one, undoubtedly, is more or less selfish, but the fact being once admitted that such is the basis of

human conduct, we have no more reason to entertain a worse opinion of others than we have of ourselves.

CCCXLV.

Public opinion is no other than the private opinion of so many individuals which happens to coincide, and on this score cannot be considered as an infallible rule of right and wrong; at the same time there is nothing that operates so powerfully on the conduct of mankind in general: for what is there we should hesitate to do if alone in the world, and what is there we should not blush to do from the moment it was condemned by the verdict of public opinion?

CCCXLVI.

All the world are engaged in increasing their means directly or indirectly. The man who lives within his income is *pro tanto* a gainer. The man who buys the greatest possible quantity of any given article at the least possible expense, is as much a gainer as he who realizes the greatest pro-

fits, in any given time, on the least possible outlay.

CCCXLVII.

There is no word more indefinite in its meaning than the word economy, as applied either to time or money. The dearth or cheapness of an article in relation to any given individual, does not depend only on the value of money, but it must be measured by a combination of hypothetical circumstances.

CCCXLVIII.

We ought to write as if we were speaking, and to speak as if we were writing.

CCCXLIX.

The circumstance of animals preying one on the other at first sight appears like an evil, which is inconsistent with the avowed goodness of God. If, however, it be an evil, it is only so (like all other evils not of our own creation) in a qualified sense—that is to say, were it not for this evil, it is easy to

foresee that greater evils would exist;* in other words the evil is overbalanced by the good, or at worst, is the less evil of the two. And after all, however difficult it may be to reconcile it with the assumed omnipotence of the Deity, it at least affords no argument against His benevolence. I believe we may assert with confidence that there is no instance of any animal being influenced so to do by any other motive than the cravings of appetite, the first necessity of its nature.

CCCL.

If true happiness consist in the approbation of our conscience, then it follows that the happiness of every one is in his own hands—in this respect, the poor man is on a level with the rich: were it otherwise, indeed, there would be ~~an~~^a apparent injustice in the moral government of the universe.

* The country would be overstocked so as to occasion a scarcity of food.

CCCLI.

As no one can confer on us the happiness which arises from the approbation of our own conscience, so no one can deprive us of it.

CCCLII.

Politeness is hypocrisy in disguise.

CCCLIII.

What is flattery but making a person fall in love with himself?

CCCLIV.

In the married state if there be not love on both sides, it is better there should be none on either; there is no hardship more painful to endure than ~~unrequited~~ love.

CCCLV.

The affections of a woman are increased by habit, those of a man are diminished by the same cause.

CCCLVI.

The art of extemporaneous speaking in public is mainly the effect of habit, because if we can think at all we certainly have the power of expressing what we think. Now, as an uninterrupted series of ideas is continually passing in our minds, and we cannot help ourselves from thinking even for a single moment, consequently there can be no assignable limit to the capability of speaking.

CCCLVII.

In the married state, as indeed in every other social combination or compact, there is no medium between command and obedience. The necessity of there existing in some one a supreme power in the direction and management of a family being once admitted, it is immaterial for all practical purposes whether A, B, or C be the ruling power; but I am confident that any compromise between authority on the one hand, and submission on the other, is the source of much matrimonial unhappiness. The love of power being indiscriminately the same in

either sex, and assuming the ability to govern to be equal in both, it is evident that woman will not voluntarily submit, under any circumstances, to the dominion of man on any other grounds than those of duty, expediency, or love.*

CCCLVIII.

Exercise, as a means of health, is certainly overrated; making due allowance for habit and constitution, in no case can it be said that exercise is absolutely necessary—in some cases it is positively injurious.

* It cannot be denied that in many instances in the matrimonial state, the female is the more capable of the two of exercising the *veto*, but as neither of the parties, like the fair candidates for the golden apple, is willing to underrate their own pretensions, or surrender that which they may consider their just prerogative, the question should always be decided in the presence of witnesses before the fatal knot is tied, because after marriage, though the husband may remind his wife of her religious vows, he is sure to be defeated by her on the score of gallantry.

There is a Persian tale to the following effect:—A man becoming impatient of being tortured on the rack of the alternate frowns and smiles of his mistress, who

CCCLIX.

We never can die too soon if we die in a good cause.

CCCLX.

So censorious and envious are the world one of another, (the fault, by the bye, of the social state more than of human nature itself,) that we feel more satisfaction in hearing our neighbour abused than in hearing him praised. Invention and prevarication

was for ever begging more time for the consideration of so important a matter as an engagement for life, consulted a friend as to putting a speedy termination to the state of suspense to which he had been so long a martyr. "Has she any *pet*?" said the friend. "Yes," said the other, "a favourite spaniel." "Well," rejoined the friend, "take my sword and cut off its head in her presence, and your fate will unquestionably be decided one way or the other, but most probably in your favour."

The far-famed prize of the "flitch of bacon" may be here mentioned as not altogether irrelevant to the subject, the conditions of obtaining which (though well meant on the part of the founder) the author feels bold to assert have never yet been fulfilled, and rewards of such a nature only offer a premium to fraud, dishonesty, and collusion.

too often supply the place of truth and fact; and the innocent fare but little better than the guilty in the estimation of the world. The honest man, in short, has no salvo in this life but the sanctuary of his own conscience.

CCCLXI.

Consolation may be extracted from the greatest misfortunes.

CCCLXII.

The knowledge of self can only be obtained by a knowledge of others.

CCCLXIII.

Criminals may put on an appearance of courage, but they are always cowards at heart.

CCCLXIV.

We cannot do otherwise than believe what is generally taken on credit, be it true or false, so long as we do not give ourselves the pain to inquire whether or no it be worthy of belief.

CCCLXV.

Colds and coughs, which are the effect of obstructed perspiration, are truly said to be the origin and foundation of all disorders. Perspiration, again, is only another word for secretion, or evacuation ; and it is on the free and proper discharge of these, of any and of every kind, that health mainly depends.

CCCLXVI.

A debauch frequently answers the purpose of medicine, as the body politic is sometimes purified by a revolution.

CCCLXVII.

Animal or physical courage may exist in a state of civilization as well as in a state of nature, though the protection afforded to person and property in the former state in a great measure supersedes its necessity ; but moral courage is exclusively the creation of society.

CCCLXVIII.

We lose nothing by the success of others
—why then envy?

CCCLXIX.

Those who have laboured most to defend revelation have, perhaps, been the means (innocent means indeed) of disseminating infidelity in as great, or perhaps a greater degree than those who have written professedly to oppose it.

CCCLXX.

If a state of repose be favourable to digestion, or rather if exercise be unfavourable to it, I will ask, when are we not digesting?

CCCLXXI.

When we are in health, existence itself is a positive pleasure. We often feel happy without any ostensible cause; and we often feel unhappy for no other reason than because we are labouring under the effects of temporary indisposition.

CCCLXXII.

We are as accountable, in a moral sense, for our acts of omission as we are for our acts of commission. There are negative duties as well as positive duties.

CCCLXXIII.

If we had the faculty of foreseeing, we should not be so happy as we are. Hopes and fears would have no place in our existence. It is the uncertainty of the future that keeps the stream of life in motion.

CCCLXXIV.

If there were no such thing as fear, there could be no such thing as courage ; fear is the rule, and courage the exception.

CCCLXXV.

All food is medicine, though medicine is not necessarily food.

CCCLXXVI.

Christianity, in all its multifarious forms, as well as the Mahometan religion, is only

a modification of Judaism ; the distinguishing feature of which religion, as compared with others, is the doctrine of one Supreme Being. What an inconsistency to subject the Jews to persecution when their religion is not only the foundation of our own, but we acknowledge the divine authenticity of the same writings, and adopt them in our church-service. Moreover, never let it be forgotten that Jesus Christ himself was a Jew.

CCCLXXVII.

There is something imposing in courage, even though it be associated with a bad cause.

CCCLXXVIII.

Our duties to God are passive—our duties to man are both active and passive.

CCCLXXIX.

If “conscience makes cowards of us all,” it is equally true that conscience makes heroes of us all.

CCCLXXX.

Liberty is not necessarily a blessing, nor is

slavery necessarily a curse. We are so much the creatures of habit that a state of slavery is in some cases preferable to a state of liberty ; a bird that is set at liberty after being pampered in a cage will assuredly die.

CCCLXXXI.

If I were called upon to define habit by a periphrasis, I would adopt the words of the poet “ Non vi sed sæpe cadendo.”

CCCLXXXII.

Let us not be niggardly of any information to others, it is only so much capital laid out at interest.

CCCLXXXIII.

Sleep, like all other wants of our nature, is passive and involuntary, nor is it confined to time, place, or circumstance.

CCCLXXXIV.

Matrimony is, at best, but a choice of evils, but matrimony is one of the necessary conditions of society which is in itself a good.

CCCLXXXV.

There is an old saying that "one hour before twelve o'clock P.M. is worth two hours afterwards." This is to be explained as follows: when we awake from our first sleep the wants of nature are supposed to be satisfied, and, consequently, any additional sleep, like excess in eating and drinking, is comparatively unnecessary and sometimes positively injurious.

CCCLXXXVI.

All diseases proceed immediately from physical, although it is possible they may originate in moral causes.

CCCLXXXVII.

Quarrels, especially in the married state, are frequently owing to excess of attachment, though the cause of them is often misunderstood even by the parties themselves.

CCCLXXXVIII.

What are commonly considered troubles

often add to our happiness, at all events they afford occupation to the mind, and we might be more unhappy without them.

CCCLXXXIX.

If health be an invaluable blessing to the rich, it must be still more so to the poor who live by their labour.

CCCXC.

The use of drugs may sometimes be expedient, and rendered even necessary by circumstances ; at the same time the application of medicine, whether tonic or aperient, is in all cases a violation of the laws of nature ; or rather, were the laws of nature never violated, medicine, in the sense we understand it, would be entirely unknown,—in a word, would have no existence : for medicine is no otherwise useful in its effect than as possessing the power of bringing back again to their proper tone the chords of life, which may have become too much relaxed or too much contracted.

CCCXCI.

There are some constitutions so weak by nature, that they always must remain so in a degree ; whilst there are others so strong that, abuse them as we may, they will sustain no material injury.

CCCXCII.

The principle of divine worship being once admitted, the outward form or mode of faith becomes comparatively of secondary importance. The same holds good of the different forms of civil government ; so just is the observation,—“that form of government is the best which is best administered.”

CCCXCIII.

The *siesta* (which I would define to be, not so much an act of the human will as the *not* doing anything to prevent or disturb that state of repose which is so necessary and so loudly called for by nature after the operation of eating) is an invaluable habit, if a

habit indeed it can be called,* and of the greatest importance to our physical and intellectual welfare. It is on these occasions we are spared the trouble of going to bed, because the bed comes to us—it is a nap which day steals from night.

CCCXCIV.

If virtue consists in self-denial, the degree of virtue will depend on the degree of temptation to which we are exposed. Let us not, therefore, boast of abstaining from acts which we feel no inclination to commit, nor let us, for the same reason, be too hasty in condemning others for doing what, under the influence of the same temptation, we should probably have done ourselves.†

* The habit indeed consists in the accustoming ourselves to forego that indulgence, in which, as infants, we were allowed to indulge.

† The author cannot forbear pressing on the attention of his readers the consideration of this article, being confident that it is a deduction we seldom make when it operates against ourselves or in favour of others. No established religion can do more than speak of virtue as

CCCXCV.

If it be doubtful whether the Deity be benevolent, I will only ask, what motive can he have to be otherwise?

CCCXCVI.

We have reason to suppose that certain animals formerly existed, the species of which is now extinct—and why not infer that other species may hereafter exist, which hitherto have been unknown.

CCCXCVII.

Does it not require as much courage to have a tooth extracted, or to undergo the amputation of a limb, as it does to wage war with our fellow creatures? and yet if our resolution should fail us, we should be scarcely

virtue and vice as vice without reference to time, place, or circumstance; whereas both one and the other are essentially *relative* in their nature. Such a consideration, whilst it ought to cure us of presumption, ought, at the same time, to inspire us with charity and forbearance towards others.

branded as cowards in the one case, though we should in the other, the only difference being, that in the one case there is a certainty of pain, and in the other uncertainty of death.

CCCXCVIII.

Poison is not necessarily poison. In other words, poison is not necessarily contagious.

CCCXCIX.

It has been wisely observed, that "an ounce of experience is worth a pound of advice."

CCCC.

Christianity, by forbidding promiscuous intercourse, has given a stimulus to population, which, aided by other causes, may be increased to an inconvenient degree.

CCCCI.

With regard to the intellectual as well as the physical qualities of our nature, there is a wide difference between *limitation* and *im-*

perfection. We should never lose sight of this principle. It will help to explain a thousand difficulties in the organization of the universe. Human nature, as every other work of God, is perfect as far as it goes.

CCCCII.

Air or climate is a species of diet, diet too of the most influential kind.

CCCCIII.

To be insensible to praise is to be insensible to shame—at the same time it is possible to be too covetous of the one as it is to be too indifferent to the other.

CCCCIV.

The communication of our ideas or opinions through the medium of the press is only another mode of communicating them by the voice; and I know not where the legislator is to be found who would be mad enough to interdict us the use of our tongues, or (what is scarcely less unreasonable) forbid us talking on other subjects than those which, in his good pleasure, he might think proper

to prescribe; and yet such is the practice of governments in a greater or less degree in regard to the press. Those who advocate such a principle would not hesitate to tax even our thoughts. The assertion, "the greater the truth the greater the libel," is itself, perhaps, the greatest libel that was ever published.

CCCCV.

If an individual, unaccustomed to the trammels of society, were, by any sudden transition, to attempt to conform to the habits of civilized life, the violence offered to his feelings and to the first impulses of his nature would be so severe that it would be the means of terminating his existence; whereas education and habit, and the conviction we feel, as we grow up, of the necessity of living under a certain moral restraint, renders the control of our passions, comparatively speaking, an easy undertaking, and thereby occasions little or no injury to our health; nor would it be much less difficult or less injurious to our health to migrate at once from a state of society to a state of nature.

CCCCVI.

Men make institutions, and institutions make men.

CCCCVII.

The law is one thing—putting it into execution is another.

CCCCVIII.

Kings, and those who are destined to rule over others, may err by being too condescending as well as by being too much the reverse, so true is it that familiarity breeds contempt. The great secret, after all, to govern well is so to conduct ourselves as to be loved and feared, if possible, at the same time.

CCCCIX.

It is almost worth while being ill were it only for the pleasure we feel in being restored to health. In a convalescent state our spirits are often more than ordinarily elated, owing, perhaps, in some degree to the wholesome and digestible diet which is generally adopted by invalids, but still more so by the pre-

cautions generally taken on those occasions to exclude objects of excitement.

CCCCX.

Nothing is more easy than to gain the affections of a female. She will not care to inquire whether she loves us, not but that she is equally capable of loving as ourselves, but if we can only succeed in making her believe that we love her to such a degree as to prefer her to any other of her sex, our object is attained, because her object is attained also. We have been the means of satisfying that love of conquest, self love or vanity, so characteristic of the sex : thence it is that a little address and knowledge of human nature will often succeed where the man who is endowed with the greatest accomplishments, united with rank and fortune, will fail in attaining his end.

CCCCXI.

Happiness is a phantom, or will-of-the-wisp, which affords pleasure so long as we are engaged in pursuing it, but is no sooner

within our reach than the charm is dissolved.

CCCCXII.

“We do not know what we can do till we try,” is a saying as true as it is trite. At the same time, it may sometimes be a question whether it be prudent to venture at any time on the attainment of any object where the probabilities of success are against us. It is possible to attempt too much, as it is to attempt too little. The destinies of mankind in general are influenced more by their physical temperament than by any other consideration. A character sanguine and confident by nature will often succeed, where a less sanguine individual possessing even greater resources in other respects will be deterred from attempting the same undertaking, or having attempted it will fail in its execution.

CCCCXIII.

Sleep, which is generally considered so much waste time, or at least a *vacuum* in our existence, is one of the greatest blessings

of life. It is escaping from ourselves into another world.

CCCCXIV.

The best explanation the light of nature affords of human nature not being so perfect as it might be, is, the presumption that the universe is governed by general and not by particular laws.

CCCCXV.

To live respected and to die regretted is in every man's power as it ought to be the object of every man's ambition.

CCCCXVI

The more simple the form of religion, the more agreeable it is to reason, though not perhaps so influential in its effects as those forms which are accompanied with more display and ostentation. Perhaps there is no form of religion that is totally exempt from errors and inconsistencies. With regard to that sect established in our own country, commonly called the Church of England, I would ask if it were not a

species of tautology or inconsistency the same service being repeated in the same church on the same day, (which is the case where there is service performed both in the evening and afternoon,) or at least there is an inconsistency in the same individual attending the same service more than once on the same day. Is there not also something unreasonable in there being so many separate prayers instead of one comprehensive prayer, embracing all our wants and objects of petition? Why are the Lord's Prayer and the "Gloria Patri" repeated so often? Why do we "bow the knee" in the Apostle's Creed and in no other part of the service? Why is one part of the church more adapted than another for the performance of any portion of the service? Why are not the sermon, prayers, and lessons, (as they are called,) delivered from the same place and in the same professional costume? To what does the altar or chancel originally refer? Are not all these things remnants of popish customs and superstitions, or rather of a period still more remote—the mythology of the ancients, which are more

or less blended with every form of Christian worship, and which ancient worship consisted principally of form, ceremony, and outward show? Why is not one clergyman as much qualified as another to administer the sacrament and read certain parts of the Liturgy? Some prayers we are directed to read aloud, some in silence, some with the clergyman, others the clergyman alone—kneeling, sitting, and standing during different parts of the service—and why not also a recumbent position? Whence the origin of vocal and instrumental music in our church service? And why are some parts of the service appointed to be sung?—those parts undoubtedly being poetry—and other parts of the same service being appointed to be read in prose? There can be but one answer to these questions, viz. established custom as regards the discipline of the church—and far be it from us to say that such customs are not harmless and well meant in their original institutions; they are nevertheless some, amongst others, of the causes of so many deserting the religion of their forefathers, and attaching themselves to other modes of worship more

suited to a reasoning and enlightened age ; and the only object we have in view in making the foregoing observations is to point out to others what are only customs and the ceremonial of religion as distinguished from religion in the abstract, and the performance of its practical duties.

CCCCXVII.

Argue with temper if you argue at all.

CCCCXVIII.

The opinion of one man is as good as the opinion of another as far as it goes : there is no such thing as an erroneous opinion.

CCCCXIX.

It is not that civilization is necessarily a good, or nature a necessary evil, or that the former was invented to supersede or supply the place of the latter. Civilization is only an alterative or expedient, not the empiric who professes infallible wisdom. She does not profess to make human nature so perfect as she could wish, but to make it better than she found it. Civilization is one of those

amiable and disinterested “ sisters”* who attend the bed of sickness not for the purpose of performing miracles, but for the purpose of ministering to the wants of humanity, and mitigating its sufferings.

CCCCXX.

If it be a question whether intellectual or physical pleasure be the greater of the two, it can be no question that pleasures which partake of the nature of both are greater than pleasures of either kind separately.

CCCCXXI.

I have often doubted which is the greater instance of the sublime, the misdirected ambition of him who fired the temple of Ephesus to immortalize his name, (and it is no less singular than true that the name† of him who destroyed the temple is better known to posterity than the name of him who built it,)

* It is an error to suppose that the life of a nun is necessarily a life of idleness—to forsake the pleasures of life is not to abandon its duties.

† Erostratus.

or the idea of a star at so immeasurable a distance from the earth that its light has not reached us, though it has been travelling from the creation of the world with a velocity greater than that of a cannon-ball.

CCCCXXII.

To engraft religion (be its nature and denomination what it may) on the rising generation of a state or country where religion of no kind existed before, is one of the best works in which philanthropy can be engaged; but to endeavour to establish one religion in the room of another for no other reason than because it happens to be our own, is to deprive a man of his dearest birthright—the religion of his forefathers in which he was born and bred, and which is associated and ingrained, as it were, in all his habits of thought and action, without making him any compensation for his loss, or giving him any thing in its place as a substitute: it were not less absurd than inviting a man to adopt the costume of a woman, to which he was unaccustomed—or the Laplander to exchange his plains of snow for the sands of the Libyan

desert. As far as it may depend on human means, the establishment of a new religion has generally been the result of a variety of concomitant circumstances, though a single individual may occasionally have been the ostensible cause indeed, but in reality the means only of carrying into effect what a conjunction of favourable circumstances may have prepared for him: it has followed as often as not in the train of conquerors, but in no instance has it succeeded where it has been the object and end of war. Religion grows best when it is self-sown and indigenous to the soil, but seldom comes to perfection when forcibly transplanted. It is not that one form of religion *as such* is better than another; nor ought we in any case to confound the abuses of religion with the benefit of religion itself. The time has been, never again to return—sooner shall the river return to its source, the sun forget to shine, and the earth to yield its increase—sooner, I say, shall we live to witness such departures from the natural order of things, than the return of those times when mankind shall again have occasion to rue the crimes and enormities that

have been committed in the name of religion: and no religion has been so grossly perverted to the basest and most unworthy purposes in the hands of the wicked and designing—no religion has afforded so great a handle to the exercise of the foulest acts of cruelty, injustice, or inhumanity, or been prostituted so often in the hateful cause of ambition, tyranny, oppression, and intolerance, as that religion which is distinguished above all others for the mildness and benevolence of its spirit, and was ushered into the world by that consoling and cheering proclamation — “ On earth peace and goodwill towards man.”*

* In the discussion on the abolition of negro-slavery Mr. Canning made some observation, as far as my recollection serves me, to the following purport: “ In setting to work to civilize the negro, he must be considered as a child and not as a brute, and he must be educated accordingly; but before he can be expected to embrace Christianity, his eye must be trained and accustomed by degrees to see things nearer to him and be taught the habits of civilized life, before his eye will have acquired sufficient power to bear the still greater light of Christianity: thus religion, whilst in one sense it is the foundation of our social duties, so on other occasions it must be made subservient, as discretion may dictate, to

CCCCXXIII

It is an argument in favour of the benevolence of the Deity that all animal pleasure, unless abused, indeed, and indulged in to excess, aids the digestion, and thus contributes to our health; whereas pain of any kind and in any degree *pro tanto* deranges the digestive organs, and so far is prejudicial to that state of sound and perfect health which it is evidently the design and intention of the Deity we should enjoy—pleasure and pain being conveyed to the sensorium by the nerves which have a direct communication with the stomach. Hence what is agreeable to our feelings promotes also our health, which is the greatest physical blessing we can enjoy, inasmuch as it is that which is indispensable to the enjoyment of every pleasure in life. Paley, indeed, has ably and beautifully inferred the benevolent design of

the more tangible and practical purposes of life.” Another passage of great force and beauty recently quoted in the House by Sir Robert Peel is much to the purpose, and is read with interest, on the eve of the moral experiment about to be tried.

Providence in wishing the happiness of his creatures by the fact of our bodies being so constructed as that all our senses are so many organs which are obviously calculated to be instrumental to the pleasure of man. He observes that, although a tooth may ache, it is to be considered only an accident or exception, for there is nothing in the formation of the tooth itself to lead us to conclude that it was the intention of Him who made us that it should give us pain, and had he so willed it, our bodies might have been so contrived that our senses should in all instances have administered to our pain instead of our pleasure. Paley, however, only speaks of pleasure as an indication of God's goodness and benevolence to his creatures; but our notions of divine goodness will be enlarged, and our gratitude proportionably increased, if we go a step further, and take into consideration the beneficial influence of that pleasure we derive from the senses on the state of our health; for if our health is promoted by pleasure, then it would appear that health is attained by means which are themselves also productive of pleasure. Now pleasure, it

cannot be denied, is always a positive good, but health is more valuable still: pleasure is casual, fluctuating, transitory, and accidental—health is more lasting, definite, and positive. Independently of its being indispensable to enjoyment of every kind, it is in some cases necessary, as affording the only means of gaining a subsistence; and deprived of it, we are in all cases incapacitated from discharging some of the most important duties of life. In a word, pleasure, which as communicated by the senses is a good in itself, is also instrumental to, or the means of, attaining a still greater good—viz. health. Is not the very act of eating and drinking as much a source of gratification as it is an act of physical necessity? Sleep again is a luxury, come when it may, and shall we value it the less because it forms a necessary part of our existence?

CCCCXXIV.

Religion is the alphabet of education.

CCCCXXV.

It is said that great wits have short memo-

ries: this is no more true than those who have retentive memories have necessarily less talent, wit, or imagination than those whose memories are more treacherous. What memory may depend on we know not: it depends but little on the will—it decays with the body, and decays no sooner in those that are famed for their wit than those that are not so.

CCCCXXVI.

Prejudices are only removed by association with our species, because prejudices and *opinions*, which require scale, weight, and measure—some standard of comparison, in short—in order to ascertain their value, and must be compared with others before we are capable of judging of their respective merits.

CCCCXXVII.

We soon find it is our interest to go right if others would only point out the way, but our state-physicians think they do enough by blocking up the avenues of crime.*

* The law that is enacted to prevent the public from indulging in any harmless amusement on the Sabbath,

CCCCXXVIII.

Women, as a sex, are a persecuted race ; they are subject to all the penalties of so-

is a sacrifice not to God but to the Devil. The use of the Sabbath in a *religious* point of view, is not to drive us into church, but to give us an opportunity of testifying our faith and performing those duties in public, which on other days we perform in private ; in a *secular* point of view, it is not to force us to rest, but to give us an opportunity of reposing that we may be more capable of renewing our labour on the following day. It is unreasonable, after depriving the labouring classes of the *means* of subsisting on that day, to dictate to them in what manner their time (which, next to money, is their most valuable right) is to be passed. Curtailing the harmless amusements of the subject on the Sabbath is offering a direct premium to the orgies of the gin-shop, the brothel, and the gaming-table ; and we want but little experience to know, that to interfere with these sinks of iniquity or *opprobria* of society, any otherwise than to render them more difficult of access by proper municipal regulations, in order to show that we disapprove of what will always be evaded do what we may to prevent it, would be such an act of blind folly, that he, who should attempt it, would find that he was defeating his own purpose, and producing in all probability effects the very reverse of those he intended. Feeling every degree of respect for those who are endeavouring to arrive at the same end with ourselves by

ciety, while they enjoy only a portion of its privileges.

CCCCXXIX.

In order to form a proper estimate of our own value and importance in a free state (say England), the humblest individual has only to ask himself what would be his situation if all the inhabitants of his country,

different means, we dare to appeal to all experience that any undue interference with the habits and long-cherished practices of the lower classes, provided they amount not to a breach of the law, answers no other purpose than creating a dislike to those whom they are taught, under such circumstances, to look upon as their oppressors without instilling into them one new principle, or making them one jot more religious than they were before : and let any one deny, if he can, that taking a morose view of the institution of the Sabbath, and observing it in too ascetic a manner, is not holding out encouragement to the young and thoughtless to pass that time in the gratification of their unemployed passions, and so far furnishing an incentive to crime, which they are debarred from passing in an innocent, if not a rational, manner, and operates as a direct tendency to make the good bad, and the bad worse.

with the exception of himself, were swept off by the plague, a second deluge, or some other desolating cause: however humble his lot before, would he not now be king as well as subject, and invested with irresponsible power? Would he not be commander-in-chief of all the land forces, no less than high admiral of the fleet, in his own dominions? Would there be any office in the state, any dignity in the church, which he could not attain, or the duties of which he could not perform? Might he not assume any rank he might think proper, himself being the fountain of honour? Would he not unite in his own person the functions of judge, jury, and witness? Would it not rest with him alone to declare war, make treaties, to receive ambassadors, and enter into alliances offensive and defensive with foreign powers? Is he not the descendant and only representative of Englishmen, who framed our institutions, laid the foundation of those liberties and civil immunities she enjoys in a pre-eminent degree—the source of her wealth and power, and are mainly the cause of the

proud position she enjoys amongst the nations of the civilized world. Is not this same individual the legislator and administrator of the laws as at present existing, and is he not indissolubly tied up and identified with every thing that makes the name of an Englishman illustrious and revered? And as in this individual alone, though before he might have begged his bread from door to door, is centred all that constituted the greatness of Britain, so with him must die all the glories of England : they may be registered, indeed, in the tablet of memory, and recorded in the page of history, but they have no personal identity, no longer any visible representation. Other nations may usurp and overrun the soil, corn may still grow in its fields, the fogs of November may still hover, as before, around its sea-girt shores; but let, I say, this one surviving individual himself be taken away, and nothing will remain of England but the dust we tread under our feet.*

“ 'Tis Greece, but living Greece no more.”

CCCCXXX.

Deism may admit of more interpretations than one, but in the strict sense of the term there is no such thing or being in the world as an atheist. The very persons who assign every thing to secondary causes, by that same mode of reasoning prove themselves not to be atheists; for who ever heard of a third story of a house without a second being implied, or a second without inferring the necessity of a first ?

CCCCXXXI.

Experience are the eyes of futurity.

CCCCXXXII.

In addition to other instances which might be enumerated to show that evil is necessary in order to make us appreciate the opposite good—such as sickness to good health—winter to summer—poverty to riches—hunger and thirst to the gratification of our animal wants; let us not forget that fatigue of body and mind, and long and restless nights,

which is an evil in itself, and a still greater if accompanied with pain, is no less necessary to make us duly sensible of the luxury of sound and refreshing sleep.

CCCCXXXIII.

It is not that the elements which compose the character of a great and distinguished person are not to be found elsewhere in abundance, but that the same elements which in the one case are scattered and distributed amongst different individuals, in the other are concentrated in one.

CCCCXXXIV.

It is ~~as~~ inconsistent to complain of the shortness of life as it would be to reproach a tradesman who had given us a year's credit with not giving us credit for a longer time. If we are happy, we ought to consider that the average term of our years might have been shorter, and not that it might have been longer than it is. If we are unhappy, we have reason to congratulate ourselves that our life cannot be protracted beyond a limited period.

CCCCXXXV.

Death is an event which can happen but once in our life, and if an evil, it is at least the cure of all others.

CCCCXXXVI.

Discussion is the test of truth in all things which are not submitted to the evidence of the senses: hence we are not only justified in considering that to be a fact which we know not to be otherwise, but the world, we find, invariably act upon this principle; and so far from its being any imputation on their understanding so to believe any thing, improbable or unreasonable as it may be, it would be far more extraordinary not to do so. It is for this reason that what may be only opinions are so often believed as incontrovertible facts, being satisfied to rest our faith on the credit of others; not but that we may be both willing and capable of proving the truth of any given proposition, but because habit has reconciled us, or rather blinded us to that which has passed current, perhaps for

many generations, on the faith and authority of others, the truth of which hitherto we have seen no reason to doubt—like the eye which sees inversely the objects imprinted on the retina, and as we believe the sun to go round the earth, or the shore to be gradually receding from us whilst we are advancing, until we are convinced of our mistake and undeceived by such evidence as cannot err.

CCCCXXXVII.

There is nothing in this life, be it ever so great a good, but what, if it exceed certain bounds, may become as great an evil. In religion itself there is a line of demarcation which is equally removed from scepticism on the one hand as it is from enthusiasm on the other.

CCCCXXXVIII.

Hope and fear are the panniers of life, which, when equally poised, enable us to proceed best on our journey. Fear and hope proceed from the same source and are offspring of the same womb—or perhaps, more

correctly, they are so nearly allied as scarcely to be distinguished from each other, as we can no more imagine hope to exist without being attended by a certain degree of fear than we can imagine fear to exist in the abstract without any relation to hope. We can scarcely fear it may rain at such an hour so as to prevent our putting into execution any project of pleasure or profit, without hoping at the same time that it will not rain; and were we to express ourselves in either phrase, we should be understood as meaning one and the same thing. Hope and fear are reciprocal terms, and are essential one to the other; the art and wisdom of man consisting, as far as the indulgence of hope and fear may be within his own control, in so weighing probabilities as to adjust them in proper proportions, so as to avoid in either case undue disappointment, for we may be disappointed in what we fear as well as in what we hope. We may err by hoping too much as well as by fearing too much. Despondency, it has been said, was the cardinal

weakness of the gallant Moore.* The affair of Corunna was an instance where the gallant and lamented general was disappointed in fear, as he found himself, contrary to his expectation, more than equal to the enemy, although the nation felt but little exultation at the result of the engagement, as it could not but reflect less on what had been done than what *might* have been done. The defeat at Waterloo, on the part of the French, who were previously flushed with success, and whose chief calculated that he had eighty to a hundred in his favour, was a disappointment in hope. To conclude—Fear, then, it will be admitted, only enhances the value of hope,† and is as essential to its existence as

* Never was there a finer tribute paid to the memory of this amiable man and accomplished soldier, (the victim, in some degree, of mismanagement in the civil departments of the state and party spirit,) than the lines of the late Mr. Wolfe, concluding with the memorable line—

“ And we left him alone in his glory.”

† Hence “sure and certain hope,” which forms a part of our Liturgy, is, in its literal sense, a contradiction of terms.

oil is to the lamp, and fuel to the flame; and it will be equally admitted, on the other hand, that fear without any admixture of hope changes altogether its nature; and that which is called fear when associated in our minds with doubt and uncertainty and expectation, is, when not so associated, more properly called despair, which is a feeling equally distinct from fear as it is from hope; as we have it on record that not only suicide, but the greatest prodigies of personal valour have been achieved under the influence of no other feeling than that of despair, as in the affair at Bender or Marston Moor.

CCCCXXXIX.

Practical religion cannot be misunderstood—
—theoretical may.

CCCCXL.

Duty and right are reciprocal terms—duty is what we owe to another, right is that to which we are entitled on the part of another: one is the debtor, the other the creditor.

CCCCXLI.

Poetry is in a certain degree a matter of taste; nor is poetry, whatever may be its intrinsic merit or demerit, wholly above the reach of fashion and caprice; and so much are we the slaves, even in literature and matters of criticism, of this empiric which exercises so powerful a spell over us in all the transactions of life, that we seldom allow ourselves to exercise an independent judgement, and we oftentimes admire and censure for no other reason than because it is the fashion to do so. There are undoubtedly many adventitious circumstances with which the memory of Byron is associated, which in the opinion of many, especially among his contemporaries, give an additional interest and precedence to his poetry over any other poet; but it must be admitted, even by the most impartial judge, that in the poetry of Byron there is so forcible an appeal to the most powerful passions of our nature, that to turn over the leaves of any other poet after perusing his composition, is to begin with wine

and finish with water. The muse of Byron is the rocket that soars to the skies, looking down upon the fruitless attempts of others who vainly attempt to follow him in his flights, and which, comparatively, are so many squibs and crackers which explode at our feet and are calculated only to amuse the infant and the vulgar mind.

CCCCXLII.

If we have but the courage to speak, we shall seldom be called upon to prove it by our deeds. As a stitch in time is said to save nine, so a word well applied will often spare the necessity of many a blow.

CCCCXLIII.

Duelling is a sacrifice on the altar of public opinion in expiation of some offence against the laws of honour.

CCCCXLIV.

The practice of duelling, it must be admitted, will neither stand the test of reason, religion, nor philosophy; for let the result

be what it may, it neither proves that one of the parties is right nor the other wrong. It is a custom, however, of which, so long as society continues to exist in its present shape, it is difficult to foresee the termination, and will be tolerated by mankind, not because we approve of the custom in itself, but because there are a certain class of offences which mankind are agreed can be expiated by no other less objectionable means. Whilst, however, we cannot do otherwise than deprecate the custom of duelling, I am not prepared to concur with those who represent it as a custom which, in its present form at least, originated in distant or barbarous times, and as being unworthy of finding any place in the present enlightened age ; for if altercations must arise,—and arise they will so long as human nature remains the same, and the same principles on which society is at present founded continue to be recognized, —I would rather consider the mode of arranging a difference as understood by the term duelling to be the cause, or, at least, a criterion of an improved state of society,

than the descendant of a less enlightened and more barbarous age : nor can it be denied that assassinations and other less warrantable means of avenging ourselves are less frequent where the practice of duelling exists, and compared to which it may at least be considered as the less of two evils.

CCCCXLV.

When we consider that our life is nearly divided between sleeping and not sleeping, and that we have no more control over one of the acts (if I may so call them) than we have over the other, it being no more in our power to prevent ourselves sleeping altogether than it is to prolong our sleep at pleasure to any given period, we cannot do otherwise than consider that that portion of our time we devote to sleep, which we are too much in the habit of considering as so much time lost, or at least misapplied, is in reality as important and necessary a part of our existence as the hours that we are awake : besides in a practical point of view, let it

not be forgotten that, when awake, it does not follow that we are always making the best use of our time ; whereas, when we are asleep, if we are doing no good, we are at least incapable of doing wrong—awake, too, we may or may not be happy ; asleep, we must be.

CCCCXLVI.

Morality has been considered, and justly so, an indefinite term. Before the Christian era, though virtue was never without its advocates and followers, there nevertheless existed various and mistaken opinions on the subject ; nor was it until Christ came into the world that all suffrages were united in favour of that code of morality on which the Christian religion is founded, and which cannot but be admired if not practised even by those who may profess a different faith. Can there be any thing (in the whole range of ethics and metaphysics) more simple, more beautiful, more sublime, more just and reasonable, and more intelligible withal to the lowest capacity—any doctrine, in short,

productive of more practical and general utility, and more calculated to command the universal assent of mankind, than the injunction to “do unto others as ye would others should do unto you.”

CCCCXLVII.

An idea once begotten (how and whence produced it is for physiologists to determine) may wander awhile from home, but memory is sure to bring it back sooner or later : it is coexistent and coeval with the mind itself, nor can it be extinguished any more than the smallest particle of matter can be annihilated.

CCCCXLVIII.

Politeness consists more in saying civilities than in not doing incivilities.

CCCCXLIX.

Politeness hesitates not to rob or murder the very individual in whose presence she would blush to remain uncovered.

CCCCCL.

Mankind are agreed to award the same degree of merit to chastity in women as to courage in men. It is to be observed, however, that the former only (viz. chastity) is entitled to the appellation of *virtue* in the Christian sense of the word, and is considered no less a virtue in one sex than it is in the other.

CCCCLI.

It is difficult to say what originally may have given rise to the senseless ridicule which attaches to the condition of those of the female sex who may not have had the means and opportunity of entering the state of wedlock, except it be that in the earlier ages of the world, and even to this day in infant colonies, it is found to be a matter of policy to hold out every encouragement to matrimony as being the source of population, and which has hitherto been* considered a national blessing; but if this be the true reason, it is evident that the odium or ridicule with which the world are pleased to

visit those of the female sex who are unmarried either from choice or necessity, is misapplied, and ought to fall on those rather of the other sex who prefer leading a single life, for men, generally speaking, can marry when they will, but women for obvious reasons, though they have the power of rejecting, have not the privilege, as men, of selecting for themselves the objects of their choice ;* nor can any other reason be assigned for the disrepute in which that unfortunate portion of the sex are held, who, swerving from the established customs of society, have been imprudent enough to forestal the mysteries of matrimony—the victims often of treachery

* The Author trusts he shall be forgiven for pointing out the danger in which those of the other sex, whose views in life may have been thwarted, are liable to fall—they may, in some instances, be too apt to avenge themselves on society by giving way to feelings of misanthropy and contracting a sour and splenetic disposition ; this, however, is far less the case in the present age than it used to be in times more anti-social and less enlightened ; and as women become more amiable, so do men become ashamed of the unmerited odium to which they may have subjected the innocent victim of virtue or necessity.

and seduction, and who are often greater objects of pity than of censure ;—I say *disrepute*, in a conventional sense only, because their conduct in other respects is not necessarily disreputable, or that of married persons necessarily the reverse, but because mankind are agreed in attaching honour to the one, and dishonour to the other, in treating the one with respect, and depriving the other of the privileges and advantages of society. So far indeed is the censure from being always merited in the one case, or respect properly bestowed on the other, that much of what really deserves the name of virtue is found to exist out of the pale of matrimony; nor does it follow on the other hand that matrimony is necessarily associated with the exercise of all the moral virtues ; and indeed any misconduct on the part of her that is married as compared with a similar act committed by one in a state of celibacy, is so much the more to be condemned, as she cannot swerve from the path of propriety without inflicting an injury on one or more of those with whom she is connected, and violating those engagements which she has solemnly promised to fulfil.

CCCCLII.

Professional men, *as such*, are necessary evils incident to a state of society. It must nevertheless be admitted that even, in a professional sense, they may render us important services which money can but ill requite, whilst in private life they are often distinguished for the practice of every moral virtue; but inasmuch as they profess to know what others are supposed to be unacquainted with, and in this sense may be said to derive a subsistence from the ignorance and (its natural associate) the credulity of their fellow creatures, we cannot do otherwise than sometimes mistrust their honesty whilst we more than half suspect, let them perform what services they may, that they are invariably prompted by motives of self-interest, or at least that that feeling is predominant over every other consideration.

CCCCLIII.

Friendship that is purchased, and attends upon us in the form of a hireling, is better than no friendship at all; nor can there be a greater error than to suppose that a menial

is not capable of feeling the same degree of friendship as those whose situation in life renders them independent of us.

CCCCCLIV.

We are part, undoubtedly, of an incomprehensible whole — incomprehensible, I mean, to ourselves—and precisely because we are no other than part of a whole: in other words, because our understanding is necessarily limited—not imperfect indeed, any more than a single wheel or any component part of a watch separated from the other part is imperfect itself, but confined only within certain bounds, and as necessary to the whole of the machine as it is to all its parts.

CCCCCLV.

Motive is the test of morality; nor is the will to do the less to be appreciated because it may not be accompanied with the power to perform.*

CCCCCLVI.

Human laws are framed with a view of preventing crime—Christianity goes further; she not only forbids crime, but enjoins us to

do good. The one awards punishment only, the other holds out the additional stimulus of future reward.



CCCCLVII.

When we weep for the loss of one who was dear to us when living, we apparently pay a tribute to the memory of the dead, at the same time it is our own misfortune that we deplore. We weep, like a child, not because they are gone, but because they are gone without us.

CCCCLVIII.

Want of health is want of courage, but want of courage is not necessarily want of health.

CCCCLIX.

There are occasions on which we may mutually oblige and be obliged—there are acts which we cannot perform without conferring as great an obligation as we receive.

CCCCLX.

The pleasure we feel in indulging sleep, when we feel an inclination for it, is in the

exact ratio of the pain we feel in resisting it under the same circumstances; and the benefit we derive to our health in the one case will be proportionate to the injury we sustain in the other.

CCCC LXI.

If there be more duplicity and intrigue in woman, as a sex, than in man, it arises, in some degree, from education or the manner in which they are brought up, not to mention that they are shut out from that open and manly mode of avenging their own wrongs which is exclusively monopolized by the other sex; but they indemnify themselves with interest for the loss of such a privilege by their superior dexterity in wielding, as occasion may require, the viper's tongue.

CCCC LXII.

Digestion, how important, and yet how little understood!—the secret principle of vitality, whose source has not yet been discovered, and whose mysterious workings have hitherto eluded the deepest research of human wisdom; and with which we are acquainted only by the effects it produces. So

important is it to our well-being, that it may be considered synonymous with health, happiness, and with life itself; for he whose digestive organs are impaired, from whatever cause it may arise, may exist indeed, but can scarcely be said to live. We begin to perform the duties of digestion as soon as we begin to eat,—I might say from the commencement of our birth: it is the great business of our existence, our occupation from morning till night and from night till morning; asleep or awake, moving or at rest, the great work proceeds; and no sooner do we cease to digest than we cease to live.

CCCCLXIII.

It has been archly but severely remarked, that we begin only to give good advice to others when we are no longer able to mislead them by a bad example.

CCCCLXIV.

Life is a game at cards where we have two adversaries to contend with, and only one ally to assist us, and the issue of the game will depend not more on maintaining a good understanding with our partner than on the

means and opportunity we may have of deceiving and foiling our enemies.

CCCCLXV.

If national war be justifiable, it would be difficult to prove that duelling is not equally so: the only difference between the two species of warfare consisting in the number of individuals that are engaged.

CCCCLXVI.

If the extreme penalty of the law—that is to say, *no more* than death—be awarded to him who forcibly plunders your house, and aggravates his crime by murdering one or more of the family, there is an inconsistency, not to say injustice, in visiting duelling with the *same measure* of punishment, more especially when we consider that, as often as not, it takes place between mutual friends, and who are not the less so in consequence of having recourse to a step which either party considered unavoidable. I am aware it may be replied that the law on the subject of duelling is seldom carried into execution in its utmost rigour; but if the penalty annexed to the commission of any given offence

be seldom awarded, it is an admission that the penalty is not suitable to the offence: it holds out a temptation also to duplicity and perjury, and amounts to a mockery of justice, not to mention that the uncertainty of punishment, together with the reluctance to prosecute, and still greater reluctance to convict, operates in all cases as an encouragement to crime.

CCCCLXVII.

Gaming is neither resorted to by the rich because they can afford to lose, nor by the poor as a means of becoming rich; but gaming is the creature of idleness—it is an apology for employment, or, rather, it is an expedient we have recourse to in order to reconcile idleness with happiness.

CCCCLXVIII.

Gaming is an amusement which has no assignable duration—a journey, as it were, the end of which we are continually anticipating, but halt, where we may, on the road, we find ourselves as far from the object of our destination as when we set off: and with regard to its influence on the moral

character, it must not be forgotten that it is a pursuit strictly selfish, nor is it associated with any of the finer and more noble feelings of our nature.

CCCCLXIX.

The gratification of our ruling passion is the main business of our existence in a state of nature, and scarcely less so in a state of society; and the acquisition of wealth, which is the chief pursuit of civilized man, possesses no other charm than as affording the means (though indeed we may conceal it from ourselves) of gratifying our passions, but more especially that one which, being predominant in our nature, is commonly called the ruling passion—that is, the passion we always feel a desire to obey, and which we never fail to indulge in on every occasion where other considerations do not intervene to prevent it. All other pursuits, whether of a physical or intellectual nature, are only so many expedients or makeshifts for the sake of supplying to man the means of occupation, but which is always of a negative, and seldom of an interesting kind.

CCCCLXX.

As far as regards the preservation of our health, it may sometimes be expedient to anticipate nature in her intentions ; but we cannot be too careful not to interrupt or check her in the discharge of any of her functions. “ Forward ” is her motto, and like a racehorse she may sometimes require the spur, but seldom the bridle.

CCCCLXXI.

Pleasure and pain are in their nature strictly passive. We suffer pleasure as we suffer pain. Pleasure, to be pleasure, must wait upon us ; if we go after it, it is no longer pleasure, but business. The very act of pursuing pleasure diminishes at least its enjoyment ; nor is it always worth the sacrifice we may make in order to attain it.

CCCCLXXII.

No better reason can be assigned for our sleeping at night instead of the day, than it is one of the few things (so to say) we can see to do in the dark as well as in broad daylight. Sleeping, therefore, at night (because

sleep we *must* at one time or another) may be considered as so much time gained, and in this sense we may be said to make no inconsiderable addition to the length of our lives.

CCCCLXXIII.

Lying, which is only another word for deception, is such a matter-of-course and everyday practice, that we feel not the least ashamed of it on our own part; and on no occasion are we bound to believe more than we choose on the part of others: so capricious, however, and unreasonable is the code of honour, that if we feel any inclination to exchange a shot with another, we have only to tell him he is a liar, whether it be true or not. Is there much adherence to truth in the profession of the law? Are we not advised by the Bench to plead "not guilty," when the Court knows as well as ourselves that such is not the fact? Besides who can be a good diplomatist without being accomplished in the art of lying; and yet diplomacy is not considered an unworthy profession; so that though there is no disgrace in lying, it is nevertheless disgraceful to be told that we lie, and which in fact is

tantamount to the mistaken morality of the Spartans, with whom robbery was a virtue, and a crime only when detected.

CCCCLXXIV.

Life is a voyage, and death nothing more than returning to the spot from whence we set off.

CCCCLXXV.

Civilized life is a continual struggle between reason and duty on the one hand, and passion and interest on the other.

CCCCLXXVI.

The change from a state of affluence to a state of poverty is more to be apprehended than a change from poverty to affluence is to be desired ; for riches in themselves do not afford us so much pleasure as to feel the want of them occasions us disappointment and mortification. The art of acquiring riches is only a means of multiplying or creating to ourselves so many additional wants, and consequently, under any reverse of fortune, our privations must be increased accordingly. In a word—it is not possession

in itself which is a positive good, but the want of that we once possessed which is a positive evil.

CCCCLXXVII.

To consume the same quantity at one meal which we usually consume at three or four different meals, is not more unreasonable than the custom of uniformly going to bed and getting up again at the same hour, without reference to inclination or the ever-varying exigencies of the case. During the whole course of our lives it would be difficult even to imagine two given periods of equal duration, where nature, in both cases, required precisely the same amount of sleep.*

CCCCLXXVIII.

Sleep I consider to be nourishment or refreshment in no other sense than as facilitating the process of digestion, and the faculty of sleep might possibly have been

* The avocations of different individuals render it expedient, in almost every case, that they should not be in bed *after* a certain hour; but we are seldom under the necessity of going to bed uniformly at the same hour.

annexed to our existence for that express purpose—unless, indeed, we were to assume the converse, viz. that we were endowed with the faculty of eating and drinking for the purpose of promoting sleep; for one supposition is as reasonable as the other; and most certain it is that they are reciprocally necessary one to the other.

CCCCLXXIX.

He who urges his child to matrimony against her own free will and consent is accessory to the perpetration of a rape, or rather to a series of rapes.

CCCCLXXX.

Matrimony, *per se*, not being essential to the propagation of the species, it must be considered the consequence and effect, rather than the object, of matrimony; were it otherwise, a great portion of the male, and a still greater portion of the female sex, would be disqualified from being candidates for the matrimonial state.

CCCCLXXXI.

If land be real property, that is, property

par excellence, as distinguished from personal property, labour has a still higher title to be so considered, for what is land without cultivation?

CCCCLXXXII.

How can we presume to extend our protection to others if we are not capable of protecting ourselves?

CCCCLXXXIII.

Mankind, unlike to objects in the physical world, diminish as we approach them, and are sometimes found to be the converse of what they appeared to be at a distance.

CCCCLXXXIV.

Mankind slept as soundly before the invention of beds as they have done since, nor would there be less health in the world if the use of them were henceforth to be discontinued, or, at least, if they were only resorted to on certain occasions, and in cases of infirmity or old age. Persons are still to be found who exclaim against the progress of luxury, and stigmatize sofas, and even car-

riages, as unnecessary, if not criminal indulgences, for no other reason than because our ancestors lived and died without them, whilst these same persons feel no scruple themselves in making use of a bed, which they forget was itself an article of luxury, when first invented. I have never heard any argument of sufficient weight assigned for not consulting our ease by day as well as by night, whilst many arguments might be adduced in favour of so reasonable and harmless a practice—not to mention the general benefit that is hence derived to trade, and the encouragement thereby afforded to the ingenuity and capabilities of man.

CCCCLXXXV.

Nature has given us five senses—Science has superadded a sixth—the sense of music.

CCCCLXXXVI.

All books, of whatever kind or nature they may be, contain either matter of fact or matter of opinion, (—for there is no other hypothesis, unless we can imagine a book to be written for the express purpose of pub-

lishing what is notoriously false, and which, in its nature, would be a libel on the understanding of its readers—) of what is true in short, and of what may be partly one and partly the other, what is universally believed in the one case, and what is assumed as an article of faith in the other: nor do works of imagination form any exception to the truth of this remark, as they invariably take their data from nature, which is always and every where the same, and ever true to herself. The “Divine Legation” of Warburton, though all but true as far as argument can make it so, is nevertheless a speculative work; as also is Smith’s “Wealth of Nations,” though a standard work of its kind. On the other hand, Baron Munchausen, to produce a specimen of a work of imagination, would lose half its interest were its scenes not borrowed from nature, and so far may be considered as founded on fact. Newton’s “Principia” again, though read but by few, and understood by still fewer, nevertheless contains what is proved to be true on such evidence as admits of no difference of opinion, nor are we in the habit of attaching less credit to Voltaire’s account of the life of

Charles XII. though his narrative ~~may~~ rest upon testimony less conclusive than mathematical demonstration.

CCCCLXXXVII.

Impotent and unreasonable man!—so because thou possessest a large share of knowledge—immeasurably large as compared with that enjoyed by other and inferior animals—thou desirest to know still more; and thy desire of knowledge appears to increase in the ratio that thy wishes are gratified: so that, like a spoiled child, the faculties with which thou art endowed, supply rather the means of dissatisfaction than inspire thee with feeling of gratitude. Finite, limited, and (when I consider thy position and rank in reference to all created matter) insignificant as thou art, thou mightest well feel astonished at the stupendous powers and capabilities of the human mind, and the progress, however slow and gradual it may have been, which has already been made in the path of wisdom and knowledge, rather than be disappointed in not being able to span with the compass of thy understanding the immensity of the universe.

It is no less unreasonable in man to expect to be acquainted with those things that are concealed from his sight and out of the reach of his limited faculties, and do not admit even of being embraced by the utmost stretch of the imagination, than it would be in the horse that we ride to be acquainted with the character and attributes of man, and with every thing that appertains to the planet he inhabits. Well was it observed by Newton, that “ though he may have been fortunate in making a few more discoveries than his predecessors, still it appeared to him as if the broad ocean of truth still lay unexplored before him ;” and indeed, when we consider how little the wisest of us know, when compared with the inexhaustible resources of infinite wisdom, we may with truth exclaim with the heathen philosopher, “ There is one thing only of which I am not ignorant, *viz.* my want of knowledge.”

CCCCLXXXVIII.

Our sensual appetites—and sleep is one of the number—are so many beacons or land-marks which nature has erected to

guide us to health through the avenues of pleasure.

CCCCLXXXIX.

I have lived many years in the world, and hope to live many more, and for this reason—because my experience enables me to discover that, constituted as the world is in ninety and nine cases out of a hundred, we have no alternative but to choose between two evils: this is undoubtedly a misfortune, and cannot be too deeply deplored; but then comes the hundredth case, which, perhaps, is a positive good, and it is this positive good, added to the expectation of other windfalls, which not only indemnifies us for all that is past and all that we have suffered, but adds a premium to our future existence.

CCCCXC.

Ambition is like gaming—assign a limit to it, and it loses its character at once.

CCCCXCI.

Thousands pass through life without ever

thinking for themselves, and pass through life, as it were, in a state of perpetual and mental bondage. They are saved much trouble undoubtedly, and perhaps some unhappiness. In the beginning of life we of necessity adopt the opinions of others because we can have none of our own—opinions being the result of reflection grounded on experience: and as we grow up, if the shoe do not pinch us, we care not to change it. Besides, there are many, independently of those who are the professed adherents of a blind faction, who adopt opinions which they suppose to be their own, and only discover they have borrowed them of others when they are called upon to support them by argument.

..

CCCCXCII.

There is nothing more true than “to-morrow never comes.” We might say the same of happiness (as distinguished from pleasure); it has no personal identity—it is no sooner come than gone, and consists more in imagination than reality.

CCCCXCIII.

What a phenomenon would sleep appear to us were it not that habit renders it an object familiar to our sight. It is neither life nor death, but partakes of the nature of both. Death is extraordinary, perhaps not more so than life ; but sleep is more extraordinary than either !

CCCCXCIV.

Property is a creation within a creation, and, when secured on the basis of wise laws administered by impartial and incorruptible judges, is the parent of commerce and the mainspring of national prosperity ; it is the cause of some crime, but serves in a greater degree the cause of virtue.

CCCCXCV.

To see the triumphs of nature, go to America and gaze upon her mountains, her forests, and her rivers ;—for the prodigies of industry and art we must go to Europe, and reflect on the multiplication of power by steam and its almost universal application. Asia is remarkable for containing the

worn-out vestiges of ancient civilization, though beautiful even in a state of decay : and as to Africa, unless we are desirous of seeing human nature in her less inviting form, she will scarcely indemnify us for the trouble of a visit.

CCCCXCVI.

How many are there who covet additional power, forgetting that they are already kings within their own circle.

CCCCXCVII.

Sleep is the barometer of health.

CCCCXCVIII.

There are few passages in history that contain a finer moral than the following attributed to King John of France :—“ If good faith were banished from the earth, it should at least find refuge in the breast of kings.” It ought moreover to be added that on the occasion to which it refers, his practice corresponded with his doctrine.

CCCCXCIX.

The ascendancy which man has acquired

over the brute creation is owing not so much to the want of intellect on the part of the latter, or the superior cunning of the former, as to the disposition and capabilities which man possesses in a superior degree of associating with his kind, and uniting one with the other for the purposes of mutual protection. It is this principle of combination, so well exemplified in the well-known fable of the bundle of sticks, which is the principal source of the power of man, and gives him the supremacy in the animal world.

D.

To estimate the probabilities and improbabilities of success in the practical concerns of life by forming a just estimate of the extent of our means, whether physical or intellectual, is perhaps, of all sciences, the most useful, whilst there are few so difficult to attain.

DI.

“ Knowledge is power,” (says a high authority,) but not, it might be added, without the courage to use it ; not because knowledge—which in fact is only another word for experience—enables us to discover our own

superiority, but because it enables us to discover the weakness of others.

“ Who knows his rights,
And, knowing, dare maintain them.”*

DII.

We occasionally hear people complain of time flying too quickly, (as in the case of the school-boy at the termination of his holidays,) but more generally of time hanging too heavily on their hands. Now as we can scarcely conceive time itself (if such a thing indeed can be said to exist) to be a positive good, or a positive evil, without reference to other circumstances affecting our physical and intellectual existence, when therefore time appears to hang heavily on our hands, (which can be understood only in a metaphorical sense,) it is a proof that we have more wants than we have the means of satisfying ; and when it appears to pass quickly, or to *hang lightly*, as it were, on our hands, it is a proof that no want remains to be satisfied ; for on no occasion does time pass so quickly as when we are asleep, (so quickly indeed as

* Sir W. Jones.

to render us insensible to its progress,) because on no other occasion are our wants both physical and intellectual so amply and completely supplied—our bodies, when asleep, being no less secure against the privations of cold, hunger, and thirst, than our minds are relieved from the pressure of all worldly care and anxiety.

DIII.

If matrimony were made for the benefit of one sex more than the other, it was made for the benefit of woman—it is the condition on which she capitulates.

DIV.

Woman in marrying stakes her all in a single voyage—she has a distant port to reach, and time being an object with her, she runs all risk of wind and tide rather than not embark by the first vessel that sails.

DV.

To complain that time flies too quickly--which in fact is to complain that our happiness, or pleasure if you will, on any given

occasion is of too short duration—is no less unreasonable than to quarrel with our existence, because we cannot live as long as we like.

DVI.

Virtue is within our own control—talents are not.

DVII.

How many *figurantes* there are in the *corps-de-ballet* whose merits, though separately entitled to applause, are, notwithstanding, entirely overlooked by the gazing multitude; being eclipsed by the superior powers of some one or two individuals more prominent than the rest—so is it on the stage of life.

DVIII.

Thoughts are acts, and acts of the most imperishable kind; were it not so, Demosthenes may be said to have toiled in vain, and the philosopher of Ferney to have lived to the age of fourscore without having achieved anything for posterity.

DIX.

An insult has no intrinsic value, but like a horse, it is worth only what it will fetch.

DX.

In very many instances in life there is a virtual understanding which has all the validity of custom in some cases, and of duty in others. Who would think, what honourable man at least would think of travelling by a stage without remunerating the coachman—(and which, though it be not a right, such is the force of custom, is scarcely considered a favour—) and dining at a tavern without thinking of the waiter, although we know him to be the servant of another, and whose trade is often so flourishing as not unfrequently to make it worth his while to purchase his own servitude.*

DXI.

Life is a market which is supplied with

* Well was it observed by Lady Mary Wortly Montague, “we make laws but follow customs.”

everything necessary and much that is desirable; and as every thing that is there provided has been produced by labour, so it is only with labour, or its representative, they are to be purchased.

DXII.

If I were at a loss for a rule of conduct, there is no consideration which would have greater weight with me than the heavy responsibility (were it only in a political sense,) which attaches to the higher orders of society, and which increases in the exact ratio of the means they may possess of doing good or harm.

DXIII.

The lower orders of society cannot but be considered, in the most enlarged sense of the term, as so many children looking up to those above them for instruction, example, and support.

DXIV.

Hope and fear are innate and co-eval with our existence; hence it is that though nothing has a more powerful influence than love so

long as it lasts, yet hope and fear being of a more permanent nature and universally felt, have in all ages and on all occasions been appealed to as affording the most efficient means by which mankind, as a whole, can be governed.

DXV.

Health, as far as it depends on nourishment, whether it be in the shape of food or sleep, consists mainly in the gratification of our natural desires, (gratifying them, I mean, to their full extent without abusing them by exceeding the just limits which have been assigned to them by nature,)—I say *natural* desires as distinguished from those stimulants and cathartics in the due application of which the whole mystery of medicine consists, and which may be useful on occasions, but which, as offering in their very nature a certain degree of violence to the constitution, are only to be resorted to as a last resource.

DXVI.

“*Status naturæ status belli*,” (which, like other dogmas, has obtained credence in the world,) in its literal sense is not true, and, if

it be true in any sense, is true only as applied to our social capacity.—Who ever heard of war amongst a flock of sheep?

DXVII.

If fear would only allow us time enough to ask ourselves this question—What is the worst that can happen?—but fear never reasons—

DXVIII.

If to administer to the pleasures of others be not an impulse of our nature, to inflict pain is, if possible, still less so: indeed, so abhorrent is it from our feelings, that it generally happens the pain we inflict on others recoils in the same degree upon ourselves.

DXIX.

The alternate succession of winter and summer enhances the value of both; for winter is so far from being an evil, that its approach is to be desired were it for no other reason than as it affords the means of appre-

ciating the luxury of a fire, which would still be a luxury though fuel were as plentiful as water.

DXX.

Whilst there is nothing of so much importance to the parties concerned, so is there nothing so much a matter of indifference to the world at large, as those events of every day occurrence, births, marriages, and deaths. Scarcely a street can we walk in, any day or during any hour of the day, where the tragedy of death is not being performed; whilst others, again, are marching into existence to supply the place of those who are taking their departure. The street, however, itself, parade it when you may, from one end of the year to the other wears the same appearance, and the throng which frequents it appears to be neither increased nor diminished; and mankind at large, see them when you will, appear to be following their ordinary pursuits without any visible interruption. Thus, whilst nations and individuals rise and fall, flourish and decay day after day and year after year,

the world itself pursues its uninterrupted career without any visible or ostensible change—like the Ganges, which an hundred years hence will be the same river as it is to day, though the waters of which it is composed are continually being changed, and pass by us in endless succession.

DXXI.

We are bound to respect the feelings of others, though we may be incapable of returning their affection; nor ought we to forget that we cannot be loved without having at least one in the world who takes an interest in our welfare.

DXXII.

If moderation and forbearance be a mark of wisdom on the part of those who are possessed of authority, it is no less incumbent upon those whose duty is obedience, not to take advantage of the confidence reposed in them. The temptation to abuse is at least as great on one side as it is on the other, and, consequently, a successful resistance in

either case is entitled to the same degree of merit.

DXXIII.

Penal laws—and what laws are not so?—as far as they regard the upper classes of society, may be considered a dead letter.

DXXIV.

There are a thousand different degrees of insanity; the ruling passion of every one, as being the least under his own controul, may be considered a species of insanity; and well was it observed by a witness* of no mean authority in such cases, on a recent trial—“There is no one of perfectly sound mind except the Deity.”

DXXV.

Hope and fear constitute the very essence of love, and are as necessary to its existence as oil is to the lamp—hence it is,

* Haslam.

that in the married state it often burns too dimly.

DXXVI.

Friendship is like water of a genial and agreeable warmth.—Love is like the same element when it is too hot for use.

DXXVII.

There was a time when the State stood more in need of the Church than the Church of the State; but if the child should now have outgrown the parent, it is no reason why she should commit an act of treasonable rebellion against one to whom she was indebted for protection in her youth, and to whom civilization owes so much.

DXXVIII.

It requires a greater degree of courage to fight a duel than to be present at a general engagement where an hundred thousand men may be arrayed against us, because in the former we are the only object of attack; but there are many other occasions in life where a far greater degree of courage is re-

quired than on either of the former: besides, it is not one solitary and insulated act, but that general and uniform intrepidity of character, the graceful surrender of our interest when occasion may require it, acts of self-denial in the face of opposing temptation, and going against the stream of public opinion when duty interposes, which ought rather to claim the respect of mankind whilst it affords to society the best security for our conduct.

DXXIX.

It cannot be that man, so courageous on other occasions, should tremble in the presence of that than which there is scarcely any object more familiar to our sight, whether it be in the shape of the autumnal leaf or the pheasant, scarcely less beautiful in death than when alive, and what we moreover know from our birth to be the common lot of humanity. The most courageous of us, I admit, may fear the contingency of danger and pain; but death itself, so far from being either danger and pain, is the best security against them.

DXXX.

The man who conscientiously denies the divinity of Christ, but whose conduct is based on the morality of the Gospel, is a far more respectable character than he who is a Christian by profession, but an unbeliever in practice, inasmuch as we are accountable for our actions ; but belief or infidelity being a matter in which our will is not concerned, it were unreasonable to make us responsible for what we cannot help.

DXXXI.

We cannot but admire the wisdom and benevolence of Providence in having provided certain animals with a covering of hair or fur, and others with feathers and scales, which, whilst it adds to their beauty, equally protects them from the extremes of heat as of cold, and defends them who are less capable of providing shelter for themselves from the inclemency and vicissitudes of the season ; and but for which covering, it is obvious they would be exposed to a thousand

accidents and inconveniences ; and life, instead of being a state of enjoyment and security, would be one continued scene of anxiety, privation, and disquietude. Even as far as regards the human species, the same wise and benevolent attention to our wants and necessities is discernible ; for the head, which is the more prominent and exposed, and, I may say, the more vital part of the human frame, is covered and protected with hair, which, unlike the other parts of the body, is insensible to pain, and the extremities of our hands and feet are armed with a substance which is equally devoid of feeling.

DXXXII.

There are emergencies in life where not a moment is to be lost, and every thing depends on promptitude and decision : in other cases, where passion intervenes to obscure our judgement, let one night at least pass over our head before we commit an act it may be afterwards too late to recall.

DXXXIII.

Punishing for cowardice is punishing for being human, or, rather, for being no more than human—it is punishing the creature for the sins of the Creator.

DXXXIV.

To do as we would be done by, whilst it is no less remarkable for its simplicity than it is a proof of the profound and comprehensive mind from which it emanated, is the only rule, in the moral world at least, of such universal application as to admit of no exception. It is, so to say, “the head and front” of morality, the *beau ideal* of equity, and the very essence of human wisdom. It is, moreover, the basis of all human legislation, because all penal laws, which will gradually become relaxed as this precept becomes better understood and more generally acted upon, are resolvable into this identical principle. A thousand philosophers may write for a thousand years to come, and they will in vain attempt to lay down any more complete or satisfactory rule of action, or in-

vent a more perfect standard of virtue. It is that *desideratum* which has been the object of so much inquiry and research, with the best and wisest of mankind, in all ages and countries—that infallible criterion of right and wrong from whose decision there is no appeal, and which is so plain and intelligible that it cannot be misunderstood even by the most ignorant and unlearned. It has already stood the test of upwards of seventeen centuries, and no succeeding generation is likely to impeach the soundness of the doctrine, or to call in question its practical utility. It is the focus in which all morality centres; and had Christ left no other legacy to the world, he still would have ranked amongst those who had deserved best of mankind—nay, taking into the account that he not only practised what he taught, but died in vindication of his own doctrines, he would still have been handed down to posterity as the greatest and most disinterested benefactor to man that ever appeared upon earth.

DXXXV.

It is fortunate for us we cannot choose our

parents, or those whose duty it is to superintend our education; for even assuming that we were old enough to have an opinion of our own, how is it possible for us at any age to be an impartial and disinterested judge in our own cause?

DXXXVI.

The love of personal liberty is a natural instinct—the love of power may also be natural to man, but it is developed only and called into existence in a state of society, and assumes either the name of vice or virtue, as man may use it for the benefit, or misapply it to the injury of others.

DXXXVII.

We talk as familiarly of fire when speaking on military matters, as if soldiers fought with that element instead of the ordinary weapons of warfare. Many have been destroyed by fire in their own houses, but I never heard of any one being burnt to death on the field of battle.

DXXXVIII.

What an absurdity to believe in the truth of nothing but what is within the compass of our finite understandings, or submitted to the testimony of our senses. At the same time the improbability of a thing, it must be admitted, is itself presumptive evidence against its credibility.

DXXXIX.

Power is, in no instance, the property of him who possesses it, but it is property which we hold in trust for the benefit of others.

DXL.

The mind never dies because it was never born, unless we are prepared to say that it is contemporaneous with our bodies; but in that case how can it be eternal, because eternity extends both ways, having neither beginning nor end. It may be doubted, indeed, whether it ever sleeps, for if we are not conscious of dreaming, it proves nothing beyond an act of forgetfulness.

DXLI.

The mind, figuratively speaking, has all the properties of the body—it eats, drinks, sleeps, absorbs, secretes, and digests: it has pains and pleasures, as has the body, peculiar to itself; and exercise and repose, on certain occasions, are no less beneficial to the one than the other. They arrive at maturity together, and decay and infirmity no sooner overtake the one, than the other (as, for instance, in the event of loss of memory*) begins to show some unequivocal symptoms of its declining powers.

DXLII.

Religion—such a religion, I mean, as is based on the assumption of a future state of rewards and punishments, (for to suppose it impossible for any one to be religious in any other sense of the word, without being in-

* Though in other instances it must be admitted that the powers of the mind appear to sustain but little injury by the influence of time as compared with those of the body.

fluenced on the one hand by the mercenary hope of reward, and on the other by a servile fear of punishment, were a reproach and insult to humanity and common sense)—will be necessary—necessary did I say? rather ought I to have said expedient—for man, until he be sufficiently enlightened to know that it is truly and positively, without any disguise, collusion, or equivocation, the interest of mankind, that is to say, their best policy, to be virtuous—even with regard to his worldly concerns, and his happiness and welfare in every sense of the word.

DXLIII.

Such is the force of imagination, that we continue to fear long after the cause which produced the fear has ceased to exist. Who is there that has met his schoolmaster in after-life who does not feel himself, as it were, spell-bound in his presence?

DXLIV.

There is one sort of courage, if such it can be called, which is the effect of inexperience, as there is another sort which is derived from

experience—an infant would feel no scruples in playing even on the very brink of a volcano, whereas a grown man would have to “screw up his courage to the sticking place” to approach within an hundred yards of it.

DXLV.

“*Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore*”—said the heathen moralist. The Christian subscribes to the same doctrine as a rule of action, though he is influenced by a different motive.

DXLVI.

The charm of composition (as far as regards works of imagination) consists in this—the thought or idea comes to us how and whence we know not : on other occasions we are obliged to go after it.

DXLVII.

In all political convulsions where government for a time is suspended, courage will go first—then talent ; but if the same individual possess both these qualities, more especially if he be able to draw for his supplies

on virtue, he will and must, and, what is more, he *ought* to triumph.*

DXLVIII.

If we had not the opportunity of communicating our thoughts personally, or at least through the intervention of writing, the acquisition of knowledge would be as useless to others as it would be burdensome to ourselves.

DXLIX.

Love is the lonely inhabitant of the wilderness. Nursed in the lap of liberty, and nourished with the dews of heaven, she is never more healthful, vigorous, and beautiful, than when allowed to flourish undisturbed in

* Had Napoleon rested his political climax on the occasion of his alliance with the proud daughter of Cæsar's illustrious line, and from that period had turned his attention to the consolidation of conquests already achieved, in all probability he would have died on the throne of France, and would have spared his imperial father-in-law the ill-grace of taking any part in accelerating the downfall of the husband of his own daughter.

her native desert. She spurns all ties but those of her own creation, and starts at the very idea of human control, knowing full well that she possesses a spell of her own more powerful than all moral obligations. Let but the spectre of worldly power once presume to intrude upon her sanctuary, and to arraign her hitherto undisputed supremacy, and you may see her delicate and sensitive form shrink aghast from the foul contagion of mortal contact. She may not, perhaps she cannot love the less, but seeing a strange and unwelcome being in human form, interpose between herself and what hitherto, through the distorted vision of her brain, she had conceived to be her lawful prey, and her own undivided possession, she disdains henceforth to hold any thing in common with, or be a party to any compromise with authority of human invention, and while she kisses the hand (aye! such devotion is not of rare occurrence) that is raised against her in the cruel and unmanly exercise of a right which man, to gratify his lust of arbitrary power, has conferred upon himself, she withers, fades, and dies

under the baneful influence of a hapless and an ill-requited passion—leaving only behind her the remembrance of those blessings she has so often implored for him who, though so little deserving, was dearer to her than life,—him the first object of her thoughts on awaking, and the last before she closed her eyes—him, who absent or present, was equally the idol of her heart, the companion of her loneliness, the tutelary genius of the place, wherever she might be, and the subject of her daily prayers.

DL.

Public opinion—that sprite that is felt, but is not seen—that is here, there, and every-where, and yet nowhere to be found—that cameleon of a thousand dies—that steam-engine of incalculable power—that lever that is capable of every thing short of transposing the order of the universe—the invention of man, and yet his most inexorable task-master !

DII.

War is in most cases only another word

for a duel, in which the seconds are principals, and the principals seconds.*

DLII.

We invite a guest to our house; and no sooner is she arrived than we lock the door upon her, and throw the key out of the window—we begin by fondling and petting her, but six months have scarcely elapsed but some cause of dissatisfaction arises: we bid her begone with no less ceremony than we discharged another of our dependents the day before. She reminds us of our invitation, one of the conditions being that her departure be postponed *sine die*, added to which the key of the door is nowhere to be found. It occurs to us, however, that the door will open from without, though not from within, and we feel inclined to invite other company, but on further consideration, decency and religion forbid it: thus we find ourselves

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* The meaning of the author will be rendered more intelligible by supposing, in the event of war, the ruling power of the state to be the principal, and the hired soldier the second.

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driven into a corner, all retreat being cut off. We are no longer masters in our own house, but find ourselves living with a demon in human guise “who is come to torment us before the time,” and upon whom we cannot set eyes without being reminded of our misery as we are of a corn every time that we set our foot to the ground. As for herself (if she has not been fortunate enough to please us, for it is scarcely credible that she would intentionally offend her fellow-prisoner), she derives a secret satisfaction in seeing herself the cause of our uneasiness ;* and if she be not happy, she at least consoles herself that, on the whole, she is less to be pitied than him who continues to be her host in spite of himself—such is matrimony.

* Influence is everything with women. When their own affections are deeply engaged, they themselves are under the influence of a superior power ; but the love of influencing others still exists in the same degree, though it may be superseded for a time by other feelings of a more potent nature. Govern they must, and if they cannot govern by love, which is their own peculiar weapon, they will govern by any means rather than not govern at all.

DLIII.

There is no society, properly so called, but that of our equals, at the same time there are few who do not prefer the society of those who are low enough to be obsequious, or too high to be objects of envy.

DLIV.

Coyness is like the ebb and flow of the sea—it knows not which way to go.

DLV.

There is a saying abroad, “He is a wise child who knows his own father”—the father who knows his own child is scarcely less so: in either case it must be taken on credit.

DLVI.

There is but one step from the most prudish and fastidious refinement to the grossest licentiousness; as was instanced in the most polished court of the world at the period preceding the revolution of 1789. The state of society at that period was such that the most immoral conceptions, veiled only by a

covering of so fine a texture as to be almost transparent, were bandied about even by females with the most unblushing effrontery, which affords a farther attestation of the truth of the proverb, viz. “ extremes meet.”

DLVII.

Education without experience is like a pack of cards in the hands of a savage.

DLVIII.

We seldom reflect that the ties between parent and child are not less binding and indissoluble than those between husband and wife: they cannot be dissolved by mutual consent, but must (under ordinary circumstances) continue to exist until death shall invalidate the contract, whereas agreement between master and servant, partnerships in trade, treaties of alliance, and other such conventional ties, may, by mutual consent, be adopted and abandoned at pleasure.

DLIX.

As far as disease may depend on the agency of moral causes, it is quite obvious that the

faculty can do nothing for us but in the shape of palliative or restorative, (not that I under-rate their efficacy, for we ought to think ourselves fortunate in being able to command even that resource,) because, in the nature of things, it is evident they have no other rule to follow than the consideration of those *secondary* causes which are termed symptoms.

DLX.

As well might we expect corns to disappear from amongst a people who are in the habit of wearing shoes as to suppose that medicine in itself has the power of eradicating disease so long as we are exposed to the influence of moral causes.

DLXI.

The fatality of the Mahometans is the providence of the Christians.

DLXII.

There is no instance on record where the prospective joys of heaven have overpowered the reasoning faculties of man, though the mere

apprehension of distant and future punishment has been known, in too many instances, to produce the most distressing effects on those of too sensitive and desponding a temperament.

DLXIII.

In nine cases out of ten where disagreements arise, both parties are in the wrong, though self-love so blinds us that few have the candour and generosity to avow their own errors. This circumstance, whilst it furnishes one reason in favour of mutual concession and forgiveness, furnishes at the same time *two* reasons for avoiding the recurrence of future dissension.

DLXIV.

Vocal music is either superior or inferior to instrumental: if superior, why does it borrow any aid from the orchestra? if inferior, why does it attempt to vie with a dangerous rival?

DLXV.

Actors are more indebted to Shakespear

than Shakespear is to them, and yet how often it happens that, in lavishing our encomiums on him who personates an ideal character on the stage, the talents and genius of the mind which created such imaginary beings are entirely overlooked; it were scarcely less absurd to compliment the fiddlestick that makes us acquainted with an overture of Mozart, or to transfer all the merit of the Parthenon from the head that designed it, to the day labourers who were employed in placing one stone above another. •

DLXVI.

Why do we go to the theatre to see an imperfect copy of a tragedy or comedy when we can see so many real ones at home?

DLXVII.

As the principle of finding its own level is an inherent property in water, so our health mainly consists in the gratification of our natural desires without falling short of them on the one hand, or exceeding them on the other.

DLXVIII.

“ Good intentions” is the best horse I have in my stable. Age makes no sensible alteration in his appearance; and though no horse has done more work in his time, he is as fresh on his legs as when he first came into my possession; and while others are sneaking about through by-roads and dirty lanes to avoid a gate or a fence, “ good intentions” swerves not to the right or to the left, but carries us gallantly along, surmounting every obstacle that comes in his way, and if he be not so brilliant as many, he is at least more sure-footed.

DLXIX.

It has been truly observed that there is no love without jealousy; but jealousy on the other hand, or something very much like it, may occasionally be found where love does not exist. It would appear that we envy others the possession of that to which we feel we have a greater claim, though we may not appreciate its value.

DLXX.

Were the laws against duelling abolished, there would not be one litigation the more—were the penalty, as at present existing, increased tenfold, there would not be one litigation the less.*

DLXXI.

Public opinion is law, and yet more than law—it is, as it were, “vigour beyond the law;” nor is it public opinion *per se* (if such a thing there be), but the prevailing opinion of the age and country we live in, that gives efficiency to law, and secures for it a ready and willing obedience. The external and fundamental principles of justice are unchangeable in their nature; at the same time, what is expedient at one time may not be so at another; and a law which has outgrown the circumstances which gave it birth, is

* This, indeed, holds good of all laws which are not based on the sanction of public opinion, and which are every day violated with impunity by those whose example is likely to have an extensive influence.

worse than nothing—it is a mockery of justice.

DLXXII.

Politics has nothing in common with morality ; and party, in the political sense of the term, is doing wrong in order to obtain a greater good.

DLXXIII.

“ Knowledge is power,” we are told : but what would be the use of that power did we not possess the courage to turn it to account, which is equally the effect of knowledge. Ignorance is no nearer allied to fear than is knowledge to courage. It is fear arising from ignorance that occasions the horse to fall an easy prey to his inferior in strength—it is courage arising from knowledge that induces man to engage in so unequal a contest.

DLXXIV.

Speaking is acting, with this difference only—the one may lie, the other cannot.

DLXXV.

There is an inconsistency in the queen being the only woman in her own dominions having a share in the legislation, or, perhaps, a greater inconsistency in ninety-nine out of an hundred of her sex having none.

DLXXVI.

The well-bred man may be known by this—he will show no more servility to his superiors, and no less affability to his inferiors, than he would to those whose position in society is equal to his own.

DLXXVII.

If one thing more than another distinguishes the man of the world, it is this—he appears as much at home with a stranger as if he had known him twenty years, and no more intimate with one whom he had known twenty years than if he had known him only as many hours.

DLXXVIII.

Property, under any form of government,

is sure to turn the scale in its own favour whether or not it may have a direct voice in the council of the nation. What a Babel is London! and yet, were it not for money, there is not one in a thousand who would take the trouble of setting one foot before another.

DLXXIX.

Where there is too great disparity of rank, the superior ceases to be an object of envy with the inferior, the object of every man's ambition not being to attain the summit of the hill, so much as that grade immediately preceding his own in the social scale. Thus, for instance, a king is seldom envied by his subjects, and a general by his army, but the master will be envied by the journeyman, and the journeyman by the apprentice—the servant out of livery by him who still wears the badge of servitude—the captain by the subaltern officers—and the marquis, though he be an object of envy with the peer below him in the order of precedence, is no less desirous himself of rising a step higher in that class of the community to which he belongs.

DLXXX.

There is more mind than body in love—it partakes of the *morale* more than the *physique*. It is not the form or feature itself, but the character or expression of a feature as conveyed to the “mind’s eye” which captivates our hearts. Hence it may happen that the less we know of others the more we may love them; and the only difference between love at first sight and love of a longer standing is that in the latter case we are put in possession of what in the former case we only take upon credit.

DLXXXI.

The ease of manner that distinguishes the foreigner as compared with the Englishman arises from this—the Englishman avoids our acquaintance until we produce our credentials; the more accessible foreigner pre-supposes our respectability whether man or woman, and discounts our bills at sight.

DLXXXII.

We may unite two bodies, but we cannot unite two minds: on the other hand, if two

minds are already united, it is not matrimony that can make them more so.

DLXXXIII.

By serving our country, we are serving ourselves; every individual in it being, as it were, part of that country—what, in short, is any nation but a multiple of one?

DLXXXIV.

In the married state husband and wife are so identified with each other, that it is no more possible for one of the parties to be happy and the other unhappy than it is possible for the same individual to be happy and unhappy at one and the same moment.

DLXXXV.

Women are in one sense our superiors, in another sense our inferiors—in no sense our equals.

DLXXXVI.

Life is more valuable than liberty (political liberty), and property is more valuable than either; because life may be enjoyed even in a state of slavery as well as out of it, but

who is there who would not risk his life, be it ever so dear to him, in defence of his property. Hence that form of government must be acknowledged to be the most perfect, in theory, under which we enjoy the greatest amount of civil privileges at the least possible expense of our natural rights; but, practically, that is the best which, with or without liberty, affords the greatest security to person and property.

DLXXXVII.

Every one has heard of a daily auction, but there is an auction which is held both night and day, regardless alike of time and place,—it is an auction where the lots to be put up are men and women, and the name of the auctioneer is Fortune.

DLXXXVIII.

It costs us nearly a whole life in endeavouring to supply the deficiencies of our earlier education, or in discarding, or rather endeavouring to unravel and erase from our minds those parts which our maturer judgement disapproves—in a word (such is the

force of early habit) a longer time is often necessary to uneducate than to educate ourselves, or rather, shall I say, to educate ourselves anew: and no man is qualified to act a decided part on the stage of life until, like the lobster changing his shell, the snake his skin, and the rein-deer his antlers, he has abandoned the prejudices he may have contracted in his youth, and adopted such principles as may be the result of his own conviction.

DLXXXIX.

Death is represented by some heathen writer as a *privilege* which even the gods themselves do not enjoy. In the teeth of such a saying as this, does the Christian fear to die!*

DXC.

The very circumstance of our being more

* It is the apprehension that they *may not* enjoy a state of future happiness that makes the best of Christians hesitate to die. Were we certain of having something to gain after this world, then indeed we should no more regret to die than the Heathen, who was as certain of having nothing to lose.

alive to the impressions of moral and physical evil than we are to moral and physical good, is at least a proof that we are less accustomed to the one than the other—in other words, that in comparing the amount of the one with the amount of the other, the balance is in favour of the latter.

DXCI.

The press has been charged with inflaming the passions—undoubtedly—but there are good passions in the world as well as bad; and so long as public opinion is allowed to take a wide and extended range, and to provoke discussion and argument by the assumption of opposite principles, the press, as a whole, is the minister of truth.

DXCII.

Matrimony is a die on which we stake our all—it is an occasion on which our own experience may be of use to others, but can be of none to ourselves.

DXCIII.

If society discard me, I shall feel no

regret in returning to my native woods, there to breathe again the fresh air of heaven, and to enjoy in common with its wild inhabitants (whom I disdain not to call my fellow-creatures) that unbounded liberty and boisterous exuberance of health, which is at least their inalienable birth-right, and enjoyed by them in a greater degree than by man, however improved may be his social condition.

DXCIV.

Books are like those who make them—as there are few which are worth reading through, so there are few from which something may not be gained.

DXCV.

There is nothing that would be so useful to mankind in general, yet (constituted as is human nature) nothing so little to be desired as the power of foreseeing future events.

DXCVI.

There is a species of daily bread which we receive without asking for it, and which we are eating and drinking day and night,

and eating and drinking too without even the trouble of feeding ourselves—it is the manna that is showered down upon us in the wilderness—the supply is as inexhaustible as the waters of the ocean: we may feast on it perpetually, and yet the quantity is not diminished; it is an article of consumption that is no less adapted to the taste of all than it is attainable by the humblest individual; and so essential is it to our health, nay, to our very existence, that nourishment of any and every other kind were useless and inefficacious without it: in doors and out of doors, sitting, or walking, in bed and out of bed, we partake of it with unabated appetite; and though indulged in at all hours from our earliest infancy to the latest moment of our existence, it has never been known to pall upon the appetite, or produce satiety and disgust. We have more than sufficient for our wants, and yet we cannot dispose of what is superfluous to ourselves: it is strictly a gratuitous gift of nature, if indeed that can be called a gift which we are not allowed to refuse. It is the condition of

our being, and the charter of our existence, and without it we should not even be able to articulate the word—air.

DXCVII.

Mankind are not naturally disposed to resist authority *as such* out of a wanton spirit of opposition—all that we object to is to be *badly* governed: in other words, it is painful to our feelings to be compelled to obey those whom we consider ourselves more qualified to command.

DXCVIII.

It has been well observed that theatrical representations possess no other interest than as they remind us of some circumstances or events that have befallen ourselves, and that there are few who would not turn their backs upon the best tragedy of Shakespear to witness a public execution in the streets.

DXCIX.

It is as well to look at a man twice before

you come to a determination to knock him down ; but once down, it is your own fault if you do not keep him there.

DC.

Let a law or principle be once violated in the case of any particular individual, and a shock is given to the whole fabric of society.

DCI.

Amongst nations as well as individuals, there is an *esprit de corps* which unites against a common enemy parties that may otherwise be hostile to each other—as is the case with religious sects, each of which striving to be uppermost, are nevertheless all united in opposition to that sect or prescribed faith which is supported by the state ; and, in politics, those parties generally most opposed to each other have been known to coalesce when threatened by any danger from a foreign foe.

DCII.

Every season has its uses and charms, if we may believe the author of the “ Seasons ;”

at the same time when the cold and comfortless winter months arrive,—when nature, whichever way we turn our eyes, presents a dreary and desolate aspect,—when the earth is bound up as it were in icy fetters, and the sharp searching winds are scarcely a less evil to the rich than the poor,—how cheering, under these circumstances, is the consideration that in the other hemisphere our fellow creatures, inhabitants of the same globe as ourselves, are enjoying all the luxury of summer, which is gone astray, but is not lost, and that its very absence will be the means of our enjoying it the more when it returns : how reviving and consolatory to anticipate its return, and to feel sure that it is already set off to meet us ; that nothing can check or arrest its progress ; whilst every successive day, nay, every successive hour, it is approaching nearer to us ; and the world appears to turn so quickly around the sun, that the winter no sooner comes than goes.

DCIII.

A case is submitted to counsel ; counsel of equal eminence are consulted on the part of

the respondents, and the opinion on either side is given in favour of the consulting party: what, then, are we to infer from this coincidence? That the lawyers are dishonest? impossible! Fools, then? Nothing less likely. No! we are bound to conclude that like wise and humane judges, in cases of crime, they gave, respectively, the benefit of the *doubt* to John Doe and Richard Roe.*

DCIV.

Man is the only animal that takes exercise for its own sake, and we often go abroad for no other reason than because we are tired of staying within.†

* According to the interpretation, as lately given by the law-officers of the crown, of the Act relating to the establishment of joint-stock banks of deposit within a certain distance of London, it would appear that the public have deprived themselves of a valuable privilege for several years past under a misconception of a law of their own making. If people will allow themselves to be turned out of their own houses without making resistance, what pity do they deserve!

† A select Committee of the House, whose talents are only equalled by their humanity, is now sitting—hear it, ye shades of the rotten Boroughs!—not on corn, com-

merce, and the currency, but on "Public Walks," (alias *Landscape Gardening*.) Who would have supposed that the labours of the Reformed Parliament, (deluge the second !) in their very first session, would have been directed to so useful and important a result as the creation of "Public Walks," intended of course for the benefit of those who prefer staying at home to being soaked in a shower of rain. Why, it reminds us of the bandy-legged gentleman who had rendered himself so obnoxious to their highnesses of Almacks, that they resolved to get rid of him by forbidding any one in future to appear at their ball except in breeches. Now, as gentlemen are no less tenacious than the other sex of the "form and pressure" of those gifts of nature which are no less ornamental than useful, the decree was obeyed on the following Wednesday by every one (*bandy-leg* with the rest) appearing in pantaloons; their highnesses being thus reduced to the alternative of dissolving the meeting, or receiving the gentlemen without breeches. Asking pardon for culling a blackberry that lay in our way, we return to the "walks" of the "public," — public walks!—"God save the mark!" just as if every street in the metropolis, and every avenue out of it, was not a "public walk." We have heard of the cloisters of the Peripatetics; we have heard of the public walks at Oxford, which are occasionally crossed by accident; we have heard also of those at Cambridge, which are as little frequented; but this is the first time we ever heard of "public walks" for the *contemplative* citizens of London. What next! — why a few months hence we shall hear of another Committee

on "Private Walks." How well-timed, too, is this display of our tender mercies!—" *Pauvre peuple! peuple vertueux!*" — we never dreamt of the thing until rail-ways and steam-boats offered to carry us over the moon in a trice, charging us for the ride *less* * than nothing. After such a display of wisdom as this on the part of those to whom we have entrusted the care of every thing that is dear to us, even as far as regards a ruddy cheek and a more buxom appearance, can we wonder any longer at the prevailing mania of building brick walls in order to make us a more religious people, or have we a right any longer to tax the good sense of the Russian Czar, who began the work of civilization in his own dominions by shaving the beards of his subjects? — *The Report of the Committee on "Public Walks" has already appeared in the public journals.*

* Such was the spirit of rivalry at one time on the Brighton road on the part of the coach proprietors, that no sooner had one coach started which conveyed the passengers *gratis*, than another was set on foot which not only took them *gratis*, but gave them a dinner in the bargain.

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